The Packaging Puzzle. An Investigation into the Income and Care Packages of the Belgian Eldery Population. by Verpoorten, Rika
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN 
The packaging puzzle  
 
An investigation into the Income and Care 
Packages of the Belgian Elderly Population 
 
 
Rika VERPOORTEN 
Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de 
graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. J. Berghman+ 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. W. van Oorschot 
Copromotor: Em. Prof. Dr. J. Billiet 
Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek 
Nr. 276 
2015 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN 
The packaging puzzle  
 
An Investigation into the Income and Care 
Packages of the Belgian Elderly Population 
 
Rika VERPOORTEN 
Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de 
graad van Doctor in de Sociale Wetenschappen 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. J. Berghman+ 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. W. van Oorschot 
Copromotor: Em. Prof. Dr. J. Billiet 
Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek 
2015 
Samenstelling van de examencommissie: 
Prof. Dr. Rudi Laermans (voorzitter) 
Prof. Dr. Jos Berghman+ (promotor) 
Prof. Dr. Wim van Oorschot (promotor) 
Em. Prof. Dr. Jaak Billiet (copromotor) 
Em. Prof. Dr. Jef Breda [Universiteit van Antwerpen] 
Prof. Dr. Anja Declercq 
Prof. Dr. Jozef Pacolet  
Dr. Lieve Vanderleyden [Studiedienst Vlaamse Regering] 
  
 De verantwoordelijkheid voor de ingenomen standpunten berust alleen bij de auteur. 
Gepubliceerd door: 
Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen   -   Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek 
[CeSO], KU Leuven, Parkstraat 45  bus 3601 - 3000 Leuven, België. 
 2015 by the author. 
Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming 
van de auteur / No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing 
from the author. 
D/2015/8978/10 
 
i 
CONTENT 
Acknowledgments vii 
Disclaimer ix 
List of tables x 
List of figures xviii 
Abbreviations xx 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
1. The context: Population ageing 2 
1.1 Recent trends in population ageing 2 
1.2 Increasing importance of old age related social risks 4 
2. SOS old age: Protection against old age related social risks 7 
3. Main research questions and hypotheses 8 
4. Research design 10 
5. Outline of the study 10 
 
CHAPTER 2. THE PACKAGING PUZZLE 13 
1. The packaging approach as the basic theoretical framework 14 
1.1 The basics: claims, rewards and institutional spheres 15 
1.1.1 Claims 15 
1.1.2 Three institutional spheres 15 
1.1.3 Rewards and claim packages 17 
1.2 Critical reflections on the packaging theory 19 
2. Applying the packaging approach to old age protection 20 
2.1 Claims 21 
2.2 Three institutional spheres 21 
2.3 The rewards: the old age income and care package 23 
3. Conclusion 24 
 
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPLORATION OF THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 27 
1. General insights 28 
2. Exploring the potential income package components within the Belgian context 31 
2.1 Public pension protection 31 
2.1.1 Public retirement pension 32 
2.1.2 Minimum retirement pension and minimum right per year worked 34 
2.1.3 Public survivor pension 35 
2.1.4 Holiday allowance 35 
2.1.5 Public minimum income protection 36 
2.1.6 Some facts and figures on the Belgian public pension protection 36 
ii 
2.2 Occupational pension protection 37 
2.2.1 Occupational pension protection for retired employees 37 
2.2.2 Occupational pension protection for retired self-employed persons 39 
2.2.3 Some facts and figures on the Belgian occupational pension protection 39 
2.3 Fiscally stimulated private pension protection 40 
2.4 Financial assets 41 
2.5 Property ownership 42 
2.6 Conditional public cash transfers 44 
2.6.1 Care related benefits 44 
2.6.2 Housing benefits 46 
2.6.3 Heating allowance 47 
3. Determinants of the old age income package 48 
3.1 Sex and gender 48 
3.2 Labour market history 50 
3.3 Socioeconomic status 53 
3.4 Marital status and household composition 55 
3.5 Health and functional status 56 
4. Conclusion 57 
 
CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 61 
1. General insights 63 
2. Exploring the care package composition within the Belgian context 65 
2.1 Health care services 65 
2.1.1 Delivery of health care services 66 
2.1.2 National health insurance scheme 66 
2.1.3 Private health insurance 69 
2.2 Social care services 70 
2.2.1 Organisation of social and old age care services 71 
2.2.2 Delivery of old age care services 73 
2.2.3 Care insurance 78 
3. Determinants of the care package 80 
3.1 The health services utilisation framework 80 
3.2 The role of income in explaining health and social care services use 82 
3.2.1 Income and health care services use 82 
3.2.2 Income and the use of social care services 85 
3.3 Other determinants 86 
3.3.1 Predisposing factors 87 
3.3.2 Need factors 90 
4. Conclusion 90 
 
CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 93 
1. The old age income package 94 
2. The old age care package 96 
iii 
3. Guaranteeing protection against the financial and physical dimension of old age 
dependency? 97 
 
CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND POPULATION 99 
1. Research design 100 
1.1 The use of secondary survey data 100 
1.2 A quantitative analysis of survey data 101 
1.3 A cross-sectional research design 102 
1.4 A single-country study 102 
2. Exploration of the available data sources 103 
2.1 Data from survey research 103 
2.2 Register data from administrative sources 105 
3. Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 106 
3.1 An introduction to the SHARE 106 
3.2 Target population, sampling and sample design 108 
3.2.1 The target population 108 
3.2.2 The sample population, sample frame and sample design 109 
3.2.3 The realised sample 113 
3.3 Data collection and survey structure 116 
3.4 Assessment of data quality 117 
3.4.1 Dealing with survey errors 117 
3.4.2 Dealing with undercoverage: the (non)sense of weighting 119 
3.4.3 Dealing with item non-response 121 
4. Sensitivity analysis 123 
5. Conclusion 124 
 
CHAPTER 7. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 127 
1. Income sources with personal ownership 128 
1.1 Assessing personal income source ownership 128 
1.2 Defining clusters of personal income sources via hierarchical cluster analysis 131 
1.3 Assessing the income package generosity 135 
2. Income sources shared within the household 138 
2.1 Financial assets and property ownership 138 
2.2 The contribution from assets 140 
2.2.1 The (potential) contribution from financial assets and secondary residence 140 
2.2.2 The (potential) contribution from home ownership 143 
2.2.3 Reflections on the inclusion of assets in the extended income package 145 
3. Taking account of financial solidarity within the household 146 
4. Overview of the generated variables 147 
5. Assessing the quality of the old age income package 148 
5.1 Protecting against old age poverty 148 
5.2 Contributing to income equality 151 
6. Conclusion 153 
iv 
CHAPTER 8. THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE UNRAFFLED 155 
1. Overall research strategy 157 
2. The old age income package of personal income sources 158 
2.1 Description of the old age income package 159 
2.2 The personal income package: tracing vulnerable groups 163 
2.3 A multinomial logit model explaining the income package composition 166 
2.3.1 Construction of the model 166 
2.3.2 Interpretation of the model results 168 
2.4 A multivariate regression model explaining the generosity of the personal  
income package 170 
2.4.1 Construction of the model 171 
2.4.2 Interpretation of the model results 174 
3. Additional protection from the asset package 174 
3.1 Description of the asset package 175 
3.1.1 Financial asset and property ownership 175 
3.1.2 The contribution from financial assets and property 176 
3.1.3 Quality of the asset package 178 
3.2 The asset package along the lines of the personal income package 179 
3.2.1 Asset ownership versus the personal income package 179 
3.2.2 The contribution from assets versus the personal income package 181 
3.2.3 Quality of the asset package versus the personal income package 183 
3.3 The asset package: Tracing vulnerable groups 184 
3.4 Two binary logit models explaining asset ownership 188 
3.4.1 Construction of the models 188 
3.4.2 Interpretation of the results in the logit models 190 
3.5 Multivariate regression models explaining the asset contribution 191 
3.5.1 Construction of the models 191 
3.5.2 Interpretation of the results in the multivariate regression models 193 
4. Combining personal income and asset sources in the extended income package 194 
4.1 The generosity of the extended income package 195 
4.2 Tracing vulnerable groups 199 
4.3 Assessing the quality of the extended income package 200 
4.3.1 Protection against old age poverty 200 
4.3.2 Enhancing old age income equality 205 
5. Conclusion 207 
 
CHAPTER 9. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 213 
1. Composition of the old age care package 214 
1.1 The use of health care services 214 
1.2 The use of social care services 217 
1.3 Defining care clusters via a hierarchical cluster analysis 219 
2. Intensity of care use 223 
2.1 Intensity of health care services use 223 
2.2 Intensity of social care services use 226 
v 
3. Assessing the quality of the old age care package 228 
3.1 The quality of health care services 230 
3.1.1 Appropriate health care contacts 230 
3.1.2 Appropriate medication 232 
3.1.3 Reflections on the health care quality indicators 234 
3.2 The quality of social care services 235 
3.2.1 Receipt of personal care and home help 235 
3.2.2 Satisfaction with social care 236 
3.2.3 Preferences on the main care provider 237 
3.2.4 Reflections on the social care quality indicators 238 
4. Conclusion 238 
 
CHAPTER 10. THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE UNRAFFLED 239 
1. Overall research strategy 241 
2. The old age care package 243 
2.1 Composition of the old age care package 243 
2.2 Intensity of care use 244 
2.3 Composition of the care package versus the intensity of use 245 
2.4 Tracing vulnerable groups 246 
3. Investigating the relationship between the income package and the care package 248 
3.1 The care package composition along the lines of the old age income package 249 
3.1.1 The care package composition versus the generosity of the old age income 
package 250 
3.1.2 The care package composition versus the income package composition 255 
3.2 The intensity of care use along the lines of the old age income package 257 
4. Explaining the care package composition 260 
4.1 Construction of the logit models 260 
4.2 A multinomial logit model explaining the care package composition 263 
4.3 A binomial logit model explaining the use of health care services 265 
4.4 A multinomial logit model explaining the use of social care services 266 
5. Explaining the intensity of care use 266 
5.1 Construction of the models 267 
5.2 A multinomial logit model explaining the intensity of health care services use 269 
5.3 A multinomial logit model explaining the intensity of social care services use 270 
6. Assessing the quality of the old age care package 271 
6.1 The quality of the health care package 272 
6.2 The quality of the social care package 274 
7. Conclusion 277 
 
CHAPTER 11. FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE PACKAGING PUZZLE 283 
1. Where did we start? 284 
2. What does our research contribute? 285 
3. What could have been better? 288 
vi 
4. What’s in it for the future? 291 
4.1 Opportunities for researchers 291 
4.2 Opportunities for policy makers 292 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 297 
 
APPENDICES 321 
Appendix 1. SHARE Data structure 322 
Appendix 2. The calculation of the weights 323 
Appendix 3. Consequences of the methodological choices: A sensitivity analysis 325 
Appendix 4. Comparing observations with and without imputations 342 
Appendix 5. Principal Limit Factors 344 
Appendix 6. Simulating the potential contribution from assets 345 
Appendix 7. Operationalisation of the background variables 347 
Appendix 8. Analysis of deleted observations with missing information 356 
Appendix 9. The quality of the care package by a number of background characteristics 366 
Appendix 10. Detailed logit models explaining the use of health and social care services371 
 
Summary 393 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 394 
Resumé en Français 395 
 
Lijst van doctoraten in de sociale wetenschappen en doctoraten in de sociale en  
culturele antropologie 396 
 
 
 
 
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
Eindelijk ligt het er! Dat is het eerste wat me door het hoofd schoot toen ik de laatste 
puntjes op de vele i’tjes in dit doctoraat zette. Toen ik in 2010 aan dit doctoraat begon, 
wist ik niet goed wat ik mocht verwachten. Het bleek een uitdagende, soms moeizame, 
maar veelal leerrijke periode te zijn waar ik voor stond. Vooral in de beginperiode waren 
er meer downs dan ups, en zeggen dat ik nooit aan opgeven gedacht heb zou een leugen 
zijn, maar de laatste twee jaren heb ik meestal met plezier aan dit doctoraat gewerkt. Dit 
deed ik uiteraard niet alleen, ook al wordt onderzoek – soms terecht, soms onterecht – 
afgeschilderd als een eenzame bezigheid. Volgende mensen verdienen dan ook een 
persoonlijke vermelding in dit voorwoord. 
Ten eerste wil ik mijn promotor, prof. Dr. Jos Berghman†, bedanken omdat hij in mij 
“doctoraatsmateriaal” zag, mij de vrijheid gaf om zelf een onderwerp te kiezen en me het 
vertrouwen gaf om mijn eigen ding te doen. In tijden van nood kon ik altijd op hem 
rekenen, ook die ene keer dat ik in tranen op zijn bureau bekende dat ik het eigenlijk niet 
meer zag zitten. Zelfs toen ik in de laatste fase besliste een nieuwe carrière-uitdaging aan 
te gaan bleef hij me onvoorwaardelijk steunen, uiteraard op voorwaarde dat ik mijn 
doctoraat zou afwerken. Het viel me dan ook bijzonder zwaar dat hij de laatste maanden 
van mijn werkproces niet hebt kunnen meemaken. Zijn overlijden in oktober sloeg in als 
een bom. Ik pikte de draad snel terug op, omdat ik wist dat ik hem nog één ding 
verschuldigd was: het doctoraat afwerken. Zijn vertrouwen en opbeurende woorden 
leveren hun vruchten af: het doctoraat is klaar, het boek ruikt zelfs nog een beetje naar 
verse inkt.  
Mijn co-promotor, prof. Dr. Em. Jaak Billiet, verdient een pluim voor zijn kritische blik op 
de methologische aspecten van mijn onderzoekswerk. Meermaals leende je me je 
methodologische bril om naar mijn denkproces en mijn onderzoeksresultaten te kijken. 
Mijn dank gaat ook naar prof. Dr. Wim Van Oorschot. Na het overlijden van Jos bood je 
spontaan aan om het promotorschap over te nemen, ook al ligt het onderwerp van mijn 
doctoraat ver af van waar je dagelijks mee bezig bent. Bedankt voor de begeleiding die je 
me bood bij de eindsprint. 
Voorts ook een woord van dank voor de leden van mijn begeleidings- en 
examencommissie: prof. Dr. Anja Declercq (LUCAS, KULeuven), Dr. Jef Pacolet (HIVA, 
KULeuven), Dr. Lieve Vanderleyden (Studiedienst Vlaamse Regering) en prof. Dr. Em. Jef 
Breda (UAntwerpen) voor de nuttige inzichten en opmerkingen die van mijn eerste 
onderzoeksvoorstel het afgewerkte product gemaakt hebben dat hier voor u ligt. 
Ook een bedankje aan het adres van het secretariaat van het CeSO en dat van de PhD 
School mag hier niet ontbreken. Voor alle administratieve en financiële aangelegenheden 
viii 
kon ik steeds bij hen terecht, maar ook hun niet aflatende vriendelijke, opbeurende en 
aanmoedigende woorden de afgelopen jaren heb ik zeker weten te appreciëren. 
De afgelopen vijf jaar waren uiteraard meer dan vijf jaar van onderzoek en denkwerk. 
Naar kantoor gaan voelde niet altijd als werken, en met veel plezier denk ik terug aan de 
oppeppende fruitjespauzes, de slaapverwekkende Maltezers, en de verkwikkende 
terrasjes samen met de vele collega’s die in de afgelopen jaren de revue zijn gepasseerd. 
Namen noemen lijkt me hier overbodig, met één uitzondering: Hans, jij was met stip de 
beste bureaugenoot die iemand zich kon inbeelden.  
Een bijzondere vermelding voor mijn ouders (in al hun vormen), (schoon)zussen, 
(schoon)broers mag uiteraard niet ontbreken. Bedankt dat jullie me hebben laten groeien 
tot de vrouw die ik vandaag ben. Luc, ik weet dat je trots zou geweest zijn op mij, al was 
het maar omdat ik netjes heb afgemaakt waar ik jaren geleden aan begonnen ben. 
Tot slot, als een typisch product van de Y-generatie wilde ik ook op niet-professioneel vlak 
niet ter plaatste blijven trappelen. Drie kindjes, bouwen, verhuizen en één man konden er 
ook nog bij. Seth, Isa, Hannah, jullie laten me lachen na zo’n typisch slechte dag waarop je 
meer achteruit dan vooruit gewerkt hebt. Bert, van jou leerde ik niet op te geven en het 
hoofd niet te laten hangen. Bedankt om me een beetje van jouw doorzettingsvermogen, je 
rationaliteit en je nuchterheid te lenen de afgelopen jaren. Bedankt om gewoon te zijn wie 
je bent, en om mij te laten zijn wie ik wil zijn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
DISCLAIMER 
This dissertation uses data from SHARE wave 2 release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011 and 
SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100). The 
SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through 
the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic 
programme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, 
RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-
LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National 
Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 
AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of 
Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully 
acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions). 
 
x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1. Composition of the income package 18 
 
Table 3.1. Components of the income package and the welfare state configuration 29 
Table 3.2. Overview of the potential components of the income package of the Belgian 
elderly population 31 
Table 3.3. An overview of the most important differences between the pension system of 
employees, the self-employed and statutory civil servants 34 
Table 3.4. Public pension protection: facts and figures (2007) 37 
Table 3.5. Occupational pension protection: Facts and figures (2007) 40 
 
Table 4.1. Components of the care package and the welfare state configuration 64 
Table 4.2. Division of responsibilities on care services among federal and regional policy 
makers 72 
Table 4.3. Residential long-term care in Belgium (resp. number of nursing homes and 
elderly homes and beds), by region (2012) 74 
Table 4.4. Estimation of the availability of service flats in Belgium (resp. number of 
facilities and accommodations), by region (2011) 75 
Table 4.5. Short stay and day care centres in Belgium (number of facilities and number of 
places), by region (2011) 77 
 
Table 6.1. Overview of most important Belgian surveys for our research 104 
Table 6.2. The sampling probabilities of households in the Belgian SHARE 112 
Table 6.3. Strategies to minimise the occurrence of survey errors in SHARE 118 
Table 6.4. Comparison of the realised sample (unweighted) and the population aged  
60 and over by sex, age, region of residence and living situation (2007) 120 
Table 6.5. Average item response rate on selected income variables, before and after 
unfolding brackets, SHARE wave 2 (%) 122 
 
Table 7.1. Including retrospective information on the receipt of second and third pillar 
pensions (unweighted, 2007) 130 
Table 7.2. Personal income sources ownership of the research population (unweighted, 
2007) 131 
Table 7.3. Overview of the hierarchical cluster analysis statistics to decide on the number 
of income clusters 133 
Table 7.4. Relative distribution of the research population by cluster and personal income 
source ownership (unweighted, 2007) 134 
xi 
Table 7.5. Relative distribution of the research population according to imputations for 
first, second and third pillar pensions (unweighted, 2007) 136 
Table 7.6. Financial assets sources ownership of the research population (unweighted, 
2007) 139 
Table 7.7. Property ownership of the research population (unweighted, 2007) 140 
Table 7.8. Overview of strategies to include the contribution from home ownership 143 
Table 7.9. Relative distribution of the research population according to imputations for 
assets (unweighted, 2007) 145 
Table 7.10. Overview of the most commonly used equivalence scales 147 
Table 7.11. Overview of the generated income variables 148 
Table 7.12. Calculating the EU-SILC adjusted SHARE at-risk-of-poverty threshold for 
Belgium 150 
Table 7.13. The age-specific poverty threshold before and after the inclusion of assets in 
the old age income package (weighted, 2007) 151 
 
Table 8.1. Distribution of the research population by personal income package 
composition (weighted, 2007) 159 
Table 8.2. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal income 
package by personal income package composition (weighted, 2007) 161 
Table 8.3. EU-SILC adjusted at-risk-of-poverty rate of the research population by the 
personal income package composition (%, weighted, 2007) 163 
Table 8.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the personal income package 
composition and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living situation 
(weighted, 2007) 164 
Table 8.5. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal income 
package and EU-SILC adjusted at-risk-of-poverty rate, by sex, age, occupational status, 
level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 166 
Table 8.6. Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the personal income 
package as dependent variable (weighted, 2007) 168 
Table 8.7. Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the personal income 
package as dependent variable (weighted, 2007) 169 
Table 8.8. Independent variables in the multivariate regression model and their reference 
category 171 
Table 8.9. Results of the multivariate robust regression model with equivalent net monthly 
income from the personal income package (in Euro) as the dependent variable (weighted, 
2007) 173 
Table 8.10. Distribution of the research population by asset ownership (weighted,  
2007) 176 
Table 8.11. Mean and median equivalent monthly direct contribution from financial assets 
and property ownership by asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 177 
Table 8.12. Mean and median simulated equivalent monthly contribution from financial 
assets and property ownership by asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 178 
xii 
Table 8.13. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income package 
and asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 180 
Table 8.14. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income decile and 
asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 180 
Table 8.15. Relative distribution of the research population by asset ownership and by sex, 
age, occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 186 
Table 8.16. Mean and median direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution from 
asset sources by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living situation 
(weighted, 2007) 187 
Table 8.17. Independent variables in the logit models testing asset ownership and their 
reference category 189 
Table 8.18. Overview of the global model statistics of the logit regression models with 
financial asset ownership (LM1) and property ownership (LM2) as dependent variables 
(weighted, 2007) 189 
Table 8.19. Results of the binary logit models with financial asset ownership (LM1) and 
property ownership (LM2) as dependent variables (weighted, 2007) 190 
Table 8.20. Results of the multivariate robust regression models with direct (MM1) and 
simulated (MM2) equivalent monthly contribution from assets (in Euros) as dependant 
variable (weighted, 2007) 193 
Table 8.21. Mean and median available and simulated equivalent monthly income from the 
extended income package by income source (weighted, 2007) 195 
Table 8.22. Mean and median direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution from 
the extended income package by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living 
situation (weighted, 2007) 200 
Table 8.23. EU-SILC at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after assets by sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 202 
Table 8.24. Age-specific at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after assets by sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 203 
Table 8.25. Income quintile share and Gini coefficient before and after adding assets to the 
old age income package (weighted, 2007) 205 
 
Table 9.1. Use of health care services by the research population (unweighted, 2007) 217 
Table 9.2. Use of social care services by the research population (unweighted, 2007) 219 
Table 9.3. Overview of the hierarchical cluster analysis statistics to decide on the number 
of care clusters 221 
Table 9.4. Relative distribution of the research population by care cluster and health and 
social care services use (unweighted, 2007) 222 
Table 9.5. Distribution of the research population by the intensity of health care services 
use (unweighted, 2007) 225 
Table 9.6. Distribution of the research population, receiving social care services, by the 
intensity of care services use (unweighted, 2007) 227 
Table 9.7. Distribution of the research population, receiving social care, by the most 
important source of care (formal and/or informal) (unweighted, 2007) 228 
xiii 
Table 9.8. Matching health problems (based on item ph006) to contacts with specialists 
(based on item hc004) to assess health care quality 231 
Table 9.9. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of success of health care 
contacts (unweighted, 2007) 232 
Table 9.10. Matching health problems (based on item ph006) to medication use (based on 
item ph011) to assess health care quality 233 
Table 9.11. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of success of medication 
(unweighted, 2007) 234 
Table 9.12. Distribution of the research population receiving social care by the match 
between the care received and limitations with ADL and IADL (unweighted, 2007) 236 
Table 9.13. Distribution of the research population receiving social care by satisfaction 
with the care received (unweighted, 2007) 236 
Table 9.14. Distribution of the research population receiving social care services by the 
match between the care they receive and their preference on who should provide this care 
(unweighted, 2007) 237 
 
Table 10.1. Distribution of the research population by care package composition 
(weighted, 2007) 244 
Table 10.2. Relative distribution of the research population by the intensity of health and 
social care services use (weighted, 2007) 244 
Table 10.3. Mean intensity of health and social care services use by the care package 
composition (weighted, 2007) 246 
Table 10.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the care package 
composition and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living situation 
(weighted, 2007) 247 
Table 10.5. Mean intensity of care use by sex, age, occupational status, level of education 
and living situation (weighted, 2007) 248 
Table 10.6. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal and the 
extended income package by care package composition, use of health and social care 
services (weighted, 2007) 252 
Table 10.7. Relative distribution of the research population by care package composition 
and personal income package composition (weighted, 2007) 256 
Table 10.8. Relative distribution of the research population by asset ownership and care 
package composition (weighted, 2007) 257 
Table 10.9. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal and the 
extended income package by the intensity of health and social care use (weighted,  
2007) 258 
Table 10.10. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal and the 
extended income package by relying primarily on formal or informal care services 
(weighted, 2007) 259 
Table 10.11. Independent variables in the logit models testing the care package 
composition and their reference category 261 
xiv 
Table 10.12. Overview of the global model statistics of the logistic regression models on 
the use of care services (weighted, 2007) 263 
Table 10.13. Overview of the global model statistics (p-values) of the logistic regression 
models on the intensity of the use of care services (weighted, 2007) 268 
Table 10.14. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of successful health care 
contacts and medication (weighted, 2007) 272 
Table 10.15. Relative distribution of the research population by the individual income 
quintile distribution and the ratio of successful health care contacts and medication 
(weighted, 2007) 273 
Table 10.16. Distribution of the research population by the receipt of appropriate social 
care and the preferential care provider (weighted, 2007) 275 
Table 10.17. Distribution of the research population by the patient satisfaction with the 
social care services received (weighted, 2007) 275 
Table 10.18. Relative distribution of the research population by the individual income 
quintile distribution and the social care quality indicators (weighted, 2007) 276 
 
Table A2.1. Distribution of the unweighted sample by age and sex 323 
Table A2.2. Distribution of the sample by age and sex, after the design weight 323 
Table A2.3. Population distribution by age and sex 324 
Table A2.4. Poststratification weights by age and sex 324 
Table A2.5. Distribution of the sample by age and sex, after the application of the 
combined and rescaled weights 324 
 
Table A3.1. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted distribution of the research 
population by personal income package composition, asset package composition, and care 
package composition (2007) 326 
Table A3.2. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted mean and median contribution 
from the personal income package and the asset package (2007) 327 
Table A3.3. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted global parameter statistics of the 
multinomial logit model with composition of the personal income package as dependent 
variable (2007) 328 
Table A3.4. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted detailed parameter statistics of 
the multivariate robust regression model with equivalent net income from the personal 
income package (in Euro) as the dependent variable (2007) 329 
Table A3.5. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted global parameter statistics of the 
binomial logit models with financial asset ownership and property ownership as 
dependent variables (2007) 330 
Table A3.6. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted detailed parameter statistics of 
the multivariate robust regression model with direct and simulated equivalent monthly 
contribution from assets (in Euro) as dependent variable (2007) 331 
Table A3.7. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the weighted and unweighted 
multinomial logit model with the care package composition as dependent variable  
(2007) 332 
xv 
Table A3.8. Comparison of the mean and median contribution from the personal income 
package and the asset package, with and without imputations (weighted, 2007) 334 
Table A3.9. Comparison of the detailed parameter statistics of the multivariate robust 
regression model with equivalent net income from the personal income package (in Euro) 
as the dependent variable, with and without imputations (weighted, 2007) 335 
Table A3.10. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the binomial logit models 
with financial asset ownership and property ownership as dependent variables, with and 
without imputations (weighted, 2007) 336 
Table A3.11. Comparison of the detailed parameter statistics of the multivariate robust 
regression model with direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution from assets 
(in Euro) as dependent variable, with and without imputations (unweighted, 2007) 337 
Table A3.12. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the multinomial logit model 
with the care package composition as dependent variable, with and without imputations 
(weighted, 2007) 338 
Table A3.13. Overview of three commonly used equivalence scales 340 
Table A3.14. Comparison of the mean and median net monthly equivalent income from the 
personal old age income package and the age-specific at-risk-of-poverty rate, by the 
Oxford equivalence scale, the OECD modified equivalence scale and the square root 
equivalence scale (weighted, 2007) 341 
 
Table A4.1 Distribution of the research population without and with imputations on the 
personal income level by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation 
and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 343 
Table A4.2 Distribution of the research population without and with imputations on the 
personal income level by personal income package composition (weighted, 2007) 343 
 
Table A5.1 Principal limit factors used for the simulation of reverse mortgages, by age, at 
an interest rate of 4.33% 344 
 
Table A6.1. Simulating the potential contribution from assets 346 
 
Table A7.1. Distribution of the research population by sex, age and living situation 
(weighted, 2007) 347 
Table A7.2. The European Socio-economic classification of occupations 348 
Table A7.3. Occupational status 350 
Table A7.4. Distribution of the research population by occupational status (2007, 
weighted) 351 
Table A7.5. Distribution of the research population by level of education (weighted,  
2007) 352 
Table A7.6. Distribution of the research population by health status and functional level 
(weighted, 2007) 355 
 
xvi 
Table A8.1 Deleted observations in model 1 with the personal income package 
composition as the dependent variable 357 
Table A8.2 Deleted observations in model 2 with the level of the personal income package 
as the dependent variable 358 
Table A8.3 Deleted observations in model 3 with financial asset ownership as the 
dependent variable 359 
Table A8.4 Deleted observations in model 4 with property asset ownership as the 
dependent variable 360 
Table A8.5 Deleted observations in model 5 with level of the direct asset contribution as 
the dependent variable 361 
Table A8.6 Deleted observations in model 6 with level of the simulated asset contribution 
as the dependent variable 362 
Table A8.7 Deleted observations in the models with health and social care services as the 
dependent variables 364 
 
Table A9.1. Relative distribution of the research population by the ratio of successful 
specialist contacts by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation and 
region of residence (weighted, 2007) 366 
Table A9.2. Relative distribution of the research population by the ratio of successful 
medication by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation and region 
of residence (weighted, 2007) 367 
Table A9.3. Relative distribution of the research population by the receipt of appropriate 
social care by type of care and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living 
situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 368 
Table A9.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the preferential care 
provider by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation and region of 
residence (weighted, 2007) 369 
Table A9.5. Relative distribution of the research population by the patient satisfaction with 
the social care services received by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living 
situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 370 
 
Table A10.1 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package 
as dependent variable and the personal income package as the main independent variable 
(weighted, 2007) 372 
Table A10.2 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package 
as dependent variable and the personal income package and the background variables as 
the independent variables (weighted, 2007) 373 
Table A10.3 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package 
as dependent variable and the extended income package as the main independent variable 
(weighted, 2007) 375 
Table A10.4 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package 
as dependent variable and the extended income package and the background variables as 
the main independent variables (weighted, 2007) 376 
xvii 
Table A10.5 Results of the binomial logit model with the use of second-line health care as 
dependent variable and the personal income package as the main independent variable 
(weighted, 2007) 378 
Table A10.6 Results of the binomial logit model with the use of second-line health care as 
dependent variable and the extended income package as the main independent variable 
(weighted, 2007) 379 
Table A10.7 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as 
dependent variable and the personal income package as the main independent variable 
(weighted, 2007) 380 
Table A10.8 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as 
dependent variable and the extended income as the main independent variable (weighted, 
2007) 382 
Table A10.9 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care 
services use as dependent variable and the personal income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007) 384 
Table A10.10 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care 
services use as dependent variable and the extended income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007) 386 
Table A10.11 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of formal care 
services use as dependent variable and the personal income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007)  388 
Table A10.12 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of social care 
services use as dependent variable and the extended income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007) 390 
 
xviii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1. Evolution of the proportion of the population aged 60 and over in the overall 
population from 1950 to 2010 3 
Figure 1.2. Evolution of the proportion of the population aged 80 years and over in the 
population aged 60 years and over from 1950 to 2010 3 
Figure 1.3. Employment rate in the EU-27 and Belgium, by age group (2011) 5 
Figure 1.4. Proportion of the Belgian population with moderate to severe restrictions in 
day-to-day and basic activities, by age group (2008) 6 
Figure 1.5. Evolution of the life expectancy (in years) and the healthy life years at 65 (as % 
of the total life expectancy at 65) in Belgium between 1995 and 2012 7 
 
Figure 3.1. Multi-pillar composition of the old age income package 28 
 
Figure 4.1. Composition of the old age care package 62 
Figure 4.2. Overview of the main characteristics of social care services 71 
Figure 4.3. Andersen’s health services utilisation framework 81 
 
Figure 6.1. SHARE Waves of data collection and participating countries 107 
Figure 6.2. From the initial sample of households to the realised sample of individuals in 
the first wave of the Belgian SHARE 114 
Figure 6.3. Decomposition of the second wave of the Belgian SHARE 115 
Figure 6.4. Illustration of the unfolding bracket procedure 122 
 
Figure 7.1. Illustration of income decile distribution 152 
Figure 7.2. Illustration of the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient 153 
 
Figure 8.1. The old age income package: Conceptual scheme 158 
Figure 8.2. Distribution of the research population by the monthly equivalent net income 
from the personal income package, in categories (weighted, 2007) 160 
Figure 8.3. Personal income package composition by income decile distribution (weighted, 
2007) 162 
Figure 8.4. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income decile and 
property ownership (weighted, 2007) 181 
Figure 8.5. Mean and median equivalent monthly direct contribution from assets by 
personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 182 
Figure 8.6. Mean and median equivalent monthly simulated contribution from assets by 
personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 183 
xix 
Figure 8.7. Proportion of the research population with an asset stock below the asset 
poverty threshold by personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 184 
Figure 8.8. Mean available equivalent monthly income from the extended income package, 
by income source and income decile (weighted, 2007) 197 
Figure 8.9. Mean simulated equivalent monthly income from the extended income 
package, by income source and income decile (weighted, 2007) 198 
Figure 8.10. Relative composition of  the simulated equivalent monthly income from the 
extended income package, by income source and income decile (weighted, 2007) 199 
Figure 8.11. Lorenz curve of the equivalent monthly income from resp. the personal 
income package and the extended income package (direct and simulated total income) 
(weighted,  2007) 206 
 
Figure 10.1. The care package: Conceptual scheme 242 
Figure 10.2. Care package composition by personal income decile distribution (weighted, 
2007) 253 
Figure 10.3. Health care services use by personal income decile distribution (weighted, 
2007) 254 
Figure 10.4. Use of social care services by the personal income decile distribution 
(weighted, 2007) 255 
Figure 10.5. Mean intensity of health and social care services use by the personal income 
decile distribution (weighted, 2007) 259 
 
 
xx 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ADL Activities of Daily Living 
AIC Akaike Information Criterion 
B.A. Bulletin of Acts [Belgisch Staatsblad] 
BIC Bayesian Information Criterion 
CAPI Computer Assisted Personal Interview 
CD Inter-cluster distance 
DB2P Database Supplementary Pensions  
DWH LM&SP Datawarehouse Labour Market and Social Protection 
ECHP European Community Household Panel 
ESeC European Socio-economic Classification 
EU-SILC European Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
Ex Life expectancy 
FACH Flemish Agency for Care and Health [Vlaams Agentschap Zorg en 
 Gezondheid, VAZG] 
FCS Fully Conditional Specification Method 
FPS Federal Public Service 
GP General practitioner 
HIS Health Interview Survey 
HECM Home Equity Conversion Mortgages for Seniors 
IADL Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMA Intermutuality Agency [InterMutualistisch Agentschap] 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations 
JPI Joint Programming Initiative 
LASA Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam 
LOVO Survey on the Living situation of Flemish Elderly 
 [LeefsituatieOnderzoek Vlaamse Ouderen]  
MAR Missing At Random 
NIHDI  National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance [Rijksdienst voor 
 Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, RIZIV] 
N.S. Not statistically significant at the 0,05 level 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLO Linear Bond [Obligation Linéaire/Lineaire Obligatie] 
OR Odds Ratio 
P1 First pillar pensions 
P2 Second pillar pensions 
xxi 
P3 Third pillar pensions 
PCSW Public Centre for Social Welfare [Openbaar Centrum voor 
 Maatschappelijk Welzijn, OCMW] 
PLF Principal Limit Factor 
PS Poststratification 
PSBH Panel study of Belgian Households 
r Interest rate 
R² Determination coefficient 
RM Reverse mortgage 
RMS STD Root-mean-square standard deviation 
R.R. Response rate 
RS R-squared 
SHARE Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
SPR Semi partial R-square 
SS Social security benefits 
VOZS Flemish Elderly Care Survey [Vlaamse OuderenZorgStudie] 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION
2 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The population is ageing. Related topics are high on the agenda of policy makers and 
researchers. One of these topics, often the subject of debate, involves the risks of financial 
and functional dependency that are related to old age. Associated to this, our PhD research 
focuses on the wide range of mechanisms that are available to the elderly population to 
limit the consequences of financial and functional old age dependency.  
In this chapter we describe the broad outline of the dissertation. Firstly, the demographic 
context of population ageing is illustrated. This is linked to the growing importance of old 
age related social risks, more specifically the risks of old age financial and functional 
dependency. Secondly, we introduce the main mechanisms that are available to protect the 
elderly population against the negative consequences of the financial and physical 
dimension of old age dependency. In this light, the packaging approach of Rainwater, Rain 
and Schwartz (1986) is presented as the main theoretical framework of our study. In 
section three, the main research questions and hypotheses are presented. A short 
introduction into the research design is given in section 4. The last section presents the 
outline of the dissertation. 
1. The context: Population ageing 
In this section, we address the recent trends in population ageing, that go together with 
important increases in the older population, and specifically in the population of 80 years 
and over.  
1.1 Recent trends in population ageing 
The attention for old age social protection by researchers and social policy makers stems 
from an important increase in the relative importance of the elderly in the overall 
population. This trend is observed not only in Belgium, but all over Europe, and by 
extension all over the world. Even less developed countries do not escape the increase of 
the elderly population. Yet, the increase in the elderly population is considerably more 
important in Western Europe than in the rest of the world (see Figure 1.1). Whereas in the 
1950s about 15% of the Western European population was aged 60 years and over, the 
relative importance of this age group increased to 24% in 2010 (an increase of 60%). A 
similar, yet less strong, increasing trend is observed in Belgium, where the relative 
importance of the population aged 60 years and over rose from 16% in 1950 to 23% in 
2010 (an increase of 44%). 
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Figure 1.1. Evolution of the proportion of the population aged 60 and over in the 
overall population from 1950 to 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division, 2011  
Further, this increase in the elderly population has gone hand in hand with an increase in 
the population aged 80 years and over (the so-called oldest old). In Western Europe, the 
relative weight of the population aged 80 years and over within the age group of 60 years 
and over increased from about 8% in 1950 to 21% in 2010 (see Figure 1.2). A similar 
trend is discerned in Belgium . 
Figure 1.2. Evolution of the proportion of the population aged 80 years and over in 
the population aged 60 years and over from 1950 to 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division, 2011 
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The increase in the elderly population is considered as the final stage of the 20th century 
demographic transition, that marks a transition from a society with high rates of births 
and deaths to a society characterised by low rates of births and deaths. Improvements in 
health care and medical science, changes in the living conditions, the introduction of 
widespread social security, etc. have managed to reduce the mortality rate and lead to an 
increase in the life expectancy over the last decades. This trend of lowering mortality and 
increasing life expectancy went hand in hand with decreasing fertility rates and a decline 
in the relative proportion of the younger population group in the overall population. 
Consequently, the size of the younger age groups is no longer in balance with that of the 
older age groups, leading to an increase in the dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of the size of 
the non-active population and the active population).1 For example, in Western Europe the 
ratio of the population aged 60 years and over versus the population between 20 and 60 
years increased from 0.28 in 1950 to 0.44 in 2010 (based on the population statistics 
provided by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2011).  
1.2 Increasing importance of old age related social risks 
The increase in the relative importance of the elderly population in the overall population 
makes that old age related social risks have become more important in the last decades. 
These risks refer to a certain degree of dependency that is associated to old age, with 
many different dimensions (e.g. functional dependency, mental dependency, economic 
dependency) (Pacolet, Bouten, Lanoye, & Versieck, 2000). In this study, we focus on two 
dimensions of old age dependency, namely financial or economic dependency and 
functional or physical dependency. These dimensions of dependency are strongly related 
to the welfare and wellbeing of the elderly population (cf. infra). 
Already in the 1960s old age has been acknowledged as a risk for labour market 
participation (International Labour Organisation, 2006). Because of their age, elderly are 
faced with decreases in their productivity, for example because of health problems, and 
thus are confronted with limitations in their labour market participation. To overcome the 
risk of financial destitution that is associated with labour market withdrawal, the 
International Labour Organisation advised that subsistence after the age of 65 should be 
guaranteed via the provision of financial compensations, replacing the former labour 
market income. Mechanisms have been set up to provide sufficient protection against the 
financial dimension of dependency. These mechanisms have to provide an alternative 
income to prevent the elderly population from becoming poor and to ensure their 
 
                                                             
1 The age limits used to calculate the dependency ratio can differ. For example, the United Nations 
limits the non-active elderly population to the population aged 60 and over, while the active 
population refers to the population between 20 years and 59 years of age. 
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standard of living. The most important mechanism is the public retirement pension, that 
provides a replacement income based on the previous labour market participation and the 
social security contributions paid during the active labour market career (Baltes, 1996). 
However, despite these alternative income mechanisms, the loss of labour market income 
makes the elderly population particularly vulnerable for poverty. According to statistics 
from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), in 2011 about one 
fifth of the Belgian population aged 65 years and over was found to be at-risk-of-poverty, 
compared to about 14% of the population younger than 65 years (Eurostat, 2013a).2 
The introduction of widespread income replacement schemes for the elderly population 
has led to very low levels of labour market participation from the age of 60. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1.3, which shows the employment rate in Europe for different age 
groups. The majority of the population aged 65 years and over is no longer active on the 
labour market. Within Europe about 5% of the population aged 65 years and over still is in 
employment, while in Belgium only 2% of this age group is still active on the labour 
market. 
Figure 1.3. Employment rate in the EU-27 and Belgium, by age group (2011) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2013) 
Besides the withdrawal from the labour market and the increase in financial dependency, 
the elderly population is also confronted more with health problems and limitations in 
their daily activities than younger population groups. Statistics from the Belgian Health 
Interview Survey (HIS) 2008 show that the incidence of restrictions in the basic and daily 
activities increases importantly with age (see Figure 1.4) (Charafeddine, Demarest, 
 
                                                             
2 The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is calculated as 60% of the EU-SILC equivalised median income. 
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Drieskens, Gisle, Tafforeau and Van der Heyden, 2008). While only 10% of the population 
aged 15 to 24 years is confronted with moderate to severe restrictions in basic activities 
like walking, climbing staircases, etc., this holds for more than 80% of the population aged 
65 years and over. Similarly, almost 40% of the population aged 65 years and over has 
moderate to severe problems with daily activities like getting dressed, bathing and using 
the toilet, compared to only 1% of the youngest age group. This decrease in the health 
conditions increases the need for outside help by either professional and non-professional 
care givers. To illustrate, in 2008 more than 60% of the Belgian population using home 
health care services3 was aged 65 or over. Similarly, about 75% of those receiving home 
help with household chores was 65 years or older.4 
Figure 1.4. Proportion of the Belgian population with moderate to severe 
restrictions in day-to-day and basic activities, by age group (2008) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Charafeddine et al. (2008) 
In addition, research shows that the increasing life expectancy did not go hand in hand 
with an overall increase in the healthy life expectancy, The end of the life course is still 
marked by an important period of care dependency. For example, since 1995 the Belgian 
healthy life expectancy of the elderly population, expressed as a percentage of the overall 
life expectancy, has decreased with 9% for the male elderly population and with 15% for 
the female elderly population (Eurostat, 2014a, 2014b). In 2012, a 65-year Belgian old 
women was expected to live another 21,3 years, of which 11,1 years in good health (in 
1995: resp. 19,3 years and 11,8 years). For men, the total life expectancy at the age of 65 in 
 
                                                             
3 This refers to the use of home care services provided by a nurse or a midwife. 
4 Calculations based on the 2008 Belgian Health Interview Survey (Charafeddine et al., 2008). 
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2012 was 17,7 years, of which 10,7 years in good health (in 1995: resp. 14,8 years and 9,8 
years).  
Figure 1.5. Evolution of the life expectancy (in years) and the healthy life years at 65 
(as % of the total life expectancy at 65) in Belgium between 1995 and 2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat (2014a, 2014b) 
2. SOS old age: Protection against old age related social risks 
This study focuses on the mechanisms that have to protect the elderly population against 
the negative consequences of two main dimensions of old age dependency, namely 
financial and functional dependency.  
On the one hand, this includes different, publically and non-publically provided, income 
sources, like pensions (public pensions, employer pensions and private pensions), social 
security benefits, savings, property incomes, etc. The combination of these income sources 
has to provide protection against the financial dimension of old age dependency, and thus 
has to compensate for the wage loss because of the withdrawal from the labour market. 
On the other hand, the use of different types of health and social care services is included 
in this study, like contacts with doctors, specialists and hospitals, but also home help and 
personal care provided by either formal or informal caregivers. The health and social care 
services have to limit the negative consequences of increased functional dependency that 
is associated with old age. 
The protection against the financial and functional dimension of old age dependency is not 
limited to a single mechanism. Elderly are expected to combine different income sources 
and health and social care services into packages to strive for a sufficient level of 
protection against the financial and functional dimension of old age dependency. To study 
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this combination of income and care mechanisms we draw on the packaging approach, 
that has been developed by Rainwater, Rein and Schwartz (1986) in their study on 
households’ combinations of different income sources into income packages. This 
packaging approach is based on three main concepts: claims, institutional spheres and 
rewards. Individuals are active in three ‘institutional spheres’ (the family sphere, the 
political sphere and the economic sphere). Activities in these spheres make that 
individuals can ‘claim’ access to certain resources. These claims can be both explicit and 
implicit, and the resources that are granted to the individuals can be considered as 
‘rewards’. Because claims are made in different spheres, and lead to a range of different 
rewards, the combination of claims and rewards is considered to result in ‘packages’ 
(Rainwater et al., 1986). These packages have to contribute to a certain degree of stability 
and security in life, and an adequate and secure income. 
Whereas Rainwater and his colleagues (1986) limited their study to households in the 
active life phase, we adopt the packaging approach to study the protection of the elderly 
population, because we believe that the notion of claims and rewards in the three 
institutional spheres can be quite easily transposed to the elderly population. In addition, 
we extend the original packaging approach by including not only monetary rewards, but 
by including also non-monetary rewards (i.e. health and social care services) that 
contribute to the welfare and wellbeing of the elderly population. Such a broad, holistic 
perspective allows us to draw a picture of the different ways in which the elderly 
population meet its need for protection against the financial and functional dimension of 
old age dependency. More details on the packaging approach as the main theoretical 
framework of this dissertation are provided in the second chapter.  
Further, a detailed overview of the potential sources to be included in the old age income 
and care packages is given in the third and fourth chapter. In these chapters, we also pay 
attention to a number of sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables like 
education, occupational status, sex and living situation that influence ownership of 
different sources and thus have an effect on the composition of the income and care 
packages of the elderly population. This enables us to investigate the differences and 
potential inequalities within the elderly population regarding their protection against old 
age dependency and the different needs associated to this.  
3. Main research questions and hypotheses 
Three groups of research questions are formulated to solve the puzzle of whether and how 
different protection mechanisms are combined into income and care packages by the 
elderly population and to what extent these packages provide a sufficient level of 
protection against the financial and functional dimension of old age dependency.  
A first group of research questions focuses on the protection against the negative 
consequences of old age financial dependency. We investigate the composition of the old 
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age income package and the level of income protection provided by the old age income 
package. In doing so, we do not only include income sources like pensions and social 
security benefits, but we also investigate the potential income of financial assets (savings) 
and property ownership. Also the relationship between the composition and the 
generosity of the old age income package is investigated. In addition, we investigate 
whether sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables influence the 
composition and the level of protection provided by the old age income package. This 
contributes to the already existing research on the income protection of the elderly 
population in several ways. Whereas the current research focuses quite strong on single 
income sources (e.g. research on pensions; research on property ownership), this study 
focuses on the combination of income sources into income packages and on the potential 
interplay between the different sources and the generosity of the income package. 
Secondly, we estimate the potential contribution of financial assets and property 
ownership to the main old age income package to investigate whether including assets can 
improve the income position of Belgian elderly. This also is expected to be interesting for 
policy makers that are exploring different ways to alleviate the pressure on the financing 
of the public pension scheme; increasing the personal responsibility and taking account of 
personal sources like home ownership and financial assets for the calculation of pension 
benefits is only one of the many options available. 
The second group of research questions focuses on the wide range of services that are 
available to the elderly population to mediate the functional dimension of dependency. We 
investigate the existence of care packages, systematic combinations of health and social 
care services, provided by either formal or informal caregivers. The study focuses strongly 
on the role of the old age income package in explaining differences in the care package 
among the elderly population. The hypothesis is that, given an equal health and functional 
status, elderly with a more generous and a more diverse income package have a more 
diverse care package. This adds to the current research in that the contribution of assets is 
taken into account to explain differences in the use of care services. This could also be 
important for policy makers searching for a better understanding of the inequalities in the 
use of health and social care services and in the design of policy strategies to reduce these 
inequalities. 
The third group of research questions is an evaluation of the extent to which the income 
and the care packages succeed in providing a sufficient level of protection against the 
financial and functional dimension of old age dependency. We expect that elderly with 
‘rich’ old age protection packages are more capable of meeting their income and care 
needs and elderly with ‘poor’ protection packages. This is closely related to the 
assessment of the quality of the protection packages. For the financial dimension of old 
age dependency, this involves an evaluation of whether the income package provides 
sufficient protection against poverty, and the potential contribution of assets in doing so. 
For the functional dimension of old age dependency, this involves an evaluation of 
whether the care package is in line with the health and social care needs. Again this is 
important for policy makers that are willing to reduce inequalities in the protection of the 
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elderly population against old age dependency. Profound insights in the income and care 
packages of the elderly population, the interplay between both, and the relationship with 
the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background, will allow policy makers to tune 
their policy strategies towards to most vulnerable groups. 
4. Research design 
To investigate the packaging puzzle of the Belgian elderly population, we have constructed 
a quantitative, cross-sectional research design based on secondary survey data. The 
availability of the interesting and rich data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), and the fact that the survey includes information on both 
income and care sources of the elderly population has encouraged us to use these data. 
However, before starting the actual data analyses we have investigated thoroughly the 
quality of the data, to ensure the reliability of the research results. Our choice for a cross-
sectional study of the income and care packages of the elderly population allows us to 
focus on the existence of differences between individuals at a certain point in time. 
Consequently, because our time frame is limited to one year, differences are not related to 
policy changes over time. In addition, we concentrate on the income and care packages of 
the Belgian elderly population, although to a limited extent we also compare the Belgian 
situation with that of the neighbouring countries. Further, the possibility to compare 
between the Belgian regions is also interesting, given the regional division of competences 
for both income protection and health and social care services in Belgium (cf. infra).  
Our research population is limited to the population aged 60 years and over and living in 
Belgium at the moment of the interview. Three groups are excluded from the research 
population: elderly permanently living in residential care facilities, elderly not able to 
speak Dutch of French, and elderly in the German speaking Community. Elderly living in 
residential care facilities and in the German speaking Community were excluded from the 
SHARE sample framework, and thus are not included in the final sample. The exclusion of 
non-Dutch and non-French speaking individuals is based on the fact that the questionnaire 
is made up in Dutch and in French. Obviously, these limitations in the research population 
have to be taken into account when interpreting the research results. The final sample 
consists of about 1.600 respondents, living in Belgium and aged 60 years and over.  
5. Outline of the study 
In this introductory chapter, the broad context of the study was outlined. Attention was 
paid to the process of population ageing, resulting in an important increase of the elderly 
population. This increase of the elderly population was linked to the growing importance 
of old age related social risks, with specific attention for the risks of financial and 
functional dependency. Within this respect, we stressed the importance of an advanced 
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investigation in the mechanisms protecting the elderly population against the risks of 
financial and (long-term) care dependency. This study aims to meet this need, and aims to 
have sufficient attention for the (societal) mechanisms explaining differences in the (level 
of) protection enjoyed by the elderly population.  
With this dissertation, we wish to add to and complement the already existing literature in 
the field of (sociological) ageing research. We attempt to sketch a complete picture of the 
different sources of protection available to the elderly population. Whereas the focus of 
the current research often is limited to income-related protection on the one hand, or to 
health and/or (long-term) care services on the other hand, this research focuses on the 
combination of these sources by the elderly population in so-called old age protection 
packages. In doing so, we do not to limit ourselves to a specific group of elderly, but we 
wish to provide a view on the larger elderly population. Yet, this does not mean that 
differences within the elderly population will be ignored; attention will be paid to 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics that lead to higher risks on 
destitution. 
The theoretical foundation of this approach on old age protection against the main 
dimensions of old age dependency is discussed in the second chapter. We draw on the 
income package approach of Rainwater et al. (1986) to investigate the income and care 
mechanisms available to the elderly population. The original insights of Rainwater et al. 
(1986) on the combination of different income sources in households are extended to the 
elderly population. Moreover, we will not limit the concept to income sources, but we will 
also include the wide range of care sources that are available to the elderly population. 
In chapter 3 and chapter 4 we focus on the specific protection mechanisms that are 
available to the Belgian elderly population to provide protection against resp. the financial 
and the functional dimension of old age dependency. In these chapters, an overview is 
provided of the possible components of the old age income and care packages of the 
Belgian elderly population. We also pay attention to the sociodemographic and 
socioeconomic determinants explaining differences in the old age income and care 
packages of the elderly population (e.g. sex, age, socioeconomic status, etc.).  
Based on the theoretical insights from the preceding chapters, we formulate research 
questions and hypotheses in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. Three groups of research 
questions are distinguished, focusing respectively on the old age income package, the old 
age care package and the ability of both packages to provide a sufficient level of protection 
against the negative consequences of old age financial and functional dependency. 
In chapter 6, the research design is discussed. The main motives why we have opted for a 
quantitative analysis of secondary survey data are highlighted. After an exploration of the 
available data sources, our choice to work with data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is explained. The advantages and disadvantages of working 
with these data, as well as strategies to overcome the most important disadvantages, will 
be considered. In addition, we elaborate on the demarcation of the research population.  
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Chapters 7 to 10 hold the empirical body of this study. In chapter 7 the operationalisation 
of the old age income package, based on the SHARE data, is discussed. A cluster analysis is 
used to investigate the existence of meaningful clusters of income sources in the data. In 
chapter 8 we investigate the old age income package. Not only a description of the 
composition of the old age income package is provided, also an in-depth investigation of 
the determinants influencing and explaining differences among the elderly population in 
these income packages is presented. Further, our attention is not limited to the 
immediately available income sources, like pensions. We also include financial assets and 
property wealth in the old age income package. Both the actual contribution and the 
potential contribution of these asset sources to the old age income package is investigated. 
A similar strategy is adopted to investigate the protection against the functional dimension 
of old age dependency. In chapter 9, the operationalisation of the health and social care 
package is discussed. Again, a cluster analysis is used to investigate the existence of 
meaningful clusters of health and social care services used by the elderly population to 
mitigate the negative physical consequences of ageing. In chapter 10 we focus on the 
distribution of these care packages among the elderly population. Particular attention is 
paid to the role of the old age income package in explaining differences in the care 
packages among the elderly population.  
In the concluding chapter, some final reflections on the study are formulated. We tackle 
the main outstanding “W’s” that are found in all PhD projects: Where did we started from? 
What does our research contribute? What could have been better? What do these findings 
imply for the future? We will make some methodological and theoretical reflections. 
Particular attention is paid to the policy decisions that nowadays are high on the political 
agenda in Belgium. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE PACKAGING PUZZLE 
In the previous chapter, insights were provided in two main dimensions of dependency 
associated with old age: financial dependency, related to labour market withdrawal, and 
functional dependency, because of age-related declines in health and functional status 
leading to a certain degree of care dependency. Several mechanisms are available to 
provide sufficient protection against these dimensions of dependency. Similarly, different 
actors are responsible for the provision, organisation and financing of these mechanisms. 
Historically, the government has been granted a central role in this, although recently also 
other non-public actors have come to the front in the organisation of different protection 
mechanisms. 
In this chapter, we present the main theoretical framework that is used for our research: 
the packaging approach of Rainwater, Rain and Schwartz (1986). This approach considers 
the wide range of mechanisms that are available to the population and that contribute to 
the security, safety and stability of the population. These mechanisms are based on a 
system of claims and rewards in three institutional spheres (the family sphere, the 
economic sphere and the political sphere). In the first section of this chapter, we will 
discuss the main points of interest of the packaging approach. In the second section, we 
rethink the packaging approach from the observation that the population is ageing and the 
increasing importance of old age dependency (and specifically financial and functional 
dependency). This results in the two main concepts that are central in our study: the old 
age income package and the old age care package.  
1. The packaging approach as the basic theoretical framework 
The packaging approach has been developed in the 1980s by Rainwater et al. (1986) in 
their research on the composition of the household income of families in Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Rainwater et al. (1986) used micro-data from three 
surveys (Swedish Level of Living Survey, the UK General Household Survey, and the US 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics) for a detailed investigation of the income packages of 
the population, with specific attention for the different household types in the income 
distribution. 
In the next sections, we discuss the main points of interest of the packaging approach. 
Where possible, we complement the packaging approach with theoretical insights from 
other social scientists active in the field of social protection and the welfare state. 
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1.1 The basics: claims, rewards and institutional spheres 
The main components of the packaging approach are the claims that are made by the 
population, the institutional spheres in which the claims are made in society, and the 
rewards that are the results of these claims and that are the components of the claiming 
package. 
1.1.1 Claims 
Rainwater et al. (1986) based their concept of income packaging on the notion of claims: 
“the ways in which people can come to command resources in a society” (Rainwater et al. 
1986, 12). Claims are distributional rules that allocate resources over the members of a 
society. Claims are not always explicit, some rewards (incomes) are the result of claims 
that were made in the past and have become more or less established; the link between 
the ‘reward’ and the ‘claim’ however is less explicit in that case. Overall, the underlying 
goal of the whole claiming system is the preservation of stability and security, and having 
an adequate and secure income. The rewards that are the result of the claims have to 
contribute to one’s welfare and wellbeing.  The claims are made in three major 
institutional spheres: the political sphere (the government), the family sphere, and the 
economic sphere. Within each sphere, individuals handle and interact to obtain certain 
resources. The principles, logic and structures of these interactions are different in the 
three spheres. 
1.1.2 Three institutional spheres 
As mentioned in the previous section, individuals and households can make claims in 
three institutional spheres: the family sphere, the economic sphere and the political 
sphere. 
The political sphere 
In the political sphere, claims are based on three principles. First, it is the government’s 
moral obligation to support its members and to mitigate certain needs. This is closely 
related to the observations of Titmuss (1974b) on the role of social policy. The 
government has to organise a wide range of social protection mechanisms that have to 
support individuals and households that are confronted with ‘needy situations’, and that 
no longer can look after themselves or their household members. Further, within the 
political sphere, policy makers have to decide what situations are considered as ‘needy 
situations’. This is closely related to the societal and historical context in which the 
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mechanisms were developed.5 According to Briggs (1969 [2000]), the industrial context 
played an important role in the demarcation of social risks in the early days of the welfare 
state. This view is supported by the industrialism thesis that states that the welfare state 
has been developed as “a response to the news ‘needs’ generated by the development of 
industrial societies.” (Pierson, 1999, p. 17). In addition, also political orientations, the 
preferences of policy makers, the administrative context and the will of policy makers to 
organise social protection mechanisms influences what circumstances are acknowledged 
as ‘needy’ (e.g. Hartley, 2010; McKillip, 1987).  
Second, the principle of redistribution that is central in the contemporary welfare state is 
an important principle that justifies the claims that are made in the political sphere. This 
resembles the central role that is given to redistribution via social protection by Titmuss 
(1964 [2001]). Within his theory, redistribution via social protection is twofold. On the 
one hand, social protection has to contribute to equality within society via vertical 
redistribution, i.e. a redistribution of resources from the richer to the poorer population 
groups. This is organised in the political sphere via systems of social assistance, that are 
targeted to the most destitute parts of the population. However, also income-based social 
security often includes a notion of vertical redistribution via the inclusion of income 
ceilings in the calculation of the benefits, but not in the calculation of the contributions. On 
the other hand, social protection aims for horizontal redistribution, from those without a 
specified risk to others that are confronted with that risk. For example, within the political 
sphere families with children can claim for child allowances and families without children 
cannot. In this way, there is a redistribution of resources from families without children to 
families with children.  
The third principle involves that a wide range of initiatives within the political sphere are 
based on notions of citizenship. Being part of the society opens the right to certain social 
protection mechanisms. For example, the right on minimum social assistance overall is 
based on citizenship: universal minimum income schemes are organised by the 
government to protect its citizens against poverty and destitution (Pierson & Leimgruber, 
2010; Van Langendonck & Put, 2002). 
 
                                                             
5 This implies that the definition of needs is not static; instead it is expected to be dynamic and 
change whenever the socioeconomic and sociodemographic context changes. This is visible in 
contemporary welfare states that protect against ‘old’ and ‘new’ social risks. The ‘old’ social risks, 
like unemployment, occupational injuries and sickness, find their roots in the period of 
industrialisation in which the welfare state was installed. The ‘new’ social risks (e.g. maternity 
protection, family and child burden) on their turn are rooted in the period of post-industrialisation 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
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The economic sphere 
Within the economic sphere, claims are based on the notion of productivity, as a 
compensation for work that was done, for services that were provided, and for capital that 
was made available. Here we can find ‘rewards’ such as wages, employer-sponsored 
benefits, interests and dividends from capital, etc. The importance of the economic sphere 
to make claims, depends on the claiming actors. For example, the economic sphere is 
particularly important for individuals and households in the middle life phase, as was the 
case in research of Rainwater et al. (1986), but it will be less important for individuals and 
households that are in a later life phase (cf. infra). 
The family sphere 
Within the sphere of the family, lastly, the claims are based on the principle of solidarity 
and exchange, with obligations resulting from affinity, reciprocity, and tradition. The 
claims that are made are different for different families and also not all family members 
can make the same claims (Rainwater et al., 1986). 
1.1.3 Rewards and claim packages 
The claims in the three spheres result in different types of ‘rewards’. These rewards do not 
always take the form of money income, also services and goods can be provided. Yet, it 
must be admitted that in the contemporary society money income is the most common 
answer to the claims that are made. Different claims, in different institutional spheres, lead 
to different rewards that are combined into “claim packages” (Rainwater et al., 1986, p. 
18). In the political sphere, a wide range of rewards has been installed via social policy. 
These include the provision of services and income transfers in the health care sector, 
education, housing, income maintenance (e.g. social security and social assistance benefits 
for old age, unemployment, labour injury, etc.)6 and personal social services (Pierson, 
1999). In the political sphere, the claims can also result in reduced spending, in that the 
‘rewards’ exempt households from certain taxes to be paid. For example, low-income 
households or families with children can claim for more favorable taxation rates based on 
their household situation.7 In the economic sphere, the claims result in, among others, 
wages, employer-sponsored health insurance, occupational pensions, interests and 
dividends, etc. In the family sphere, the claims will result often in the provision of services, 
 
                                                             
6 This resembles the notion of social welfare in Titmuss’ (1974a) categories of welfare provision.  
7 This is closely related to notion of fiscal welfare (Titmuss, 1974a). 
18 
like social care, but also gifts and financial transfers are considered as ‘rewards’ in the 
family sphere. 
Rainwater et al. describe the combination of rewards into claim packages as “the 
arithmetic sum of many separate sources (components) of income [within the household]” 
(Rainwater et al., 1986, p. 251). As discussed in the previous section, these income sources 
are the result of a complex process of claiming in different institutional spheres. In the 
research of Rainwater et al. (1986), labour market income was found to be the primary 
source of income for many families, and central in the majority of the household income 
packages. Also different types of (publically provided) income support, distributed in the 
political sphere, were included in the household income package. This involved public 
benefits and subsidies, that can be spent at one’s own discretion, but also “cash-like in-
kind benefits (…) [for example] the value of student aid, labour market training 
allowances, food stamps, and housing allowances” (Rainwater et al., 1986, pp. 7–8). 
Further, account was given to incomes from savings, interests or dividends from capital, 
and rental incomes to the household income package. Lastly, private transfers (between 
private individuals), like alimony and informal financial support, were included 
(Rainwater et al., 1986, pp. 251–253). Table 2.1 gives an overview of the different 
components. 
Table 2.1. Composition of the income package 
Earnings • Earnings of the male head of household – includes wages, salary and self-
employment income 
• Earnings of the female head of household 
Public transfers • Total work-related transfer income of the household – includes social 
security, unemployment and sickness benefits; transfer payments to which 
one is entitled of virtue of being employed. These are frequently forms of 
social insurance to which the worker has made contributory payments either 
directly or through his/her employer. Nevertheless, they are distributed by 
the government. 
• Means-tested transfer income for the household – includes welfare or public 
assistance, social help, and supplementary benefits distributed by the 
government. 
• Universal cash transfers – governmental transfers which are neither means-
tested nor work-related. For example, unconditional child allowances fall into 
this category. 
Private income • Capital income of heads of household – includes interests, dividends, and 
income from rent 
• Private pension payments 
• Private transfers – payments one receives from other individuals rather 
than the government; includes alimony and/or any other regular amount 
from relatives or friends. 
Other • Total taxable income of other (non-head(s) of household) adults 
• Miscellaneous transfers – transfer income which could not be allocated to 
one of the above categories. 
Source: Rainwater et al. (1986, p. 252) 
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Households compose their unique claim package, depending on the institutional spheres 
in which the household members are active, on their needs and preferences. This implies 
that, for example, a household that is not involved in the labour market is expected to 
make less claims in the economic sphere but will make more claims in the political and/or 
family sphere. The income package of this household will thus not include wages, but will 
include proportionally more social assistance benefits, allowances, other public benefits, 
gifts, etc. This also implies that these claim packages are not static: when the household’s 
needs and preferences change, the claims made will also change and the composition of 
the claim package will be modified.  
1.2 Critical reflections on the packaging theory 
Some critical reflections can be made on the packaging theory of Rainwater et al. (1986). 
Although the researchers mention that the boundaries between the spheres are somewhat 
blurred, but they do not go into the details of the possible overlap and interplay between 
the spheres, although this is of particular importance in the context of the contemporary 
welfare state. 
First, we wish to address the interaction between the economic and the political sphere. 
An important part of the income protection that is provided by the state is based on 
actions within the economic sphere. Social security benefits are often limited to workers, 
and depend on the wage-related social security contributions that were paid (cf. infra). 
Similarly, some rewards and claims in the economic sphere are the result of actions of the 
political sphere. When a legal framework, that regulates the claims and the rewards in the 
economic sphere, is set up by the government, the political sphere seeps into the economic 
or the family sphere. This is the case for, for example, specific rewards granted in the 
economic sector, but bound to government regulations on access, financing, benefits, 
eligibility, etc.8 This also is the case when the government provides tax incentives to actors 
in the economic sphere to organise certain rewards or to make certain claims (e.g. 
Johnson, 1987). To illustrate, this includes employer sponsored pension plays and 
additional employee health insurance schemes.    
Further, we find that the political sphere increasingly shifts responsibilities to the 
economic sphere, under the rationale to alleviate the financial burden on public social 
protection schemes. This explains for example the growing importance of private pension 
schemes and private health insurance schemes. However, because the rationales in the 
economic sphere and in the political sphere are different, this brings about important 
challenges for the contemporary welfare state (e.g. Ginn & Arber, 1999; Johnson, 1987; 
 
                                                             
8 This resembles the notion of occupational welfare, one of the three types of welfare distinguished 
by Titmuss (1974a). Occupational welfare includes the in cash and in kind mechanisms organised 
by the employer for his employees, within the legal framework and regulations of the government. 
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Pearson & Martin, 2005). Responsibilities that are shifted from the political to the 
economic sphere no longer are based on the rationale of equality, moral obligations and 
citizenship. Notions of productivity will get the overhand, and people not able to make 
productivity-based claims will face increased difficulties in finding adequate protection, 
and ensuring the overall stability and security of their lives.9  
In addition, the interaction between the three institutional spheres also implies that when 
the claims in one sphere are insufficient or absent, households draw on other spheres to 
compensate for this lack. To a certain extent these compensations are structurally 
incorporated in the other spheres, particularly in the political sphere. For example, social 
assistance, that is provided in the political sphere, is only available when no other claims 
can be made; it acts as a ultimate safety net for individuals or households that can make no 
proper claims.  
One should also note that the interplay between the three spheres, and the importance of 
the three spheres depends from country to country. This is closely related to the role and 
the interpretation that is given in the political sphere to the social policy concept. 
Depending on the social policy goals and objectives that are laid down by policy makers in 
the political sphere, the government’s actions range from minimal to fairly extensive. In 
case of minimal actions in the political sphere, the other two spheres will be more 
important, while in case of extensive actions in the political sphere, the family sphere and 
the economic sphere will be less important. This is closely related to the welfare state 
configuration: in the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) for example, the 
three main actors that are discerned (government, family, commercial sector) correspond 
to the three spheres that are central in the packaging theory of Rainwater et al. (1986). 
Lastly, it must be stressed that the “claim package” of Rainwater and his colleagues (1986) 
shows a strong preference for money income. As a consequence, non-cash sources that 
indirectly contribute to the disposable income are excluded, although their potential 
contribution to protecting the welfare and wellbeing of the population cannot be 
neglected. 
2. Applying the packaging approach to old age protection 
In the development of their packaging concept, Rainwater et al. (1986) explicitly focused 
on households in the middle stage of the life cycle to guarantee an interplay between the 
different institutional spheres. However, we consider the packaging approach as an 
 
                                                             
9 This trend can already be observed in countries where the economic sphere plays an important 
role in society. According to research of Vogel (1999), higher poverty rates and important 
inequalities in the income distribution are found in countries where the economic sphere is central, 
than in countries where the political sphere plays an important role.  
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interesting theoretical framework to investigate the protection of the elderly population, 
and specifically the protection of the elderly population against the financial and 
functional dimension of old age dependency. In the next sections, we will discuss the 
notions of claim, spheres and rewards from the specific perspective of the elderly 
population. 
2.1 Claims 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the elderly population is confronted with old age 
financial and functional dependency. The claims older individuals and households make 
intend to reduce the negative consequences of this old age dependency, and have to 
contribute to their welfare, wellbeing, safety and stability. It must be noted however that, 
because of the confrontation of the elderly population, with functional dependency we 
explicitly have to include non-monetary ‘rewards’ to the claims for safety, welfare and 
wellbeing that are made by the elderly population. In kind care mechanisms are needed to 
protect the elderly population against the negative effects of physical ageing. This is an 
extension of the original packaging theory of Rainwater et al. (1986), in which in kind 
mechanisms were not included in the claim packages and the focus was on monetary 
income as the main reward. 
2.2 Three institutional spheres  
As the households that were included in the study of Rainwater et al. (1986), older 
households make claims in three institutional spheres: the family sphere, the economic 
sphere and the political sphere. Claims in the family sphere are based on notions of 
intergenerational solidarity, reciprocity and altruism. Within families, younger relatives 
are expected to stand in for the welfare and wellbeing of older relatives whenever this is 
necessary, and vice versa. This often takes the form of informal care from children to their 
older parents (Arber & Attias-Donfut, 2000; Daatland, 1990). The claims in the family 
sphere can be stimulated by the actors in the political sphere, for example via the 
provision of informal care subsidies to compensate informal care givers for the care they 
provide. These subsidies can be claimed by informal care givers in the political sphere, 
based on their actions in the family sphere; or they can be claimed by the informal care 
receivers, based on notions of solidarity and citizenship (cf. infra). Also, the political 
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sphere can enforce these claims in the family sphere by drawing a legal framework for the 
provision of care to family members in need.10  
Claims in the economic sphere are based on the contributions individuals have made 
during their labour market career, or on the capital they provide (via savings, stocks and 
bonds, etc.). For example, elderly can claim for an employer-provided occupational 
pension based on the employment during their active life phase. Further, sometimes 
elderly can claim for additional health insurance based on the continuation of their 
employer-provided health insurance plan.  
Lastly, the political sphere – the government – is very important when the protection of 
the elderly population against age-related dependency is considered. The claims that are 
made by the elderly population within the political sphere are based on different 
rationales. A first rationale underlines the fact that old age is considered as a social risk, 
and that providing protection against the needs related to this risk is one of the seminal 
tasks of the contemporary welfare state. Old age is one of the social risks that is 
acknowledged in the political sphere to be covered by society, via a system of social 
protection.11 A second rationale, that allows elderly to claim for protection against old age 
dependency, stresses the importance of social equality and the need of redistribution. 
Resources are redistributed from individuals and households not confronted with the risk 
of old age to individuals and households that are confronted with this risk (horizontal 
redistribution). Moreover, within the elderly population, certain groups can claim for 
increased level of (income) protection because they have a higher risk on poverty and 
destitution. Vertical redistribution takes places between high-income individuals and 
households and low-income individuals and households. Lastly, from the citizenship 
rationale, elderly can claim old age social assistance, and health and social care services. 
The preservation of a good health status of the population and the provision of health and 
 
                                                             
10 An important strand of literature exists on the interplay between the political and the family 
sphere in the provision of social care. Much has been written about whether or not protection that 
is provided in the political sphere rules out the protection that is provided in the family sphere. One 
could expect that the development of a wide range of care initiatives in the political sphere has 
encouraged elderly to make more claims in the political sphere and less in the family sphere. 
However, only limited evidence is found for this crowding out of claims in the family sphere by the 
political sphere (e.g. Liliana E. Pezzin, Kemper, & Reschovsky, 1996; Liliane E. Pezzin & Schone, 
1999; Viitanen, 2007). The bulk of the research points to a certain degree of complementation 
between the political and the family sphere. Elderly in need of care make claims in both spheres, 
but the rationale of the claims and the rewards is different. For example, researchers (e.g. Attias-
Donfut & Rozenkier, 1995; Bonsang, 2008; Brandt, Haberkern, & Szydlik, 2009; Daatland & 
Lowenstein, 2005; Künemund & Rein, 1999) have found that in the political sphere claims are made 
for specialised care, or social care services that cannot be provided by care givers in the family 
sphere; while in the family sphere claims are made for the daily, non-specialised care. 
11 Old age is included in the classification of social risks of the International Labour Organisation 
(2010). Further, also the European Commission (European Commission Employment and Social 
Affairs, 2009) and the OECD (OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, no date) 
acknowledged the increased risks that are related to old age and the central role the government 
has to play in providing protection against these risks. 
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social care services is often considered as one of the seminal tasks of the contemporary 
welfare state (either via the organisation of these services or via the installation of a health 
and care insurance scheme) (Pierson & Castles, 2000; Titmuss, 1974b). 
2.3 The rewards: the old age income and care package 
As said, the claims of the elderly population are focused on the two main dimensions of old 
age dependency: financial dependency and functional dependency. The old age income 
package includes the rewards from the claims elderly make in the three spheres to protect 
themselves against falling into poverty and to safeguard their standard of living after 
leaving the labour market. The old age care package includes the rewards from the claims 
elderly make to protection their health and functional status, and to safeguard their 
welfare and wellbeing. 
First, we consider the potential components of the old age income package. Overall, public 
pensions are found to be the main component of the old age income package. Claims for 
public pensions are made in the political sphere, and are based on notions of solidarity 
and citizenship (cf. supra). Public pensions are particularly important in countries where 
quite generous social security pensions have been developed (e.g. Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden, etc.) (Börsch-Supan & Reil-Held, 1997; West Pedersen, 2004). The claims for 
public pensions are to a certain extent also based on the former activities of the elderly in 
the economic sphere (cf. supra). Public pensions are often related to the former wage, the 
length of the labour market career and the social security contributions paid. This again 
underlines the interaction between the political and the economic sphere. In addition, in 
the public sphere also old age social assistance and a wide range of other in cash benefits 
are found to compensate for the financial risk of old age. In the economic sphere, 
occupational pensions and private pensions have grown in importance in the last years, 
driven by the claims for additional protection in the economic sphere, but also from the 
rationale of the political sphere to reduce the financial burden of the public pension 
system by increasing the role of other, non-public income sources (European Commission 
Social Protection Committee, 2006) (cf. supra). The revenues from financial assets on their 
turn are expected to be an important source of income for the elderly population, not only 
because they contribute directly to the household income via interests and dividends, but 
also because of their indirect contribution. Savings are considered to be a financial back-
up that can be spent in case of unexpected expenses (Keynes, 1936, cited in Browning & 
Lusardi, 1996; Casey & Yamada, 2002). The same is true for property ownership. Home 
ownership does not yield a direct income, but - when the mortgage is redeemed - it 
‘releases’ the household budget from rent, leaving mortgage-free home owners with a 
larger disposable income than tenants (Kemeny, 2005; Ritakallio, 2003). In the family 
sphere, financial transfers and gifts could contribute to the income package of the elderly 
population. However, the relative weight of these informal transfers is expected to be 
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rather limited, since claims in the family sphere mostly result in the provision of services 
and goods (cf. supra).  
Second, we consider the potential components of the old age care package. A wide range of 
mechanisms and services have been organised to mitigate the adverse effects of the age-
related decreases in the population’s health and functional status. These include a wide 
range of mechanisms that provide financial compensations for the use of the health and 
social care services. Elderly compose their care packages based on their needs and 
preferences, depending on the sources and actors that are available.  This leads to a kind of 
“patch working” or “quilt making” of care services (Balbo, 1987, cited in Gerhard, Knijn, & 
Weckwert, 2005). Health care services include, among other, consultations with doctors 
and specialists, inpatient and outpatient treatments in hospitals, rehabilitation, nursing 
care, etc. Common to the health care services is that they are provided by professional, 
specialised and trained care givers (e.g. doctors, nurses, therapists, specialists, etc.), either 
inside or outside the home of the care receiver. The services themselves or 
reimbursements for the use of these services via health insurance schemes can be claimed 
in the political sphere (via public health services and/or national health insurance 
schemes) or in the economic sphere (employer-provided health services or health 
insurance schemes). The specialised character of the health care services makes them less 
interesting for the family sphere. Besides health care services, also the wide range of social 
care services are included in the old age care package. This refers to all services associated 
to help with basic activities of daily living and instrumental activities of daily living (resp. 
ADL and IADL). Help with ADL refers to personal care like bathing, getting dressed, using 
the toilet, eating, etc., while help with IADL refers to home help (gardening, shopping, 
cooking, etc.) (European Commission Directorate for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities, 2008; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005). 
The – overall – low degree of specialisation that is needed to provide these care services, 
makes them open for claims from the three institutional spheres: the political sphere (as 
part of the public health services and the national health or long-term care insurance 
schemes); the economic sphere (as part of an employer-provided health or long-
term/social care insurance scheme); and the family sphere (informal care provided by 
relatives).12 
3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main theoretical framework of this study was discussed. In the 
packaging approach, Rainwater et al. (1986) combine the concepts of ‘claims’, ‘rewards’ 
 
                                                             
12 The old age care package refers to the type of care, irrespective of the location of the care 
provision. Consequently, also the care provided in (semi-)residential care facilities can be part of 
the old age care package. 
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and ‘institutional spheres’ to discuss the combination of income sources by households to 
safeguard their living situation, financial stability and security. The focus is on money 
income, although Rainwater and his colleagues (1986) do not neglect the potential 
importance of other non-monetary income sources. 
As discussed, to use the packaging approach of Rainwater et al. (1986) to study the 
protection of the elderly population, we expand and widen the original theory. We expand 
the theoretical concept by applying it to a different population, namely the elderly 
population. This is particularly interesting in the light of the current process of population 
ageing and in the increasing prevalence and importance of age-related dependency issues, 
like financial and functional dependency. In addition, we widen the original concept by 
including not only income sources (in cash), but by including also help and care (in kind). 
Both sources have to contribute to protecting the standard of living after retirement, to 
providing protection against destitution and poverty, and overall, to contribute to the 
welfare and wellbeing of the elderly population.  
 
In the next chapters we explore the potential components of the income and the care 
packages of the elderly population. In chapter 3 the wide range of income sources 
available to the Belgian elderly population is discussed. In addition, we also give an 
overview of the current research explaining differences in the income sources. In chapter 
4, we focus on the wide range of health and long-term care services that are available to 
the elderly population. Also the determinants explaining differences in the use of these 
health and long-term care services are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPLORATION OF 
THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 
In the previous chapter, we introduced the packaging approach as the theoretical 
framework that is used in this dissertation to study the protection of the elderly 
population against the consequences of old age financial and functional dependency. In 
this chapter, the actual sources available to the elderly population to protect them against 
the risks of old age financial dependency will be discussed. In doing so, more general 
research on the old age income package is reviewed, and an extensive overview of the 
different income sources available to the elderly population within the Belgian context is 
provided. Lastly, attention is paid to a number of determinants influencing the 
composition and the protection provided by the old age income package.  
The insights should lead to the conclusion that, whereas old age income protection often is 
conceived as a three-pillar system including public pensions, occupational pensions and 
private pensions, actually six income pillars can be discerned. Besides public pensions, 
occupational pensions, and private (fiscally stimulated) pensions, the old age income 
package also includes personal (non-fiscally stimulated) savings, property ownership and 
other public cash transfers (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1. Multi-pillar composition of the old age income package 
 
1. General insights 
Different studies have been conducted comparing the composition of the income package 
of the older population in different Western countries (e.g. Börsch-Supan & Reil-Held, 
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1997; Casey & Yamada, 2002; Ebbinghaus & Neugschwender, 2011; Gornick, Sierminska, 
& Smeeding, 2009; Heinrich, 2000; Kohl, 1992; Rein & Turner, 1999; Smeeding & 
Sandström, 2005; West Pedersen, 2004; Whitehouse, 2000; Williamson & Smeeding, 2004; 
Yamada, 2002). A general finding from these studies is that important differences exist 
between countries on the composition of the income packages of the elderly population. 
These differences can be traced back to the government’s policy orientations, the 
socioeconomic context, historical events, etc.  
Roughly speaking, the different compositions of the income package can be linked to the 
welfare state configurations in the welfare regime approach of Esping-Andersen (1990). 
This was confirmed in a study of Maître, Nolan, and Whelan (2005), where the 
composition of the income package was analysed for all EU Members States (except 
Sweden) based on data from the third wave of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) (see Table 3.1). Public transfers were found to be more important in social-
democratic and conservative welfare states, while occupational pensions showed to be 
more important in the liberal regimes (see also Börsch-Supan & Reil-Held, 1997; Casey & 
Yamada, 2002). This corresponds with the importance of the political sphere and the 
economic sphere in the different welfare regimes (cf. supra). 
Table 3.1. Components of the income package and the welfare state configuration 
Welfare state configuration Public versus private income components 
Liberal  • Minor role of public pensions in retirement income package 
(e.g. UK, US) • Important contribution of private pensions to retirement 
income package 
 • Public pensions more important for those in lower income 
quintiles 
Conservative  
(e.g. France, Germany) 
Major role of public pensions in retirement income package 
Social-democratic  • Major role of public pensions in retirement income package 
(e.g. Sweden, Denmark) • Overall important role of public pensions (independent of 
income) 
Source: Börsch-Supan & Reil-Held (1997); Casey & Yamada (2002); Maître et al. (2005); 
West Pedersen (2004) 
However, the differences in the composition of the old age income package only hold for 
the relative importance of the components in the total income. In general, the income 
package of the elderly population consists of the following components, irrespective of the 
welfare regime configuration (in descending importance): 
 public pensions, either earnings-related or flat-rate; 
 occupational pensions, provided via the employer; 
 other private income sources, like income from personal pension plans and 
capital income (interests, dividends, etc.). 
Overall, public pensions (both earnings-related and social assistance pensions) are the 
most important part of the retirement income package, independent of how the public 
pension system is organised (e.g. Casey & Yamada, 2002; Hardy, 2009; OECD, 2001; 
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Whitehouse, 2000). These pensions can be used to attain different goals: providing 
minimum income protection during old age, safeguarding the standard of living after 
labour market withdrawal, or contributing to a vertical redistribution of the available 
income among the elderly population. In countries where public pensions are considered 
as earnings-related pension provision, the public pension is the most important income 
source for the bulk of the population. The main goal in that case is to protect the standard 
of living during the retirement period. However, in countries where public pensions serve 
as minimum income protection and only flat-rate benefits are provided, public pensions 
tend to be very important for those with lower incomes, but are less important for those in 
the higher income groups (Casey & Yamada, 2002; Hardy, 2009).  
Occupational pensions, provided by the employer, are shown to be the second most 
important income source of the elderly population, independent from the government’s 
involvement in their organisation and regulation. Overall, occupational pensions serve the 
goal of living standard protection. Minimum income protection, nor vertical redistribution 
of resources is considered as important in occupational pension plans. The importance of 
this income source in the overall retirement income package is related to the income level 
of the individual: employer-sponsored pensions are more important for those at the upper 
end of the income distribution (middle and high incomes) than for those at the lower end 
of the income distribution (Casey & Yamada, 2002; Hardy, 2009; OECD, 2001). This 
particularly is the case in countries where only a minor part of the population receives 
private pensions (Casey & Yamada, 2002). 
With regard to financial assets, research has shown that there is no straightforward 
relationship between asset income and the overall income level. The bulk of the 
population draws in some extent on asset income, and a comparison of households within 
the same income groups has shown important within-group differences on the level of 
assets (e.g. Börsch-Supan & Reil-Held, 1997; Casey & Yamada, 2002; Venti & Wise, 2001, 
cited in Hardy, 2009). However, Casey and Yamada (2002) as well as Yamada (2002) 
found that the importance of assets in the total retirement income package increases with 
income: assets contribute more to the income of pensioners in the middle and high-
income groups than to the income of low-income pensioners.  
Further, evidence is found that the number of income sources (i.e. diversification of the 
income package) is related to the income level (OECD, 2001; Rein & Turner, 1999; 
Whitehouse, 2000; Yamada, 2002). Pensioners with a low average income are found to 
rely on only a single income source, mostly the public pension. In the middle-income 
group, pensioners still importantly depend on public pensions, but the importance, and 
consequently the number of other income sources in the retirement income package, 
grows. In the high-income group pensioners are found to combine a number of income 
sources, resulting in a quite diversified in cash social protection package.  
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2. Exploring the potential income package components within the 
Belgian context 
In this section, detailed information is provided on the different sources available to the 
Belgian elderly population to protect them against the financial dimension of old age 
dependency. However, this is without the intention to provide an exhaustive overview of 
all modalities, regulations and conditions of the different components, since this 
information can be easily consulted in social security reference books (e.g. Agten & 
Asselberghs, 2009; De Brabanter, Gieselink, Petry, Roels, & Stevens, 2004; Van 
Langendonck & Put, 2002). Table 3.2 gives an overview of the different income sources 
available to the Belgian elderly population.  
Table 3.2. Overview of the potential components of the income package of the 
Belgian elderly population 
Sector Type  
Public  Social insurance benefits Old age pension 
 Survivor pension 
Social assistance benefits Income guarantee scheme for the elderly 
Other social transfers Care related allowances 
 Housing benefits 
 Heating benefits 
Occupational Business pension plan 
Sectoral pension plan 
Private Life insurance 
Personal pension savings account with tax expenditure 
Personals savings without tax expenditure 
Property ownership 
Where possible, statistics are presented on the importance of the different income 
components for the Belgian elderly population. However, it will become clear that this was 
only possible for a limited number of income sources, namely the public and occupational 
pension protection, as well as a limited number of additional publically provided benefits 
targeted to the elderly population. Little to no accurate information is available on the 
importance of private pension plans, financial assets and property ownership in the 
income package of the Belgian elderly population. 
2.1 Public pension protection 
The most important income source of the Belgian elderly population are the social 
insurance benefits provided by the government via the public pension system. This system 
is strongly employment related, in that every person who has paid social security 
contributions during his or her active labour market career is eligible for an old age 
pension. Further, in case of death, the government provides social insurance benefits to 
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specific categories of relatives (i.e. the surviving spouse and/or children). Both the old age 
pension and the survivor pension aim at protecting the standard of living via the provision 
of income-related benefits. 
2.1.1 Public retirement pension 
With regard to the retirement pension, three different pension systems have been 
installed in Belgium, depending on the employment statute during the labour market 
career: a pension system for employees, one for the self-employed and one for statutory 
civil servants.13 In general one can apply for an old age pension when reaching the age of 
65, although under specific circumstances an early retirement system is open from the age 
of 62. Further, the receipt of a retirement pension implies an important reduction in 
labour market activities, although the pension can be combined with a limited income 
from employment.  
Despite the fact that the main aspiration of the retirement pension is to protect the living 
standard of the elderly population, the transition from a labour market income to a 
retirement pension always implies a reduction in the disposable income. The generosity of 
the retirement pension depends on a number of factors: 
 the former employment statute (i.e. employee, self-employed or statutory civil 
servant); 
 the length of the labour market career (the number of years worked);  
 the income from employment during the active labour market career; and 
 the composition of the household (living with or without a dependent spouse; 
only for employees and the self-employed). 
The pension system for statutory civil servants is considered as the most generous 
pension system, followed by that of the employees; the public retirement pension 
protection of the self-employed is considered as the least generous. This stems from 
important differences in the pension calculation; an overview of these differences is 
provided in Table 3.3.  
For employees and self-employed persons, on the one hand, a maximum of 45 years of 
work is taken into account; whenever the pensioner has worked more than 45 years, the 
least profitable years are left out of the pension calculation. For civil servants, on the other 
hand, all years worked as a statutory civil servant, multiplied by a factor of 1/60 
(“tantième”) are taken into account. To a certain level, periods without employment, due 
 
                                                             
13 For more information on the different pension systems, consult the website of National Pension 
Office (http://www.onprvp.be) (for employees), the National Institute for the Social Security of the 
Self-employed (http://www.rsvz-inasti.fgov.be), and the Pension Service of the Governmental 
sector (http://www.pdos.fgov.be). 
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to unemployment, labour market disability, career interruption, etc., are taken into 
account (so-called assimilated periods).  
Regarding the account given to the former labour market income, for employees and self-
employed persons the average wage per year worked is included in the pension 
calculation. The level of these wages is limited, so that those with high earnings during 
their labour market career will not receive similarly high pensions during retirement. This 
induces a certain degree of vertical redistribution of resources (cf. chapter 2). Further, 
these wages are revaluated to adapt them to changes in the costs of living and the welfare 
level. For employees, for the periods worked before 1955 flat-rate wages are taken into 
account; the same holds for periods of self-employment before 1984. For assimilated 
periods (cf. infra: periods without actual employment, but taken into account in the 
pension calculation) fictive wages are used in the pension calculation. Statutory civil 
servants, in contrast, receive a pension calculated on the average wage of the last ten years 
of work. Since wages tend to increase during the labour market career, this has important 
consequences for the generosity of the pension: retirement pensions of statutory civil 
servants are thus importantly more generous compared to those of employees or the self-
employed with similar labour market careers.  
Lastly, in the pension systems of the employees and the self-employed, the household 
composition influences the actual pension payment. Married pensioners with a dependent 
spouse (i.e. a spouse without an individual income, be it from the public pension system, 
from the social security system, or from employment) receive a family pension, calculated 
at a ratio of 75%. Single pensioners, or pensioners without a dependent spouse (i.e. a 
spouse with an individual income) receive a singles pension calculated at a ratio of 60%. 
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Table 3.3. An overview of the most important differences between the pension 
system of employees, the self-employed and statutory civil servants 
 Employees Self-employed Statutory civil servants 
Length 
of career 
Number of years worked 
as an employee 
Number of years worked 
as self-employed 
Number of years worked 
as a statutory civil  
Servant 
 
 Assimilated periods  
 
Assimilated periods Assimilated periods 
 Max. 45 years Max. 45 years “Tantième”: 1/60 
Income Average (revaluated*) 
wage per year worked  
Average (revaluated*) 
earnings per year 
worked 
 
Average wage of last ten 
years worked 
 Flat-rate wage for years 
worked before 1955 
Flat-rate earnings for 
years worked before 
1984 
 
 
 Fictive wage for 
assimilated periods 
Fictive earnings for 
assimilated periods 
 
Household 
situation 
Married with a 
dependent spouse: 75% 
Married with a 
dependent spouse: 75% 
 
No account is given to the 
household situation 
 Single or married with an 
independent spouse**: 
60% 
Single or married with an 
independent spouse**: 
60% 
 
* Adapted to changes in the costs of living and the welfare level. 
** An independent spouse is considered to having sufficient individual income, be it via the public pension system or via 
employment. 
2.1.2 Minimum retirement pension and minimum right per year worked 
Despite having worked before the retirement age, it is possible that the public old age 
pension is below a certain threshold, for example because of low wages or because the 
person did not work enough years. For this group of pensioners, a minimum retirement 
pension is organised providing them with a minimum level of old age income protection. 
Employees and the self-employed have to fulfil a minimum labour market condition to 
gain access to this minimum pension system. They have to prove at least two thirds of 
(full-time) employment of a complete labour market career of 45 years (i.e. 30 years). The 
minimum pension is thus calculated taking account the number of years worked. For 
statutory civil servants, the guaranteed minimum pension provides a supplement to the 
regular old age pension. The level of this supplement equals the difference between the 
real old age pension (based on the regular pension calculation) and the minimum pension 
threshold.  
A second strategy to provide a minimum level of retirement protection to pensioners is 
found in the minimum right per year worked (the guaranteed minimum wage per year 
worked). In case the wage earned during a specific year is lower than the threshold wage, 
the wage used in the retirement pension calculation is raised to meet this threshold. 
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Consequently, the retirement pension in that case is calculated on a higher wage than 
actually earned during that year of the labour market career, leading to a more profitable 
retirement pension than would be the case when based on the actual revenues. 
2.1.3 Public survivor pension 
The organisation of the survivor pension is closely related to the retirement pension, 
though differences exist in the reasons for granting these pensions. Whereas the public 
retirement pension has to safeguard the living standard after labour market withdrawal at 
retirement age, the public survivor pension has to protect the living standard of the 
surviving spouse after the decease of his/her partner, and related to that, the loss of the 
spouse’s labour market income.  
As is the case in the public retirement pension system, in the public survivor pension 
system a difference is made between employees, self-employed and civil servants. This is 
based on the labour market activities of the deceased spouse. Access to the system of 
survivor pensions is limited. One can only apply for a survivor pension from the age of 45 
(age condition), although a number of exceptions exist. For example, a surviving spouse 
with little children can apply for a public survivor pension before the age of 45. Further, 
one had to be married at least one year with the deceased spouse (marriage condition). 
Cohabitation does not open the right to a public survivor pension. Lastly, the receipt of a 
survivor pension can only to a certain extent be combined with employment income, thus 
the labour market activities of the surviving spouse have to be limited to apply for a public 
survivor pension (employment condition).  
For the calculation of the survivor pension the same modalities hold as for the retirement 
pension, with the difference that account is given to the labour market career of the 
deceased spouse. The average wage during the labour market career and the number of 
years worked play a decisive role in the amount of the pension. The survivor pension 
shows to be important for a large group of older widows without a sufficient labour 
market career to apply for a personal retirement pension. 
2.1.4 Holiday allowance 
Besides the regular monthly pension payments, pensioners eligible to a retirement 
pension or a survivor pension also receive a holiday allowance in the month of May. For 
retired employees and self-employed persons the level of this allowance depends on the 
level of the regular pension benefits. For retired civil servants, holiday allowances are only 
paid to pensioners with a public pension below a specific threshold. 
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2.1.5 Public minimum income protection 
Elderly persons with an insufficient income of their own, for example because of 
insufficient public pension rights, can apply for an Income Guarantee for the Elderly 
[Inkomensgarantie voor Ouderen], a social assistance benefit that has to guarantee 
minimum income protection to elderly that cannot cope by themselves, for example, 
because they did not perform sufficient labour market activities during their active life.  
One can apply for the Income Guarantee benefit at the age of 65. Its granting depends on 
an extensive means-test, in which account is given to both personal income sources and 
income sources of other household members. To a certain extent, the Income Guarantee 
benefit can be combined with other income sources like a retirement or survivor pension. 
Further, the generosity of the Income Guarantee benefit depends on the living situation of 
the receiver. Elderly living alone can apply for a higher benefit than elderly living together 
with others. This is based on the assumption that returns of scale result from cohabitation 
(Van Langendonck & Put, 2002).14 
2.1.6 Some facts and figures on the Belgian public pension protection 
Some facts and figures on the public pension protection in Belgium are presented in Table 
3.4. These figures refer to the situation of the retired population in 2007, and are drawn 
from administrative data records. The information on the population receiving a public 
pension is drawn from the online application from the Datawarehouse on the Labour 
Market and Social Security (Crossroads Bank for Social Security, 2014), while the 
information on the level of the public pensions is drawn from the 2010 Belgian Pension 
Atlas (Berghman et al., 2010). 
In 2007, 64% of the population aged 60 years and over received a public retirement 
pension. The majority of this group was completely retired (95%), whereas about 5% 
combined this public retirement pension with an income from employment. On average, 
the public retirement pension amounted to almost 1300 Euros per month (gross, non-
equivalent income) for elderly receiving a public retirement pension, not combined with 
other public pensions. About one fifth of the population aged 60 years and over was found 
to receive a public survivor pension (20%). Again, the majority of this group does not 
combine this with an income from employment (98%). The mean monthly gross survivor 
pension was 1030 Euros per month for elderly receiving only a public survivor pension. 
About 4% of the population aged 60 and over had an income not sufficient according to 
the norms of the public minimum income protection scheme in 2007, and thus received an 
Income Guarantee benefit for the Elderly (on average 753 Euros per month). 
 
                                                             
14 For more information on the Income Guarantee for the Elderly, consult the website of the 
National Pension Office (http://www.onprvp.be), and the FPS Social Security (2011). 
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Table 3.4. Public pension protection: facts and figures (2007) 
Type N % Average level 
Public retirement pension 1606310 64  
  Completely retired 1530784 95 1288* 
  Combined with employment 75526 5  
Public survivor pension 500618 20  
  Completely retired 490187 98 1030* 
  Combined with employment 10431 2  
Income Guarantee for the Elderly 90392 4 753⧖ 
Unknown income 326356 12  
Total  2523676 100  
Note: All amounts refer to gross, monthly, non-equivalent pension incomes in Euros. The statistics are limited to the 
population aged 60 years and over. 
* For pensioners receiving only a public retirement, resp. public survivor pension. 
⧖ For pensioners receiving an Income Guarantee benefit, whether or not combined with other public pensions. 
Source: Berghman et al. (2010); Kruispuntbank Sociale Zekerheid (2014) 
Note that for about 12% of the Belgian population aged 60 years and over no income 
information is included in the data of the Datawarehouse on the Labour Market and Social 
Security (“unknown income”). The assumption is that this group of elderly mainly consists 
of individuals without a personal income, but living together with a partner that receives a 
public retirement pension. Also elderly with only private means or living off his/her 
interest belong to this group of elderly (Crossroads Bank for Social Security, 2010). 
2.2 Occupational pension protection 
In addition to public pension protection, a part of the elderly population receives an 
occupational pension. These pensions are directly related to the former labour market 
situation of the individual, be it via its former employer(s) or via the labour market 
sector(s) in which the pensioner has worked during his/her labour market career. Special 
occupational pension schemes exist for the self-employed. 
2.2.1 Occupational pension protection for retired employees 
The government has developed a legal basis for occupational pension plans for retired 
employees to avoid discrimination and unfairness in the attribution of these pensions.15 
Two main types of occupational pension plans are discerned: industry pension plans and 
 
                                                             
15 For example the 2003 Act on Supplementary Pensions (B.A. 26 mei 2003) [Wet van 28 april 2003 
betreffende de aanvullende pensioenen en het belastingstelsel van die pensioenen en van sommige 
aanvullende voordelen inzake sociale zekerheid]. 
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business pension plans. For both, the main goal is to protect the living standard after 
retirement. 
Industry pension plans or sector pension plans are the result of actions of employers’ 
organisations and workers’ unions to improve the working conditions for the employees 
in certain labour market sectors. They aim to bridge the gap between the public 
retirement pension and the labour market earnings at the end of the labour market career. 
These plans are laid down in collective labour agreements, and have a binding character. 
All enterprises within the sector are obliged to follow the regulations and have to register 
their employees for the industry pension plan. Company pension plans, on the other hand, 
are developed at the enterprise level. Collective business pension plans cover the entire 
workforce of an enterprise, or a well-defined group of employees. No discrimination is 
allowed in both the access and generosity of the pension plan16. For example, occupational 
plans may not differentiate between men and women on the access, coverage and 
protection provided; also no difference may be made between employees in full-time or in 
part-time employment in access to the pension plan. 
Besides these collective pension plans, under strict conditions also individual pension 
promises can be made to single employees. The main condition for the organisation of an 
individual pension plan is the existence of a collective pension plan for the entire 
workforce of the company.17 
Occupational pension schemes are based on contributions paid by the employee (and the 
employer) during the labour market career. Unlimited payments can be made, however, 
this mostly is not the case since the contributions for the financing of an occupational 
pension plan are tax-deductible only to a certain threshold (De Brabanter et al., 2004). At 
the moment of retirement, and at least at the age of 60, the employee will receive an 
occupational pension, be it as a single lump sum payment, or as regular annuity payments. 
In Belgium, most occupational pensions are paid out as single lump sum payments, 
because of the more preferential tax treatment of lump sum payments compared to 
regular annuity payments.  
Some occupational pension arrangements also provide additional survivor pensions 
and/or contain a solidarity module. Such a module protects the occupational pension 
built-up during specified periods of inactivity like involuntary unemployment, sickness, 
maternity leave, etc. The choice of the risks protected depends on the pension plan with 
the restriction that at least three contingencies have to be included to be recognised as a 
social pension plan (De Brabanter et al., 2004). 
 
                                                             
16 Article 14 of the Act on Supplementary Pensions (B.A. 26 mei 2003). 
17 Article 6 of the Act on Supplementary Pensions (B.A. 26 mei 2003). 
39 
2.2.2 Occupational pension protection for retired self-employed persons 
Individuals who are self-employed during their labour market career, have the possibility 
to opt in for a voluntary additional pension for the self-employed [Vrij Aanvullend 
Pensioen voor Zelfstandigen], providing additional income protection during old age.  
These occupational pension plans are organised and offered by private insurance 
companies. The contributions paid are tax-deductible, be it to a certain threshold, as is the 
case with the occupational pension plans for employees. The pension plans can be 
modelled to the preferences of the self-employed person (for example concerning the risks 
covered, the payment modalities, etc.). It should provide additional retirement income 
protection, however, also additional survivor pensions can be included. Further, the so-
called “social” voluntary occupational pensions for the self-employed also provided 
protection in case the self-employed individual is confronted with disability, decease, 
bankrupts, etc. (Van Eesbeeck & Vereycken, 2004). 
In addition to the voluntary additional pension for the self-employed, self-employed 
company managers can draw on a number of other occupational pension schemes, mostly 
in the form of individual pension promises from the company to the manager (Van 
Eesbeeck & Vereycken, 2004). The individual pension plans can be combined with a 
voluntary additional pension for the self-employed.  
2.2.3 Some facts and figures on the Belgian occupational pension protection 
Little accurate information is available on the importance of the occupational pension 
protection for the Belgian elderly population. Until recently, no central databank existed 
with information on occupational pensions in Belgium. As a reaction to this, in 2011 the 
Databank on supplementary pensions (DB2P) was launched, collecting information on 
different aspects of occupational pensions (both built-up and payment of occupational 
pensions).18 However, it is not yet possible to extract statistics from this database to 
investigate the importance of occupational pensions for Belgian pensioners. We thus 
collected some facts and figures from other data sources to illustrate the role of 
occupational pension protection in the old age income package of Belgian pensioners 
(Table 3.5). 
  
 
                                                             
18 For more information on the Supplementary Pensions Database, consult the website: 
http://www.db2p.be 
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Table 3.5. Occupational pension protection: Facts and figures (2007) 
Type N % Average level 
Occupational pension for employees 205457  575 
  Annuity payments 38841 73  
  Lump sum payments 149049 19  
  Combination of annuity and lump sum 17940 9  
Occupational pension for self-employed 2916   
  Annuity payments 870 30 3800 
  Lump sum payments 2046 70 25000 
Note: The occupational pensions for employees refers to retired employees receiving only a public retirement pension, 
combined with an occupational pension. The average level includes both the annuity and the lump sum payments 
(converted to fictitious annuities), and refers to gross monthly payments in Euros. The occupational pensions for the self-
employed refer to the self-employed retired in 2007. The annuity payments refer to gross annual payments. 
Source: Berghman et al., 2010; Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, 2009 
In 2007 205457 retired employees, or 35% of the total population of pensioners with an 
employee retirement pension, received an occupational pension. More than 70% of this 
group opted for a lump sum payment, while about 19% received (and still receives) 
his/her supplementary pension as an annuity payment. On average, the occupational 
pension contributed 575 Euros per month to the income of the elderly population (lump 
sum payments were transposed to fictitious annuities).  
For elderly receiving a public self-employment retirement pension, information was only 
available for self-employed individuals that retired in 2007. Based on the bi-annual report 
of the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (2009), in 2007 about 14% of the 
retired self-employed elderly population received a voluntary additional pension for the 
self-employed. The majority of this group opted for a single lump sum payment (on 
average 25000 Euros), while about 30% chose to receive the occupational pension in the 
form of regular annuities (on average 3800 Euros per year). 
2.3 Fiscally stimulated private pension protection 
Private pension plans are the result of an agreement between the individual and a private 
insurance company offering additional pension protection at old age. Two main types of 
private pension plans are discerned: the individual pension savings account, and the 
individual life insurance. Both have a certain legal basis, in that the Belgian government 
provides tax exemptions for savings made via these arrangements.  
In an individual pension savings account, annual deposits are made, and the accumulated 
capital (annual deposits + annual interest) can be withdrawn at the age of 65. Tax 
exemptions are provided for the annual deposits, whenever they do not exceed a fixed 
threshold. These tax exemptions have to promote individual pension savings and 
stimulate the population in contributing to their own old age income protection. Overall, 
the pension is paid out as a single lump sum payment, although the beneficiary is free to 
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opt for regular annuity payments. Obviously, only elderly who have contributed to such an 
individual pension plan can profit from it during old age.  
Another fiscally stimulated savings product is the individual life insurance, that can be 
contracted to provide an additional income when reaching old age. Tax exemptions are 
available for individual life insurance plans with a guaranteed return. Individual life 
insurance plans without a guaranteed return are not eligible for such tax exemptions. 
Further, the insurance premiums paid are only taken into account when not exceeding a 
certain threshold, which takes account of the individuals’ income.   
Some facts and figures on the Belgian fiscally stimulated private pension protection 
Little to no accurate information is available on the (former) participation of the Belgian 
elderly population in fiscally stimulated private pension schemes. Research based on 
administrative data from tax declarations indicates that in 1998 about 26% of the 
unmarried population and 58% of the married couples contributed to a fiscally stimulated 
private pension plan (Gieselink, Peeters, Van Gestel, Berghman, & Van Buggenhout, 2003).  
Overall, individual life insurance schemes proof to be a little more popular than individual 
pension savings accounts. Note, however, that this information concerns the contributions 
made for the build-up of a private pension. No information is available on the 
beneficiaries, or to put differently, on the elderly population that has received a private 
pension from fiscally stimulated private pension schemes. 
2.4 Financial assets 
Whereas the private savings discussed in the previous section are fiscally stimulated via 
tax expenditures, individuals and households are free to save a part of their income in a 
savings account or via (long-term) investments.  
These savings and investments can have different motives, either or not explicitly focused 
on providing additional old age income protection (Keynes, 1936, cited in Browning & 
Lusardi, 1996). For example, the classical precautionary motive (“to build up a reserve 
against unforeseen contingencies”) and the life-cycle motive (“to provide for an 
anticipated relationship between the income and the needs of the individual”) can be 
considered as savings motives that contribute to one’s old age wealth. The wealth 
accumulated via savings has an important contribution during old age, not only because 
financial means are provided to safeguard one’s standard of living, but also because an 
economic buffer is available to pay for unexpected financial costs (Casey & Yamada, 2002; 
Hardy, 2009; Sierminska, Frick, & Grabka, 2010). 
With regard to financial assets, a difference can be made between the accumulated assets 
and the interests and dividends received from these assets (the so-called financial asset 
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income). The interests and dividends can be considered as part of the current income, 
since they are available for direct consumption (Expert Group on Household Income 
Statistics, 2001). The assets and capitals themselves do not have an immediate, but a 
postponed contribution to the disposable income in that, for example, they provide a 
financial back-up for unexpected circumstances. This possibility of wealth decumulation 
during old age makes it interesting to include them in the old age income package. 
Moreover, asset wealth can induce a certain consumption behaviour, since a positive 
relationship is found between the asset stock and the consumption (Blake, 2004; 
Skudelny, 2009).19 For the elderly population this could be important because, for 
example, elderly with a large assets stock have the potential to spend more on care 
services than elderly with a small assets stock (cf. chapter 4). 
2.5 Property ownership 
A last possible source in the old age income package refers to property ownership, which 
included ownership of both property for living and property for rental purposes. Property 
ownership holds a rather specific position in the old age income package, firstly because it 
mostly does not have a direct contribution to the old age income, and secondly, because it 
finds itself between the public and private sphere of welfare protection (Dewilde & 
Raeymaeckers, 2008; Kemeny, 2001). Nevertheless, the contribution of property 
ownership to old age income protection cannot be neglected. According to Kemeny (2001, 
p. 53) “it has always been recognised as comprising a key aspect of everyday life, closely 
associated with security and with health and well-being.”. Further, for (mortgage free) 
home ownership, the exempt of rent payments makes that the disposable income of home 
owners essentially is larger than that of renters (Ritakallio, 2003), which could be 
particularly important for elderly falling back on a lower income after retirement. 
Home ownership can be regarded as a kind of private pension insurance, in addition to 
other old age income sources (Dewilde & Raeymaeckers, 2008; Kemeny, 2005). However, 
wide discussions exists on whether or not housing wealth can be or should be considered 
as part of the disposable income. Housing itself is often not considered as a potential 
source of income, since it serves numerous other functions like feeling at home, having a 
place for family, belonging to a community, having access to services and facilities, etc., 
 
                                                             
19 For example, according to an analysis of SHARE data by Cápeau and Pacolet (2009), elderly in 
Belgium spend more on consumption goods than elderly in the Netherlands, despite their lower net 
incomes. One explanation for this is found in the life cycle saving hypothesis: “possibly older 
Belgian people have succeeded, for whatever reason, in saving more during an earlier phase of the 
life cycle, so that they can guarantee a higher consumption level than their current income would 
indicate.” (Cápeau & Pacolet, 2009, p. 28). An alternative explanation is found in mortgage-free 
home ownership, which reduces the costs of the older population, leaving a higher income available 
for consumption goals. 
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that outweigh the possible income function. To illustrate, a study on the housing needs of 
the Flemish elderly population, based on the 2005 Flemish Living Survey, has shown that 
elderly are not very keen to move or sell their house, since this often also implies changes 
in the living neighbourhood and social networks (Myncke & Vandekerckhove, 2007). This 
also has been found in international research (e.g. Venti & Wise, 1990; Walker, 2004): 
elderly are not very willing to move or sell their house to collect the wealth related to it, 
although it does happen when unexpected events occur (like the death of a partner).  
Despite these discussions, taking account of home ownership proofs to have an important 
effect on old age poverty (e.g. Dewilde & Raeymaeckers, 2008; Fahey, Nolan, & Maïtre, 
2004; Ritakallio, 2003): the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the elderly population tends to 
decrease when housing is taken into account. This can mainly be attributed to home 
ownership: “(…) outright owning is really the major factor accounting for the big 
difference between before- and after-housing-costs poverty figures.” (Ritakallio, 2003, p. 
95). However, the poverty reducing effect of home ownership is moderated by Fahey et al. 
(2004) in that only when the cost of housing counts heavily in the disposable income, 
home ownership can actually influence the at-risk-of-poverty rate.  
In Belgium, the government plays an important role in stimulating home ownership and in 
providing decent housing to the population. Different strategies are at hand (Deleeck, 
2001; Ritakallio, 2003). Housing loans arranged after January 2005 give the right to a tax 
exemption for “single and proper home ownership” in the personal income taxing system, 
the so-called housing bonus [woonbonus] for mortgage loans with a duration of at least 
ten years for the financing of a unique and personal property. Mortgage loans contracted 
before 2005 gave right to several types of tax relief, like interest deductions, tax credits for 
capital redemption payments and a dwelling allowance (FOD Financien, 2014; Verbist & 
Lefebure, 2008). (Low-income) Households can apply for a social loan at more 
advantageous interest rates for the purchase of a house. The preconditions to qualify for a 
social loan differ and relate to the value of the property, the household composition, and 
the household income.  
Whereas property as such does not have an immediate contribution to the disposable 
income during old age, one strategy – the reverse mortgage strategy – could be considered 
to convert the property’s value into cash. Reverse mortgaging implies that the estimated 
housing wealth is transposed to a regular annuity. Account is given to the property value, 
the remaining mortgage, and the life expectancy of the owner(s). In doing so, the property 
wealth can be consumed during the retirement phase, and can provide an actual 
contribution to the income from other old age income sources like pensions. However, 
until now reverse mortgaging is not yet possible in Belgium, though political initiatives 
have been taken to install such a system. A first notice of the possibility of reverse 
mortgaging was made in a policy document of Verwilghen in 2006. Reverse mortgaging 
was put on the agenda as an initiative to allow elderly to release the wealth accumulated 
in their property and to use this for other goals, without losing the property for living. A 
first bill was introduced in 2009 to install a reverse mortgage [omgekeerd 
woonkrediet/pensioen krediet] to allow pensioners to transpose their housing wealth into 
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regular annuity payments (DOC 52 2152/001) (De Block, Schiltz, Staelraeve, & Defreyne, 
2009). This bill was again introduced in 2011 (DOC 53 1229/001) (De Block, 2011). 
However, until now it has not been adopted. 
2.6 Conditional public cash transfers 
Besides the public retirement and survivor pensions and the social assistance for the 
elderly population, the government provides a wide range of conditional cash transfers, 
either or not targeted specifically to the elderly population. These transfers are 
conditional in that specific conditions are attached to the spending of the cash. Three 
broad categories of conditional cash transfers for the elderly population are distinguished: 
care related benefits; housing benefits; and heating allowances. 
2.6.1 Care related benefits 
The first category consists of a number of financial compensations provided by the 
government to elderly with specific care needs. To receive these benefits, the elderly 
person has to prove a certain level of care dependency or the existence of a certain care 
need. The cash transfer has to compensate for the additional cost of care dependency, 
though the actual receipt of care does not always has to be proven. 
Disability benefits 
The most important allowance in this category is the benefit for assistance to the elderly 
[tegemoetkoming voor hulp aan bejaarden], which is granted to low-income, disabled 
persons aged 65 and over facing a severe reduction in their autonomy and problems with 
activities of daily living. The benefit for assistance to the elderly has to compensate for 
additional costs due to the person’s disability, though the actual additional costs for the 
receipt of care do not have to be proven. The generosity of this benefit depends on the 
person’s income and on his/her degree of autonomy (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011).20  
Besides this age related benefit for assistance to the elderly, elderly persons receiving an 
integration benefit [intergratietegemoetkoming] or an income replacement benefit 
[inkomensvervangende uitkering] before the age of 65, keep on enjoying this benefit after 
the age of 65. Both are granted to disabled persons younger than 65 years. The integration 
 
                                                             
20 For more information on the allowance for assistance to the elderly, consult the website of the 
federal Directorate General Disabled Persons (http://handicap.fgov.be), and the FPS Social Security 
(2011). 
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benefit depends on the degree of dependency and takes account of the income of the 
disabled person. It is granted to compensate for the limitations of one’s handicap in the 
activities of daily living, or to compensate for a certain loss in the ability to live 
independently. The income replacement benefit on his turn has to compensate for the loss 
of income generating capabilities due to one’s handicap (i.e. not or only partly being able 
to take part in the labour market). The benefit itself takes account of the household 
income of the disabled person (Van Langendonck & Put, 2002). 
Long-term care benefits 
In Flanders, a specific long-term care benefit – the Flemish care insurance [Vlaamse 
zorgverzekering] – has been installed for persons confronted with long-term care needs. 
This long-term care insurance is not specifically targeted to the elderly population, but 
because of the link between age and the risk on long-term care dependency, long-term 
care insurance benefits are particularly important for the elderly population.  
The benefit has to compensate for the non-medical costs resulting from the long-term care 
needs, either provided at home or in a long-term care institution. However, the actual 
costs do not have to be proven to receive the care benefit, only a certain degree of care 
dependency is taken into account. When eligible for the Flemish care insurance, a flat-rate 
monthly benefit is paid to compensate for both formal and informal care. Only those living 
in Flanders, and in Brussels when they have joined the care insurance scheme, can apply 
for benefits via this long-term care insurance scheme.  
Note that, while in Flanders participating in the long-term care insurance is obligatory, it is 
voluntary for individuals living in the Brussels Capital Region. (Vlaams Agentschap voor 
Zorg en Gezondheid, 2010).21 Until now, this type of public financial compensation for the 
receipt of long-term care only exists in Flanders. No alternative is organised in the other 
Belgian regions (Pacolet et al., 2004). 
Home care benefit 
A third group of care related benefits involves the care benefits provided by local 
authorities (e.g. municipalities) to compensate for the financing of (informal) home care. 
These benefits are known under different names, like the home care allowance, informal 
care allowance, etc.  
 
                                                             
21 For more information on the Flemish Care insurance, consult the website of the Flemish Agency 
for Care and Health [Vlaams Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid] (http://www.zorg-en-
gezondheid.be). 
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This benefit is paid either to the informal care giver or to the care receiver. The application 
conditions differentiate between municipalities, however, most conditions concern the 
place of residence of the care receiver and/or care giver, the degree of care dependency, 
the income of the care receiver, and the age of the care receiver (Pacolet et al., 2004; 
Ziekenzorg CM, 2012). Also at the level of the Flemish Provinces (more specifically in 
Antwerp, East-Flanders and Limburg), informal long-term care benefits are paid to 
compensate informal care givers (Ziekenzorg CM, 2012). 
Facts and figures about the conditional public cash transfers 
An attempt was made to gather some statistics on the importance of the previously 
discussed conditional public cash transfers for the Belgian elderly population. 
Firstly, based on administrative data from the Crossroads Bank of Social Security (2014), 
we found that in 2007 154606 elderly aged 60 years and over received some kind of 
disability benefit. This implies that about 6% of the elderly population receives such 
benefits.  
Secondly, statistics from the Flemish Agency for Care and Health (2013) indicate that in 
2007 148051 elderly aged 65 years and over received a long-term care benefit. This 
corresponds to about 10% of the Flemish population older than 65 years. Or, to put it 
differently, about 80% of all long-term care insurance benefits are granted to individuals 
aged 65 years and over.  
Thirdly, with regard to the home care benefit, a study conducted by one of the leading 
Belgian Health Services (Ziekenzorg CM, 2012) showed that in Flanders in 2012 in about 
80% of all Flemish municipalities an informal home care benefit was granted, covering 
about 32000 individuals receiving home care. This is an underestimation of the actual 
number of beneficiaries, because information was not available for all Flemish 
municipalities. In 70% of the municipalities with an informal home care allowance, age 
conditions are coupled to the receipt of this allowance. This implies, among others, the fact 
that the care receiver should be 65 years or older. In four municipalities the informal 
home care allowance is targeted specifically to the care dependent population aged 65 
years and over. An additional home care benefit is granted by the Provincial authorities in 
Antwerp, Limburg and East-Flanders. In Antwerp and Limburg this home care benefit is 
targeted to elderly care receivers.  
2.6.2 Housing benefits 
A second category of conditional public social transfers consists of a range of housing 
benefits, mostly not specifically targeted to the elderly population. These allowances differ 
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between the Belgian regions, since housing policy was granted to the Belgian regions after 
the state reform in the 1980s.  
In Flanders, housing benefits are granted to individuals moving from bad housing to 
better, adapted housing. The rental subsidy [Vlaamse tegemoetkoming in de huurprijs] 
combines a single flat-rate settling subsidy [installatiepremie] and a monthly rental 
allowance [huurtoelage]. The settling subsidy is granted to low income tenants moving 
from a bad to a better accommodation. In addition, these tenants can also apply for a 
monthly rental allowance. The receipt of these housing benefits is limited in time, although 
this precondition is abolished for the elderly population. The amount of the benefit takes 
account of the income of the applicant (Agentschap Wonen-Vlaanderen, 2010).  
In Wallonia, a similar housing benefit exists for persons moving from insufficient to 
adequate housing (Service Public de Wallonie Département du Logement, 2011). As is the 
case in Flanders, the “moving and rental allowance” [allocation de déménagement et loyer] 
combines a single flat-rate moving subsidy [allocation de déménagement] and a monthly 
rental allowance [allocation de loyer]. However, important differences exist between the 
housing benefits in Flanders and Wallonia with regard to the income conditions and the 
amount of the benefits provided. 
2.6.3 Heating allowance 
A third category of social transfers involves the heating allowances, that have to cover for 
high heating costs. Elderly with a guaranteed old age benefit granted before 2001 receive a 
special heating allowance [bijzondere verwarmingstoelage]. This allowance is flat-rate, 
takes account of one’s living situation, and is paid in the month of February.22 
Elderly not eligible for the special heating allowance, because they do not receive a  
guaranteed old age benefit granted before 2001, can apply for a heating allowance via the 
Social Heating Fund [Sociaal Verwarmingsfonds] when they are eligible for an Income 
Guarantee allowance. The heating allowance is flat-rate, and depends on the price paid at 
the moment of fuel delivery. Compensation is provided only for the purchase of fuel oil, 
not for the purchase of natural gas.23 This heating allowance is not specifically designed for 
the elderly population, since all low-income households can apply for compensations via 
the Social Heating Fund. 
 
                                                             
22 For more information on the special heating allowance, consult the website of the National 
Pension Office (http://www.onprvp.be). 
23 Detailed information can be consulted on the website of the Social Heating Fund 
(http://www.verwarmingsfonds.be/). 
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3. Determinants of the old age income package 
In the previous sections the potential components of the old age income package were 
discussed. Now, we turn to the factors influencing the actual composition and protection 
provided by the old age income package. The focus is on the following determinants, that 
could explain the differences in the old age income package among the elderly population: 
 sex and gender, since women tend to be less well off than men; 
 age, since the oldest elderly tend to be less well off than younger groups of 
elderly; 
 labour market history, because of the strong link between pensions and previous 
wages and between public and private (i.e. employer-sponsored) pensions and 
working history; 
 socioeconomic status, since those with a higher socioeconomic status are found 
to enjoy higher levels of protection compared to those with a lower socioeconomic 
status;  
 marital status and household composition, since important differences exist 
between (married) couples, the single, the widowed and the divorced; and  
 health and functional status, since the receipt of certain benefits depends on 
one’s health and functional status.  
3.1 Sex and gender 
In an important part of the research literature, gender differences in (old age) in cash 
social protection are put in the forefront. These differences are not specific for the elderly 
population, but can be found in the entire population. Gender differences in old age are 
thus said to be a mere reproduction of existing inequalities between men and women 
during their active live phase (e.g. Ginn, Street, & Arber, 2001; Ginn, 2003; Hardy, 2009; 
O’Rand & Henretta, 1999).  
With regard to public pension incomes, gender differences are found in the generosity as 
well as in the coverage of the public pension systems (e.g. Casey & Yamada, 2002; 
Heinrich, 2000; Levine, Mitchell, & Phillips, 1999; O’Rand & Henretta, 1999; Smeeding & 
Sandström, 2005; Williamson & Smeeding, 2004). Both are found to be significantly lower 
for women than for men. Overall, women tend to be less covered by the public pension 
system, and when they are covered, the level of protection tends to be lower. Explanations 
for this are sought in the strong link between public pensions systems, work history, 
marital history and family formation. Given “the earning-related structure of social 
security systems, together with the traditional division of labour between the sexes”, these 
gender differences are structurally built into European public pension systems (Leitner, 
2001). As discussed before, public pensions are often strictly linked to the individual’s 
work history. On the one hand, access to the public pension systems depends on the social 
security contributions paid (based on formal employment). On the other hand, the benefit 
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level depends on the number of years worked in formal employment and on the wages 
earned during this period of employment. The strict coupling between labour market 
participation and public pension protection disfavours women, in that the current 
generation of female pensioners often was not or only temporarily in formal employment 
during their active life phase. After all, these women were at active age in the 1950s and 
1960s when the male breadwinner model was dominant. Male employment outside the 
house and female housework was considered as the standard, so that these women often 
only knew a short or very fragmented period of paid employment (Ginn et al., 2001; 
O’Rand & Henretta, 1999; Sefton, Evandrou, Falkingham, & Vlachantoni, 2011). However, 
several mechanisms have been built into the public pensions systems to compensate for 
the unpaid homework mostly done by women. For example, career interruptions can 
(partly) be taken into account when calculating pensions, and the same holds for periods 
of part-time employment (Leitner, 2001) (cf. supra: assimilated periods).  
Concerning the receipt of old age social assistance, it is found that women more often than 
men fall back on old age social assistance benefits, mainly because they do not have 
sufficient (pension) incomes of their own (Ginn & Arber, 1999). This has important 
consequences for the protection provided by the income package of the female part of the 
elderly population, since social assistance benefits serve to provide minimum income 
protection and thus on average provide lower levels of income than retirement pensions. 
This also links up with the observation that, among the elderly, women tend to have a 
higher poverty risk than men (e.g. Hardy, 2009; Smeeding & Sandström, 2005; 
Whitehouse, 2000). 
These gender differences are also found in the private pension provision. Different authors 
(e.g. Bardasi & Jenkins, 2010; H. Ginn & Arber, 1999; J. Ginn et al., 2001) show that in the 
UK the proportion of women receiving a private pension is smaller than the proportion of 
men receiving such a pension. Several explanations are put forward for this: the 
overrepresentation of women in part-time work, in temporary contracts, in casual 
employment, in less favourable sectors of employment, etc.24 Further, not only do women 
have less access to private pensions, when they have access to these systems, their 
benefits are often significantly lower than those of their male counterparts. Again, the 
main reasons for this are found in their work history: lower earnings, a lower number of 
years worked, having worked in sectors without sector occupational pension provisions, a 
lower occupational status, etc. (e.g. Ginn & Arber, 2001; Ginn, 2004; Moffat & Luckhaus, 
1998). Or as Ginn and Arber (1999, p. 321) put it: “Designed for middle class men's 
pattern of continuous full-time employment, occupational pensions translate women's 
labour market disadvantages into low personal income in later life.”. This gender 
inequality in private pensions is especially alerting given the increasing call for pension 
 
                                                             
24 All explanations for the less favourable private pensions of women are related to their labour 
market situation. This is obvious, since private pensions are very often conceived as occupational 
pensions, provided by the employer or by the sector of employment. 
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privatisation to tackle problems with the financeability of the public pension schemes. 
Pension inequality between men and women and female poverty among the elderly is 
expected to rise whenever a radical shift from public to private pensions is made (e.g. 
Bardasi & Jenkins, 2010; Frericks, Knijn, & Maier, 2009; Ginn, 2004). 
As regards financial assets, it is expected that the differences between men and women are 
smaller, since financial assets are pooled within households. However, for singles, 
important differences are found between men and women (e.g. Deere & Doss, 2006; 
Denton & Boos, 2007; Sierminska et al., 2010; Warren, Rowlingson, & Whyley, 2001). 
Single men overall tend to have accumulated more financial assets than single women at 
the moment of retirement, consequently enjoying a higher degree of income protection 
from these sources. This difference between men and women often is traced back to pre-
retirement gender differences in that women, due to lower earnings, interrupted labour 
market careers, and working in less favourable occupational sectors, are found to have 
less opportunities for wealth accumulation than their male counterparts. However, also 
the gender difference in risk preference is put forward to explain gender differences in 
asset accumulation: because women tend to be more risk averse than men, they more 
often miss out on high investment returns, leading to lower accumulated financial assets 
(Sierminska et al., 2010). 
In line with the link between gender and financial assets, also for property assets an 
advantage for men in comparison with women is found. Overall, men have higher labour 
market earnings and a more stable labour market career than women, and thus they have 
more opportunities to obtain housing tenure. This is specifically important for singles, 
since in couples housing wealth is expected to be pooled among both partners (Hood, 
1999). 
3.2 Labour market history 
In the previous section, reference has been made to the importance of work and labour 
market history as an additional factor explaining differences in the income package of the 
elderly population. Specifically in countries where a strong link exists between labour 
market participation and pension systems, labour market history plays an important role 
in later life income protection. Not only earnings during the active labour market career, 
also one’s occupational status, the length of the employment career, whether or not one 
has experienced (numerous) career interruptions, the labour market segment, etc. 
influence the access to and the coverage provided by the different income sources. 
The importance of early life events in later life income protection is also acknowledged in 
the life course perspectives on ageing and social stratification in old age (Elder, 2007). 
Human development is conceived as a lifelong process of events and actions shaping the 
entire life course of individuals. Choices made during the life course keep on posing their 
influence throughout life. Obviously, individuals do not act in a vacuum: the life course is 
embedded in history and place. Furthermore, individual life courses are found to mutually 
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interact, leading for example to the fact that one’s life course to a certain extent is 
influenced by that of his/her parents. Within this viewpoint, theories on status attainment 
have substantiated that even in old age, when individuals in general are no longer active 
on the labour market, the former occupational position keeps on posing its influence 
(Riley, Foner, & Waring, 1988, p. 250). Consequently, labour market inequalities (during 
the active life phase) are persistent throughout the post-retirement life phase. Three 
perspectives on status attainment have been developed, differing in the strength of the 
relationship between the pre- and the post-retirement life: status maintenance, status 
levelling and status divergence. In the status maintenance perspective, it is assumed that 
social status is built up during the life course, and keeps – unchanged – exerting its 
influence during old age. “Resources and rewards obtained early in the life course, 
particularly in the transition from education to work, have persistent effects over time and 
serve to maintain individuals’ relative status within cohorts.” (O’Rand & Henretta, 1999, p. 
9). Existing inequalities are reproduced with the transition from the active life into 
retirement. This implies that social security mechanisms do not succeed in removing 
active life inequalities. The second perspective, the status levelling perspective, makes a 
less strong link between active life status and old age social status: inequalities in the old 
age life phase tend to be less pronounced due to public policy actions intervening in old 
age inequality (O’Rand & Henretta, 1999). The last perspective, the status divergence or 
cumulative disadvantage perspective, assumes that the transition from the active life to 
retirement goes hand in hand with growing inequalities among the elderly, mainly 
because of an increase in the importance of resources that are unequally distributed 
among the elderly population (O’Rand & Henretta, 1999). Inequalities are cumulated 
throughout the life course, leading to the reproduction of advantages and disadvantages. 
This has been called the Matthew-effect: the rich get richer, the poor get poorer (Dannefer, 
1987, 2003). 
The strong link between the labour market and the old age income package largely stems 
from the fact that the calculation of pensions strongly builds on the former labour market 
career. For the calculation of Belgian public old age pensions account is given to the labour 
market statute (employee, self-employed, or statutory civil servant), the length of the 
labour market career (number of years worked) and the average earnings during the 
labour market career. Consequently, whether or not one has gaps in his or her labour 
market career, received only low wages, or worked primarily as an employee or was self-
employed, has important consequences for the income protection provided via the public 
old age pension system. To a certain extent, gaps in the labour market career are covered 
via a system of assimilated periods: periods in which the individual has not worked, but 
which are nevertheless included in the pension calculation. This holds for, among others, 
periods of involuntary unemployment, sickness, career interruptions and time-credit, and 
part-time work (cf. supra). For these periods, the pension calculation is based on a 
fictitious wage, that normally corresponds to the average wage of the preceding year. 
However, gaps in the labour market career not covered via this system of assimilated 
periods (for example voluntary unemployment, voluntary part-time work, etc.) give the 
individual no entitlement to pension rights, thus having important consequences for 
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his/her future pension claims. Further, labour market interruptions also have 
consequences for the access to the system of minimum pension protection. Since access to 
the minimum pension is only granted when meeting the requirements on the length of the 
labour market career, pensioners with important periods of labour market absence might 
not qualify for a minimum old age pension.  
Also for occupational pensions, work history plays an important role. Access to 
occupational pension plans depends on the labour market statute, the labour market 
sector and the size of the organisation. Employer-sponsored benefits are often available to 
only a limited group of employees, related to their position on the labour market, their 
earnings and the skills required for the job (O’Rand & Henretta, 1999). For Belgium, 
research of Gieselink et al. (2003) found that company executives have more access to 
occupational pension plans than white-collar workers, who on their turn have more access 
than blue-collar workers. Further, differences between labour market industries were 
found, depending on, among others, the financial capacities of the sector, the knowledge, 
and whether or not industry pension arrangements were set up (Peeters, Van Gestel, 
Gieselink, Berghman, & Van Buggenhout, 2003). Lastly, occupational pension plans were 
found to be significantly more organised in large companies than in small companies, 
possibly because of the administration costs related to the organisation of an occupational 
pension plan. Similar results on the relationship between labour market history and the 
access to occupational pension plans was found in the United States (Hardy, 2009), the 
United Kingdom (Bardasi, Jenkins, & Rigg, 2002), and Norway (Hernaes, Piggott, Zhang, & 
Strom, 2011). Concerning the generosity of these occupational pensions, a strong link 
between the occupational pension benefit and the previous wage is found (e.g. Bardasi et 
al., 2002; Hardy, 2009; Peeters, Debels, Verschraegen, & Berghman, 2008). Whether they 
are considered as defined benefit plans or as defined contribution plans, occupational 
pensions always to a certain extent reflect the previous earnings. Also, in the calculation of 
the occupational pension account is given to the length of the labour career (the 
contributions paid reflect the number of years worked). This works out badly for those in 
part-time employment or with lower overall earnings, who have contributed less to the 
occupational pension plan. Lastly, those with and incomplete labour market career, 
because of career interruptions or (involuntary) periods of unemployment, will have 
lower occupational pensions than those with a complete labour market career (given that 
both have access to an occupational pension).  
For the other income sources in the old age income package, the link with former labour 
market participation is less direct. Both private pension plans, and financial and property 
assets are built up largely during the active life course. Higher labour market earnings and 
a higher employment status go hand in hand with more possibilities for savings, and thus 
for building personal pensions and accumulate financial and property assets. This is quite 
obvious, since, given equal spending on indispensable goods, those with a higher labour 
market income can save a larger part of their income than those with a lower labour 
market income. This active life accumulation of resources is, at least partially, transposed 
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to the post retirement phase, thus resulting in old age differences in the income package 
based on pre-retirement labour market differences. 
Lastly, it should be noted that one cannot reflect on the influence of the labour market 
history without taking into account the gender differences in labour market participation: 
Women tend to differ importantly from men with regard to their work biography. On 
average, they have shorter and more often interrupted labour market careers, higher 
unemployment levels, a higher frequency of part-time employment, lower wage rates, and 
an overall lower degree of occupational stability. This results in a lower degree of pension 
built-up in both public and occupational pension systems. On the other hand, it leads to 
lower pension benefits (both public and occupational) at the moment of retirement (e.g. 
Bardasi et al., 2002; Frericks et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2008; Sefton et al., 2011; Shuey & 
O’Rand, 2006). Because of lower labour market earnings, also the opportunities for asset 
accumulation are found to be more limited for women than for men, though this is largely 
compensated via the pooling of income sources within couples. For singles, nevertheless, it 
could lead to important differences in accumulated assets between men and women (cf. 
supra). 
3.3 Socioeconomic status 
Socioeconomic status is considered to be a seminal stratification determinant. This 
multidimensional concept combines income, education and occupational status to explain 
societal inequalities (Rogers & Saint Onge, 2007). It is generally assumed that those in 
employment, with a higher level of education and a higher income are better off than those 
without employment, with low educational levels and with low income. Here also the 
status attainment theories are applicable, in that active life socioeconomic status is found 
to influence importantly the individuals’ retirement living situation. Because the link 
between one’s retirement income and former labour market participation is already 
discussed in the previous section, in this section the focus is on the impact of one’s level of 
education on the old age income package.  
As was the case with former labour market participation, the influence of education is 
considered from a life course perspective. Education is found to remain fairly constant 
throughout the life course, resulting in a certain degree of continuity (Dowd, 1980). It is 
conceived as “a pivotal mechanism governing social mobility and socioeconomic 
attainment” (Mare, 2001, p. 480), an early life event (or transition of events) that keeps on 
posing its influence throughout the rest of the life course. Given the strong link between 
education and occupation on the one hand, and occupation and old age in cash social 
protection on the other hand, education indirectly influences the old age income package. 
Or, as Hardy (2009, p. 494) puts it: “education is a significant factor in determining 
occupation as well as wages and salaries within broad occupational categories, [thus] it is 
also related to differences in income and wealth [in old age]”.   
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For public retirement pensions, no important differences are expected to exist between 
low and high educated individuals concerning access to the public pension system, since 
the old age pension is available to all that have paid sufficient social security contributions 
(cf. supra). However, given the link between education, labour market participation and 
occupational status, it is expected that the generosity of the public pension benefits will 
increase with the level of education, under the assumption that labour market earnings 
increase with level of education. However, given the restrictions in the level of retirement 
pensions (cf. supra), this only holds until a certain point; from that point onwards 
pensioners will receive the same public pension despite any differences in the 
contributions paid. Regarding old age social assistance, it is expected that an 
overrepresentation of low educated elderly receives an old age social assistance 
allowance. After all, old age social assistance is only granted to those without sufficient 
individual pension rights, thus, to elderly who did not (sufficiently) participate in the 
labour market. Again it is expected that the risk on not participating in the labour market 
is higher for those with a low level of education. Further, even when included in the labour 
market, those with a low level of education are found to be overrepresented in labour 
market segments with lower wages, less stable careers, more part-time and temporary 
employment, etc., resulting in a lower built-up of public pension rights. 
With regard to occupational pensions, both coverage and generosity are correlated with 
the individual’s level of education (O’Rand & Henretta, 1999). Again, this is mainly 
attributed to the link between education and occupational status, since those with a higher 
level of education are found to have a higher occupational status, that on its turn is 
associated with a higher coverage and more generous occupational pension payments. 
Research confirms this, and what’s more, showed that occupational pensions are a tool for 
those with a high socioeconomic status to increase their retirement income (Ginn & Arber, 
1999). 
Similarly, private pension plans and financial assets are found to be more important for 
those with a higher level of education. Research based on EU-SILC data (Van den Heede, 
Van Den Bosch, & Cantillon, 2010) showed that in Belgium the incidence of having a 
savings account, stocks, or bonds increases with the level of education. In addition, 
research has shown that those with a higher level of education accumulate more financial 
assets than those with a lower educational degree (e.g. Browning & Lusardi, 1996). 
Different explanations could account for this: a higher level of education is generally 
related to a better occupational position, thus creating more opportunities for asset 
accumulation; a higher level of education can be associated with more financial knowledge 
and less risk aversion for financial investments; etc. Further, a positive relationship 
between income, asset ownership and the amount of financial assets has been found (e.g. 
Browning & Lusardi, 1996). In the higher income groups, asset ownership was found to be 
more widespread than in the lower income groups. The amount of financial assets 
accumulated also proved to be larger for those with higher incomes than for those with 
lower incomes, again because, given an equal spending on indispensable goods, a higher 
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income creates more opportunities for saving than a lower income (Bardasi & Jenkins, 
2010). 
3.4 Marital status and household composition 
A last determinant of income inequality among the elderly population, that is often 
considered in the literature, refers to the marital status and the household composition 
(living arrangements). Whether an individual is married, divorced or widowed has 
important consequences for his or her old age income protection. The same holds for the 
household composition; for example whether or not a single individual lives together with 
adult children, or one lives together with a partner influences importantly his or her in 
cash social protection. After all, it is shown that living together with others bring about 
important economies of scale. Further, cohabitation is an important buffer against 
poverty, since resources and risks are pooled within the household, thus resulting in a 
kind of shared financial safety net (e.g. Casey & Yamada, 2002; H. Ginn & Arber, 1999; 
Hardy, 2009).25  
In the public pension system marital status and household composition is taken into 
account for the calculation of the pension benefits. Firstly, with regard to retirement 
pensions of employees and the self-employed, the benefit level differs with marital status. 
The old age pension of married elderly with a dependent spouse, without sufficient 
individual pension rights, is calculated at a ratio of 75% of the former average wage (cf. 
supra). For single pensioners, or pensioners married with a spouse that is entitled to a 
personal old age pension, the old age pension is calculated at a ratio of 60%. The higher 
ratio which is taken into account for married pensioners with a dependent spouse has to 
compensate for the fact that this spouse has no personal pension entitlements.26 It is 
expected that couples where both partners receive a public retirement pension, calculated 
at the 60% ratio, will be in the most advantageous financial situation. Secondly, for 
widowed pensioners the state provides a survivor pension, that is based on the labour 
market career of the deceased spouse. Thirdly, a number of specific arrangements have 
been set up for divorced pensioners, compensating for periods of unemployment during 
the marriage. For ex-partners of employees and self-employed persons, a divorce pension 
 
                                                             
25 Very often, in the literature marital status is linked with gender, and a focus is put on the 
differences between men and women in relation with their marital status. Traditionally, different 
roles are ascribed to men and women whenever they get married, resulting in, among others, 
differences in their labour market participation: men tend to work in full-time, continuous 
employment, while women are often not or only in part-time employment, and are often confronted 
with career breaks for child bearing (so-called “specialisation within the marriage”: Yabiku, 2000). 
In later life, this brings about important differences in the protection provided via both the public 
pension system and the private (employer-sponsored) pension system.  
26 Note that in the public retirement pension system for statutory civil servants no account is given 
to the marital status. No difference is made between married and single pensioners. 
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is granted if the individual did not work during the marriage, and thus did not built up 
personal pension rights. This pension is calculated on the labour market career of the ex-
partner during the marriage. However, the divorce pension tends to provide only low 
levels of income protection, leading to a situation in which divorced women overall are in 
the worst financial situation. Even more than widowed women, they tend to fall back on 
social assistance benefits. For these women, cohabitation (with adult children) has proven 
to be an important buffer against poverty: single women living alone face a higher risk of 
low income than single women living together with others (Bardasi et al., 2002; Casey & 
Yamada, 2002). 
Occupational pensions on the other hand, do not take account of the living situation. 
Provisions can be included in these pension plans to provide protection to surviving 
spouses. In this case, occupational survivor pensions are provided based on the 
occupational pension of the deceased spouse. When also account is given to gender, 
interesting differences are found between single versus cohabitating men and women. 
According to Ginn and Arber (1999) little difference exists between single men and 
married men. For women important differences between the married and the non-
married were found. Married women showed to be less well, off with only a minority 
receiving individual occupational or private pension benefits, though it is expected that 
these women benefit from the occupational pension rights built up by their spouses. Single 
women who never were married, in contrast, showed the highest prevalence in 
occupational and personal pensions. Divorced women are in the least favourable situation 
with only a minority having a private pension; this group faces the highest risk on 
deprivation associated with marital dissolution (e.g. Disney & Johnson, 2001; Ginn & 
Arber, 2001; Price & Ginn, 2003; Shuey & O’Rand, 2006).  
Also for financial assets and homeownership, marital status and household composition is 
found to be important (e.g. Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Wakita, Fitzsimmons, & Liao, 
2000). The existence of economies of scale and financial solidarity between partners in 
couples makes that a part of the mutual income can be saved, while this is not or only 
partly possible for singles. Also the pooling of financial risks and the sharing of finances 
within couples contributes to this. Living together with a partner also has a positive effect 
on the purchase of property, not only because couples overall have more opportunities for 
wealth accumulation, but also because couples are more inclined to settling down than 
singles, and thus are more open to home ownership (Hood, 1999). 
3.5 Health and functional status 
A last determinant that could influence the generosity of the old age income package 
refers to the individual’s health and functional status. In particular, the granting of certain 
benefits depends on the health and functional status of the person. For example, to be 
eligible to the majority of the care related benefits the functional status of the person is 
assessed (cf. supra). Disability benefits (e.g. the benefit for assistance to elderly) are 
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preserved for elderly facing a severe reduction in their autonomy and problems with 
activities of daily living. Further, to receive a benefit from the Flemish care insurance, one 
has to proof a certain degree of care dependency (cf. section 2.6.1). 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we focused on the wide range of sources that are available to the Belgian 
elderly population to protect themselves against the risks related to the financial 
dimension of old age dependency. In line with the theoretical frame, these sources are the 
‘rewards’ based on the ‘claims’ that are made by the elderly population in the three 
institutional spheres (cf. chapter 2).  
The first group of income sources discussed in this chapter is based on claims that are 
made in the economic and the political sphere. These claims stem from the former 
contributions on the labour market in the economic sphere (e.g. occupational pensions) or 
from notions of solidarity and citizenship in the political sphere (e.g. public pensions). 
Quite often, the claims are based on the interplay between the economic and the political 
sphere. For example, public pensions are based on one’s former activities on the labour 
market in the economic sphere (and co-financed by the employer), and these actions open 
the right to make a claim for a pension in the political sphere, based on notions of 
solidarity and social insurance. Within the public pension protection scheme, a difference 
was made between public retirement and public survivor pensions. Attention was also 
paid to the public minimum income protection schemes via the provision of a minimum 
retirement pension and the Income Guarantee for the Elderly population.  
Within the occupational pension schemes, occupational pension plans for employees 
(sector pension plans and business pension plans) and for the self-employed (voluntary 
additional pension for the self-employed) were distinguished. Individual pension savings 
accounts and individual life insurances were found to be the two main fiscally stimulated 
private pension protection schemes. Both the occupational pension plans and the private 
pension plans are mainly situated in the economic sphere, but under impetus of the 
political sphere. After all, we found that the government plays an important role in 
stimulating the organisation of these types of pension plans via, for example, tax 
exemptions. 
In addition, we also distinguished a number of sources that are limited to the economic, 
resp. the political sphere. In the economic sphere, we find the ‘claims’ based on the 
provision of investment capitals. These claims include financial assets without tax 
exemptions (i.e. savings account, stocks and bonds, etc.) and the direct revenues from 
these assets. In the political sphere, we found a number of conditional public cash 
transfers, namely care related benefits (i.e. disability benefits, long-term care benefits and 
informal home care benefits), housing benefits (rental subsidies etc.) and the heating 
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allowance. These ‘rewards’ are based on notions of citizenship within the framework of 
the contemporary welfare state. 
Lastly, we discussed the potential importance of property assets as a source of income for 
the elderly population. From the packaging approach, the return from property assets can 
be situated in the economic sphere: the rent one receives is based on the claim of 
providing a place to live for another household. However, to a certain extent also the 
government is involved in property ownership. Via tax exemptions and fiscal measures 
(based on notions of citizenship) the government can stimulate households to obtain 
property.  
It proved to be difficult to sketch an accurate picture of the importance of these income 
sources. Occupational pensions for employees are covered quite accurately in the 
administrative data of the Crossroads Bank for Social Security, but this is not the case for 
the occupational pension protection enjoyed by the self-employed population. Further, 
also for private pensions no accurate statistics were found to exist. Moreover, little 
information is available on the combination of these income sources, nor on their potential 
to protect the former living standard of the elderly population during their retirement. 
Also the potential contribution from financial assets and property assets to the old age 
income package has not been investigated to its complete extent. In debates on the living 
standard protection of the elderly population, and within the light of discussions on the 
financeability of public old age income protection, the potential of private income sources 
to protect the elderly population against the financial dimension of old age dependency 
needs to be investigated more profoundly. This is one of the main tasks of this 
dissertation: to investigate in detail the income packaging of the elderly population by 
taking account of all potential income sources. We do not limit ourselves to sources with 
personal ownership or to sources that are shared within households, but we combine both 
into comprehensive income packages. In addition, we will investigate the interplay 
between personal income sources and asset sources to figure out whether similar patterns 
of inequality among the elderly are found (for example to what extent are elderly with 
only limited personal income sources disadvantaged in their asset ownership). 
In the second part of this chapter, an overview of the recent research on the income 
protection of the elderly population was provided. Specific attention was paid to the main 
stratification determinants explaining the income differences and inequalities within the 
elderly population. First, gender is put to the forefront in explaining income differences 
among the elderly population, mainly in explaining the disadvantaged income situation of 
women. These differences were found to exist with regard to all the income sources 
discussed. Yet, the question can be posed whether these differences are stronger with 
regard to specific income sources, and whether taking account of a broader income 
package (i.e. including financial and property assets) manages to reduce (or increase) the 
existing income differences between older men and women. Second, the role of labour 
market history was underlined in explaining both the access to certain income sources, 
and the level of income protection provided by these sources. This was connected to three 
basic theories on the role of status and status maintenance in the life course. Researchers 
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seem to agree on the ongoing influence of one’s status during the life course, though 
differences exist with regard to the scale of this effect. Whereas extensive research exists 
on the relationship between labour market history and public and occupational retirement 
pensions, less research was found on the link with other private old age income sources. 
However, it cannot be questioned that one’s labour market situation is decisive in the 
accumulation of financial and property assets during his or her active life phase, and thus 
also keeps on exerting its influence during one’s retirement. Third, research on the link 
between one’s level of education, as a proxy for socioeconomic status, and the old age 
income package was summed up. Higher levels of education were found to be associated 
with more generous old age income sources, and with a wider access to different income 
sources. Yet and again little to no research was found on the relationship between the 
level of education and the combination of different income sources into income packages. 
Questions on whether or not high educated elderly have more diverse income packages 
than low educated elderly could not be answered from the literature. A last determinant 
included in the literature review was marital status: being married, living single, being 
divorced or widowed were found to have important consequences for one’s protection 
against the financial dimension of old age. However, also here, a stronger focus on the 
overall income package is missing. 
To summarise, old age income protection has already been extensively investigated. Yet, a 
holistic perspective on the combination of different, both public and private, income 
sources into income packages providing protection against the financial dimension of old 
age tends to be missing. The existing research focuses strongly on the income protection 
provided by single sources, without investigating how the combination of different income 
sources can contribute to the overall level of income protection of the elderly population. 
This lack makes us critical against the current information on old age income protection.  
Further, from social policy perspective, it is interesting to shed more light on the potential 
contribution of the extended income package to the income protection of specific, 
currently considered as vulnerable, groups like older (single) women. This is why in 
chapter 8, the combination of the different income sources by different groups of elderly 
will be discussed. Extensive attention will be paid on the explanatory power of the 
mainstream stratification determinants like sex, status and living situation. In addition, 
including the potential contribution of financial and property assets into the old age 
income package could be food of thought for policy makers confronted with increasing 
costs of public pension schemes and looking for alternative income sources.  
In the next chapter, we will focus on that other important group of protection mechanisms 
available to the elderly population, namely all mechanisms focused on providing 
protection against the functional dimension of old age, thus everything that involves (long-
term) care. Attention will be paid to health care services and long-term care services 
within the Belgian context. Specific attention will be paid to research on the link between 
income and care, as well as on research explaining differences in the use of health and 
long-term care services from the main stratification determinants like sex, status and 
living situation. 
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CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN  
THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, attention was paid to the financial and functional 
dimensions of old age dependency. It was shown that the health status and the functional 
level of the population tends to decrease with age. To put it differently, when growing 
older, the population is confronted more and more with health and functional problems, 
thus inducing the need for some kind of protection against this dimension of age related 
dependency. In the subsequent chapter, insights are provided in the mechanisms available 
to manage this increase in functional dependency, namely the use of health and social care 
services. These services are combined into care packages, depending on the individuals’ 
preferences, his/her degree of care dependency, the availability of care, etc. (see Figure 
4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Composition of the old age care package 
 
In the following sections, the possible configuration of these care packages within the 
Belgian context and the main stratification determinants influencing the use of care 
services are discussed.  
It is important to note that a number of care related mechanisms find themselves on the 
borderline between in cash and in kind provided protection. An example of this is the 
provision of health care. In Belgium, health care is provided by both public and private 
actors, and for both individual users receive reimbursements via the public health 
insurance scheme. Given the thin demarcation line between both, also the system of public 
health insurance is discussed briefly in the following sections.  
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1. General insights 
Whereas the income package focuses on income, the care package refers to the wide range 
of care services available to the population, installed to meet a person’s needs so that he or 
she can live a comfortable and dignified life (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2005). These services have to contribute to the quality of life, the mental 
and physical health of the individual, the potential to live independently, etc. The 
combination of these services is denoted as the care package. According to the definition 
of Van Vliet, Broese Van Groenou, and Deeg (2010, p. 3) care packages refer to “useful 
combinations of care of elderly people living at home”, including all types of services 
available.  
On the one hand, the care package includes a wide range of health care services, like 
consultations with doctors (both general practitioners and specialists), inpatient 
treatments in hospitals for operations, rehabilitation, treatment of illness, other 
treatments of injury, sickness or other physical complaints, as well as outpatient hospital 
treatment. Common is that they are provided by health care professionals (e.g. a general 
practitioner, a specialised nurse), either inside or outside the home of the care receiver. On 
the other hand, social care services are included, being all services associated with help 
with basic activities of daily living and instrumental activities of daily living (resp. ADL and 
IADL). Help with ADL refers to personal care like bathing, dressing, eating, etc.; help with 
IADL refers to home help like gardening, shopping, cooking, etc. (European Commission 
Directorate for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2008; Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005). Social care services can be provided 
in different settings:  
 at the house of the care receiver (home care: e.g. help with ADL and IADL);  
 in transmural or semi-institutional care settings (e.g. day or night care centres, 
where no permanent stay in the care facility is required); or  
 in residential care facilities (i.e. elderly homes and nursing homes), which 
provide a combination of medical, nursing and long-term care.  
Social care services can be provided for short or for extended periods of time. For 
example, elderly who have left the hospital often need some assistance with ADL and IADL 
during a shorter period of time. However, elderly with severe and ongoing care 
dependency will draw on social care services for an extended period of time. In the 
literature, this is denoted sometimes with the concept of ‘long-term care’. 
Whereas health care services are always provided by professional care givers, this is not 
always the case for social care services, specifically when these services are provided at 
the home of the care receiver. In this case, also informal actors can play an important role 
in the care giving process (European Commission Directorate for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2008; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2005; Pacolet et al., 2004, 2000).  
One cannot consider the use of care without paying attention to the organisation of these 
care services by the government. After all, to an important extent the availability of care 
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services depends on the public efforts to invest and organise these social services. With 
regard to this, some important research has been done by, among others, Bettio & 
Plantenga (2004); Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa (2006); Reimat (2009); and Rostgaard 
(2002). As was the case with the income package, a link can be made with Esping 
Andersen’s (1990) welfare regime typology. The following care configurations or care 
regimes are associated with each welfare regime (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1. Components of the care package and the welfare state configuration 
Welfare state configuration Public versus private care components 
Liberal  
(e.g. UK) 
• Major role for private (for-profit) sector actors for organisation 
of care services 
 • Financing via private health or long-term/social care insurance 
 • Public assistance (services and financial compensation for care) 
only for most destitute groups of population 
Conservative  • Important care responsibility for the family 
(e.g. Germany, Belgium) • Organisation of social care often by voluntary, non-profit actors 
 • Financing via contributory social insurance system (includes 
health care and certain types of social care) 
Social-democratic  • Major role of public actors for organisation of care 
(e.g. Sweden, Denmark) • Major role for government for financing of health and social 
care 
 • Universalistic access to health and social care services 
 • Minor role to informal care (“defamilialisation of care”) 
Mediterranean countries • Major role for the family 
(e.g. Italy, Greece) • Strong values about the importance of family solidarity 
 • Minor role of public care provision 
Source: Anttonen & Sipilä (1996); Bettio & Plantenga (2004); Reimat (2009); Rostgaard 
(2003) 
In liberal welfare states, like the UK, the main focus of the organisation of health and social 
care for the elderly population is on private sector providers. For the financing, individuals 
are expected to take out a private health and social care insurance, and almost no public 
compensation for these services is provided. Only the most destitute parts of the 
population can rely on public services or public finances (to pay for private services). In 
the corporatist, social-insurance based welfare regimes (e.g. Germany, Belgium), a 
distinction is made between health care and social care. Overall, health care is offered by 
public actors, and financed via the contributory social insurance system. The 
responsibility for social (elderly) care to an important extent comes down to the family. In 
some of the corporatist welfare regimes, for example Austria and Germany, financial 
compensations are provided to stimulate informal family care. In the care regime typology 
of Bettio and Plantenga (2004) these countries are joined in the publicly facilitated, 
private care model. Despite the strong focus on informal care, also contributory social 
insurance-like systems can be organised for the financing of social care. In the social-
democratic welfare regimes, universalistic, citizenship-based programs of social care and 
health care protection are organised and financed by the government. This public 
provision of care substitutes importantly for family care and thus leads to a 
“defamilialisation” of social care (Reimat, 2009, p. 4). Lastly, the Mediterranean countries 
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(e.g. Italy, Greece) are considered as a distinct group because of their strong focus on the 
family. In these countries, strong values about family solidarity exist and this is reflected in 
the organisation of care. The government hardly provides or finances care services, this 
responsibility is left entirely to the family. 
From the packaging perspective, care is largely the result of claims that are made in the 
political sphere. Notions of citizenship and solidarity open the right to enjoy protection 
from public health insurance schemes, the receipt of health and social care services, etc. 
Overall, safeguarding the health of the population is considered as one of the main tasks of 
the contemporary welfare state, which makes the provision of health and long-term care a 
government affair. However, also within the economic sphere the provision of health and 
long-term care can be claimed from a productivity perspective. Additional employer-
provided health insurance schemes, for example, are reserved for employees and are 
based on the productivity of those employees. This is discussed more in detail in section 
2.1.3 of this chapter. 
2. Exploring the care package composition within the Belgian 
context 
The care package overall consists of the following elements: health care services on the 
one hand, and a wide range of social care services on the other hand. In the following 
paragraphs, detailed information is provided on the outlook of these services within the 
Belgian context, with specific attention for the services focused on the elderly population. 
Note that the overview is limited to services focused on functional care limitations; mental 
health care services are not explicitly included. 
2.1 Health care services 
The provision of health care services in Belgium is not restricted to the elderly population. 
But, given the link between age and health discussed in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, this type of services is very important for the research population. In 
assessing the outlook of the Belgian health care system, a difference is made between the 
delivery of health care services as such (2.1.1) and the provision of financial 
compensations for the use of these services via either public (2.1.2) or private insurers 
(2.1.3).  
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2.1.1 Delivery of health care services  
The delivery of health care services includes the wide range of medical and paramedical 
services contributing to the health status of the population. For example, contacts with 
general practitioners as well as specialists are included, but also the consumption of 
medication, and hospital treatments (operations, technical examinations, etc.) are 
involved.  
In Belgium, the provision of these services is mainly organised via private health care 
providers, though to a certain extent, hospitals services are organised via publically owned 
hospitals (Paris, Devaux, & Wei, 2010). Patients are free in the choice of their health care 
provider. However, financial incentives have been included in the national health 
insurance scheme to encourage individuals to get committed to a particular primary care 
provider via the global medical record [Globaal Medisch Dossier] (Paris et al., 2010). 
Consultations with the general practitioner holding the patients’ global medical record are 
cheaper and require lower personal payments. For patients older than 75 years, this cost 
reduction amounts to 30 percent for consultations at the general practitioner’s cabinet.27  
A number of health care services proof to be specifically important for the elderly 
population. For example, given their reduced mobility and reduced opportunities to go to 
the GP’s cabinet, general practitioner’s house visits are very important for the elderly 
population (Pacolet et al., 2004). Further, since the health status of the older population 
often is characterised by a combination of different (chronic) conditions (the so-called 
geriatric medical profile, e.g. multi-pathology, disability, general decline in health status, 
frailty, etc.), specialised multidisciplinary care is provided via the so-called G-departments 
in hospitals (geriatric wards). In addition, an important group of elderly is treated in SP-
departments focused on specific medical conditions (e.g. cardiologic problems, chronic 
disorder, functional disorders, etc.). Lastly, elderly are also overrepresented in palliative 
hospital wards, providing adapted care to terminal patients (Afschrift et al., 2002, pp. 49-
59; Cohen et al., 2008). 
2.1.2 National health insurance scheme 
In Belgium, financial compensations for the use of health care services are provided via 
the national health insurance scheme.28 Individuals are obliged to participate in the 
national health insurance, resulting in a quasi-universal coverage of the scheme (Paris et 
 
                                                             
27 Based on the rates of conventional doctor visits as published on the website of the Social Security 
Agency for Health and Invalidity Insurance [Hulpkas voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering] 
(http://www.hziv.be/tarieven-artsen-N.htm#huisbezoek75plus). 
28 By extension, reimbursements are also provided for the use of a number of social care services, 
like personal care at home provided by qualified nurses or the care received in residential and 
semi-residential care facilities. 
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al., 2010). To receive reimbursements, one has to join a health insurance fund or a Social 
Security Agency (S. Callens & Peers, 2003).  
A wide range of both preventive and curative (para-)medical services is covered by the 
national health insurance scheme (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011): 
 regular medical care (e.g. consultations with GP or specialist);  
 nursing care at home29; 
 dental care; 
 pharmaceutical products;  
 hospital care (including specialised care provided in residential care facilities for 
the elderly30 and elderly day care centres); and 
 rehabilitation care. 
An extensive list of all health care services suitable for reimbursements via the national 
health insurance scheme, the so-called nomenclature of medical treatments  
[nomenclatuur van geneeskundige verstrekkingen], is made up by the National Institute 
for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) [Rijksdienst voor Ziekte- en 
Invaliditeitsverzekering]. Different categories of health care and related services are 
discerned, for example based on the health care provider (e.g. GP versus specialist), the 
type of services (e.g. dental care, medication, dentures), the diagnose and the care setting 
(e.g. hospital, nursing home) (Rijksdienst voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, 
2014b).31  
Several mechanisms are included in the national health insurance for the reimbursement 
of the use of medical services:  
 personal payments with reimbursements,  
 maximum billing, and 
 
                                                             
29 Nursing care refers to specialised medical care (i.e. administering medication and injections, 
wound care, pain relief, etc.) provided by qualified nurses in the home of the elderly. These nurses 
can be either self-employed or employed in a home nursing agency, but always have to be 
recognised by the NIHDI for the execution of medical tasks. Whether or not one is eligible for home 
nursing care depends on his/her degree of care dependency. The provision of these services is most 
often related to additional services and benefits offered by the health insurance funds (cf. supra). 
Figures on the number of nurses providing nursing care at home are rare. According to statistics of 
the FACH (Vlaams Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2012c), in 2012 198 teams of home 
nursing care were active in Flanders. Further, based on financial expenses and user statistics, it is 
found that nursing care use is slightly more important in Flanders than in Wallonia, and it is found 
to be least important in the Brussels Capital Region (Pacolet et al., 2004; Pacolet, Merckx, & 
Peetermans, 2007). Based on statistics of the Belgian HIS (Demarest et al., 2010), in 2008 13% of 
the population aged 65 years and older received professional nursing care at home. 
30 A financial compensation is provided to elderly permanently residing in a residential care facility. 
This compensation is paid directly to the institution to compensate for nursing and personal care, 
and depends, among others, on the degree of dependency of the individual. 
31 The nomenclature of medical treatments was initially published in the Bulletin of Acts, as an 
annex to the Royal Decree of 14 September 1984 on the nomenclature of medical treatments 
concerning the compulsory health and invalidity insurance (B.A. 29.09.1984). An online version of 
the nomenclature can be consulted in the NomenSoft databank of the NIHDI (2014d). 
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 the third party payer’s scheme. 
 A first mechanism involves personal payments with reimbursements that are provided 
afterwards. The care receiver pays for the receipt of certain medical services, and 
afterwards he or she can recover these costs via the national health insurance. Overall, 
only a part of the total cost is recovered, the non-refundable part32 is covered by the care 
receiver. Yet, specific groups of care receivers are entitled to increased reimbursements 
[Rechthebbende op Verhoogde Verzekeringstegemoetkoming], and are exempted either 
partially or fully from such co-payments (i.e. lower non-refundable part). This holds for 
example for low-income widows, orphans, handicapped and low-income pensioners 
[former WIGW-statute], and - since 2007 - for all other low-income families (Callens & 
Peers, 2003; Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, 2014c; Van 
Langendonck, 2001).33 A second mechanism is the maximum billing system 
[Maximumfactuur], which has been installed for patients faced with very large co-
payments in his or her medical care expenses, due to ongoing and long-term health 
problems. Whenever the personal co-payments exceed a certain threshold, the remaining 
medical care costs are entirely compensated by the national health insurance scheme and 
co-payments are no longer required (FOD Sociale Zekerheid, 2011). The level of this 
threshold depends on the individual’s social category (i.e. those entitled to increased 
reimbursement; cf. supra) (social maximum billing), or on the household income (income 
related maximum billing). A third mechanism is the third party payer’s scheme 
[derdebetalersregeling], which implies immediate interventions in the health care costs 
via the national health insurance. Thus, no or only partial personal payments (i.e. the non-
refundable part) are required from the care receiver. The third party payer’s scheme is 
used for specific (costly) health care services. In addition, certain low-income groups can 
apply for a third party payer’s scheme for regular health care services so they only have to 
 
                                                             
32 The non-refundable part differs between health care providers, depending on their 
specialisation, training, time and place of consultations, reputation, etc. So-called fund doctors (i.e. 
doctors that have subscribed to the general tariff agreements between the health insurance funds 
and the medical profession) are obliged to charge collectively agreed tariffs (based on the rates 
included in these agreements). Doctors that have not endorsed to these agreements, are free to 
decide on the level of the fees they charge. Consultations with non-fund doctors thus can be 
significantly more expensive than consultations with fund doctors. The reimbursements via the 
health insurance fund are independent of whether one has consulted a fund doctor or a non-fund 
doctor. 
33 One should note that access to the more favourable reimbursement rates is granted 
automatically only to individual receiving social assistance. Other low-income individuals, that are 
eligible to the higher reimbursement rates, have to submit a request and proof their income 
situation in order to get access to the more favourable reimbursement scheme. This creates an 
additional administrative burden that could lead to non-take-up. An small-scale exploratory study 
of Henin (2013) on the use of health care services by social assistance beneficiaries shows that the 
favourable reimbursement mechanisms for low-income households are underused. A significant 
proportion of the low-income individuals does not have a global medical record, and thus misses 
out on the more favourable reimbursement rates related to this. Also, only a small group of low-
income individuals has requested the third party payer’s scheme for general doctor visits. 
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pay the non-refundable part. The health care provider in that case can recover the 
reimbursable part directly from the health insurance fund. 
Besides the costs covered in the regular national health insurance, a number of additional 
financial compensations for health care costs have been organised by the government. A 
federal Solidarity Fund [Bijzonder Solidariteitsfonds] has been installed to cover 
exceptionally large health care costs. Requests for these reimbursements have to be 
directed to one’s health insurance fund. The allocation and the amount granted is decided 
by a board of specialised doctors (Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, 
2006). Further, chronically-ill patients with a high degree of care dependency and high 
care costs can apply for a flat-rate allowance for chronic disease [Zorgforfait]. The level of 
this annual benefit depends of the degree of dependency, and on the actual care costs 
made (Pacolet et al., 2004). For elderly receiving palliative home care, the national health 
insurance provides a flat-rate palliative allowance [Palliatief forfait]. Also, no co-payments 
are to be done by palliative patients (Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en 
Invaliditeitsverzekering, 2010). 
2.1.3 Private health insurance 
In addition to the coverage provided by the national health insurance scheme, in Belgium 
patients are free to get involved in private health care insurance for additional 
reimbursements of health care costs. Private health care insurance is provided mainly in 
two ways (Berghman & Meerbergen, 2005): either via the health insurance fund one is 
involved in for the national health insurance, and/or via a private (employer-provided) 
health insurance scheme.  
In Belgium, these private health insurance schemes overall cover the costs not included in 
the national health insurance, and are complementary to the national health insurance 
(Paris et al., 2010). Obviously, individuals have to pay additional health insurance 
contributions to the insurer to apply for such private health care insurance.  
All health insurance funds, except the Social Security Agency for Health and Invalidity 
Insurance, offer an additional health insurance to their members, covering a wide range of 
health care related services and benefits, not or only partially included in the national 
health insurance scheme (Berghman & Meerbergen, 2005). An important degree of 
regulation and solidarity is involved, and the services have to contribute to the physical, 
mental and social well-being of the insured population. This includes, for example, 
additional reimbursements for health care services, and the organisation of medical and 
paramedical services. On no account elderly may be excluded from the additional 
insurance offered by the health insurance fund. However, when based on objective 
grounds, age-related exclusions from certain reimbursements and services are allowed. 
In addition, private insurance companies offer private health insurance schemes. Often, 
these schemes are organised via the employer as an additional service for their employees. 
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Most often this takes the form of an additional hospitalisation insurance, protecting 
against the supplemental costs of hospitalisation not covered via the national health 
insurance (Berghman et al., 2005; Schokkaert, Van Ourti, De Graeve, Lecluyse, & Van de 
Voorde, 2010). Insurance premiums have to be paid to apply for coverage via a private 
health care insurance. These premiums can be paid by the insured individual or by his/her 
employer in case of an employer-provided private health insurance.  
Concerning the opportunities for the elderly population to get involved in private health 
care insurance, the following should be noted. It is prohibited for private health insurance 
providers to end the insurance contract when the insured individual reaches the age of 65 
years (principle of lifelong insurance coverage). Moreover, individuals covered via an 
employer-provided private health insurance can opt for an individual continuation when 
the employment contract comes to an end. Further, the health insurance premiums are 
found to increase with age, mainly because of age-related increases in the prevalence of 
health conditions and problems.  
2.2 Social care services 
As was the case with health care services, the provision of social care services in Belgium 
is not limited to the elderly population. However, given the strong link between functional 
limitations and age, an important group of elderly population draws on social care service. 
Different viewpoints can be taken when discussing the availability of social care services, 
focusing on the actors involved, the place of care provision, etc. In the following sections, 
the organisation of social care is assessed from the place of care provision, differentiating 
between intramural or residential care, transmural care and extramural or home care (see 
Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Overview of the main characteristics of social care services34 
 
Only services providing nursing care, personal care and home help (i.e. help with ADL and 
IADL) are included in the overview (2.2.2). Services focusing on re-activation and social 
inclusion are left out of the overview. Further, only services actually providing care are 
included; services responsible for the provision of information, advise and the 
coordination of health and social care are not discussed. To start off, some insights are 
provided in the complex sharing of responsibilities for the organisation of care services in 
Belgium (2.2.1).35 
2.2.1 Organisation of social and old age care services 
In Belgium, the policy responsibilities for the organisation of old age care services are 
shared between federal and regional policy makers.36 The contours of elderly care policy 
are set out in a more or less harmonised and coordinated way via a number of protocol 
agreements focusing on common objectives and the contours of the programming of 
facilities.37 These agreements are the result of the interministerial conference on public 
 
                                                             
34 Note that nursing care is included in this overview of social care services (between parentheses), 
because in Belgium certain personal care services can be provided by specialized nurses and are 
included in the national health insurance scheme (cf. section 2.1). 
35 Our overview dates from before the transfer of social care responsibilities from the federal to the 
regional policy level at the end of 2014. 
36 This division of responsibilities is based on the 1980 law on the reformation of the Belgian 
institutions (art. 5 §1; B.A. 15.08.1980 ) and laid down in the Belgian Constitution (art. 
128,130,135). 
37 The last protocol agreement dates back to 2005 (Protocol agreement n°3 of 13 June 2005, B.A.  
28.04.2006), earlier agreements were made in 2003 (Protocol agreement n°2 of 1 January 2003, 
B.A.  30.11.2004) and 1997 (Protocol agreement n°1 of 9 June 1997, B.A. 30.07.1997). 
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health and the intergovernmental working group on elderly care policy joining federal, 
regional and communal policy makers involved in elderly care issues, the NIHDI and the 
Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre [Federaal Kenniscentrum voor de 
Gezondheidszorg]. A common concern expressed in these protocol agreements refers to 
ageing at home, and the aim to stay at home as long as possible via, among others, the 
development and expansion of home care services. Further, the guidelines and scale of this 
expansion are laid down in the protocol agreements, as well as the number of care units 
and the criteria for the development of additional residential long-term care facilities.  
Further, a quite complex division of responsibilities exists between the federal and the 
regional level with regard to the organisation of care services, and these differences are 
related to the place of the care provision (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Division of responsibilities on care services among federal and regional 
policy makers 
Type LTC Federal level Regional level 
Intramural   
  & 
• Recognition and planning  
• Price setting of accommodation 
• Financing (e.g. management, staff, 
nursing equipment) 
• Reimbursements via the national 
health insurance 
• Planning, supervision and 
recognition  
• Subsidies for e.g. infrastructure, 
animation, activation 
Transmural 
Extramural • Reimbursements via the national 
health insurance 
• Planning, supervision and 
recognition 
Concerning the care services provided in an intramural or a transmural care setting, 
responsibilities are divided between the federal and the regional policy level (FOD 
Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand, en Energie, 2009). At the federal level, different 
departments are involved in different aspects of the care provision38: 
 the FPS Health decides on the recognition standards for nursing homes providing 
long-term care to elderly with a severe degree of care dependency; 
 the outline of the planning of the number of nursing homes is decide by the FPS 
Social Security; 
 the Price Service of the FPS Economy is responsible for the maximum price policy 
and keeps an eye on price changes of residential care accommodation; and 
 the NIHDI stands in for the financing of residential care facilities and for the 
reimbursements made to care receivers via the national health insurance. 
The actual planning of the number of places in care facilities that is needed in the future, 
the supervision on the minimum quality levels and the recognition of nursing homes and 
 
                                                             
38 Note that at the end of 2014 important shifts have occurred in the long-term care policy 
responsibilities. All responsibilities related to residential long-term care have been transposed to 
the Belgian regions.  
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residential care facilities is a regional responsibility. Consequently, regional authorities 
are obliged to make up their own rules and standards for this. In Flanders, this 
responsibility is granted to the Flemish Agency for Care and Health (FACH) [Vlaams 
Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid]. In Wallonia, this is a responsibility of the General 
Operational Board of social action and health [Pouvoirs locaux, action sociale et santé – 
direction aînés], and in the Brussels Capital Region, decisions on residential care are taken 
collectively by the administration of the French Community Commission, the Communal 
Community Commission and the Flemish Agency for Care and Health. Further, regional 
authorities can grant subsidies for the financing of, among others, infrastructure, 
animation and activation of the elderly residents in (semi-)residential care facilities (FOD 
Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand, en Energie, 2009).  
The policy responsibilities for care services provided at home, on the other hand, come 
entirely to the regions. Only the reimbursements made for the receipt of personal care 
services via the national health insurance scheme are a federal responsibility. Regional 
authorities decide almost completely autonomous on the goals and orientations of their 
(long-term) care policy, the planning, recognition and supervision of the different 
facilities. However, the contours of these decisions are commonly laid down for all Belgian 
regions in the Protocol Agreements (cf. supra). 
2.2.2 Delivery of old age care services  
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the provision of old age care services involves a wide range of 
services, delivered either inside or outside the home of the care receiver. These services 
can be provided by public or private actors. As was the case with health care services, the 
care receiver is free in his/her choice of the care provider, though often this choice stems 
from the services offered via the additional health insurance of the care receiver’s health 
insurance fund (cf. supra).  
Residential care facilities  
Residential care facilities include homes for the elderly and nursing homes permanently 
residing elderly persons with a certain degree of care dependency. These residential, 
intramural care facilities combine several functions: residence, activities of daily living, 
personal care, nursing care, and to some extent also (non-specialised) medical care. The 
care provided in these facilities always is provided over an extended period of time (long-
term care). According to an overview of the Belgian long-term care system by Willemé 
(2010), residential care facilities are provided by local Public Centres for Social Welfare 
(PCSW) [Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, OCMW’s], or by private for-profit 
and not-for-profit institutions. 
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In Belgium, residential care facilities are reserved for the population aged 60 years and 
over. Homes for the elderly focus on the provision of residence and assistance with 
activities of daily living for mainly elderly with a low level of care dependency, while 
nursing homes also provide nursing care and focus on elderly with a severe degree of care 
dependency (i.e. grades B and C of care dependency39). However, in reality, residential 
care facilities often combine both, and provide residence and assistance with activities of 
daily living as well as nursing care to elderly with a severe degree of care dependency. For 
example, according to data of the NIHDI (2012), in December 2011 about three quarters of 
all residential care facilities were combinations of elderly homes and nursing homes. 
Based on statistics of the NIHDI (2012), in September 2012 there were 1554 residential 
care facilities for the elderly population, providing accommodation to by and large 132000 
elderly in need of permanent care (see Table 4.3). About halve of all these facilities is 
situated in Flanders, accounting for 52% of the residential long-term care beds. In 
Wallonia, 616 nursing homes and old age homes are found, providing accommodation to 
about 46000 elderly.  
Table 4.3. Residential long-term care in Belgium (resp. number of nursing homes 
and elderly homes and beds), by region (2012) 
 Facilities Beds 
N % N % 
Region     
  Flanders 761 49.0 69120 52 
  Walloon region  616 39.6 46895 35 
  Brussels Capital Region 169 10.9 15708 12 
  German Community 8 0.5 728 1 
Total 1554 100 132451 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NIHDI (2012) 
Besides homes for the elderly and nursing homes, special residential care facilities exist 
for elderly with a minor to moderate degree of dependency: assisted living facilities or 
service flats. Strictly spoken, service flats are not considered as permanent care facilities, 
since no permanent, continuous care is provided. Only a central permanence centre has to 
be installed, in that the residents can call for help in case of emergency. Residents are 
expected to have a low degree of care dependency (ideally a degree of O or A on the KATZ-
scale) and to be able to live almost entirely independent. However, care services are 
organised in the close environment of the residence, so that residents can use them on a 
voluntary, non-permanent basis (e.g. delivery of meals, cleaning services and limited 
 
                                                             
39 The grades of care dependency are based on the activities of daily living included in the KATZ-
scale: O=no care dependency, A=minor degree of care dependency, B and C=severe degree of care 
dependency (Art. 150 of the Royal Decree of 3 July 1996 for the execution of the law on the 
mandatory insurance for health care and benefits coordinated on 14 July 1994, B.A. 31.07.1996).  
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nursing care). Further, in a number residences common activities are organised, thus 
contributing to the social network of the residents (Vanden Boer, 1999).  
The organisation of these assisted living facilities often comes down to private (for-profit 
and not-for-profit) providers, though public providers are not explicitly excluded. An 
estimation of the number of service flats in Belgium showed that in 2011 about 600 
service flat buildings put nearly 18000 accommodations40 at the disposal of the  
(semi-)valid elderly in search of (semi-)assisted living (Table 4.4). Note the large 
discrepancies between the Belgian regions: The bulk of the service flats is situated in 
Flanders (81% of all facilities), while only 15% of the service flat residencies is situated in 
the Walloon region and about 4% is found in the Brussels Capital Region. 
Table 4.4. Estimation of the availability of service flats in Belgium (resp. number of 
facilities and accommodations), by region (2011)  
 Facilities Accommodations 
N % N % 
Region     
  Flanders 472 81 14846 82.9 
  Walloon region  88 15 1682 9.4 
  Brussels Capital Region 23 4 1368 7.6 
  German Community 3 1 16 0.1 
Total 586 100 17912 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on mix of sources41 
In addition, also other alternative housing facilities for the elderly population are 
developed, like shared housing (“kangaroo housing”), sheltered accommodation and 
duplex apartments. However, these rest entirely on private initiative, and no information 
is available on their popularity and on their distribution across Belgium. 
Transmural care facilities 
Transmural or semi-residential care facilities focus on the provision of social care services 
outside the house of the care receiver, though not on a permanent residential basis. The 
services not necessarily are provided for an extended period of time, and thus not always 
 
                                                             
40 Note that each accommodation can house one or two persons. No information is available on the 
number of persons per accommodation. 
41 These statistics are an estimation of the actual situation, based on information from the Flemish 
Agency for Health and Care (Vlaams Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2011c) for Flanders; the 
Walloon Public Service Administration for the Elderly (Direction générale opérationnelle des 
Pouvoirs locaux, de l’Action sociale et la Santé, 2011) for Wallonia; the database of Home-Info vzw 
(2011) for the Brussels Capital Region; and the databases of Senior Info (2011) and SeniorenNet 
(2011). 
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are considered as long-term care services in the strict sense. Transmural care services 
includes, among others, the social care provided in day care centres, night care centres, 
short stays at residential care facilities, short stay centres, etc. (Pacolet et al., 2004; 
Willemé, 2010). Both public (local PCSW’s) and private actors (for-profit and not-for-
profit) are responsible for the organisation of these facilities.  
Nursing care as well as personal care (help with ADL and IADL) are provided. It is focused 
on elderly with a moderate degree of care dependency, still able to live at home. 
Transmural care serves three main goals: (1) to maintain to stay at home as long as 
possible; (2) to provide additional care to elderly living at home when no or only limited 
informal care is available; and (3) to alleviate the burden of the informal care giver(s) 
(Willemé, 2010). 
In Belgium, only two types of transmural care are explicitly authorised by the government: 
short stay centres and day care centres. On the one hand, elderly in need of alternative 
care for a short period of time can be looked after in short stay centres [centra voor 
kortverblijf], providing temporary day and night care, with a maximum of 90 days per 
year, similar to the care provided in residential care facilities. Most often this type of care 
is provided in a residential care facility. Day care centres [dagverzorgingscentra], on the 
other hand, provide different types of care (i.e. personal care, nursing care, meals, and 
social activities) during the daytime to elderly with a moderate degree of dependency.  
The development of these transmural care facilities is found to be importantly more 
modest in comparison with the residential care facilities. In 2011, 479 short stay centres 
and 194 day care centres could provide care to 4765 elderly in need of temporary 
residential care. About 65% of these facilities is located in Flanders and 30% is located in 
Wallonia (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5. Short stay and day care centres in Belgium (number of facilities and 
number of places), by region (2011) 
 Short stay centres Day care centres 
 Facilities Beds Facilities Beds 
 N % N % N % N % 
Region         
  Flanders 306 63.9 1399 62.2 129 66.5 1753 69.7 
  Wallonia  155 32.4 782 34.8 49 25.3 523 20.8 
  Brussels Capital Region 14 2.9 55 2.4 12 6.2 210 8.3 
  German Community 4 0.8 14 0.6 4 2.1 29 1.2 
Total 479 100 2250 100 194 100 2515 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on mix of sources42 
Also other types of transmural care are found, though not authorised by the federal policy 
makers, nor organised the same in all Belgian regions. This includes, among others, night 
care, providing care during night-time (night hotel). Again, this care is provided only on a 
temporary basis to elderly in need of extra care or attention during night-time. This care is 
provided in a residential care facility or in a short stay centre. In Flanders, until now, no 
legal framework exists for night care, while both in Brussels and Wallonia night care is 
included in the regulations on care for the older population.43 However, little information 
is available on the actual importance of these services, since the provision of night care is 
entwined with the care provided in short stay centres and temporary care provided in 
elderly homes.  
Further, in Flanders for short periods of time host families take care of elderly without 
specialised or intensive care needs, though looking for company, social activation, 
supervision and (limited) assistance with ADL and IADL. This is organised and 
coordinated by local services for host families, and depends on the voluntary efforts of the 
host families (Vlaams Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2012a).44 
 
                                                             
42 These statistics are based on information from the Flemish Agency for Health and Care (Vlaams 
Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2011a, 2011b) for Flanders; the Walloon Public Service 
Administration for the Elderly (Direction générale opérationnelle des Pouvoirs locaux, de l’Action 
sociale et la Santé, 2011) for Wallonia; the database of Home-Info vzw (2011) for the Brussels 
Capital Region; and the Infocenter of the German Speaking Community (DG Belgien, 2011a, 2011b). 
43 Some night care initiatives in Flanders and Brussels receive project subsidies from the NIHDI 
within the framework of the development of alternative care initiatives from dependent elderly 
(Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, 2014a). Also the Flemish Agency for Care 
and Health grants subsidies to innovative projects experimenting with night care for dependent 
elderly (Vlaams Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2014) 
44 Also private initiatives offering this type of care have been developed in Belgium. One important 
example is Baluchon Alzheimer, a non-profit organization offering continuous care to elderly with 
Alzheimer’s disease for short periods of time. More information on Baluchon Alzheimer can be 
found on the website: http://www.baluchon-alzheimer.be. 
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Home care  
Home care refers to the wide range of social care services provided at the house of the 
care receiver. This includes personal care and home help. Also companionship can be part 
of the social care services provided at home. Home care services can be provided for a 
short period of time (for example, acute home care after a hospitalisation) or for a longer 
period of time. 
Personal care services (e.g. going to the toilet, getting dressed, etc.) can also be provided 
by both formal (professional) and informal (non-professional) care givers. Whenever 
provided by formal care givers, these tasks often come to qualified nurses or (not 
qualified) professional personal care givers. Home help refers to help with household 
chores. This includes, among other, the preparation of meals or the at-home delivery of 
meals (meals-on-wheels), garden work, cleaning, grocery shopping, etc. Often, also the 
provision of company and supervision for elderly that cannot stay at home alone is 
included in home help. The non-specialised character of home help makes that it can be 
provided by both formal and informal care givers. When formally provided, both public 
and private actors can offer home help.  
Figures on the development of personal care and home help services within Belgium are 
limited and very fragmented. Consequently, it is difficult to sketch a complete picture of 
the importance of these services. In Flanders, the provision of personal care and home 
help is coordinated and supervised by the Services for family care and supplementary 
home care [Diensten voor gezinszorg en aanvullende thuiszorg]. In 2012, 127 services for 
family care were providing family care to the population (independent of age) (Vlaams 
Agentschap voor Zorg en Gezondheid, 2012b). Concerning the actual hours of care 
provided, according to a study of Pacolet et al. (2004, 2007) in Flanders the formally 
provided home help and personal care outweighs that of Wallonia. Lastly, the Belgian 
Health Interview Survey (HIS) provides some insights on the use of social care services at 
home (Demarest et al., 2010). This however does not entirely reflect the actual size of the 
supply of these care services. In 2008 about a fifth of the population aged 65 years or older 
used home help services, while about 4% used a meals-on-wheels service for the delivery 
of meals at home. The incidence of use is found to be significantly higher in Flanders than 
in Wallonia and Brussels. 
2.2.3 Care insurance 
The costs of the use of social (long-term) care services can be covered in three ways: 
either via the national health insurance scheme, via the public social care insurance 
scheme (in Flanders), or via a private (long-term) care insurance schemes. 
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Social care services included in the national health insurance scheme 
Personal sanitary care, provided by a qualified nurse at the house of the care receiver, is 
included in the nomenclature of the national health insurance scheme. Reimbursements 
are thus provided via the national health insurance scheme, though overall also co-
payments of the care receiver are required (cf. supra). Low-income elderly are exempt 
from these co-payments.45 Further, often also account is given to the care receiver’s degree 
of care dependency. Elderly with a more severe degree of care dependency have to pay 
smaller personal contributions than elderly with a more modest degree of care 
dependency. 
Further, for the financing of a number of social care services, additional insurance is 
provided by the health insurance agency, to which one has to register to apply for the 
national health insurance. The services covered differ between the health insurance funds, 
but often include compensations for personal care and home help, coordination of the care 
package, etc.46 
Public social care insurance scheme 
In Belgium, no national public social care insurance scheme has been set up, mainly 
because social care is a regional, and not a federal, responsibility. However, in Flanders a 
social care insurance scheme [Vlaamse zorgverzekering] was introduced in 2001 
providing additional financial protection for the use of non-medical, social care services 
(e.g. home care, personal care) by individuals with a severe degree of care dependency (cf. 
chapter 3). These services can be provided either in a residential care facility or in the 
house of the care receiver, by a professional formal or non-professional, informal 
caregiver. Only those with a severe degree of care dependency can apply for 
compensations in the social care insurance scheme. The financial compensations are flat-
rate and do not take account of the care receiver’s own income sources. 
 
                                                             
45 These co-payments can be quite important. For example, a survey of the FPS Economy (FOD 
Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand, en Energie, 2009) showed that the personal contribution of the 
care receiver in a residential care facility ranges between 31 and 46 Euros per day (961 to 1426 
Euros per month). These individual contributions have to cover the costs for the residence (the so-
called hotel costs), and the use of supplementary services (like hairdresser, laundry service, 
pedicure, etc.). Under specific conditions, low-income elderly staying in a residential care facility 
can apply for financial PSWC support to finance their stay in the residential care facility. Further, 
this group of elderly can also apply for a PSWC allowance for elderly residents [zakgeld voor 
rusthuisbewoners]: a flat-rate monthly allowance to spend on additional personal expenses. 
46 Note that the use of certain home help services (e.g. cleaning, laundry, grocery shopping) is 
covered via the system of service checks [dienstencheques]: the care receiver pays a fixed hourly 
compensation, independent of his/her income, of which a part can be claimed back via the annual 
tax declaration. 
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Private long-term or social care insurance schemes 
Individuals are free to participate in a private long-term or social care dependency 
insurance scheme offered by a private insurance company. Financial compensations are 
provided in case of “a medical physical or mental incapacity to perform certain activities of 
daily living” (Berghman et al., 2005, p. 44). Although little is known about the popularity of 
these private care insurance schemes, we do know that in Belgium only a very limited 
proportion of the population takes part in this type of insurance (Berghman et al., 2005; 
Colombo, Llena-Nozal, Mercier, & Tjadens, 2011).  
3. Determinants of the care package 
In this section, an overview of the literature on the determinants of the care package 
composition is provided. For this, we draw on the classic behavioural model of health 
services utilisation developed by Andersen at the end of the 1960s (Andersen, 1968; 
Andersen & Newman, 1973). The framework is widely recognised as ‘the’ tool to analyse 
the use of health care services, and has been the object of critics, revisions and 
refinements from its development onwards (Andersen, 1995; e.g. Andersen & Davidson, 
2001). Without going into the details, the main points of the framework are presented 
here. Afterwards, attention is paid to the relationship between income and care utilisation. 
Lastly, a number of other stratification determinants of elderly care use are touched upon. 
3.1 The health services utilisation framework 
Seminal in the research on health care use is the work of Andersen (1968), who developed 
a model for explaining and predicting the use of health care (and social care) services. 
Initially, Andersen (1968) developed his model to explain differences in health utilisation 
with a focus on the family as the unit of analysis. Later, the focus of the model shifted to 
the individual, mainly because health status proved to be difficult to measure at family 
level (Andersen, 1995). The main focus was on individual factors that could both explain 
and predict health care services use. However, to a limited extent also societal 
determinants were taken into account (Andersen & Newman, 1973) (see Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3. Andersen’s health services utilisation framework 
 
Source: Andersen & Newman (1973, p. 4) 
With regard to the individual determinants, the model focuses on “the individual 
characteristics of people which help to determine the health care they receive” (Andersen 
& Newman, 1973, p. 12). These are divided into three groups of factors. First, predisposing 
factors include the determinants preceding and not directly related to health care use, 
though posing an indirect influence on it. This includes demographic characteristics like 
age and gender; social structural characteristics like socioeconomic status, education and 
occupation; and attitudes and beliefs about medical services. To illustrate, age is not 
directly related to health care use, though with age the prevalence of health problems 
increases and thus also health care use related to this. Secondly, enabling factors refer to 
resources that facilitate the access to health care services, both at household and 
community level. At household level, for example income and health insurance is found to 
enable the access to health care services. At community level, the size of health services 
and whether or not one lives in a rural or an urban environment predicts if the individual 
has easy access to health care services. Lastly, need factors refer to characteristics directly 
influencing one’s health care use: an individual has to be confronted with illness before 
turning to certain health care services. This includes both the subjective, self-perceived 
illness level as well as the evaluated, objective illness level (i.e. medically assessed illness 
or possibility of its occurrence) (Andersen & Newman, 1973). 
At the contextual level, initially societal determinants referred to technology (changes and 
improvements in medical treatments and procedures), norms (values and opinions 
towards health care utilisation, either or not formalised via legislation) and the health 
services system (resources and organisation of the formal health care) (Andersen & 
Newman, 1973). Later, a more elaborated viewpoint on the contextual determinants was 
developed, differentiating between contextual predisposing, enabling and need factors, 
resembling the classification of the individual level determinants (Andersen & Davidson, 
2001). The contextual predisposing factors refer to the aggregate, already existing 
conditions not directly related to health care usage, though significantly influencing it. For 
example the age structure, ethnic composition and overall educational level of the 
population are included here. Enabling factors, on their turn, refer to the conditions 
enabling the access to and the use of health care services. This includes health policies, 
Societal determinants Health services system 
Individual determinants 
Health services utilisation 
Predisposing factors 
Enabling factors 
Need factors 
Technology 
Norms and attitudes 
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financing characteristics (e.g. per capita income, health insurance coverage, per capita 
health expenditures), and the organisation of health services. This last element refers to 
the development of health facilities and personnel, and is closely related to what initially 
was classified as the health care service system determinants. Need factors, at last, refer to 
the quality of the physical environment (e.g. quality of water) and more general 
population health indicators. 
Given the focus of our research on individual protection against old age dependency, no 
further attention is paid to the contextual factors influencing (health) care utilisation, 
however, without neglecting the importance of these factors. In the following sections a 
selection of stratification determinants, also included in the Andersen model of care 
utilisation are discussed and substantiated with findings from empirical research. The 
main focus is on income (enabling factor), since this is central in our research question. 
Additionally, also other influencing factors are included: 
 predisposing factors: gender, age, socioeconomic status and marital status; 
 enabling factors: income; and 
 need factors: health and social care needs (health status and functional level). 
3.2 The role of income in explaining health and social care services use 
In the seminal Andersen framework of health care services utilisation (Andersen & 
Newman, 1973), income is included as an enabling factor, inducing the access to specific 
health and social care services. Income thus reflects the degree of economic access, 
referring to “an individual’s [...] financial ability to pay for medical care” (Dunlop, 
Manheim, Song, & Chang, 2002, p. S224). Central in the research on income and care use is 
the role of the national health and social care insurance schemes, since these schemes can 
mediate the influence of income on health and social care services utilisation. In the 
following sections, more detailed insights from empirical research are provided on the 
role of income in the use of health and social care services, the ‘mediating potential’ of 
public insurance schemes, and the potential interactions between the old age income 
package and the use of health and social care services. 
3.2.1 Income and health care services use 
National health insurance schemes, providing financial coverage for the use of health care 
services to (almost) the entire population, have been installed in all Western European 
countries (Paris et al., 2010). Overall, partial or full coverage of the costs of basic primary 
health care services, like doctors consultations, medical tests and examinations, and 
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hospital care47 is provided (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2012). In addition to the national health insurance, voluntary health insurance can be 
taken out. Coverage via a private voluntary health insurance scheme is classified as 
complementary, when it covers the non-covered costs of the services in the national health 
insurance scheme; supplementary, when it covers for services not included in the national 
health insurance scheme; or duplicate, when the coverage is similar to that of the national 
health insurance scheme (Kiil, 2012; Paris et al., 2010). 
Three reasons, all related to the system characteristics of the national health insurance 
schemes, are put forward by Devaux and de Looper (2012) to explain income related 
differences in health care utilisation. The first reason refers to the public health setting 
and the practical organisation of the health care system. Whether or not the individual has 
to pay the costs for the use of health services up-front (out-of-pocket payments versus 
third-party payer’s scheme), the administrative burden of the reimbursement procedure, 
the time span between the out-of-pocket payment and the receipt of the reimbursement 
and the lack of knowledge about the reimbursement procedure make that low-income 
households are faced with more difficulties to apply for reimbursements than high-income 
households. This results in a lower use of health care services by low-income households. 
The second reason refers to the level of the out-of-pocket payments (co-payments), or, to 
put differently, the level of the non-refundable contribution of health care services. A 
larger personal contribution for certain health care services makes them less accessible 
for low-income households. Thirdly, the importance of private health insurance schemes, 
beside the national health insurance scheme, could account for income related inequalities 
in health care utilisation. Private health insurance schemes overall are based on personal 
insurance fees, that tend to favour high-income groups with more means to buy 
themselves into a private insurance scheme than low-income groups (Kiil, 2012). In 
addition, because private insurance fees overall are risk related, and income is strongly 
associated with health status (Mackenbach et al., 2008), low-income individuals, who tend 
to have a worse health status than high-income individuals, are faced with higher 
insurance fees than high-income individuals. In addition, because private health insurance 
is associated with access to more and higher quality health care services, that are often 
significantly faster available than public health care services, the relative importance of 
private health insurance is expected to favour higher-income households even more 
(Devaux & de Looper, 2012; Jones, Koolman, & van Doorslaer, 2006; Kiil, 2012).  
Research confirms the existence of income related differences in health care utilisation 
within the complete population, as well as within the elderly population, despite the 
existence of widespread national health insurance systems. Overall, low-income 
households are found to have less access to health care services and lower degrees of 
health care utilisation, though their need for health care is expected to be higher because 
 
                                                             
47 To a lower extent, also dental care and prescribed pharmaceuticals are covered in the majority of 
the national health insurance schemes. 
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of a negative relationship between income and health status (cf. the literature review of 
Feinstein, 1993). However, the relationship between income and health care use tends to 
differ when account is given to the type of health care service (Allin, Masseria, & Mossialos, 
2009; Van der Heyden, Demarest, Tafforeau, & Van Oyen, 2003; van Doorslaer, Koolman, & 
Jones, 2004; van Doorslaer & Masseria, 2004). According to a comparative study of Devaux 
and de Looper (2012) in 19 OECD countries, health care utilisation equity is higher for 
visits to a general practitioner, while the differences between low and high-income 
individuals increase when the focus is on specialist and dentist visits, in that the likelihood 
and the frequency of specialist and dentist visits is higher among high income individuals 
than among low income individuals.48 Concerning inpatient hospital treatment, little 
differences are found between high-income and low-income individuals, when account is 
given to the differences in their health status (van Doorslaer & Masseria, 2004). Lastly, a 
similar relationship between health care utilisation and income is found when health care 
use is measured as foregone health care or unmet health care needs (cf. Allin & Masseria, 
2009; Litwin & Sapir, 2009). In Europe, perceived income adequacy, i.e. the subjective 
estimation of the financial capacities of the household, is found to have a substantive 
influence on the decision not to draw on a particular health service (Litwin & Sapir, 2009). 
Similarly, the proportion of those reporting unmet health needs – which refers to 
problems in the access to health services – is higher among those with lower incomes 
(Allin & Masseria, 2009). 
Whereas the relationship between income and health care access has been fairly 
extensively documented, this does not hold for the possible role of wealth in health care 
utilisation.49 Little research exists on this, though, as discussed earlier, wealth is a 
particularly important potential source of income for the elderly population (cf. chapter 
3). One reason that could account for this is the fact that wealth is not immediately 
available for consumption goals, and thus cannot be used for the direct financing of health 
care services utilisation. However, wealth is recognised as a future source to finance 
health care services, since wealth accumulation for unforeseen circumstances is seen is 
one of the main motives for saving (i.e. “the precautionary motive”: Keynes, 1936 cited in 
Browning & Lusardi, 1996, p. 1797). Further, asset ownership is associated with altered 
consumption patterns (Henretta & Campbell, 1978), in that wealth provides a buffer for 
higher consumption levels. Mortgage-free homeownership, on his turn, contributes 
importantly to the available income, since no rents nor mortgages have to be paid for 
 
                                                             
48 Specialist and dentist visits are thus considered to be strong pro-rich distributed (van Doorslaer 
& Masseria, 2004). 
49 While little research exists on the relationship between wealth and health care use, literature on 
the relationship between health status and wealth does exist (e.g. the literature review of Feinstein, 
1993). Overall, higher wealth stocks are associated with better health status. However, this 
literature does not provide insights in whether or not the wealth stock interacts with differences in 
health care utilisation. 
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housing. Consequently, a positive relationship between mortgage-free homeownership 
and the possibility to buy in additional health care services could be expected.  
Lastly, also limited research exists on the relationship between the diversification in the 
income package (i.e. the number and type of different income sources available) and the 
access to health care services. Yet, it could be expected that, for example, an individual 
with an employer-provided pension plan also receives additional health insurance 
provided via the employer. Thus, a positive relationship between employer-provided 
income protection and health protection could be expected, although this relationship has 
not yet been investigated. Similarly, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
individuals taking out a private pension plans are also more likely to opt for a 
supplementary or a complementary private health insurance plan. No research exists 
investigating the link between these sources of old age protection. 
3.2.2 Income and the use of social care services 
Whereas for health care services broad public health care systems have been set up in all 
Western European countries, this is not the case for social and long-term care services. A 
strong degree of differentiation and fragmentation among Western European countries is 
found in their organisation and financing of the social care provision. In the overview 
provided by Colombo, Llena-Nozal, Mercier and Tjadens (2011) three groups of countries 
with similar social care systems are discerned:  
 countries with a single social care system providing universal coverage;  
 countries with a mixed system of social care provision; and  
 countries with means-tested safety schemes for social care services.  
In the first group of countries (including Belgium) almost the entire population enjoys 
public social care services, irrespective of their income, assets or personal care resources 
(like the availability of informal care). A minimum standard of care is included to 
safeguard the quality of the care provided. In the second group of countries (e.g. France), 
combinations of social care benefits, programmes and services have been set up, though 
not joined together into a single care scheme. For example, different systems have been set 
up for different types of care, combinations of income-tested benefits and universal 
coverage are found, etc. On average, in these countries a lower coverage of care costs is 
found and households are confronted with significant amounts of out-of-pocket payments, 
which is particularly difficult for low-income households. Further, in case of fragmentation 
in the provision of services, more problems occur in protecting a minimum quality 
standard, and households have more difficulties is assessing to what services they are 
eligible (knowledge problems). In the last group of countries, with means-tested care 
services, only low-income household are eligible to publically provided social care 
services, leading to an overall low degree of coverage. High income households are 
expected to draw on private insurance schemes to compensate the costs of social care. 
Consequently, households with incomes just above the income thresholds in the public 
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schemes cannot apply for public services, though do not have sufficient means to pay for 
private services or take out private social or long-term care insurance, and are thus not 
covered at all. 
The lack of public social care (insurance) systems leads to important income-related 
differences in the access and utilisation of these care services. Overall, more generous 
income levels are associated with a higher probability of formal care utilisation (Declercq 
et al., 2009; Geerlings, Pot, Twisk, & Deeg, 2005; Geerts, 2009). Furthermore, Geerlings et 
al. (2005) found that in the Netherlands having a high income was significant in predicting 
the transition from no or informal care to privately purchased home care. This is at odds 
with the general conclusion of Goodridge, Hawranik, Duncan and Turner (2012) on the 
access and utilisation of home care services. Based on an extensive literature review, they 
concluded that low-income individuals tend to receive more home care services than high-
income individuals, even after controlling for differences in their health and functional 
status. Similar results were found by Kadushin (2004) and Crets (1992).  
As was the case with health care utilisation, little research exists on the role of assets in 
explaining differences in the use of social care services. In their comparison of four 
European countries (the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and the UK), Broese Van Groenou, 
Glaser, Tomassini and Jacobs (2006) found that in the UK and Italy individuals without 
homeownership had a higher propensity to receive informal care, mainly because this is 
much cheaper than formal care. However, in the same study they also found that “those 
who were not owner occupiers had higher odds of formal help [in the UK and Belgium]” 
(Broese van Groenou et al., 2006, p. 759), which is at odds with the findings in the UK and 
Italy. 
Moreover, little to no research exists on the link between the composition of the old age 
income package (i.e. the number and type of income sources available) and the access to 
social and long-term care services. To put it differently, no answer is provided to the 
question whether a diversification in one’s income sources increase one’s access to social 
care services, and whether differences exist in the use of social care services among 
individuals with different income sources at their disposal. 
3.3 Other determinants  
Other stratification determinants influencing the use of health and social care services, of 
interest in this research, include predisposing factors, as well as need factors. The 
following factors are discussed in the next paragraphs: gender, age, socioeconomic status, 
and marital status as predisposing factors, and health status and functional level as need 
factors. 
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3.3.1 Predisposing factors 
The predisposing factors refer to individual level determinants influencing “the propensity 
toward [health care] use [...].”, though “not directly responsible for health service use” 
(Andersen & Newman, 1973, p. 108). This includes gender, age, socioeconomic status and 
marital status. 
Gender 
A first predisposing determinant of interest here is gender. The link between gender and 
the receipt of care is twofold. On the one hand, gender differences in life expectancy and 
age at marriage make that the incidence of women living alone at the end of their life is 
larger than that of men. Thus, men have more access to informal care provided by their 
partner compared to women. In addition, the healthy life expectancy of women is lower 
than that of men. In 2010, the remaining health life expectancy of a 65-year-old woman 
was 9.7 years (overall life expectancy: 21.3 years), while the healthy life expectancy of a 
65-year-old man was 10.4 years (overall life expectancy: 17.6 years) (Eurostat, 2014b). 
Women thus do not only face a longer period living alone at the end of their life, overall, 
they also face living longer in bad health – and thus in need of care – than men. 
On the other hand, gendered expectations and norms about the receipt and provision of 
care generally disfavour married women. Traditionally, the role of care giver within the 
household was preserved for women, leading to care provided by the wife to her husband, 
and not or only to a limited extent the other way round. These norms on the provision and 
the receipt of care are still predominant among the older generations (Spitze & Ward, 
2000), leading to an overrepresentation of wives providing care and husbands receiving 
this care and not the other way round. Consequently, men are found to receive overall 
more care than women, and more specifically, men receive more informal care than 
women (Declercq et al., 2009; Katz, Kabeto, & Langa, 2000; Larsson, Thorslund, & 
Kareholt, 2006). Women on their turn more often rely on care from outside the household, 
and receive more formal care than men (Declercq et al., 2009; Mutchler & Bullers, 1994). 
However, not all literature confirms these gender differences in the amount and type of 
care received. Several researchers have found little to no gender differences in the receipt 
of either formal or informal care (e.g. Auchincloss, van Nostrand, & Ronsaville, 2001; 
Davey, Savla, Sundström, Zarit, & Malmberg, 2007; Geerlings et al., 2005; Geerts, 2009). 
Age 
A second predisposing determinant of interest is age. The relationship between care and 
age is fairly straightforward. Growing older is strongly related to increases in physical 
dependency and problems with ADL and IADL. Consequently, with age the incidence of 
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care receipt is expected to increase. This holds for both formal care and informal care 
(Broese van Groenou et al., 2006; Colombo et al., 2011; Declercq et al., 2009). Further, the 
odds of receiving formal care instead of informal care are also found to increase with age 
(Davey et al., 2007; Geerlings et al., 2005; Geerts, 2009). Older age groups receive more 
formal care than younger age groups, both for personal and household care. This can be 
explained by the higher degree of care dependency of older groups, and by higher chance 
on the loss of the primary informal care giver with the decease on the individual’s partner. 
Lastly, the amount of care also increases with age: the older, the higher the intensity of 
care one receives (Geerts, 2009). 
Socioeconomic status 
Thirdly, socioeconomic status is included as a predisposing factor of care use. In scientific 
research, this mainly refers to the level of education, combined with the occupational 
status of the last job and income (cf. supra). The link between socioeconomic status and 
care use is twofold.  
First, socioeconomic status interacts with health and functional status, thus influencing the 
need for care services. Different studies have found that low socioeconomic status goes 
hand in hand with higher levels of mortality and morbidity, thus increasing the need for 
(health) care services (e.g. Cavelaars et al., 1998; Kunst, Groenhof, & Mackenbach, 1998; 
Mackenbach et al., 2008). A similar relationship is found between socioeconomic status, 
functional status and old age disability (i.e. difficulties with ADL and IADL). Among the 
elderly population, differences in educational level and occupational status are persistent 
in influencing the daily functioning during old age (Arber & Ginn, 1993; Berkman & 
Gurland, 1998; Huisman, Kunst, & Mackenbach, 2003; Rahkonen & Takala, 1998). In 
addition, a recent study of Hoeck et al. (2011) has found a strong relationship between 
socioeconomic status and frailty among the Belgian elderly population. Elderly with a low 
socioeconomic status were more likely to be frail than elderly with a high socioeconomic 
status, and thus have a higher need for health and social care services. 
Second, socioeconomic status relates to (health) care use by differences in knowledge and 
access (health literacy). Research of Van der Heyden, Demarest, Tafforeau, and Van Oyen 
(2003) indicates that in Belgium those with a higher socioeconomic status have more 
contacts with specialists, dentists and physiotherapists than those with a lower 
socioeconomic status. Individuals with lower socioeconomic status have more contacts 
with a GP more often. This confirms findings from other studies across Europe and North-
America (e.g. Veugelers & Yip, 2003). The main explanation for this is based on differences 
in the individual’s knowledge and the awareness of the availability of (health) care 
services related to socioeconomic status. To a limited extent, also financial barriers could 
explain socioeconomic differences in (health) care use. Also interesting is the relationship 
between socioeconomic status, taking out private health insurance, and health care use. 
According to Schokkaert et al. (2007, p. 18) “there is a clear socioeconomic gradient in the 
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take-up of supplemental insurance”. Individuals with a high socioeconomic status are 
more likely to get involved in private health insurance than low status individuals. Yet, no 
straightforward relationship between taking out supplementary health insurance and 
health care use was found. 
Socioeconomic status can also be associated with the use of preventive health care 
services, like screenings, routine check-ups and blood tests, vaccinations, etc. Overall, the 
preventive health behaviour of high status individuals tends to be better developed than 
that of low status individuals. According to a research report of the Belgian Health 
Interview Survey of 2008, a higher socioeconomic status is related to a higher degree of 
vaccinations, a higher propensity of screening for cardiovascular diseases and diabetes, 
and a higher participation in cancer screening. Yet, among the population aged 65 and 
over, socioeconomic differences were not found to be significant in explaining differences 
in the population’s vaccination rate (Demarest, Drieskens, Van der Heyden, & Tafforeau, 
2010). 
Lastly, socioeconomic differences are also found in the use of formal and informal care 
services. Overall, it is confirmed that those with a lower socioeconomic status use more 
informal care, while those with a higher socioeconomic status use more formally provided 
care (e.g. Auchincloss et al., 2001; Broese van Groenou et al., 2006; Declercq et al., 2009; 
Geerlings et al., 2005). One reason could be that informal care comes for free, while for 
formally purchased care services a (minimal) personal financial contribution has to be 
paid by the care receiver. Financial constraints thus could impose those with a lower 
socioeconomic status to draw on ‘free’ informal care, while those with a higher 
socioeconomic status have more options available to choose from informal and formal 
care services. 
Marital status 
Lastly, marital status is included as a predisposing determinant of health and social care 
services utilisation. Living together with a partner (or other household members) creates 
the opportunity for informal partner help, while those living single cannot fall back on 
such within-couple care. Research confirms this: living together with a partner induces the 
opportunities for informal care, while those living single more often fall back on formal 
care services because of the non-availability of informal carers (e.g. Auchincloss et al., 
2001; Davey et al., 2007; Declercq et al., 2009; Pickard, Wittenberg, Comas-Herrera, 
Davies, & Darton, 2000). Further, marital disruptions, either because of death of the 
spouse or because of later-life divorce, has important consequences for the access and 
availability of informal care, since it is associated with the loss of the primary source of 
informal care (Glaser, Tomassini, Racioppi, & Stuchbury, 2006). 
Note, however, that marital status, and by extension household composition, can also be 
considered as an enabling factor in explaining social care service use, in that the presence 
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of a partner or other household members induces the possibilities for informal care 
provision. 
3.3.2 Need factors 
Need factors refer to the individuals’ health status and illness level or the probability of 
the occurrence of illness, and to one’s functional level and problems with ADL and IADL 
(Andersen & Newman, 1973, pp. 109–110).  
Both influence the use of health and social care services. The relationship between both is 
quite obvious: certain health or functional problems have to exist before the individual 
turns to health care services. Research shows that objective health and functional 
impairments, as well as self-rated poor health status are associated with a higher 
utilisation of health care and social care services (Declercq et al., 2009; Geerlings et al., 
2005; Geerts, 2009; Larsson, Thorslund, Szebehely, & Daatland, 2004; Miller & Weissert, 
2000). Further, frailty is also associated with the use of health and social care services. 
Even after adjusting for possible cofounding variables, Hoeck et al. (2011) found that in 
Belgium the use of health and social care services is higher among the frail than among the 
‘robust’ (i.e. not considered as frail) elderly population. 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explored the mechanisms that provide protection against the functional  
dimension of dependency, which is found to be very important for the elderly population. 
Together with the income sources discussed in the third chapter of this report, these 
sources are found to be among the most important sources to protect the elderly 
population against the consequences of old age dependency.  
From the packaging perspective, care is largely the result of claims that are made in the 
political sphere. Notions of citizenship and solidarity open the right to protection via 
public health insurance schemes, the receipt of health and social care services, etc. Overall, 
safeguarding the health of the population is considered as one of the main tasks of the 
contemporary welfare state, which makes the provision of health and social care services a 
government affair. However, also within the economic sphere the provision of health and 
social care can be claimed from a productivity perspective. Additional employer-provided 
health insurance schemes, for example, are reserved for employees and are considered to 
be a reward based on the productivity of those employees.  
The care package includes two main components: health care services on the one hand, 
and social care services on the other hand. In Belgium these services overall are organised 
within the framework of the national health insurance scheme. An encompassing 
obligatory insurance scheme provides the majority of the population with financial 
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compensations for the use of health care services. This includes the wide range of medical 
and paramedical services focused on the health status of the population, like contacts with 
a GP, hospital treatments, preventive screenings, etc. In Belgium, health care services 
overall are offered by private health care providers. The social care services refer to the 
care services provided in residential care settings (i.e. residential care in elderly homes 
and nursing homes, as well as transmural care in day care centres and short stay centres) 
or the wide range of care services provided in the home of the care receiver (i.e. personal 
care and home help provided by formal and informal care givers). 
The population can apply for (partial) financial compensations via the national health 
insurance scheme. More advantageous reimbursements are provided for specific groups, 
like elderly with a modest household income. To an important extent, also social care 
services (e.g. personal hygiene provided by professional care givers, etc.) are included in 
the national health insurance scheme. In addition, individuals can voluntary participate in 
private health insurance schemes providing complementary protection to the national 
health insurance scheme. In Belgium, this complementary insurance often covers the 
supplementary costs of hospital stays that are not included in the regular health insurance 
schemes. Further, supplementary private insurance for a wide range of health and social 
care services is offered via the health insurance funds. Lastly, in Flanders a public care 
insurance scheme has been set up, providing flat-rate benefits for individuals in need of 
(long-term) social care. Private care insurance schemes, however, are found to be less 
popular and only a very limited proportion of the population is involved in this type of 
private insurance schemes. 
In the literature review we focused on the main determinants inducing differences in the 
use of health and social care services. This overview was based on the seminal health 
services utilisation framework of Andersen (1968), that distinguishes between 
predisposing, enabling and need factors to explain the use of health care services. The 
main factor of interest for this research, namely income, was found among the enabling 
factors. An important strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between income 
and the use of health and social care services. Despite the provision of extensive financial 
reimbursements for the use of these services, income related differences between 
individuals are found. Overall, higher income individuals are found to have easier and 
more access to health and social care services than lower income individuals. Further, 
high-income individuals draw more on formally provided social care services, while low-
income individuals mainly depend on (cheap) informal care services. 
Yet, in the existing literature the focus mainly is on the available income, and little 
attention is paid to the possible role of wealth (i.e. financial assets and property 
ownership) in the use of health and social care services. It could be expected however that 
the availability of wealth induces and eases the use of these services. After all, having an 
asset stock could bring about an increased consumption behaviour, leading to a higher use 
of health and social care services among individuals with a large wealth stock. Individuals 
with a more modest asset stock are obliged to a lower use of these services. Also the 
potential relationship between the type of income sources in the income package and the 
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type of protection one enjoys for the use of health and social care services needs more 
attention. For example, it could be expected that individuals with an employer-provided 
occupational pension also enjoy additional employer-provided health insurance. Again, 
this needs to be considered more in detail, since it could expose important connections 
between inequity in the income package and the care package. Investigating this 
relationship is particularly important for policy makers that are urging for an increased 
role for private pensions. After all, if a significant relationship exists between the 
composition of the income package and the composition of the care package, the more 
vulnerable elderly are expected to face a double disadvantage. Not only are they expected 
to be less protected against the financial dimension of old age dependency because of the 
limited coverage of their income package, they also are expected to be less protection 
against the functional dimension of old age dependency because of limitations in their care 
package. This points to a potential reproduction of inequality in old age.  
 
In chapter 10 of this dissertation, extensive attention is paid to the care package of the 
Belgian elderly population. The focus is not limited to the composition of the care 
packages, but also on the intensity of the care use and, more importantly, the relationship 
between the income package and the care package is investigated. The focus will be on the 
potential contribution of assets and the income package composition to explain 
differences in the care packages among the elderly population. We investigate whether 
differences in the income package are significantly related to differences in the care 
package. This should fill in the existing gaps in the literature on inequity among the elderly 
population with regard to their use of health and social care services. However, before 
turning to the actual research results, we first address the main research questions and 
hypotheses in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
AND HYPOTHESES 
As explained in the first chapter, this dissertation focuses on the protection of the elderly 
population against the two most important dimensions of old age dependency, namely 
financial dependency and functional dependency. In the previous chapters, extensive 
attention was paid to the main sources available to the elderly population to protect 
themselves against the negative consequences of these dimensions of old age dependency. 
These sources are clustered into the income package on the one hand, and the care 
package on the other hand. Further, attention was also paid to the differences in the level 
of protection enjoyed by the elderly population, and the origin of these differences. Lacks 
in the current research have been pinpointed, and will be used as the foundations of our 
proper research.  
In this chapter, the main research questions and hypotheses are discussed. We distinguish 
three groups of research questions, that are elaborated further in the subsequent sections: 
 concerning the old age income package; 
 concerning the old age care package; and 
 concerning the potential of both packages to protect against the financial and 
functional dimensions of old age dependency. 
1. The old age income package 
A first group of research questions addresses the in cash component of the old age 
protection package. The use of different income sources and the combination of these 
sources into income packages is investigated. Further, attention is paid to the main 
background determinants influencing the level and the composition of the old age income 
package, to explain inequalities among the elderly. Do the so-called ‘rich’ packages 
differentiate from the ‘poor’ packages with regard to their composition? Four specific 
research questions are formulated: 
RQ 1a. How is the old age income package composed?  
RQ 1b. How generous is the old age income package? 
RQ 1c. What is the relationship between the composition and the generosity of the old age 
income package?  
RQ 1d. What sociodemographic and socioeconomic background factors influence the 
composition and the generosity of the old age income package? 
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We expect to find diverse income package configurations because elderly can make claims 
in the three institutional spheres. In addition, because the rewards in the three spheres 
are not the same, also the generosity of the income packages is expected to be different. 
The following hypothesis is derived from the literature: Elderly with a more diverse 
income package are expected to have a more generous income package (‘rich’ income 
package) than elderly with a low degree of diversification in their income package. Former 
research on the income package of the elderly population in several European countries 
showed substantial differences in the composition of the income packages of those in the 
higher income groups, compared to those in the lower income groups. The higher income 
groups were found to combine different, both public and private income sources, while 
those in the lower income groups mainly fall back on publically provided benefits. Also 
research specifically focused on the Belgian context (Berghman, Curvers, Palmans, & 
Peeters, 2007) found that the higher income groups have more access to additional 
retirement income sources than the lower income groups. Casey and Yamada (2002) 
showed that those with income from private sources are better off than those with income 
from public sources. The part of the population receiving only public social assistance 
income is least well off. In addition, we expect to find a relationship between the income 
package based on personal income sources and the extended income package, including 
asset sources. Elderly with a more diverse and a more generous personal old age income 
package are expected to have more access to asset sources. Further, we also expect that 
the (potential) revenues of assets is higher for elderly with a more generous personal 
income package.  
A number of stratification determinants are included in the research to explain differences 
in the composition and the level of the old age income package: gender (sex), occupational 
status (based on the former labour market participation), socioeconomic status and living 
situation. Based on previous research, women are expected to have a lower level of in cash 
protection and a less diversified income package than men. These gender differences are 
expected to interact with occupational history. Secondly, those with complete labour 
market career, a limited number of career interruptions, a higher overall labour market 
income and having worked in favourable labour market sectors are expected to have a 
higher level of in cash protection and a more diverse income package than those with an 
incomplete labour market career, numerous career interruptions, lower overall labour 
market income and having worked in less favourable labour market sectors. Thirdly, a 
higher socioeconomic status is expected to go hand in hand with higher levels of in cash 
protection. Lastly, those married or living together with a spouse or partner are expected 
to be the best off with regard to in cash protection. An interaction with gender is expected 
in that single women are expected to have the lowest degree of diversification in their 
income package and the lowest level of income protection. 
This research question contributes to the already existing literature in several ways. First, 
our focus is on the combination of income sources into income packages and the 
differences in these package among the elderly population, whereas the current research 
focuses strongly on separate income sources. Second, the inclusion of assets into the old 
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age income package is expected to be very important in explaining inequalities in the 
Belgian elderly population. A specific procedure will be used to included wealth in the old 
age income package, this will be discussed in chapter 7. Lastly, we will highlight the 
income package of a number of vulnerable groups, like older women, to investigate 
whether their vulnerable situation, which in current research is based mainly on lacks in 
their disposable income, persists when account is given to the extended income package 
including assets.  
2. The old age care package 
A second group of research questions focuses on the use of different types of care (i.e. the 
old age care package), and how this interacts with the protection provided by the old age 
income package. For this, a wide interpretation of care is used: besides health care, also 
social care services (i.e. personal care and home help) are addressed. What types of care 
are used by the older individual? How do elderly differ with regard to their care use? What 
role does the income package play in explaining the composition of the care package and 
the intensity of care use? What role does the income package play in explaining differences 
among the elderly population with regard to their care package? Again, we formulate two 
main research questions: 
RQ 2a. How is the old age care package composed?  
RQ 2b. What is the intensity of the use of health and social care services? 
RQ 2c. What role does the old age income package play in explaining the composition of 
the care package and the intensity of the care services utilisation? 
Significant differences are expected to exist in the older population concerning their care 
use. Mainly, these differences will depend on differences in their health and functional 
status, which can be directly related to their care use. However, the question is posed 
whether or not the old age income package, when controlling for differences in care needs, 
influences the care services used. Do elderly with a so-called ‘rich’ income package differ 
from those with a ‘poor’ income package with regard to their care package? Or, to put 
differently, are the inequalities among the elderly population with regard to their income 
package transposed to inequalities in their care package? 
Based on the fairly extensive literature review on income and care, the following 
hypotheses are formulated. First, those with a more generous income package are 
expected to have more access to health care and a higher frequency of utilisation. Specific 
attention will be paid to the role of asset sources, since these sources are expected to be 
very important for the elderly population. Similarly, for social care, those with a less 
generous income package are expected to fall back more often on informal care, while 
those with more generous income packages have more opportunities to buy formal care 
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services. Lastly, it is investigated whether a more diverse income package results in a 
more diverse care package, irrespective of the income package’s generosity and the 
individual’s health and functional status. It is assumed that differences in the care package 
are explained by the composition of the income package, given similar income levels and 
similar health and functional status. 
The strong focus on the role of wealth (i.e. financial assets and property assets) should 
contribute to the current strand of literature on the health and social care services use of 
the elderly population. Also the strong connection between the income package and the 
care package, and the search for a possible transfer of inequity from the income package to 
the care package is expected to be important for the debates on the protection of the 
elderly population against the risks related to old age dependency. This is discussed in 
chapter 10. 
3. Guaranteeing protection against the financial and physical 
dimension of old age dependency? 
A third group of research questions focuses on the extent to which the income and the care 
package meets the two main needs of the elderly population, namely protection against 
the financial dimension of old age dependency and protection against the functional 
dimension of old age dependency. Are elderly with a ‘rich’ protection package more 
capable of meeting their needs than those with a ‘poor’ protection package? Are 
differences in the income and care package of the elderly population translated into 
differences in the meeting of their needs? We formulate the following questions: 
RQ 3a. To what extent does the old age income package provide protection against the 
financial dimension of old age dependency? 
RQ 3b. What role does the old age care package play in providing protection against the 
functional dimension of old age dependency?  
RQ 3c. What role does the old age income package play in providing protection against the 
functional dimension of old age dependency? 
The meeting of the needs of the elderly population is considered as an observable, 
objective, and relative concept. As discussed in chapter 2, needs are situations of 
dependency, in which individuals are no longer able to take care of themselves. According 
to McKillip (1987, p. 10) “a need is the value judgement that some group has a problem 
that can be solved.". This implies that the needs concept has a normative character: what 
is conceived as a needy situation by one group or in one community is not automatically 
conceived as a needy situation by another group or community. In addition, needs are 
considered to be problematic situations, i.e. situations that do not correspond to the main 
expectations one has in a given situation. Lastly, the definition of McKillip (1987) points to 
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the fact that the needy situation or condition can be removed and that certain means and 
mechanisms can be used to overcome the needy situation. 
In our research, we focus on two age related dimensions of need, namely the financial and 
functional needs that are related to old age. We investigate whether the mechanisms that 
are available to the elderly population (i.e. the income package and the care package) are 
sufficient in alleviating the potentially needy situation of the elderly population. This is 
closely related to the quality of the protection provided by the income and the care 
package. A high quality income package is expected to successfully protect the elderly 
population against financial destitution. Similarly, a high quality care package is supposed 
to protect the elderly population as good as possible against the negative dimension of 
functional dependency. An evaluation of the protection the income and the care package 
provides against the financial and functional needs in old age is included in chapter 8 
(financial needs) and chapter 10 (functional needs). 
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CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND 
POPULATION 
In this chapter, the methodology of the research project is discussed. In the first section, 
we elaborate on the research design: a quantitative, cross-sectional analysis of secondary 
survey data. In the second section, we explain our choice to work with data from the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). In the third section, the main 
features of this data source are discussed (e.g. sampling, non-response and data quality).  
1. Research design 
The core of our research is a quantitative, cross-sectional analysis of secondary survey 
data. More specifically, data of the second research wave (2006-07) of the SHARE are used 
(cf. infra). As will be explained, our analysis is a single-case study of Belgium, with 
possibilities for comparison between the Belgian regions. 
1.1 The use of secondary survey data 
The research is conceived as an analysis of secondary survey data, more specifically as an 
analysis of data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. The SHARE 
data cover a wide range of topics on old age (cf. section 2), and both the content and the 
free dissemination for scientific research has to encourage a large group of researchers to 
use the data.  
One of the main advantages of working with secondary survey data is that it saves the 
researcher a lot of time and money in performing the research. Neither practical nor 
methodological issues on the data collection have to be tackled by the researcher, which 
creates the opportunity to concentrate on the data analysis and the research results 
(Glover, 1996; Hakim, 1982). Further, the use of secondary data avoids an increase in the 
number of surveys and the reporting burden among the population (Hakim, 1982). Also, 
the coverage of numerous topics; the inclusion of specific, hard to reach, population 
groups; and the opportunity for longitudinal and/or comparative research are advantages 
of working with secondary survey data (Burton, 2000b).  
However, Glover (1996) also discerns three important disadvantages of working with 
secondary data: technical, institutional and epistemological problems. Technical problems 
include problems with the survey documentation and being not familiar with the data 
(Glover, 1996). We do not expect this type of problem to occur with the SHARE data, 
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because detailed information on the survey design, questionnaires, etc. is distributed via 
the website (http://www.share-project.org). Further, the central SHARE research team is 
present whenever questions might occur. Institutional problems, secondly, refer to 
problems with the accessibility of the data (Glover, 1996). However, because the SHARE 
data are distributed for free via the online SHARE Research Data Center, no institutional 
problems are expected to occur. Third, epistemological issues refer to the context and the 
perspective in which the data were collected (Glover, 1996). This is expected to be 
problematic in comparative research, in which it is harder for researchers to take account 
of the context of the data collection. Yet, we do not expect this to be problematic: the 
SHARE has been designed in a coordinated, harmonised way to minimise cross-national 
differences, and our research is a single-country study (cf. infra), thus limiting the 
epistemological problems that are expected to arise with the use of secondary data in 
comparative research. 
In addition, the use of secondary data has important consequences for the content and the 
quality of the research. The researcher is limited to the survey content, and no nuances 
can be made (Burton, 2000b; Schutt, 2007). Working with secondary data thus always 
refers “a trade-off between the ease with which the research process can be initiated and 
the specific hypotheses that can be tested and methods that can be used.” (Schutt, 2007, 
par. 8). Yet, the multidisciplinary character of the SHARE makes it well suited to answer 
our research questions. Also, when working with secondary data the researcher has no 
control over the quality, the reliability and the validity of the data collection. Burton 
(2000b) thus advises a careful consideration of the sample size, the sample design and the 
response rates in order to assess the quality of the secondary data (see section 3). 
1.2 A quantitative analysis of survey data 
The core of the research project is a quantitative analysis of survey data. Several reasons 
account for this. First, we want to provide a representative picture of the elderly 
population and their use of different sources to protect themselves against the financial 
and functional dimension of old age dependency. In that case, quantitative analytical 
techniques are considered as the most appropriate statistical techniques. We investigate 
the outlook and the differences in the income and care packages of the elderly population, 
with specific attention for the relationship between the old age income and care package. 
In our opinion, a quantitative analysis of survey data is the most appropriate technique to 
do so.  
We will provide both descriptive and inferential statistics to investigate the relationship 
between the main variables. In chapter 8, we focus on the protection against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency. We investigate the existence of clusters of income 
sources (income packages). The generosity, as well as the quality of the protection 
provided by these old age income packages is examined. In chapter 10, the focus shifts to 
the functional dimension of old age dependency. A cluster analysis is used to investigate 
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whether clusters of health and social care services can be distinguished. We describe the 
composition of these care packages, and the quality of the protection that is provided 
against the functional dimension of old age dependency. We concentrate on the 
relationship between the income package and the care package.  
The choice of the data analysis techniques depends on the research question and the 
variables involved in the analysis. More details on this are provided in the subsequent 
chapters. For the data analysis, the SAS-software package is used.  
1.3 A cross-sectional research design 
Given our focus on the protection of the older population against the financial and 
functional dimensions of old age dependency, and the research questions formulated in 
chapter 5, we consider a cross-sectional research design as the most appropriate for our 
research. A cross-sectional research design implies that we focus on the existence of 
differences between individuals at a given point in time (Burton, 2000a). In addition, the 
use of only one moment of data collection implies that our data and research results are 
not influenced by policy changes. In order to get to this cross-sectional research design, we 
select the second wave of SHARE data, which has been collected in 2006 and 2007 (cf. 
infra). 
1.4 A single-country study 
Our research focuses exclusively on Belgium. Such a single-country study is defined by 
Landman (2008) as “any study in which a single country forms the basic unit of analysis, 
but which may also be broken down into smaller units across time and space, by 
examining sub-national variation across states in federal countries, other administrative 
units in unitary systems, as well as other appropriate units of analysis, such as 
individuals.". The selection of the country under study should be considered carefully, to 
make sure that the study contributes to the wider research field. This contribution can be 
quite diverse, going from the fact that a single-country study can provide input for further 
multi-country research, to the fact that classifications can be developed or that new 
hypotheses can be formulated to nurture new “research puzzles” (Landman, 2008). 
We aim to develop a new viewpoint on the old age protection against the financial and 
functional dimension of old age dependency from the packaging approach (cf. chapter 2). 
This approach can proof to be useful in later studies comparing welfare states and the 
protection of their elderly population. Given the conservative corporatist welfare state 
character of Belgium, we expect to find an interplay between different protection 
mechanisms. According to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology (1990), an 
important role is preserved for the state in the welfare production, via, among others, the 
provision of pensions to the elderly population. Further, private income sources (e.g. 
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private pension plans) gain interest because of the ongoing debate on the financing of 
public pensions. Also the family holds an important role in the welfare production, 
especially for the provision of social care. 
However, the single-country character of this study does not rule out entirely the 
comparative aspect (Kennett, 2004; Landman, 2008). In Belgium, the responsibilities for 
social care are assigned to the regions, while the federal government is responsible for 
income matters (e.g. retirement incomes) and for everything that is related to the national 
health insurance scheme.50  
2. Exploration of the available data sources51 
In this section we explore the potential of different data sources to answer the research 
questions formulated in chapter 5 and  to make an informed choice on the data used. Both 
survey (2.1) and administrative data (2.2) are discussed. 
2.1 Data from survey research 
Information on the protection of the elderly population against the main dimensions of old 
age dependency can be found in both general surveys and surveys focusing on the elderly 
population. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the most important Belgian surveys that could 
be interesting for our research. 
  
 
                                                             
50 Art. 5 §1 Law of 8 August 1980 on the reformation of the Belgian institutions (B.A. 15.08.1980).  
51 An extensive overview of different data sources on a wide range of aspects of the ageing process 
is provided within the framework of the Joint Programming Initiative (JPI) “More Years, Better 
Lives - The Challenges and Opportunities of Demographic Change”. More information on this 
project and an overview of the available data sources can be consulted online at http://www.jpi-
dataproject.eu/ 
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Table 6.1. Overview of most important Belgian surveys for our research  
   Content 
 Population Timing Income Care 
Surveys on the overall population 
  PSBH Population in private households 1992-2002 (11 waves) X (x) 
  EU-SILC Population in private households 2003-now (11 waves) X (x) 
  HIS Entire population 1997-now (5 waves) (x) X 
Surveys on the elderly population 
  LOVO 55+ in private households 
75+ in collective households 
2001, 2004 X X 
  VOZS 65+ in private households, with care 
needs 
2009  X 
  SHARE 50+ in private households 2004-now (5 waves) X X 
Note: X= good coverage  (x)= limited coverage 
On the one hand, there are surveys that focus on the entire population. The Panel Study of 
Belgian Household52 (PSBH) (1992-2002) is a longitudinal survey on income, housing, 
labour, health and education of the Belgian population. Elderly living in private 
households are included in the research population, while elderly residing permanently in 
care facilities are excluded from the research population. Quite detailed information is 
collected on the income package, but information on the care use remains rather limited. 
Further, since the last research wave was in 2002, the data can blamed to be outdated. 
Since 2003, the PSBH is integrated in the European Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). As was the case with the PSBH, the EU-SILC contains rather detailed 
information on the income package, but not on the use of health and social care services. 
This makes the EU-SILC not appropriate for our research, since we focus on both income 
and care. Another survey of interest is the Belgian Health Interview Survey (HIS), a 
repeated cross-sectional survey that is conducted since 1997 among approximately 10000 
Belgian citizens. In 2004 and 2008 an additional sample of the older population was 
drawn to get a more representative picture of this population group. Both elderly in 
private and collective households are included in the sample framework. The HIS collects 
quite detailed information on health and functional status and on the use of health and 
social care services, but information on the income package is rather limited and 
restricted to the household level. 
On the other hand, some potentially interesting surveys focus explicitly on the elderly 
population. In Flanders, between 2001 and 2004, the Survey on the Living situation of 
Flemish Elderly [LeefsituatieOnderzoek Vlaamse Ouderen, LOVO] collected information on 
different aspects of the daily life of elderly living at home (55+), and in institutions (75+). 
Both income and care were covered, but the research population was limited to elderly 
living in Flanders. More recently, in 2009 a survey on Flemish elderly receiving home care 
was executed (the Flemish Elderly Care Survey [Vlaamse OuderenZorgStudie, VOZS]). Yet, 
given the broad focus of our research, this population demarcation makes it less suited for 
 
                                                             
52 The PSBH was integrated with the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) in 1994.  
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us. Lastly, since 2004 the SHARE collects information on different aspects of the elderly 
population, including income and care use. This makes the SHARE well suited for our 
research. However, some limitations have to be taken into account, like the exclusion of 
institutionalised elderly in the Belgian research population (cf. section 3.2). 
2.2 Register data from administrative sources 
Also register data can be used to answer certain research questions. In Belgium, register 
data on a wide range of social protection topics are collected in the Datawarehouse Labour 
Market and Social Protection [DWH LM&SP]. These data include, among others, 
information on first and second pillar pension payments (from the Pension Register), 
social assistance for elderly, wages after retirement, etc. 
One of the major advantages of register data is the high level of detail and accuracy 
(Palmans, Peeters, & Berghman, 2006). There are no errors with the reporting of income, 
like often is the case with surveys (e.g. due to memory effects or refusal to answer income 
questions). For our research project, for example, the Pension register includes 
information on first and second pillar pensions53, additional social security and social 
assistance payments, like the allowance for heating, etc. However, because no information 
is available on private pension plans, individual life insurance, the receipt of early 
retirement benefits, home ownership, etc. no complete picture can be drawn of the entire 
old age income package (Palmans et al., 2006). Another important advantage of register 
data is the coverage of almost the entire population. Individuals living in residential (care) 
settings like nursing homes are not excluded, while this often is the case in surveys 
(Peeters, Debels, & Verpoorten, 2013). However, one must take into account that even 
register data do not grasp the entire group of institutionalised elderly because of the 
divergence between the registered and the actual living situation. For example, when in an 
older couple one of both partners moves to a residential care facility, this move is not 
always reported to the authorities. In this case, the older person is not registered as living 
in an institution, although in reality he/she is living in such an institution. Consequently, 
even in register data the number of elderly living in an institution is underestimated.54 
 
                                                             
53 Yet, one should note that this holds only for former employees; the information available on the 
occupational pension protection of the self-employed elderly population is fairly limited and quite 
sensitive to errors (Palmans, Peeters, & Berghman, 2006).  
54 On 1/1/2009, 102978 persons aged 60 years and older were registered as being part of a 
collective household in the National Register (Crossroads Bank for Social Security, 2014). However, 
the NIHDI reported 128245 authorised beds in residential care facilities (situation on 1/1/2009) 
(Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering, 2013). This point to an underestimation of 
the institutionalised population with almost 25000 persons. 
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Moreover, the National Register does not allow to distinguish in the type of collective 
household, so elderly in residential care facilities cannot be extracted.55 
However, some disadvantages of register data cannot be neglected. First, register data are 
not free accessible: data requests are expensive and time-consuming, specifically when 
one wants to receive a lot of detailed information. In addition, analysing register data is 
complex and often indistinct, because register data are not collected for scientific 
purposes. Lastly, register data do not capture every facet of the protection of the elderly 
population against the financial and functional dimensions of old age dependency. Certain 
income sources are not registered, and little information is collected on the use of health 
and social care services. Also subjective evaluations (like wellbeing) are not included. 
Ideally, working with a combination of register and survey data would provide the best 
results. However, until now in Belgium such combinations are not widely available, 
although attempts have been made to link register data with data from the EU-SILC.  
3. Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
As discussed in the previous section, we have chosen to work with data from the SHARE, a 
multi-disciplinary survey on different aspects of the daily lives of older people all over 
Europe. Information is collected on both the income sources of the elderly population and 
the use of health and social care services. Further, the free dissemination of the data 
facilitates the access and use of these data.  
In this section, we provide some necessary information on the SHARE. In 3.1 the 
development of the SHARE is discussed. Attention is also paid to our focus on the second 
wave of data collection. In 3.2, the sample design - with a specific focus on the Belgian 
sample in the second wave - is covered. The data collection and the structure of the 
dataset is explained in 3.3, and in the last section we focus on the quality of the data, with 
specific interest in the limitations of the data source, item and unit non-response (3.4). 
3.1 An introduction to the SHARE 
The SHARE was initially designed to enlarge the understanding of ageing and its effects on 
individuals within the diverse cultural setting of Europe (Börsch-Supan & Jürges, 2005). 
Therefore, a longitudinal, multi-disciplinary and multi-country survey was set up to build 
 
                                                             
55 For the elderly population collective households refer mainly to residential care facilities, and 
only to a very limited extent to prisons and convent communities (Peeters, Debels, & Verpoorten, 
2013). 
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a micro-data database on different aspects of the ageing process (e.g. health status, 
economic status, family networks, etc.). 
The first steps towards the SHARE were taken by the European Commission, which in 
2000 urged for the development of a European longitudinal ageing survey to collect data 
on topics like health care, economic status and social protection for the design of effective 
policies in these fields.56 In 2002 the actual development of the SHARE took off, which 
resulted in a first wave of data collection in 11 European countries in 2004-05. In 2006 a 
second wave of data collection started in 13 countries. A third wave of data collection took 
place in 2008-09, this time focusing on the people’s life histories (SHARELIFE). A fourth 
and fifth wave of data collection were organised in 2010-11 and in 2013-14 (see figure 
6.1). 
Figure 6.1. SHARE Waves of data collection and participating countries 
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For our research, we selected data from the second wave of the SHARE. At the moment we 
started our research, in 2011, only the first three rounds of the SHARE data collection 
were  available. Only the first two waves contained the information on incomes and care 
 
                                                             
56 COM(2000)846 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: The contribution of public finances to growth and employment: Improving quality and 
sustainability.  
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we needed for our research. In addition, in the first wave gross income values were 
registered, while in the second wave net income values were registered. Net incomes give 
a more accurate picture of the income situation, and are expected to be less biased than 
gross income values because respondents tend to know better what they actually receive 
on their bank account (after taxes and social security contributions: net incomes) than 
what they would have received before taxes and social security contributions (gross 
incomes). Lastly, the use of the second wave of data collection had larger opportunities to 
use the retrospective life history information in the SHARELIFE. This will be explained 
more in detail in chapter 8. 
3.2 Target population, sampling and sample design 
In this section we discuss the SHARE target population, the sample population and the 
realised sample. We will also stress the limitations of the sampling and the potential 
consequences for our research.  
3.2.1 The target population 
The SHARE target population of households refers to all households with at least one 
member aged 50 or over, “speaking the official language of the country and not living 
abroad or in an institution such as a prison during the duration of the field work” 
(Klevmarken, Swensson, & Hesselius, 2005, p. 30). The target population of individuals 
refers to all individuals aged 50 and over, “speaking the official language of the country 
and not living abroad or in an institution such as a prison during the duration of the field 
work, and their spouses/partners independent of age” (Klevmarken et al., 2005, p. 30).  
In Belgium, the target population of households in the first wave referred to all households 
with at least one French speaking household member born in 1954 or earlier living in 
Wallonia and Brussels; and all households with at least one Dutch speaking household 
member born in 1954 or earlier in Flanders. The target population of individuals included 
all French, resp. Dutch speaking residents born in 1954 or earlier and their 
spouses/partners living in Wallonia and Brussels, resp. Flanders. In the second wave, the 
respondents of the first wave were recontacted. 
Restrictions in the Belgian SHARE target population 
The demarcation of the target population has important consequences for our study. The 
following groups of elderly are excluded from the target population in the Belgian SHARE: 
 elderly living in collective households (residential care facilities); 
 elderly not able to speak Dutch or French; 
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 elderly residing in the German speaking Community. 
Firstly, elderly living in collective households are excluded from the Belgian target 
population (Klevmarken et al., 2005; SHARE Project, 2009). In Belgium, this largely 
corresponds to the elderly living in a residential long-term care facility like a nursing 
home. The exclusion of this group of elderly stems from the sampling frame (cf. infra), 
which is based on telephone listings including only private households. Elderly residing in 
other types of adapted housing, like service flats, sheltered housing or housing with 
services, are not excluded from the sample frame, since these types of adapted housing are 
not conceived as collective households. Based on the OECD Health Data (2010), we 
estimated that about 6% of the population aged 65 and over permanently lives in a 
residential care facility, and thus is excluded from the target population. The bias even 
grows when the oldest elderly are considered, since on average 20% of this group 
permanently resides in a nursing home.57 Their high degree of care dependency, the 
limitations in their physical and mental capacities, having little control on their income 
situation (Dey, 1997), the lack of cooperation of the residence administration and staff 
(Callens & Pauwels, 2006), makes that institutionalised elderly are often excluded from 
(survey) research.  
Secondly, elderly not able to speak one of the national languages (i.e. Dutch or French) are 
excluded, because the questionnaires are made up in one of both languages. Consequently, 
mainly immigrants are excluded and remain under the radar.58 An analysis by De Luca and 
Peracchi (2005) on data from the first wave of the SHARE showed that 13% of the 
households not fulfil the eligibility criteria because of language barriers.59 Yet the exact 
scale of the language based exclusion is not clear, because no information is available on 
the language skills of the Belgian older population.  
Thirdly, elderly living in the German speaking part of Belgium are not included in the 
target population because they were not part of the Belgian sample framework (cf. infra). 
This means an additional exclusion of about 0.7% of the research population.60  
3.2.2 The sample population, sample frame and sample design 
Whereas the Belgian SHARE target population refers to all households with at least one 
French or Dutch speaking member born in 1954 or earlier, and all French or Dutch 
 
                                                             
57 The OECD Health Statistics refer to the Belgian situation in 2005. 
58 Also other barriers contribute to the exclusion of foreign elderly: communication problems, 
cultural differences, unfamiliarity with the wide range of care facilities, etc. (Talloen, 2007). 
59 The analysis included Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Sweden (De Luca & 
Peracchi, 2005). 
60 Calculation based on national population data (Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische 
Informatie, 2010). 
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speaking residents born in 1954 or earlier and their spouses/partners, some additional 
restrictions in the population rose from the sample frame and the sample design. We will 
first elaborate on the sample frame and sample design, and in addition we discuss the 
consequences for the sample population and the broader research. 
The sample frame: list of municipalities, telephone directories and the National Register 
In Belgium, the overall sample frame was the same in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels: in 
the first stage, the sample frame was a list of municipalities, and in the second stage a list 
with telephone numbers. The seven German speaking municipalities in the east of 
Wallonia were not included in the list of municipalities. Obviously, the list with telephone 
numbers only included individuals with a telephone number, but in addition also business 
numbers, and telephone numbers of, for example, schools, government institutions, 
hospitals, etc. were included (cf. infra). The use of a telephone listing has several 
limitations. Telephone listings require a serious amount of cleaning (telephone numbers 
not referring to private households, as well as double entries had to be removed), and 
individuals without a telephone number are not included (undercoverage). This affects the 
representativeness of the sample, though the extent of this is not clear.  
In Flanders, an additional sample was drawn from the National Register.61 It is not clear 
why the National Register was not used as the initial sampling frame, because this would 
have avoided the problems related to the use of telephone directories in the sample 
framework. One should note that here we are confronted with one of the main 
disadvantages of working with secondary data (cf. supra): the researcher has no control 
on the decisions made regarding the sample framework and the sample design. 
A three-stage sample design 
In Belgium, a three-stage sampling design was used in the first wave of the SHARE (SHARE 
Project, 2009): 
 Stage 1: selection of municipalities; 
 Stage 2: selection of households within selected municipalities; and 
 Stage 3: screening of selected households for age-eligibility. 
In the first stage, municipalities were selected from a list of municipalities. This was done 
separately for Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders. Five large cities (i.e. Charleroi, Namur, 
Liège, Antwerp and Ghent) were considered as separate strata and were included as such 
 
                                                             
61 This additional sample was made possible because additional financial resources were made 
available by the Flemish government for an extension of the SHARE research (SHARE Project, 
2009). 
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in the sample of municipalities. Their selection probability was set to 1, which is larger 
than when the selection probability would take account of the (age) structure of the 
population. Consequently, elderly living in one of these big cities have a higher chance of 
being part of the final sample, and - due to the selection with certainty - are expected to be 
overrepresented in the sample. In Flanders and Wallonia, the other municipalities were 
selected via a simple random sampling without replacement. Flanders and Wallonia were 
considered as two separate strata. The selection probabilities were set proportional to the 
number of private households with at least one person born in 1954 or before in the 
municipality versus the total number of private households with at least one person born 
in 1954 or before in the stratum. Brussels initially was selected as a whole (selection 
probability=1). However, an additional sample was drawn using the procedure to select 
the remaining municipalities in Wallonia and Flanders (selection probability proportional 
to the number of households with at least one member born in 1954 or before). Making 
the selection probability dependent on the size of the older population implies that 
municipalities with larger older populations have a higher probability of being selected 
than municipalities with a smaller elderly population. This should contribute to the 
representativeness of the realised sample.  
In the second stage, households within the selected municipalities were sampled via a 
simple random sampling without replacement. Cleaned telephone directories were used 
for the selection of addresses.62 The number of selected addresses differed between the 
strata. For the large city strata (cf. supra: Charleroi, Namur, Liège, Antwerp, Ghent, 
Brussels’ initial sample), the selection probability of an address (household) was set 
proportional to the number of private households with persons born in 1954 or before in 
the stratum and the total number of private households with persons born in 1954 or 
before in the region (Wallonia, Brussels or Flanders). Thus, although in the first stage of 
sampling no account was given to the population structure, this was the case in the second 
stage of the sampling. In all other municipalities in Flanders and Wallonia and in the 
additional sample in Brussels, a fixed number of addresses (households) was selected: 100 
per municipality in Flanders and Wallonia, and 200 per municipality in Brussels. 
Consequently, households in smaller municipalities have a higher probability of being 
included in the sample than households in larger municipalities, since the sampling in this 
stage does not account for population size or age structure.  
 
                                                             
62 The cleaning of the register included the following (SHARE Project, 2009): business numbers 
were not deleted, because often small business owners share their home address with their 
business address; double entries were removed; addresses clearly referring not to private 
households were removed. The research team assumed that the number of addresses in the 
cleaned telephone list refers to the number of private households in the National Register. This 
does, however, not match completely with reality, because private households without a telephone 
are not included in the telephone directory, while they are included in the National Register. 
Further, addresses referring to private households could have been deleted accidently during the 
cleaning process. Thus, the telephone directories contain only a (although large) part of the 
population in the National Register. 
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In the third stage of the sample design, the selected households were screened for age 
eligibility via information provided by a commercial firm. This firm could identify the age 
eligibility for about three quarters of the sampled households; and the remaining quarter 
was contacted by the interviewers to determine their age eligibility (SHARE Project, 
2009).63 
The selection probabilities in both stages of the sample design, and the overall selection 
probability is shown in Table 6.2. In every stratum account is given to the population size 
and the age structure of the population, either in the first or the second stage of sampling. 
The sampling probabilities are not the same for each household in the sample frame, yet, 
they are proportional to the number of households with persons born in 1954 or before, 
and thus take account of the population size. 
Table 6.2. The sampling probabilities of households in the Belgian SHARE  
Stratum Stage 1 Stage 2 
Overall sampling 
probability 
Brussels - initial  1 n (As / At) / Tm_B n (As / At) / Tm_B 
Brussels - additional  cs (Am/At) 200 / Tm_W (200 cs Am) / (At Tm_W) 
Charleroi 1 nW (As / At) / Tm_W nW (As / At) / Tm_W 
Namur 1 nW (As / At) / Tm_W nW (As / At) / Tm_W 
Liège 1 nW (As / At) / Tm_W nW (As / At) / Tm_W 
Wallonia – rest cs (Am/At) 100 / Tm_W (100 cs Am) / (At Tm_W) 
Antwerp 1 nF (As / At) / Tm_F nF (As / At) / Tm_F 
Ghent 1 nF (As / At)  / Tm_F nF (As / At)  / Tm_F 
Flanders – rest cs (Am/At) 100 / Tm_F (100 cs Am) / (At Tm_F) 
Note: cs = Number of selected municipalities per stratum 
Am = Number of private households with at least one person born in 1954 or before in municipality 
At = Total number of private households with at least one person born in 1954 or before in the region 
nW = Overall gross sample size for Wallonia and Brussels 
nF = Overall gross sample size for Flanders 
Tm_w = Number of entries in the cleaned telephone listing for Wallonia 
Tm_F = Number of entries in the cleaned telephone listing for Flanders 
Tm_B = Number of entries in the cleaned telephone listing for Brussels 
Source: SHARE Project (2009, p. A28) 
In the second wave of the SHARE, the initial panel of respondents was revisited. Elderly no 
longer willing to participate or deceased were excluded. In Wallonia and Brussels, an 
additional sample was drawn with an overrepresentation of individuals born in 1955 and 
1956 to get an adequate proportion of this age group in the overall sample (Börsch-Supan 
& Jürges, 2008; De Luca & Rossetti, 2008). This was not done in Flanders, leading to an 
under representation of the elderly born in 1955 and 1956. However, because we will 
limit our research population to those aged 60 and over at the moment of the interview 
(born in 1947 or before) (cf. infra), this has no consequences for our research. 
 
                                                             
63 Note that in the additional Flemish sample, no age eligibility screening was necessary because 
this information is included in the National Register. 
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Lastly, we should stress that the focus of the sample design on households instead of on 
individuals can have consequences for our research. Singles and couples have equal 
probabilities on being part of the sample, which could lead to an overrepresentation of 
singles, and thus affect the representativeness of the research results. However, within 
couples the spouse/partner of the respondent is “automatically” included in the sample, 
irrespective of his/her age. This gives some counterbalance to the overrepresentation of 
singles in the sample frame.  
To take into account the different selection probabilities in the data analysis, the SHARE 
research team provides design weights, that are constructed as “the inverse of the 
probability of being included in the [...] sample.” (De Luca & Rossetti, 2010, p. 23). These 
weights are the same for households and individuals because “the probability of including 
any of the eligible individuals in a household is the same as the probability of including the 
household.” (Klevmarken et al., 2005, p. 34). These weights have to compensate for the 
differences in the probability of being included in the sample.  
3.2.3 The realised sample 
Little information is available on the size of the sample population during the different 
stages in the sample procedure. For example, no exact information is available on the 
number of age-eligible households that remain after the third stage of the sampling 
procedure. Yet, using the limited information provided by the SHARE research team, we 
can estimate the size of the initial sample of households and the initial sample of 
individuals (see Figure 6.2).  
According to information on the first wave probability samples64, a household response 
rate of 39.2% was reached in Belgium; and 2532 households were actually interviewed. 
Consequently, the initial sample of age-eligible households contained an estimated 6459 
households. Further, the sample of interviewed households contained 5081 individuals, of 
which 4202 were eligible according to the SHARE target population criteria (cf. supra). 
Each household thus included on average 1.66 eligible individuals. When we assume that 
the average number of eligible household members is the same in all households65, the 
initial sample of eligible individuals included 10672 potential respondents. Based on the 
estimated initial sample of individuals and the realised sample of respondents (N=3827), 
we estimate a relatively low individual response rate of about 35.9%.66  
 
                                                             
64 This information can be consulted at the SHARE website (http://www.share-project.org/data-
access-documentation/sample.html). 
65 Similar to the approach of De Luca and Peracchi (2005). 
66 To illustrate, in the 2004 round of the European Social Survey the response rate was 61.4% 
(European Social Survey, no date), while in the EU-SILC the individual response rate in 2004 was 
47.7% (Quality Report Belgian SILC 2004, 2005).  
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Figure 6.2. From the initial sample of households to the realised sample of 
individuals in the first wave of the Belgian SHARE  
 
Note: R.R. = Response rate 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 1 
One should note that the average household response rate for all countries in the first 
wave of the SHARE was importantly higher than in Belgium (61.6% vs. 39.2%). The 
Belgian within-household response rate, however, was somewhat larger than the SHARE 
average (91.1% vs. 85.3%). Moreover, the realised individual response rate was very low 
in Belgium when compared to the other participating countries. According to a survey 
participation analysis of De Luca & Peracchi (2005) for ten SHARE countries67, the average 
individual response rate was 48%, while this was only 35% in Belgium. This low initial 
response rate has important consequences for our research, because non-response does 
not tend to be at random, but selective, which means that the situation of those not 
participating in the survey differs from those in the survey. However, because we do not 
have information on the non-participating part of the initial sample, we cannot assess how 
important the differences between the realised sample and the target population are. 
In the second wave, the initial respondents from the first wave were recontacted to 
participate (longitudinal sample). In Wallonia and Brussels an additional sample was 
drawn to include individuals born in 1955 and 1956; this however was not done in 
Flanders. The refresher sample makes up about 9% of the realised sample of individuals 
and households (190 households were introduced in wave 2, resulting in 282 individuals 
interviews). Attrition between the first and the second research wave was considerable: 
about 25% of the respondents from the first wave did not participate in the second wave. 
The response rate thus decreased even more: from 35.9% in the first wave to 27.1% in the 
second wave for the sample of individuals, and from 39.2% to 30.1% for the household 
response rate.  
 
                                                             
67 The countries included were France, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, 
Sweden, Spain and Switzerland. 
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Figure 6.3. Decomposition of the second wave of the Belgian SHARE  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2  
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interview (born in 1947 or before)68, living alone or with a spouse/partner that is also 
aged 60 years or over. The reason why we limit the research population to elderly living 
alone or with a partner is that we wish to take account of financial solidarity within 
couples, and thus need complete income information on both partners (cf. chapter 8). And, 
given our focus on the elderly population, only couples where both partners are 60 years 
or older are included in the research population. 
3.3 Data collection and survey structure 
The data collection period was preceded by a long period of testing and fine-tuning of the 
survey instruments and the question wording. Research teams from different countries 
cooperated to guarantee the international comparability of the data collection.  
The data were collected via face-to-face Computer Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI). 
Blaise software, a “computer-assisted interviewing system tool (…) developed for the 
Windows operating system by Statistics Netherlands and (…) designed for use in official 
statistics.” (Das, Vis, & Weerman, 2005, p. 12), was used to support the interviews. Each 
interview was conducted at the home of the respondent, and the answers were 
immediately entered into the computer by the interviewer. The face-to-face interview was 
complemented with a drop-off questionnaire, that had to be filled in by the respondent 
after the interview.  
For Belgium, the interviews were performed under the supervision of the Centre for 
Longitudinal and Life course research [Centrum voor Longitudinaal en Levensloop 
Onderzoek] for Flanders, and the Demographic Family Panel [Panel Démographique 
Familiale] for Wallonia and Brussels. CAPI made the manual input of the data after the 
interviews redundant. All the SHARE data (interviews, questionnaires, interviewer 
information, etc.) were gathered and coordinated by CentERdata, a Dutch institute for data 
collection and research (Tilburg University, the Netherlands) (Das et al., 2005). In 
cooperation with the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Ageing, a first 
round of data processing was performed, the data were cleaned and transformed to data 
 
                                                             
68 The main demarcation criterion is that of age: The research population is limited to older 
individuals. In general, the elderly population is referred to as that part of the population that no 
longer is economically active. Often, this refers to the moment of retirement, the moment at which 
one becomes eligible to a (public) retirement pension. Based on national and international - though 
not formally agreed - standards on old age, we restrict the elderly population to that part of the 
population aged 60 and over. For example, the United Nations, as well as the European Commission 
and the Flemish Government take the age of 60 as the cut-off point to differentiate the elderly 
population from the active population (European Commission, 2010b; 
Kabinet van Vlaams Minister van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en Gezin, 2010; United Nations 
Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 2010). 
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files ready for analysis. Finally, the data were launched for free dissemination among 
researchers all over the world.69 
Given the wide range of topics covered in the SHARE and the fact that information was 
gathered both on the individual and on the household level, the structure of the data is 
quite complex. The dataset consists of different data files, which can be linked with a 
personal identification number. An overview of the structure of the data and the different 
modules is included in appendix 1.  
3.4 Assessment of data quality 
When working with secondary data, the researcher must check the quality of the data 
before starting the actual analyses to guarantee the reliability of the research results. 
Survey quality can be affected by different types of errors. In his taxonomy of survey 
errors, Bethlehem (2009) distinguishes between sampling errors and non-sampling 
errors. Sampling errors are linked to the sampling design, while non-sampling errors refer 
to errors during the data collection (observation errors), and errors like undercoverage 
and non-response (non-observation errors). Working with secondary data like the SHARE 
implies that the researcher cannot control the occurrence of survey errors. However, the 
researcher must be aware of their existence, and whenever necessary and possible, 
additional analyses must be performed to validate the research results and to improve the 
overall quality of the research. 
3.4.1 Dealing with survey errors 
Several mechanisms were built into the SHARE research design and data collection to 
minimise the occurrence of survey errors (see Table 6.3 for an overview).  
  
 
                                                             
69 For more information of data access and use, consult the SHARE Research Data Center website 
(http://www.share-project.org/). 
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Table 6.3. Strategies to minimise the occurrence of survey errors in SHARE 
Type of error Strategy 
Sampling error Probability sample 
Simple sample design 
Observation error Overcoverage Assessment of age eligibility 
Measurement Testing of questionnaire 
Use of answering cards 
Processing Computer assisted interviewing 
Non-observation error Undercoverage 
Unit non-response 
Number of contact attempts  
Refusal conversion strategies 
Participation enhancing strategies 
Item non-response Unfolding brackets 
First, the use of probability samples and simple sample designs had to minimise the 
occurrence of sampling errors. Yet, as discussed in the previous section, the Belgian three-
stage sample design was not that simple and the decisions made could induce errors in the 
data (e.g. the sampling of households versus individuals; the selection with certainty of big 
cities; ...). Further, the central SHARE research team made recommendations on the 
sample size70, the expected response rate and the intended number of interviewed 
households (cf. supra) to reach the required level of precision in the research results. 
However, the quite low response rates could have consequences for the 
representativeness of the research results (cf. supra). 
Second, several mechanisms were built into the survey instruments to minimise the 
occurrence of observation errors. To avoid overcoverage (i.e. the inclusion of respondents 
that do not belong to the target population), age eligibility was assessed quite strict: the 
computer software indicated the household members eligible for the interview. To avoid 
measurement errors, a profound preparation and development of the questionnaire took 
place.71 In several phases, question wording, length of the questionnaire, 
comprehensibility of the questions, etc. was tested. Further, answer cards were used to 
avoid memory effects and to ease the answering process. Errors in the data processing 
were minimised via the use of CAPI. Only the paper and pencil questionnaires were 
entered into the computer by hand after the interview (Das et al., 2005).  
Third, several mechanisms were built into SHARE to limit non-observation errors, and 
more specific to reduce the influence of non-response errors. The contact procedure 
included a number of specific techniques to stimulate respondents to participate and to 
improve the response rate. For example, a minimum number of contact attempts had to be 
done, and interviewers were trained in participation enhancing strategies and refusal 
 
                                                             
70 Also sample size is said to be important to avoid sampling errors. On the one hand, very large 
samples are time and money consuming, and do not contribute to a higher level of precision. On the 
other hand, very small samples do not provide the wanted level of precision, and thus threaten the 
quality of the survey results (Bethlehem, 2009). 
71 For more information on the development of the survey instrument, consult Börsch-Supan and 
Kemperman (2005). 
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conversion mechanisms (De Luca & Lipps, 2005). Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the 
Belgian SHARE is prone to a substantial degree of non-response (about 65%, cf. supra). 
Weighting could be a valuable strategy to deal with the undercoverage (or overcoverage) 
of certain groups in the sample, and to increase to representativeness of the research 
results. This is discussed in the next section. 
Finally, to minimise item non-response (i.e. respondents not willing to answer specific 
questions, which leads to gaps in the questionnaires) in questions on amounts of income, 
assets, etc., an unfolding bracket procedure was incorporated in the questionnaire. In 
addition, imputed values are calculated by the central SHARE research team to 
compensate for item non-response. This is discussed more in detail in section 3.4.3. 
3.4.2 Dealing with undercoverage: the (non)sense of weighting 
Different mechanisms had to maximise the respondents’ willingness to participate in 
SHARE (cf. supra). Yet, the Belgian SHARE still faces relatively high levels of non-response: 
for the first wave we estimated that only 36% of the initial sample of individuals was 
actually interviewed (see 3.2.3). When the non-responding part of the sample is different 
from the responding part, this can lead to non-response bias with important consequences 
for the research results (Bethlehem & Schouten, 2004).  
To discover non-response bias, we should compare the responding and non-responding 
part of the sample with the entire sample to assess the difference between both. Yet, in the 
SHARE this is not possible because there is no information available on the non-
responding part of the sample. We can, however, compare the realised sample with the 
entire population on a number of basic characteristics to determine whether the realised 
sample resembles the target population. As show in Table 6.4, men, individuals aged 60 to 
64 years, elderly living in Brussels, and elderly living with partner are (slightly) under 
covered in the realised sample. Women, those aged 70 years and more, elderly living in 
Flanders and Wallonia, and single elderly are (somewhat) overrepresented in the realised 
sample. 
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Table 6.4. Comparison of the realised sample (unweighted) and the population aged 
60 and over by sex, age, region of residence and living situation (2007) 
 Realised sample Population 
 N % N % 
Sex     
  Male 699 41 1019412 45 
  Female 993 59 1271392 55 
Age     
  60-64 359 21 581890 25 
  65-69 344 20 452719 20 
  70-74 339 20 439152 19 
  75-79 300 18 389350 17 
  80+ 350 21 427693 19 
Region     
  Flanders 1068 63 1394017 61 
  Wallonia 558 33 704922 31 
  Brussels 66 4 191865 8 
Living situation     
  Single 612 36 800789 35 
  Couple 1080 64 1490015 65 
Total 1692 100 2290804 100 
Note: The population totals are adjusted for individuals living in one of the seven German speaking municipalities, and 
individuals permanently living in a residential care facility (i.e. registered as being part of a collective household in the 
National Register). 
Source: Author’s calculations on SHARE data wave 2 (for the realised sample) and 
Kruispuntbank Sociale Zekerheid (2014) (for the population) 
Finding differences between the realised sample and the entire population is one thing, 
adjusting for them another. To correct for the potential bias from the under- and 
overcoverage of certain groups in the sample, correction techniques can be used. 
Poststratification is one of these techniques (Gelman & Carlin, 2002). To successfully 
improve the representativeness of the research results, the weighting variables should be 
related to the main variables of interest (Bethlehem & Schouten, 2004). For our research, 
this implies that the weighting variables have to be related to the old age income and care 
package. From the 2010 Belgian Pension Atlas (Berghman et al., 2010), we know that old 
age income is related to sex and age, mainly favouring men and younger pensioners. Also, 
we know that age differences exist in the use of health and social care services (cf. supra). 
It thus makes sense to use sex and age as weighting variables to match the realised sample 
to the research population.  
Before calculating the poststratification weights, account should be given to differences in 
the selection probabilities stemming from the sample design (see 3.2.2). The design 
weights are calculated by the SHARE research team as “the inverse of the probability of 
being included in the [...] sample.” (De Luca & Rossetti, 2010, p. 23). The poststratification 
weights on their turn are computed taking account of the population distribution and the 
sample distribution by age and sex. Information on the population distribution is based on 
the Belgian National Register (Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie, 
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2009). Following Bethlehem (2002), the poststratification weights are calculated per 
stratum of age and sex as: 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑆 =
𝑁ℎ
𝑛ℎ
𝑥
𝑛
𝑁
 
in which Nh refers to the size of the stratum in the population, nh refers to the size of the 
stratum in the sample, N to the total population size and n to the total sample size. We 
combine the design weights with the poststratification weights to adjust the realised 
sample to the research population. In a final step, the weights are rescaled to facilitate the 
interpretation of the research results.72  
When applying weights, one must be aware of the fact that weights do not only improve 
the representativeness of the research results and reduce the non-response bias, they also 
can increase the standard error and the variance in the variables, which reduces the 
reliability of the research results (Bethlehem, 2002; Gelman & Carlin, 2002). This has to be 
kept in mind when interpreting the research results. In the sensitivity analysis (cf. infra), 
we will examine more in detail the effect of weights on the research results.  
3.4.3 Dealing with item non-response 
Errors are very likely to occur in income questions, since they are generally considered as 
very sensitive for non-response: respondents often do not know the exact amount asked, 
or they are not willing to provide this information. In the SHARE, a specific procedure – 
the unfolding bracket procedure – was included to minimise item non-response on income 
questions (Christelis, 2011). When the respondent did not give the exact amount, a set of 
subsequent questions was posed to estimate that amount. The respondent had to answer 
whether the amount was larger, smaller or about the same as a given amount. The number 
of questions depended on the entry point value (v1, v2, v3).73 The sequence of questions is 
illustrated in Figure 6.4.  
  
 
                                                             
72 More details on the calculation of the weights are provided in the appendix. 
73 To illustrate: if the respondent does not know the level of his monthly pension, the interviewer 
asks whether this amount is larger than, smaller than or about 1000 Euros (v2). If the respondent 
answers that the pension is larger than 1000 Euros, the interviewer asks whether the amount is 
larger than, smaller than, or about 1.500 Euros (v3). If the respondent than answer that the pension 
is smaller than 1500 Euros, we know that the amount is between 1000 and 1500 Euros. 
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Figure 6.4. Illustration of the unfolding bracket procedure 
  
  v1  v2  v3  
Q1        
Q2        
Q3        
Q4        
Q5        
Q6        
Q7        
Q8        
Q9        
Source: Brugiavini et al. (2005, p. 108) 
After completion of the unfolding brackets procedure, the interviewer had a fairly correct, 
though not exact, idea about the real amount (Das et al., 2005). Yet, the use of unfolding 
bracket answers is not completely error-free: entry point bias (i.e. answers within 
unfolding brackets questions are biased towards the entry point) may occur, though this is 
not expected to be an important source of error (Juster, Cao, Perry, & Couper, 2006). 
An analysis of a selection of income variables on employment and pensions, housing and 
assets showed that the use of unfolding brackets improves the average response rate from 
about 58% before the unfolding brackets to about 76% after the unfolding brackets (see 
Table 6.5). Even after the unfolding bracket procedure, item non-response remained 
larger in the module on assets than in the modules on employment and pensions and 
housing.  
Table 6.5. Average item response rate on selected income variables, before and 
after unfolding brackets, SHARE wave 2 (%) 
 
Before unfolding brackets 
Response rate (%) 
After unfolding brackets 
Response rate (%) 
Module   
  Employment and pensions  90 95 
  Assets  36 61 
  Housing 79 95 
Overall average response rate 58 76 
Note: The following items were used from the module on employment and pensions: ep078e1-ep078e16, ep082e1-
ep082e16; from the module on assets: as003, as005, as007, as009, as011, as015, as017, as058; and from the module on 
housing: ho024, ho027 and ho030.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Although the use of the unfolding bracket procedure reduces the item non-response on 
certain income questions, still important amounts of non-response are found. Several 
options are available to limit even more the negative effects of item non-response: list 
wise or pair wise deletion of respondents with missing values on income questions, single 
and multiple imputation of missing values, etc. (cf. Allison, 2002; Bethlehem, 2009). The 
central SHARE research team provides imputed values based on the multiple imputation 
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procedure of Rubin (1987, in Allison, 2002).74 Multiple imputation was preferred over 
single imputation because of the fear that a single imputation dataset would be used in the 
same manner as a dataset without imputations, and thus “the uncertainty due to the 
imputation of missing values would not be captured by the estimates generated from the 
single completed dataset, thus leading to potentially severely underestimated standard 
errors.” (Christelis, 2011, p. 6). The imputation methodology was based on the Fully 
Conditional Specification Method (FCS) of van Buuren, Brand, Groothuis-Oudshoorn and 
Rubin (2006, in Christelis, 2011), which assumes information to be missing at random 
(MAR). According to Christelis (2011, p. 10) the MAR assumption “is made in the vast 
majority of imputation procedures applied to large household surveys”, although it is 
likely that this does not hold for all variables. Even if this is the case, the FCS method 
combined with multiple imputation is said to “perform reasonable well, (…) [to] lead to 
less biased estimates than an analysis that uses only observations without missing data 
(…) [and to be] a reasonably robust procedure.”. The following decisions were made in the 
imputation procedure by the central SHARE research team (Christelis, 2008): 
1. Imputations were done separately for each country in SHARE; 
2. The sequence of introducing variables into the imputation model depended on the 
number of missing values and their predictive power: demographic variables were 
included before economic variables; individual-level variables before household-
level variables; and important variables before less important variables; 
3. The logical order of the variables was respected when introducing them into the 
imputation model. For example, pension ownership was determined before 
calculating the imputations. 
4. The amount information in the unfolding brackets procedure was used to calculate 
the imputations. 
5. Five imputation datasets were generated, following Rubin’s advice on the number 
of imputations, resulting in five imputed values for each missing one. 
The exact use of imputed values in our research is discussed in chapter 7 when the 
operationalisation of the old age income package is considered. The influence of the 
imputations on the research results is investigated as part of the sensitivity analysis (cf. 
Appendix 3). 
4. Sensitivity analysis 
Working with survey data always implies a certain degree of uncertainty whether or not 
the research results, which are based on a sample of the population, reflect the actual 
situation of the entire population. This stems from, among others, the sampling procedure, 
 
                                                             
74 For a detailed overview of the imputed variables, see SHARE Project (2010, pp. A38–A44). More 
details on the imputation procedure are provided by Christelis (2011). 
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differences between the sample and the population, the use of weights and imputations, 
the operationalisation of the concepts, etc.  
To a certain extent, sensitivity analysis is an appropriate technique to reduce the 
uncertainty in the research results. Sensitivity analysis refers to an alternative analysis of 
the data with changes in the model parameters and/or the model assumptions to check 
the robustness of the research results. If the changes have little influence on the research 
results, the model is concluded to be quite robust and not very sensitive to changes in the 
model parameters and assumptions. In that case the research results are considered to be 
(quite) reliable. However, if the changes in the model parameters and/or assumptions 
have an important influence on the research results, the robustness and the validity of the 
model and the research results can be questioned. More details on the sensitivity analysis 
are presented in the methodological appendix (Appendix 3). We will focus on the influence 
of weights, imputed values, and equivalence scales on the main research results. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research design, the data and the main characteristics of the research 
population were discussed. Different reasons were put forward to motivate our 
quantitative, cross-sectional single-country study based on secondary survey data. An 
overview of potential data sources, including survey data and administrative data, was 
used to motivate our choice to work with SHARE data. This survey focuses on the elderly 
population and on different aspects of the ageing process (like income and care use); it 
thus is most appropriate to answer our research questions. The main characteristics of the 
SHARE were discussed, with specific attention for the target population, the sample design 
and the realised sample. We focused on the quality of the data (collection); weights and 
imputations were put forward to tackle issues of bias related to unit and item non-
response. The importance of a sensitivity analysis was highlighted: it contributes to a 
validation of the research results, it reduces uncertainty due to data manipulations, and it 
improves the reliability of the research results. 
In the next chapters, the operationalisation and the main research results are discussed. In 
chapter 7, we focus on the operationalisation of the old age income package. We 
distinguish the personal income package, including income sources with personal 
entitlement like pensions, and the extended income package, that includes personal 
income sources as well as asset sources like financial assets and property ownership. In 
chapter 8, we analyse the personal and extended old age income package of the Belgian 
elderly population. We pay particular attention to the relationship between the personal 
and the extended income package and the quality of the financial protection provided by 
the old age income package. In addition, we investigate whether certain background 
characteristics, like sex, age and socioeconomic status, are related to the old age income 
package. In chapters 9 and 10 we focus on the old age care package, that includes the 
health and social care services that are used by the elderly population. In chapter 9, the 
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operationalisation of the care package is discussed, while in chapter 10 we focus on the 
research results. Attention is paid to the composition of the care package, the intensity of 
the use of care services, and the quality of the protection provided against the functional 
dimension of old age dependency. We pay particular attention to the relationship between 
the old age income package and the old age care package, to investigate whether 
inequalities in the old age income package are reproduced into the old age care package. 
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CHAPTER 7. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE 
OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 
In this chapter, we discuss the operationalisation of one of the main concepts in our 
research: the old age income package,. The operational concept should include the 
different income sources available to the elderly population. Because we use SHARE data, 
we are limited to the income sources that are included in the SHARE. On the one hand, the 
income package includes income sources with personal entitlement, like pensions and 
wages. This is referred to as the personal income package, composed of personal income 
sources. On the other hand, also assets, like financial assets and property ownership, are at 
the disposal of the elderly population. This is referred to as asset sources, or the asset 
package. When the personal income sources and the asset sources are taken together, we 
speak of the extended old age income package. A difference is always made between the 
ownership and the level of protection provided by the different income sources. 
In the first section, we address the operationalisation of the personal income package, 
which includes only personal income sources. We investigate the existence of clusters of 
personal income sources using a hierarchical cluster analysis. In section 2, the asset 
sources shared within households are discussed. This includes financial assets and 
property ownership. We simulate the potential contribution from these assets to the 
income of the elderly population. In the third section, the equivalence scale used to take 
account of financial solidarity within households, is discussed. In the last section, we 
present the indicators that are used to evaluate the level of protection that is provided by 
the old age income package against the financial dimension of old age dependency. 
1. Income sources with personal ownership 
Income sources with personal ownership refer to the income sources that are paid to a 
person, based on his or her individual situation, and that - overall - are immediately 
available for consumption. This includes pensions, social security benefits, wages, etc. We 
distinguish between income source ownership (whether one has received a specific 
income source) and the generosity of these sources (income level). 
1.1 Assessing personal income source ownership 
For the older population, the main income sources with personal ownership are the 
different types of pensions. The SHARE module on employment and pensions contains 
information on the ownership of first pillar pensions (items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9), social security 
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benefits (items 4, 5, 6), and the public care insurance (item 10). The respondents are 
asked which income sources they have received in the last year, and they can give more 
than one answer if necessary. 
ep071 Have you received income from any of these sources in the previous year? (multiple 
answers possible) 
1. Public old age pension 
2. Public old age supplementary pension or public old age second pension 
3. Public early retirement or pre-retirement pension 
4. Main public disability insurance pension, or sickness benefits 
5. Secondary public disability insurance pension, or sickness benefits 
6. Public unemployment benefit or insurance 
7. Main public survivor pension from your spouse or partner 
8. Secondary public survivor pension from your spouse or partner 
9. Public war pension 
10. Public long-term care insurance 
96. None of these 
To assess second and third pillar pension ownership, the module on employment and 
pensions includes two additional questions: ep324 for second pillar pensions and ep089 
for third pillar pensions (item 1,2). Ep089 also allows us to determine whether the 
respondent has received other regular private payments, like alimony and private (long-
term) care insurance payments   
ep324 Have you received income from any of these sources in the previous year? (multiple 
answers possible) 
1. Occupational old age pension from your last job 
2. Occupational old age pension from a second job 
3. Occupational old age pension from a third job 
4. Occupational early retirement pension 
5. Occupational disability or invalidity insurance 
6. Occupational survivor pension from your spouse or partner’s job 
96. None of these 
 
ep089 Did you receive any of the following regular payments or transfers during the previous 
year? (multiple answers possible) 
1. Regular life insurance payments 
2. Regular private annuity or private personal pension payments 
3. Alimony 
4. Regular payments from charities 
5. Long-term care insurance payments from a private insurance company 
96. None of these 
The main disadvantage of the questions on the second and third pillar pension ownership 
is that these questions focus only on the receipt of pension payments in the previous year. 
We know, however, that an important part of second and third pillar pension payments is 
paid as single lump sums (cf. chapter 3). Registering only the receipt of second and third 
pillar pensions received in the last year leaves out an important group of people who have 
received second and third pillar pension payments in the years before. For example, a 
respondent who is retired for a period of 15 years and received a lump sum occupational 
pension at the moment he/she retired will not be captured in the preceding questions. 
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However, to give in to this shortcoming, additional information on second (re025, item 2) 
and third pillar pension ownership (re025 item 3 and fs006) in the past was looked up in 
the retrospective life history survey of SHARELIFE. Note that the SHARELIFE asks whether 
the respondent contributed to the built-up of second and third pillar pensions. We assume 
that the built-up of an additional pension always results in a payment at a certain point in 
time.  
re025 While doing this job, towards which of the following did you or your employer contribute? 
(multiple answers possible) 
1. A public pension plan 
2. An occupational pension plan 
3. A private pension plan or individual retirement plan 
4. No contributions paid 
 
fs006 Have you ever subscribed to an individual retirement account? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Including the retrospective information on the receipt of second and third pillar pensions 
increased importantly the second and third pillar pension ownership within the research 
population. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the research population by second and 
third pillar ownership in the previous year (based on SHARE) and having contributed to 
the built-up of second and third pillar pensions before retirement (based on SHARELIFE). 
Based on the information in the SHARE, resp. 5% and 1% of the research population 
received a second or third pillar pension, while in the SHARELIFE resp. 6% and 46% of the 
respondents indicated to have contributed to the built-up of a second or a third pillar 
pension before retirement.  
Table 7.1. Including retrospective information on the receipt of second and third 
pillar pensions (unweighted, 2007) 
 Received in previous 
year (ep324/ep089) 
Contributions paid 
before retirement 
(re025/fs006) 
Combined 
 Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Total 
(N) 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Total 
(N) 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Total 
(N) 
Second pillar pension 5 95 1687 6 94 1687 11 89 1687 
Third pillar pension 1 99 1689 46 54 1689 48 52 1689 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Lastly, a minority of our respondents is still active on the labour market and thus receives 
an income from (self-)employment. To include these income sources, the following 
questions were used from the module on employment and pensions: 
ep204 Have you had any wages, salaries, or other earnings from dependent employment in the 
previous year? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
  
131 
ep206 Have you had any income at all from self-employment or work for a family business in the 
previous year? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
We constructed a number of ownership variables, based on the information in the 
preceding questions. We distinguish between first pillar pensions, second pillar pensions, 
third pillar pensions, social security benefits, wages (either from employment or self-
employment), private payments and long-term care insurance payments (either from 
public or private providers). Table 7.2 gives for each personal income source the 
proportion of the research population that has received this income source. The majority 
of the research population receives a first pillar pension (76%). Second and third pillar 
pensions are less widespread: resp. 11% and 49% of the research population receives or 
has received this type of pension. The other personal income sources are less important. 
Only 7% receives a social security benefit, which is obvious because the entitlement to 
social security benefits ends at the age of 65. Given the low importance of labour market 
participation, only 6% of the research population has an income from employment or self-
employment. Less than 1% of the research population receives long-term care insurance 
payments or private payments.  
Table 7.2. Personal income sources ownership of the research population 
(unweighted, 2007) 
  Ownership   
Personal income source Based on ... 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Total 
(N) 
N 
missing 
First pillar pension ep071 (items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9) 76 24 1689 3 
Second pillar pension ep324 / re025 (item 2) 11 89 1687 5 
Third pillar pension ep089 (item 1,2) / re025 
(item 3) / fs006 
49 51 1691 1 
Social security benefit ep071 (items 4, 5, 6) 7 93 1689 3 
Long-term care insurance ep071 (item 10) / ep089 
(item 5)  
1 99 1690 2 
Wage ep204 / ep206 6 94 1689 3 
Private payments ep089 (items 3,4) 1 99 1688 4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
1.2 Defining clusters of personal income sources via hierarchical cluster 
analysis 
After having determined the ownership of the different income sources, a hierarchical 
cluster analysis was performed to differentiate clusters of personal income sources. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis is an explorative technique that combines observations into 
groups or clusters so that there is a large degree of in-group homogeneity and out-group 
heterogeneity. The number of clusters is not know in advance, and the grouping in clusters 
depends on the distance between the clusters. The main advantage of cluster analysis is 
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that the clusters are derived from the data, independent of the researcher and his/her 
predispositions. In this way, we are guided by the data and not by our expectations. 
Obviously, the cluster solution will be investigated and validated in detail afterwards, to 
strengthen and enforce the cluster solution. 
Different techniques can be used to determine the distance between the clusters and the 
final number of clusters, like the centroid method, the single-linkage method, the average-
linkage method and the Ward’s method. For our analyses, the Ward’s technique was used 
to create clusters maximizing the within-cluster homogeneity and minimizing the within-
cluster sum of squares. According to the overview of Sharma (1996) the Ward’s technique 
most often gives the best results. 
The cluster analysis was performed in SAS, using the PROC CLUSTER procedure. The input 
variables were the variables on the ownership of the most important personal income 
sources, namely first, second, and third pillar pensions, social security benefits and wages. 
Private payments and long-term care insurance payments were not included in the cluster 
analysis because they are owned by less than 1% of the research population. Only 
observations without missings on all included income sources were used for the cluster 
analysis; 6 observations were excluded because of missings. 
The most appropriate number of clusters always depends on the interpretation of the 
researcher. Yet, specific statistics can be used to evaluate of the cluster solution and to 
make an informed decision on the number of clusters. In SAS, the root-mean-square 
standard deviation (RMS STD), the semipartial R-squared (SPR), the R-squared (RS) and 
the inter-cluster distance (CD) are calculated and plotted (see Table 7.3). According to 
Sharma (1996) the RMS STD, that measures the homogeneity of the new cluster, as well as 
the RMS and the CD, indicating the homogeneity of the merged clusters, should be low. The 
RS, which measures the heterogeneity of the clusters, should be high. 
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Table 7.3. Overview of the hierarchical cluster analysis statistics to decide on the 
number of income clusters 
Root-mean-square standard deviation  
(RMS STD) 
Semi-partial R-squared  
(SPR) 
  
R-squared (RS) Inter-cluster distance (CD) 
  
Based on the results of the Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis, it was decided that the 
seven cluster solution fits the data best. The RMS STD is low when compared to the 
solutions with less of more clusters. Both the SPR and the CD start to rise fast after the 
seven cluster solution, and the RS decreases importantly when less than seven clusters are 
involved.75 
In a next step, the cluster membership was assigned to each respondent via the PROC 
TREE procedure. Afterwards, we are able to determine the income sources that are most 
important in each cluster. Table 7.4 gives an overview of the personal income source 
ownership in each cluster. Clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4 are “exclusive” clusters: all observations in 
those clusters have the same personal income sources. In cluster 1, all observations have 
 
                                                             
75 Note that it is advised that a hierarchical cluster analysis is complemented with a non-
hierarchical cluster analysis to validate the number of clusters. However, according to 
Wijnen, Janssens, De Pelsmacker, and Van Kenhove (2002) non-hierarchical cluster 
analysis is not a valid technique to use with exclusively binary variables, as is the case 
here. 
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first pillar pensions, in cluster 2 all observations have third pillar pensions, in cluster 3 all 
observations combine first and third pillar pensions, and in cluster 4 all observations have 
no personal income sources. Clusters 5, 6 and 7 are not exclusive clusters, but it is possible 
to determine the most important income sources in each cluster. In cluster 5, all 
observations have a second pillar pension, and nearly all observations have a first pillar 
pension (98%). A smaller group in cluster 5 also has a third pillar pension (63%). In 
cluster 6, all observations receive a social security benefit, sometimes in combination with 
a first (41%), a second (14%) or a third pillar pension (58%). A minority in cluster 6 
combines a wage with social security benefits (7%). The last cluster is dominated by wage 
ownership: 96% of the observations receives a wage. Again a part of the observations in 
this group combines his/her wage with a first (50%), a second (20%), a third pillar 
pensions (70%) or with a social security benefit (1%).  
Table 7.4 also shows the distribution of the research population to these clusters of 
personal income sources. The first (first pillar pensions) and the third (first and third 
pillar pensions) cluster are the most important clusters. About 62% of the research 
population is in these clusters (resp. 34% in the first and 28% in the third cluster). About 
11% of the research population has no personal income sources (cluster 4). The remaining 
27% of the research population belongs to the other clusters: 6% has only a third pillar 
pension (cluster 2); 9% has a first and second pillar pension, either or not in combination 
with a third pillar pension (cluster 5); 7% receives social a security benefit in combination 
with other income sources (cluster 6); and 5% of the research population receives a wage 
in combination with other income sources (cluster 7). 
Table 7.4. Relative distribution of the research population by cluster and personal 
income source ownership (unweighted, 2007) 
 Total % personal income source ownership 
Cluster N % 
First pillar 
Second 
pillar 
Third 
pillar Wage SS benefit 
  1 569 34 100 0 0 0 0 
  2 107 6 0 0 100 0 0 
  3 477 28 100 0 100 0 0 
  4 183 11 0 0 0 0 0 
  5 147 9 98 100 63 0 1 
  6 113 7 41 14 58 7 100 
  7 90 5 50 20 70 96 1 
Total 1686 100      
Note: 6 respondents were excluded from the cluster analysis because they had missings on at least one of the personal 
income sources included in the analysis. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
To recapitulate, the hierarchical cluster analysis resulted in the following clusters of 
personal income sources (see also Table 7.4): 
 cluster 1: only a first pillar pension (P1); 
 cluster 2: only a third pillar pension (only P3); 
 cluster 3: a first and a third pillar pension (P1+P3); 
135 
 cluster 4: no personal income sources (None); 
 cluster 5: a second and a first pillar pension (combined with a third pillar 
pension) (P2+P1); 
 cluster 6: a social security benefit, combined with other income sources 
(SS+other); and 
 cluster 7: a wage from (self-)employment, combined with other income sources 
(Wage+other). 
1.3 Assessing the income package generosity 
After assigning each respondent with the appropriate income package based on the 
hierarchical cluster analysis, the generosity of the personal income packages was 
calculated. In doing so, information on payments was drawn from the SHARE module on 
employment and pensions. This information includes the period and the level of payment. 
The following questions were used to determine the income from first and second pillar 
pensions and from social security benefits: 
ep078e After taxes, about how large was a typical payment of this income source in the previous 
year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
ep074 What period did that payment cover? 
1. One week 
2. Two weeks 
3. Calendar month (4 weeks) 
4. Three months (13 weeks) 
5. Six months (26 weeks) 
6. Full year (12 months) 
97. Other 
An exploratory analysis showed that 2% of the research population (29 respondents) 
reported an extremely high first pillar pension. Based on theoretical considerations 
regarding maximum first pillar pensions in 200776, first pillar pensions over 5000 Euros 
per month were considered as errors. These respondents were left out of the final 
analyses.  
For third pillar pensions, the following two questions were used: 
ep094 After any taxes and contributions, about how large was the average payment of this 
income source in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
                                                             
76 In 2007, the maximum gross retirement pension for employees was about 2050 Euros per month. 
For self-employed pensioners, the maximum gross retirement pension was about 1170 Euros per 
month (Put, 2007). Retired statutory civil servants were eligible to an absolute maximum gross 
retirement pension of 3906 Euros per month (Appels, Franceus, Van Sande, & De Becker, 2007). 
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ep090 Which period did that payment cover? 
1. One week 
2. Two weeks 
3. Calendar month (4 weeks) 
4. Three months (13 weeks) 
5. Six months (26 weeks) 
6. Full year (12 months) 
97. Other 
As often is the case with income questions, non-response threatens the quality of the data 
(cf. chapter 6). To minimise non-response in the data, imputations calculated by the 
SHARE research team are used. Imputed values were only used when the respondent 
indicated ownership of that income source; income source ownership itself was not 
imputed. For example, for first pillar pension, amounts were imputed for 15% of the 
respondents with first pillar pension ownership. Imputations become more important 
when second and third pillar pensions are considered (resp. 23% and 40%) (see Table 
7.5). One must keep in mind that the use of imputations can have consequences for the 
research results. Therefore, we investigate the influence of the imputations on the overall 
research results in the sensitivity analysis (Appendix 3). In addition, we also compare the 
population with and without imputed values on the income variables on a number of 
background characteristics (e.g. sex, age, region of residence, etc.) (Appendix 4). 
Table 7.5. Relative distribution of the research population according to imputations 
for first, second and third pillar pensions (unweighted, 2007) 
 No imputations  
(%) 
Imputations  
(%) 
Total  
(N) 
First pillar pensions 85 15 1353 
Second pillar pensions 77 23 80 
Third pillar pensions 60 40 20 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Further, an additional problem came fore with the second and third pillar pensions. We 
retrieved information on the receipt of second and third pillar pensions in the past from 
SHARELIFE (cf. supra), but SHARELIFE does not collect information on the level of the 
second and third pillar pensions received in the past. The only information on the level of 
second and third pillar pensions is included in SHARE. For this payment information, we 
assume that it refers to regular pension payments (for example, monthly or annual 
payments) and not to single lump sum payments. However, this also implies that no 
information is available on the level of second and third pillar pension that were paid as 
lump sum payments in the past, for which we determined the ownership via the 
SHARELIFE. Yet, because we focus on the disposable income and because we include 
assets in the extended income package, the lump sum payments received in the past are 
accounted to some extent. After all, single lump sum payments received in the past that 
have been spent, no longer contribute to the actual disposable income. When these lump 
sums have been saved or invested in property, their contribution is accounted via the 
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inclusion of assets in the extended income package (cf. infra). However, this approach still 
does not allow us to get a complete picture of the financial importance of second and third 
pillar pensions, because we are not able to make a difference between the assets from 
second and third pillar pensions (paid a single lump sums) and the assets that have been 
accumulated during the active life phase. This should be taken into account when 
interpreting the research results. 
Besides income from first, second and third pillar pensions and social security benefits, 
also the income from (self)employment determines the generosity of the income package. 
The following SHARE questions collect information on the wage from (self)employment: 
ep205 After any taxes and contributions, what was your approximate income from employment 
in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
ep207 After any taxes and contributions and after paying for any materials, equipment or goods 
that you use in your work, what was your approximate income from self-employment in the 
previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
Similar to the pension income, amounts were calculated on a monthly basis and imputed 
values were used whenever necessary. This was the case for 27% of the respondents with 
wage ownership.  
Further, also regular private payments and long-term care insurance payments (either 
from a public or a private provider) are used to determine the generosity of the income 
package. For this, the following SHARE questions were used: 
ep094 After any taxes and contributions, about how large was the average payment of this 
income source in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
ep090 Which period did that payment cover? 
1. One week 
2. Two weeks 
3. Calendar month (4 weeks) 
4. Three months (13 weeks) 
5. Six months (26 weeks) 
6. Full year (12 months) 
97. Other 
Again, imputed values were used if necessary. This was the case for one respondent who 
received private payments, and for one respondent who received long-term care 
insurance payments. 
The amounts of the different income sources were combined into a single amount 
variable: the monthly income from the old age income package of personal income sources 
after taxes and contributions (i.e. the monthly net income from the personal income 
package). Respondents without personal income sources were assigned with a monthly 
income of zero Euros. Amounts were only calculated when the respondent indicated 
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having received these income sources. In case ownership information was missing, the 
level of income package was also set to be missing. 
2. Income sources shared within the household 
In the previous section attention was paid to personal income sources. In this section, we 
focus on the sources that are built-up and shared within the household77, and that are 
assumed not to be owned by only one household member. This refers to the assets 
accumulated within the household, being financial assets and property ownership. We 
discuss both asset ownership (2.2.1) and the contribution from these assets to the 
extended old age income package (2.2.2). 
2.1 Financial assets and property ownership 
Within the SHARE, information on assets is registered at the household level, but for our 
research the household information is appointed to each household member at the 
individual level. Assets ownership thus refers to assets ownership within the household. 
Financial assets include for example bank accounts, stocks and bonds, that contribute both 
directly, via interests, and indirectly, in that they are a buffer against potential financial 
shocks, to the old age income package. In the SHARE, the following questions in the 
module on assets focus to the household ownership of financial assets: 
as060 Do you (or your partner) currently have any money in bank accounts, transaction 
accounts, saving accounts or postal accounts? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
as062 Do you (or your partner) currently have any money in government or corporate bonds? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
as063 Do you (or your partner) currently have any money in stocks or shares (listed or unlisted 
on stock market)? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
  
 
                                                             
77 Also personal income sources are expected to be shared within the household; that is why 
equivalent incomes are calculated (cf. infra). However, the difference we make is between sources 
with personal entitlement (like pensions and wages) and sources with broader household 
entitlement (like assets). 
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as064 Do you (or your partner) currently have any money in mutual funds or managed 
investments accounts? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Table 7.6 shows the distribution of the research population by financial asset ownership. 
The vast majority of the research population has access to savings in a bank account 
(97%). Other financial asset sources are less important: only 13% has bonds, 22% has 
stocks and 15% of the research population has savings in mutual funds or managed 
investment accounts. Also note that the non-response ranges between 2% and 6%. 
Table 7.6. Financial assets sources ownership of the research population 
(unweighted, 2007) 
 Ownership   
Financial assets Yes (%) No (%) Total (N) N missing 
  Bank account 97 3 1647 40 
  Bonds 13 87 1584 103 
  Stocks 22 78 1587 100 
  Mutual funds 15 85 1581 106 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Besides financial assets also property ownership is included. Property ownership 
contributes mainly indirectly to the income package. In case of home ownership, no 
additional costs for renting have to be made, thus providing a buffer against poverty. A 
direct contribution from property ownership comes from the potential to renting out the 
property: the rent is immediately available to the household. Also, the property can be 
sold in times of need to provide an additional income (cf. chapter 3). The SHARE registers 
property ownership at household level with the following questions in the housing 
module: 
ho002 Do you live as an owner, a main tenant, a subtenant, or do you live rent free? (single 
answer) 
1. Owner 
2. Member of a cooperative 
3. Tenant 
4. Subtenant 
5. Rent free 
 
ho026 Not including special time-sharing arrangements, do you (or your partner) own 
secondary homes, holiday homes, other real estate, land or forestry? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
ho029 Did you or your partner receive any income or rent from these properties in the previous 
year? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
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A difference is made between home ownership (ho002, item 1) and secondary residence 
ownership (ho026). Home ownership refers to the house one owns and lives in, while 
secondary residence refers to other property one owns and does not live in. Being 
member of a housing cooperative (ho002, item 2) is considered as home ownership, but 
this holds for only one respondent. Although respondents that live rent free do not have 
rental costs like home owners, they cannot sell their house in times of financial hardship. 
Consequently, this is not considered as home ownership. 
Table 7.7 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population by property 
ownership. The majority of the research population owns a house for living (80%). About 
17% owns secondary residence, of this group almost half receives rent from this 
secondary residence. Information on property ownership was missing for about 2% of the 
research population.  
Table 7.7. Property ownership of the research population (unweighted, 2007) 
 Ownership   
Property assets Yes (%) No (%) Total (N) N missing 
  Home ownership 80 20 1649 38 
  Secondary residence 17 83 1649 38 
  Rent 8 92 1649 38 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
2.2 The contribution from assets 
To assess the contribution from financial and property assets in the old age income 
package, different strategies can be used. We make a distinction between the (potential) 
contribution from financial assets and secondary residence (section 2.2.1) and the 
(potential) contribution from home ownership (section 2.2.2). In the last paragraph we 
formulate some critical remarks on the methodology used. 
2.2.1 The (potential) contribution from financial assets and secondary residence 
First, the direct contribution can be assessed in that financial assets generate interests and 
secondary residence can yield rental incomes. Such information is included in the SHARE 
modules on assets and housing: 
as005 After taxes, about how much interest income did you (and your partner) receive from 
such [bank] accounts in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
as009 After taxes, about how much interest income did you (and your partner) receive from the 
bonds in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
141 
as012 After taxes, about how much dividend income did you (and your partner) receive from 
these stocks in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
as019 After taxes, about how much interest or dividend income did you (and your partner) earn 
with mutual funds or managed investment accounts in the previous year? 
[Numerical value] 
 
ho030 How much income or rent did you or your partner receive from these properties during 
the last year, after taxes? 
[Numerical value] 
Secondly, inspired by Weisbrod and Hansen (1968), the wealth stock in financial assets 
and secondary residence can be transposed to a fictitious annuity (An) to simulate the 
potential contribution to the disposable income. For financial assets, we assume that the 
assets stock is spent gradually over the remaining life course. For secondary residence 
ownership, we assume that the property is sold and that the proceeds are spend gradually 
over the remaining life course. In calculating the simulated income from financial assets 
and secondary residence, account is given to the accumulated wealth (NWt) that combines 
the wealth in financial assets and the value of the secondary residence, the remaining life 
expectancy (Ex) (i.e. the predicted period to spend the asset stock) and the long-term 
interest rate (r).78 The annual fictitious annuity from financial assets and secondary 
residence ownership is thus calculated as: 
𝐴𝑛 = 𝑁𝑊𝑡 ∗
𝑟
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝐸𝑥
 
The disposable income at a moment t (Yt*) is the sum of the actual available income from 
the personal income package (Yt) and the fictitious annuity from assets: 
𝑌𝑡
∗ = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐴𝑛 
The long-term interest rate r was set at 4.33% (based on the interest rate of an OLO 
reference loan with a duration of 10 years at the secondary market, provided by the 
National Bank of Belgium (2012) in its annual macro-economic statistics).  
To determine the remaining life expectancy Ex, a difference is made between singles and 
couples. For singles, sex specific life tables79, provided by Statistics Belgium (Algemene 
Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie, 2013), are used. The remaining life 
expectancy is based on the current age and sex of the respondent. For couples, different 
strategies can be used. A first strategy assumes that the annuity is paid only as long as 
both partners are alive. The remaining life expectancy in that case refers to the partner 
 
                                                             
78 As similar approach was used in a research project on the adequacy of the Belgian pension 
system for pensioner households (cf. Berghman, Curvers, Palmans, & Peeters, 2007; Berghman, 
Curvers, Palmans, Vandermeerschen, & Verpoorten, 2009). 
79 These life tables are based on the age at last birthday. They do not take account of future 
evolutions in life expectancy. 
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with the shortest predicted life span. However, we doubt that couples would choose to 
leave the surviving partner without any additional income. A second strategy involves the 
payment of a fixed annuity, even after the death of the first spouse (i.e. joint and full 
survivor annuity). A third strategy implies that after the decease of the first partner, a ratio 
of the annuity is paid to the surviving partner (i.e. joint and last survivor annuity). The ratio 
is often set at two-thirds of the initial annuity (Brown, 2002; Brown & Poterba, 2000; 
Murray, 1964). Exploratory calculations indicate little difference between the level of the 
joint and full survivor annuity and the joint and last survivor annuity.80 For statistical 
reasons, we will draw on the second strategy, assuming the payment of a joint and full 
survivor annuity. The remaining life expectancy Ex in that case refers to the remaining life 
span of the partner with the longest life expectancy. 
The SHARE module on assets includes the following questions to determine the wealth 
accumulated in financial assets (NWt): 
as003 About how much do you (and your partner) currently have in bank accounts, transaction 
accounts, saving accounts or postal accounts? 
[Numerical value] 
 
as007 About how much do you (and your partner) currently have in government or corporate 
bonds? 
[Numerical value] 
 
as011 About how much do you (and your partner) currently have in stocks or shares (listed or 
unlisted on stock market)? 
[Numerical value] 
 
as017 About how much do you (and your partner) currently have in mutual funds or managed 
investment accounts? 
[Numerical value] 
To determine the secondary residence equity, we drew upon the following question 
included in the housing module of the SHARE. It refers to an estimation of the market 
value of the secondary residence: 
ho027 In your opinion, how much would this property be worth now if you sold it? 
[Numerical value] 
 
                                                             
80 Furthermore, the closer the ratio for the calculation of the joint and last survivor annuity to 1, the 
closer it resembles the joint and full survivor annuity (Brown, 2002). 
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2.2.2 The (potential) contribution from home ownership 
To include the contribution from home ownership, different strategies can be used (see 
Table 7.8). These strategies differ in the account that is given to the market value of the 
property, the costs related to home ownership, etc.  
Table 7.8. Overview of strategies to include the contribution from home ownership 
Market value approach 
(National accounts approach) 
Gross market rent of similar dwellings (GR), including all 
related costs (C) (e.g. operation and maintenance costs, 
reparations, service costs, ...): 
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝐺𝑅 + 𝐶 
Opportunity cost approach 
(Rental equivalence method) 
Net imputed rent (IR), taking account of costs (C), 
depreciation of the property (D) and interest on mortgage 
payments (I): 
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝐺𝑅 − 𝐶 − 𝐷 − 𝐼 
Capital market approach  
(User-cost method) 
Owner-assessed value of the property, taking account of 
outstanding mortgages, multiplied with the sum of inflation 
and the rate of return on capital: 
 𝐼𝑅 = (𝐻𝑉 − 𝑀) ∗ (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) 
Self-assessment approach Potential rent as estimated by owner: 
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Reverse mortgage approach Regular annuity based on a percentage of the owner-
assessed housing wealth (PLF*HV), the remaining mortgage 
(M), the life expectancy, and the long-term interest rate (An): 
 𝑅𝑀 = 𝑃𝐿𝐹 ∗ (𝐻𝑉 − 𝑀) ∗ 𝐴𝑛 
Reduction of home equity 
approach 
Simulation of housing equity under assumption that 
property is sold and a smaller dwelling is purchased. 
Fictitious annuity based on value difference of larger and 
smaller dwelling, including interest rate and life expectancy. 
Sources: Frick, Grabka, Smeeding, & Tsakloglou (2008); Frick & Grabka (2003); Lefebure, 
Mangeleer, & Van Den Bosch (2006); Yates (1994) 
To include home ownership in our analysis, we use the reverse mortgage approach, that 
combines the optimal use of the property’s value with a guaranteed right of residence for 
the older home owner(s). Such a reverse mortgage simulation “allow[s] individuals to 
convert some of the equity they have in their homes into a steady income stream, without 
giving up residence in them.” (Bartel, Daly, & Wrage, 1980, p. 477). A mortgage is taken 
out on a percentage of the dwelling’s value, providing the household with a fixed annuity 
and the assurance that they can continue living in their house until they die or until the 
property is sold.  
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Because the legal framework for reverse mortgaging is absent in Belgium81, and inspired 
by the approach of Lefebure et al. (2006), we draw on information from the US Home 
Equity Conversion Mortgages for Seniors scheme (HECM) of the US Department Housing 
and Urban Development (2013) to calculate the reverse mortgages.82 Central in the 
formula is the principal limit factor (PLF), that “indicates which percentage of the value of 
the house may be taken into account in determining the maximum size of the loan” 
(Lefebure et al., 2006, p. 8). The PLF depends on the age of the home owner(s) and on the 
average mortgage interest rate (4,33%), and varies between 60% and 80%, depending on 
the age of the home owner.83 For couples, the age of the youngest partner is taken into 
account to ensure that the housing wealth is not entirely spent when the oldest partner 
dies. This resembles the joint and full survivor strategy discussed before. The following 
formula is used to determine the total value of the reverse mortgage (RM): 
𝑅𝑀 = (𝐻𝑉 − 𝑀) ∗ 𝑃𝐿𝐹 
in which HV refers the value of the property and M refers to the mortgage that has to be 
repaid. The total value of the reverse mortgage is transposed to a fictitious annuity (RMAn) 
using the formula that was used to calculate the fictitious annuities from financial asset 
and secondary residence ownership (cf. supra)84: 
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑛 = (𝐻𝑉 − 𝑀) ∗ 𝑃𝐿𝐹 ∗
𝑟
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝐸𝑥
 
In the SHARE, both the market value of the house (HV) and the remaining mortgages (M) 
are provided by the respondent in the housing module: 
ho024 In your opinion, how much would you receive if you sold your property today? 
[Numerical value] 
 
ho013 Do you have mortgages or loans on this property? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
ho015 How much do you or your partner still have to pay on your mortgages or loans, excluding 
interest? 
[Numerical value] 
 
                                                             
81 However, political initiatives have been taken to introduce reverse mortgaging as an insurance 
product in Belgium. A first bill to create a reverse mortgage scheme (pension credit) was proposed 
in 2009 (DOC 52 2152/001) (De Block, Schiltz, Staelraeve, & Defreyne, 2009). This bill was again 
proposed in 2011 (DOC 53 1229/001) (De Block, 2011), but until now it has not been adopted. 
However, despite the lacking legal framework for reverse mortgaging as an insurance product, in 
Belgium home owners can sell their property, and instead of receiving the purchase price as a 
single lump sum, they can choose to receive lifelong annuity payments (verkoop op lijfrente) (see 
also Delta Lloyd, 2014; Koninklijke Federatie van het Belgisch Notariaat, 2014).  
82 For more information on the US Home Equity Conversion Mortgages for Seniors scheme, consult 
the website of the US Department Housing and Urban Development: http://portal.hud.gov/. 
83 The PLF by age are included in annex appendix 4. 
84 In appendix 5 we illustrate the simulation of the potential contribution from assets to the old age 
income package. 
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2.2.3 Reflections on the inclusion of assets in the extended income package 
Some critical notes have to be made regarding the inclusion and simulation of assets as 
part of the extended old age income package.  
First, we can have doubts about the knowledge individuals have about the value and the 
amount of assets they possess, as well as the revenues (both rent and interests) these 
assets yield. Little research exists that compares the amount of wealth reported by 
individuals in surveys and the actual amount of wealth they have (Avery, Elliehausen, & 
Kennickell, 1988; Curtin, Juster, & Morgan, 1989; Kennickell & Starr-McCluer, 1997). 
Overall, the reported asset stock diverges to a certain extent from the actual amount, 
although factors like question wording, population sampling, etc. can contribute to the 
quality of the data. This also holds for property assets. Research has found a general 
overestimation of about 5% of the market value of the house when assessed by the 
property owner in comparison with the actual transaction prices (e.g. DiPasquale & 
Somerville, 1995; Goodman Jr. & Ittner, 1992; Kiel & Zabel, 1999). This has to be kept in 
mind when looking at the analysis results.  
Second, it is generally known that income and wealth questions in surveys suffer from 
important degrees of item non-response. This is not different in the SHARE. To overcome 
problems related to item non-response, imputed values provided by the SHARE research 
team are used (cf. chapter 6). Imputations are most important for financial assets. More 
than half of the amounts on financial assets are imputed values (resp. 55% and 70%). For 
property, item non-response rates are lower and imputations are needed for 10% of the 
values of home ownership and for 21% of the values of secondary residence ownership 
(see Table 7.9). As already mentioned, using imputed values increases the risk to 
systematic mistakes in the research results. Therefor we investigate the influence of 
imputations on the research results in the sensitivity analysis (Appendix 3). 
Table 7.9. Relative distribution of the research population according to imputations 
for assets (unweighted, 2007) 
 No imputations  
(%) 
Imputations  
(%) 
Total  
(N) 
Financial assets    
  Amount 45 55 1603 
  Interest 30 70 1603 
Home ownership    
  Value 90 10 1320 
Secondary residence    
  Value 79 21 281 
  Rent 83 17 135 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Third, the financial contribution from home ownership depends on the technique used to 
take account of home ownership (cf. supra, Table 7.9). However, according to a 
comparison between the different methods by Lefebure et al. (2006) and Verbist and 
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Lefebure (2008), the results of the different methods are comparable on the aggregate 
level.  
Fourth, we should keep in mind that the simulation of fictitious annuities does not refer to 
a real-life situation. Nothing is said about the willingness of households to actually spend 
the wealth, accumulated in financial and property assets. When discussing the simulated 
contribution from assets and the protection provided by the extended old age income 
package, which includes the simulated asset contribution, we thus present a mathematical 
exercise that does not fit with reality. We do not state anything about the willingness of 
the elderly population to actually transpose their assets into a regular income.85 However, 
we evaluate the fictitious annuity simulation as a good indicator of the potential 
contribution from wealth to the old age income package. 
Fifth, in calculating fictitious annuities we do not take account of transaction costs or taxes 
that have to be paid when transposing financial assets to a regular annuity payment. 
Moreover, we do not take account of potential differences in the consumption needs of the 
older population, in that for example younger pensioners have other consumption needs 
than older pensioners (e.g. the last group probably has more care related costs than the 
younger group). Also, no account is given to the future inflation, which has an influence on 
the consumption value of the fictitiouos annuity.86  
Lastly, as was the case with the personal income sources, the contribution from financial 
and property assets is only included when the respondent indicated ownership of these 
assets. In case ownership information was missing, the assets package generosity was also 
set to be missing.  
3. Taking account of financial solidarity within the household 
We expect a minimum degree of financial solidarity and the sharing of the disposable 
income between household members to exist. Living together with a partner (or with 
other household  members) leads to returns of scale, because some households costs, like 
heating, are independent of the number of household members. In addition, to a certain 
extent financial solidarity also is incorporated in the Belgian pension system. More 
advantageous calculation rates are used in the retirement pension calculation for 
pensioner couples than for singles, resulting in the granting of so-called family pensions 
(calculated at 75% of the previous wage) and singles pensions (calculated at 60% of the 
 
                                                             
85 Literature has shown that the elderly are generally not very willing to reduce their asset wealth. 
Only in the case of the decease of one’s partner or important declines in health and functional 
status, the tendency to consume property assets increases importantly (Venti & Wise, 1990, 2004; 
Walker, 2004). 
86 In the study of Capeau and Pacolet (2009), more attention is paid to the age-related consumption 
differences. 
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previous wage). Lastly, financial solidarity between partners is explicitly laid down by law 
for married couples. The Belgian Civil Code explicitly foresees that in a common marriage 
settlement the disposable income (e.g. pensions, social security benefits, rental incomes, 
etc.) is shared between married partners.87  
Equivalent incomes are calculated to take account this financial solidarity. Several 
equivalence scales have been developed (see Table 7.10), however, for our analyses, we 
use the modified OECD equivalence scale, which gives a value of 1 to the first adult in the 
household, and a value of 0.5 to all other adults in the household (Hagenaars, de Vos, & 
Zaidi, 1994; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009).  
No account is given to the possible cohabitation with (adult) children, because no 
sufficient information is included in the SHARE to determine the income of household 
members (apart from the respondent’s partner). This is the case for about 7% of the 
research population (126 respondents) that live together with a child or a child-in-law. 
Table 7.10. Overview of the most commonly used equivalence scales 
 Household income is divided by ... 
Oxford equivalence scale ... a factor that assigns a value of 1 to the first adult; 0.7 to 
the other adults and 0.5 to every child in the household  
OECD modified equivalence scale ... a factor that assigns a value of 1 to the first adult; 0.5 to 
the other adults and 0.3 to every child in the household 
Square root equivalence scale ... the square root of the number of household members  
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009) 
One should be aware of the effect of the equivalence scale on the research results: 
applying a different equivalence scale could yield different research results. According to 
Förster (1994), when a greater weight is given to each additional household member the 
share of singles and older married couples in the low-income population decreases. More 
attention will be paid to the influence of the equivalence scale on the research results in 
the sensitivity analysis (see Appendix 3).  
4. Overview of the generated variables  
To round up, we recapitulate on the different generated variables that will be used to 
assess the generosity of the old age income package. This should enhance the 
understanding of the research results in the next chapter. We differentiate income from 
personal income sources (also called the personal income package); the income from 
assets, with a difference between the direct income from assets and the simulated income 
 
                                                             
87 Art. 1405 of the Civil Code. For more information, see Berghman et al. (2009). 
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from assets; and the income from all income sources (also called the extended income 
package). In the extended income package we make a difference between the extended 
available income package and the extended simulated income package. An overview is 
provided in Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11. Overview of the generated income variables 
Personal income sources Income sources with personal entitlement like pensions, 
wages, social security benefits etc. 
Personal income package Cluster of personal income sources (see 2.1.2) 
Income from personal sources Income from different income sources with personal 
entitlement  
Asset sources Financial assets, home ownership and secondary residence  
Direct asset income Income from interests on financial assets, plus rental 
incomes from secondary residence 
Simulated asset income Reverse mortgaging from home ownership, plus fictitious 
annuity from financial assets, plus fictitious annuity from 
secondary residence 
Total available income Income from personal sources, plus the direct asset income  
Total simulated income Income from personal sources, plus the simulated asset 
income  
5. Assessing the quality of the old age income package 
To assess the quality of the old age income package, and to investigate whether the old age 
income package succeeds in providing sufficient protection against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency, we focus on the extent to which the old age income 
package protects the elderly population against poverty. In addition, we also focus on the 
contribution of the old age income package to enhancing income equality among the older 
population.  
For the selection of relevant indicators, we draw on the EU indicators developed to 
monitor the European Strategy for Social Protection and Inclusion, which are included in 
the Social Protection and Social Inclusion Portfolio (European Commission Directorate 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2009). 
5.1 Protecting against old age poverty 
In its overall definition, poverty is considered as a relative, destitute situation based on a 
comparison of the individual situation and the general standard of living of the society one 
lives in. In social research, the poverty risk is operationalised in monetary terms, with an 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold equal to 60% of the median equivalent household income for 
the entire population, not taking account of assets (European Commission, 2010a). 
However, because the SHARE data are only collected for the population aged 50 and over, 
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it is impossible to calculate this type of at-risk-of-poverty threshold using only SHARE 
data. Yet, also other strategies are available to estimate other poverty thresholds with the 
SHARE data. 
In the first strategy, we could introduce the EU-SILC poverty threshold in our analyses 
based on the SHARE data. The EU-SILC is considered to be a high standard and widely 
used instrument for the registration of comparable income data and (social) policy 
research in Europe. The EU-SILC poverty threshold is used in the bulk of poverty and 
social policy research. The EU-SILC poverty threshold reflects the “share of persons with 
an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national equivalent median income”. 
The national equivalised median income reflects the income situation of the entire 
population, because income data in the EU-SILC are not limited to the income of the 
elderly population as is the case with the SHARE. In 2007, the EU-SILC poverty threshold 
was 878 Euros per month for a single person. However, because of differences in the 
income concept of the SHARE and the EU-SILC, the EU-SILC poverty threshold cannot be 
transposed to analyses with data from the SHARE. This would inflict important differences 
in the research results. Consequently, we have chosen not to use this strategy 
A second strategy is inspired by Lyberaki and Tinios (2008). They calculate age-specific 
poverty thresholds with SHARE data and adjust them taking account of income 
information from the entire population. In doing so, we calculate EU-SILC correction 
factors88, which are the ratio between the median equivalent income of the elderly 
population and the median equivalent income of the entire population (Eurostat, 2012). 
The correction factors are used to estimate the median equivalent income of the entire 
population using the median equivalent net income of the elderly population in the SHARE 
and to calculate adjusted poverty rates (60% of the median adjusted equivalent net 
income) (see Lyberaki & Tinios, 2008). Because this strategy makes it possible to compare 
the income situation of the older population with that of the entire population, we will use 
this to determine the quality of the old age income package. In Table 7.12, we present the 
SHARE median equivalent net income from personal income sources before adjustment 
(A); the EU-SILC correction factor (B); the adjusted SHARE median equivalent net income 
(A/B); and the adjusted SHARE poverty threshold (60% of the adjusted SHARE median 
equivalent net income) (60% A/B). The equivalent adjusted SHARE poverty threshold 
thus is 793 Euros per month (weighted). 
  
 
                                                             
88 We chose the EU-SILC for the calculation of the correction factors, because it is considered to be a 
high standard and widely used instrument for the registration of comparable income data and 
(social) policy research in Europe. 
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Table 7.12. Calculating the EU-SILC adjusted SHARE at-risk-of-poverty threshold for 
Belgium 
(A) (B) (A/B) (60% A/B) 
SHARE median 
equivalent net income 
(weighted) 
EU-SILC 
correction 
factor 
Adjusted SHARE median 
equivalent net income 
(weighted) 
Adjusted SHARE 
poverty threshold 
(weighted) 
1067 0.8066 1322 793 
Note: EU SILC correction factor =
median income of population aged 60 and over (based on EU−SILC)
median income of overall population (based on EU−SILC)
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
A downside of using the adjusted SHARE poverty threshold is that it is limited to the 
personal old age income package. Because in the EU-SILC assets are not included in the 
income concept in the same way as in our research, the adjusted SHARE poverty threshold 
cannot be calculated for the extended old age income package.89  
A third strategy is to calculate age-specific poverty thresholds. These thresholds do not 
compare the income situation of the elderly population with that of the entire population; 
they only reflect the income situation of the elderly population. Consequently, it reduces 
the potential to use the research results for social policy goals. Yet, when we use age-
specific poverty thresholds we can calculate poverty thresholds before and after the 
inclusion of assets in the extended income package. In doing so, the poverty threshold 
takes account of the distribution of assets among the elderly population, which 
compensate the lack of a completely relative approach when we stick to the EU-SILC 
adjusted SHARE poverty threshold to evaluate the quality of the extended old age income 
package. We calculate three age-specific poverty thresholds based on the income from: 
 the personal old age income package (i.e. before assets); 
 the extended available old age income package (i.e. after assets: interests from 
financial assets, plus rental incomes from secondary residence); 
 the extended simulated old age income package (i.e. after assets: reverse 
mortgage on home ownership, plus fictitious annuities from financial assets and 
secondary residence). 
The poverty thresholds, calculated as 60% of the median net equivalent monthly income 
from the income sources listed above, are shown in Table 7.13. Note that the age-specific 
poverty threshold is about 20% lower than the EU-SILC adjusted SHARE poverty 
threshold presented in Table 7.13. 
 
                                                             
89 We however do use the adjusted SHARE poverty threshold to assess the quality of the extended 
old age income package. Yet, this is not a completely relative approach, in that is does not take 
account of the distribution of assets among the population. More details on this approach are 
provided in chapter 8. 
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Table 7.13. The age-specific poverty threshold before and after the inclusion of 
assets in the old age income package (weighted, 2007) 
 (A) 60% (A) 
 Median income  
(weighted) 
Age-specific SHARE poverty threshold 
 (weighted) 
Before assets 1066 640 
After assets   
  Available income 1167 701 
  Simulated income 2122 1273 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
In addition, we also calculate an asset poverty threshold to investigate whether the asset 
stock provides a sufficient buffer against unexpected financial shocks. Households with a 
small asset stock will be more vulnerable when confronted with sudden large 
expenditures than households with a large asset stock. Following Brandolini, Magri and 
Smeeding (2010) we consider the asset poverty threshold as having a financial asset stock 
equal to three months of the minimum household income needed to stay above the 
poverty threshold. Obviously, account has to be given to the household composition when 
assessing asset poverty. The equivalent asset stock must be above 2379 Euros90 to provide 
minimum protection in case the household is confronted with a short period of 
unexpected income deprivation. Note that only the financial asset stock is used to calculate 
the asset poverty threshold. Financial assets are available for direct consumption, while 
property ownership as such cannot be consumed immediately. 
5.2 Contributing to income equality 
The quality of the old age income package does not only reflect the extent to which it 
provides protection against old age poverty, but also the extent to which it contributes to 
an equal income distribution among the elderly population. As discussed in the second 
chapter, contributing to social equality and a vertical redistribution of resources is one of 
the main goals of public social protection.  
We will use the following indicators to investigate the (in)equality of the income 
distribution among the elderly population:  
 the income decile distribution,  
 the S80/S20 income ratio, and  
 the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve.  
For the income decile distribution, we range the research population based on their 
income (from low to high), and divide them in ten equal size groups (the deciles). Mean 
 
                                                             
90 I.e. three times the EU-SILC adjusted SHARE poverty threshold of 793 Euros. 
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and median incomes are calculated in each decile. The differences between the income 
deciles give a first view on the income distribution among the elderly population. This is 
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Little differences in the mean and the median of the deciles 
indicate a more equal income distribution (left graph), while large differences indicate a 
more unequal income distribution (right graph). 
Figure 7.1. Illustration of income decile distribution 
More equal income distribution More unequal income distribution 
  
The second indicator is the income quintile share. This is the ratio between the income of 
the top quintile of the population (i.e. the total income of the 20% of the population with 
the highest incomes) and the income of the bottom quintile of the population (i.e. the total 
income of the 20% of the population with the lowest incomes).  
S80
S20
=
Total equivalised income of 20% of population with highest incomes
Total equivalised income of 20% of population with lowest incomes
 
The income quintile share focuses on the extremes in the income distribution. A higher 
income quintile share indicates large differences between the upper and the bottom 
income quintile, and reflects a higher degree of inequality in the income distribution. A 
lower income quintile indicates smaller differences between the upper and the bottom 
income quintile, and reflects a smaller degree of income inequality. 
The third and fourth indicator are the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve. Both are 
commonly used indicators to calculate income inequality in the population. They give a 
more general view on the income distribution and focus less on the differences between 
the extreme income groups than the income quintile share. The Gini coefficient and the 
Lorenz curve take account of the share each individual in the population has in the overall 
income. The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative proportion of the population with lower to 
higher incomes on the X-axis, and their cumulative share in the overall income on the Y-
axis. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2. In a situation of perfect equality, each member of the 
population has an equal share of the total income, and the plotted line resembles the 45° 
diagonal (left graph). In a situation of perfect inequality, one member of the population 
has all income, while the rest has no income. In that case, the plotted line is a vertical line 
at the right side of the cumulative distribution (right graph). The Gini-coefficient refers to 
the surface of the area below the Lorenz curve. A Gini-coefficient equal to 0 refers to a 
situation of perfect inequality, while a Gini-coefficient of 1 refers to a situation of perfect 
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equality. The closer the Gini-coefficient is to 1, to more equal the income distribution will 
be. 
Figure 7.2. Illustration of the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient 
Perfect equal income distribution Perfect unequal income distribution 
  
The Gini-coefficient and the Lorenz curve are computed in SAS using the SAS code written 
by P. N. Cohen (University of Maryland, Department of Sociology), based on the 
computation of the Gini coefficient in Shryock, Siegel and Stockwell (1976).91 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the operationalisation of one of the main concepts of the research was 
presented: the old age income package. A difference was made between the personal 
income package, including only income sources with personal ownership, and the 
extended income package, including also asset sources that are shared within the 
household. The operationalisation of both the ownership and the level of the income 
package were presented. In the last section, we presented a number of indicators to assess 
the protection the old age income package provides against the negative consequences 
related to the financial dimension of old age dependency. 
 
In the next chapter we focus on the analyses of the old age income package. We investigate 
the composition and the generosity of the personal and the extended old age income 
package, as well as the level of protection the income package provides against the 
financial dimension of old age dependency. 
  
 
                                                             
91 The Gini SAS code is available on http://www.terpconnect.umd.edu/~pnc/gini.sas 
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CHAPTER 8  
THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 
UNRAFFLED92
 
                                                             
92 A part of this chapter is published as: Verpoorten, R. (2015). Including assets in comparative old 
age poverty research: How does it change the picture? In I. Salagean et al. (Reds.), The young and 
the elderly at risk: Individual outcomes and contemporary policy challenges in European societies. 
Intersentia. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE OLD AGE INCOME PACKAGE 
UNRAFFLED 
How is the income package of the elderly population composed? What level of protection 
is provided by the income package? And what determines its composition and generosity? 
In this chapter, we investigate the use of different income and asset sources by the older 
population, and their combination into old age income packages. The following research 
questions are addressed: 
RQ 1a. How is the old age income package composed?  
RQ 1b. How generous is the old age income package? 
RQ 1c. What is the relationship between the composition and the generosity of the old age 
income package? 
RQ 1d. What sociodemographic and socioeconomic background factors influence the 
composition and the generosity of the old age income package? 
RQ 3a. To what extent does the old age income package provide protection against the 
financial dimension of old age dependency? 
Differences and inequalities between the elderly population in the level and the 
composition of the old age income package are discussed. In addition, we assess the 
quality of the protection the old age income package provides against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency. To what extent does the old age income package 
manage to provide sufficient income levels in old age and how does it contribute to old age 
income inequality? In particular, we assess the potential of asset sources to improve the 
quality of the old age income package. Does taking account of assets in the extended 
income package reduce the overall at-risk-of-poverty rate, and how does it influence 
inequalities in the income distribution? Based on the research questions, we have 
formulated the following hypotheses: 
H1. Elderly with a higher degree of diversification in their income package are expected to 
enjoy higher levels of income protection than elderly with a low degree of income 
diversification. 
H2. Elderly with a more diverse and/or a more generous personal income package are 
expected to have more access to asset sources than elderly with a less generous personal 
income package. 
H3. The (potential) contribution from asset sources is expected to higher for elderly with a 
more diverse and/or a more generous personal income package than for elderly with a 
less diverse and/or less generous personal income package. 
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H4. (Single) Women, the oldest elderly and low-status elderly are expected to be in a more 
vulnerable position regarding the composition and the generosity of their income 
packages. 
H5. Elderly with a more diverse and/or a more generous old age income package are 
expected to enjoy a higher level of protection against the financial dimension of old age 
dependency. 
In the first section of this chapter, we introduce the broad research strategy and the 
conceptual scheme that includes all variables of interest. In the second section, the income 
package exclusively including income sources with personal entitlement is investigated 
(i.e. the personal income package). We investigate both the composition and the 
generosity of the income package, as well as the relationship between the composition and 
the generosity. We also address the quality of the old age income package in terms of 
providing protection against poverty and the equality of the income distribution. In the 
third section, the asset sources (i.e. home ownership, financial assets and secondary 
residence) that are shared at the household level are explored. We look at the direct 
contribution from assets, but we also simulate the potential asset contribution assuming a 
complete spending of the asset stock over the remaining life course. In section 4, personal 
income sources and asset sources are combined into the extended old age income package. 
We investigate the level of income protection derived from this package. We also compare 
the quality of the personal old age income package with that of the extended old age 
income package to assess the influence of including assets on the poverty risk and the 
equality of the income distribution. Throughout the sections we pay attention to a number 
of vulnerable groups, like women and the oldest elderly, to link the old age income 
package to the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the research 
population. 
1. Overall research strategy 
The first research question on the composition and the level of protection provided by the 
old age income package is based on a conceptual scheme which includes the level of 
education (as a proxy for socioeconomic status), sex, occupational status (as a proxy for 
labour market history), and living situation (with a partner or single) as the main 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables93. The composition and the 
level of protection provided by the old age income package are the main dependent 
variables. Also the relationship between the income package composition and the level of 
 
                                                             
93 The operationalisation of the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables is 
included in appendix 7. 
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income protection is investigated, as well as the quality of the old age income package (see 
Figure 8.1). 
Figure 8.1. The old age income package: Conceptual scheme 
 
 
To map the composition of the income package, both descriptive and explanatory 
statistical techniques are used. The distributions of the categorical variables and their 
mutual relationships are displayed in cross tables. These cross tables give some first 
insights into the distribution of the main variables, and allow us to explore the data and 
get some first insights in potentially interesting relationships. In the cross tables we 
evaluate whether the relationship between the variables are significant using the 
appropriate test statistics (Pearson Chi², Kruskal-Wallis Chi², etc.). Multivariate techniques 
are used to investigate whether the background variables in the model are decisive in 
explaining the composition and the level of protection provided by the old age income 
package. In addition, multivariate models allow us to assess the unique influence of the 
different independent variables on the main dependent variables. The choice of the 
appropriate multivariate techniques depends on the character of the dependent variables 
(i.e. categorical or metric dependent variables). This is discussed more in detail in the 
following sections. 
2. The old age income package of personal income sources 
In this section, we focus on the composition and the generosity of the old age income 
package. In this stage only income sources with personal entitlement, like pensions, wages 
and social security benefits, are included. No account is given to the sources that are 
shared within the household, like financial assets and property ownership.  
To start off, we describe the composition and generosity of the personal old age income 
package. Also the relationship between the composition and the generosity of the package 
is investigated. Secondly, bivariate statistics on the old age income package and the main 
Level of education 
 
Occupational status 
Sex 
Living with partner 
Composition Level 
Age 
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stratification determinants (e.g. sex, occupational status, level of education) are presented. 
Thirdly, we present two multivariate models to investigate whether the background 
determinants are significant in explaining the composition and the generosity of the old 
age income package. 
2.1 Description of the old age income package  
First, the composition of the personal old age income package is assessed. Table 8.1 shows 
the weighted distribution of the research population by the composition of the personal 
income package. About one third of the elderly population receives a only a first pillar 
pension (32%), and 28% combines a first pillar pension with a private third pillar pension. 
About 9% of the research population has a second pillar pension combined with a first 
pillar pension, while only 6% has an income from (self)employment (either or not in 
combination with other personal income sources). 11% of the elderly population does not 
have any personal income sources at his/her disposal, and 7% receives only a third pillar 
pension or has received this income source in the past (cf. supra: operationalisation of 
third pillar pension ownership). 
Table 8.1. Distribution of the research population by personal income package 
composition (weighted, 2007) 
 Personal income package N % 
P1 First pillar pension 542 32 
P2+P1 Second and first pillar pension 148 9 
P1+P3 First and third pillar pension 473 28 
SS+other 
Social security benefits, plus other 
sources 133 8 
Wage+other Wage, plus other sources 94 6 
Only P3 Only third pillar pension 109 7 
None None 176 11 
 Total 1676 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
The average equivalent net income from the personal old age income package is 1300 
Euros per month. Half of the research population has an income below 1067 Euros per 
month. In Figure 8.2, that shows the distribution of the research population by the 
monthly equivalent net income from the personal income package, we see that about 5% 
of the research population has a very low income (below 300 Euros per month), while 
about 3% has a very high income (above 3000 Euros per month). 
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Figure 8.2. Distribution of the research population by the monthly equivalent net 
income from the personal income package, in categories (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
When we look at the quality of the old age personal income package, we find that about 
21% of the research population has an equivalent monthly net income from personal 
income sources below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold of 793 Euros per month (the 
adjusted SHARE poverty threshold: cf. chapter 7). Concerning the (in)equality of the 
income distribution, the Gini coefficient is 0.3391 and the total equivalent net income from 
personal income sources of the top income quintile is about 5.0 times larger than that of 
the bottom quintile (income quintile share S80/S20=5.0787), indicating a warp in the 
income distribution favouring the highest incomes.  
Further, we investigate the relationship between the composition and the level of the 
personal old age income package to assess whether more diverse income packages 
generate higher levels of income protection. This is confirmed in Table 8.2. Elderly with 
only a first pillar pension (P1) receive on average 1145 Euros per month, while those 
combining a first and a third pillar pension (P1+P3) receive on average 1545 Euros. 
Elderly with a second and a first pillar pension (P2+P1), together with the group of elderly 
that still receives a wage from (self-)employment (wage+other) are the best of: on 
average, their personal income sources generate about 1700 Euros per month. Elderly 
without any personal income sources (none) are in the least favourable situation with an 
equivalent income of about 694 Euros per month. 
When we look at the median income levels, the same trends are found. The median income 
of elderly with only a first pillar pension is smaller than that of elderly combining their 
first pillar pension with a second or a third pillar pension (resp. 1048 Euros versus 1193 
and 1237 Euros). Elderly that receive a wage have the highest median income (1451 
Euros), while elderly without personal income sources have the lowest median income 
(733 Euros).  
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Table 8.2. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal 
income package by personal income package composition (weighted, 2007) 
 N Mean Median 
Personal income package    
P1 543 1145 1048 
P2+P1 146 1699 1193 
P1+P3 461 1545 1237 
SS+other 113 1436 1066 
Wage+other 81 1705 1451 
Only P3 107 946 833 
None 179 694 733 
Total 1630 1300 1067 
Note: The income differences between the income package compositions are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi²=253,8360; DF= 6; p<0,0001) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
When we look at the distribution of the personal income package composition in the 
overall income distribution, we can draw two conclusions (see Figure 8.3). First, the 
prevalence of elderly without personal income sources, as well as those with only a 
private, third pillar pension, decreases when moving up the income distribution. In the 
first income decile 34% of the research population has no personal income and 28% has a 
third pillar pension, while in the upper income decile this holds for resp. only 1% and 5% 
of the research population. Second, and in the opposite direction, the incidence of having a 
second pillar pension increases when moving up in the income decile distribution. In D1 
only 4% of the research population has an occupational (second pillar) pension, compared 
to 13% in D10. Similarly, only 4% of the research population in the lowest income decile 
combines a first pillar pension and a third pillar pension, while this is the case for 14% of 
the research population in the upper income quintile.   
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Figure 8.3. Personal income package composition by income decile distribution 
(weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, Table 8.3 shows the EU-SILC adjusted at-risk-of-poverty rate of the research 
population by the composition of the personal old age income package. The poverty risk is 
found to be largest for elderly without personal income sources and for elderly that only 
have a third pillar pension: Respectively 55% and 42% have an income below the poverty 
threshold of 793 Euros per month. To put it differently, almost one third of the older 
population at-risk-of-poverty does not have personal income sources. The poverty rate is 
lowest among the elderly receiving a second or a third pillar pension. About 10% of the 
research population that combines a second or a third pillar pension with a first pillar 
pension has an income below the EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold. In the largest group, 
those with only a first pillar pension, about 19% has an income below the EU-SILC 
adjusted at-risk-of-poverty threshold. 
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Table 8.3. EU-SILC adjusted at-risk-of-poverty rate of the research population by the 
personal income package composition (%, weighted, 2007) 
% 
Above poverty 
threshold 
Below poverty 
threshold Total (N) 
Personal income package    
P1 81 19 523 
P2+P1 90 10 146 
P1+P3 89 11 460 
SS+other 85 15 130 
Wage+other 78 22 89 
Only P3 58 42 109 
None 45 55 174 
Total 79 21 1631 
Note: The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is calculated as 60% of the EU-SILC adjusted median equivalent net monthly 
income from personal income sources. See chapter 7 for more details. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
2.2 The personal income package: tracing vulnerable groups 
Certain groups of elderly are considered as more vulnerable than others. This 
vulnerability is multidimensional, yet, given our research questions, we focus on income 
vulnerability (i.e. poverty risk). For example, single women, the oldest elderly, and elderly 
who have encountered problems during their labour market career are considered as 
more vulnerable: they often have a less favourable old age income package, enjoy lower 
levels of income protection and have a higher poverty risk. In this section, we trace these 
vulnerable groups and examine the income protection they enjoy from their personal old 
age income package. 
We first assess whether differences in the composition of the personal old age income 
package are related to certain sociodemographic and socioeconomic background 
characteristics of the research population. In particular, we focus on groups that can be 
considered as vulnerable with regard to their income package composition. Based on the 
relationship between the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the personal income package 
composition presented in the previous section, elderly with a low degree of diversity in 
their income package (i.e. having only a first pillar pension), or without meaningful 
personal income sources (i.e. having only a third pillar pension or no personal income 
sources) are considered as more vulnerable. Table 8.4 presents the relative distribution of 
the research population by the composition of the personal income package and by a 
selection of sociodemographic and socioeconomic stratification determinants (i.e. sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation). 
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Table 8.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the personal income 
package composition and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and 
living situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Personal income package 
% P1 P2+P1 P1+P3 SS+other 
Wage+ 
other Only P3 None 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Sex         
  Male 27 14 31 11 8 5 3 747 
  Female 37 4 26 5 3 8 16 929 
Age                 
  60-74 21 8 32 11 8 9 11 1079 
  75+ 52 10 21 3 2 3 10 597 
Occupational status               
  Salariat 22 16 39 7 8 4 4 561 
  Intermediate 35 8 27 9 7 6 8 389 
  Working class 41 4 25 11 4 8 7 475 
  None 35 3 11 2 2 11 37 186 
Education                 
  High 22 11 40 7 9 6 5 359 
  Intermediate 30 10 27 8 6 9 10 766 
  Low 43 5 22 9 3 4 14 536 
Living situation             
   Couple 25 10 29 7 6 9 14 1085 
  Single 46 7 26 10 5 2 3 592 
Total 32 9 28 8 6 7 11 1676 
Note: The bivariate relationship between the background determinants and the income package composition is significant 
at the 0,05 level for all background variables (based on the Pearson Chi² test statistic). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In Table 8.4 we see that higher proportions of older women, the oldest elderly (75 years 
and over), elderly with a low occupational status (i.e. working class or without 
employment), elderly with a low level of education and single living elderly have only a 
first pillar pension. The lower degree of diversity in the income packages of these groups 
exposes them to a potentially more vulnerable situation. Higher proportions of older men, 
elderly between 60 and 74 years, elderly with a higher occupational status, resp. level of 
education, and elderly living with a partner have a more diverse personal old age income 
package. These groups thus are considered as being less vulnerable. For example, elderly 
that combine a first and a second pillar pension overall are younger (between 60 and 74 
years) men with a relatively high socioeconomic status (i.e. a high occupational status 
and/or a high level of education). Similarly, the elderly that combine a first and a third 
pillar pension overall are younger elderly (60-74 years) with a high socioeconomic status.  
In addition, higher proportions of older women, elderly without previous employment, 
elderly with a low level of education, and elderly living with a partner are found to have no 
meaningful personal income sources. For example, 16% of the women has no personal 
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income sources, compared to 3% of the male research population.94 Similarly, 37% of the 
elderly without previous employment have no personal income sources compared to 4%- 
8% of elderly with previous employment. Overall, the group of elderly without personal 
income sources refers to women with a lower socioeconomic status, who live together 
with a partner. Similarly, elderly that only have a third pillar pension most often are 
women between 60 and 74 years that live together with a partner. 
One should note that the higher proportions of older women and elderly with a partner 
without meaningful income sources not necessarily result in a more vulnerable position. A 
part of this group is expected to live together with a partner that has personal income 
sources. Because of the sharing of income sources within the couple, an important 
proportion of the older women and cohabitating elderly without personal income sources 
are expected to enjoy the personal income sources of their partner.95 
Also the level of the personal income package has an important role in protecting the older 
population against poverty and inequality. Table 8.5 presents the mean and median 
monthly equivalent income from the personal old age income package, and the related at-
risk-of-poverty rate (EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold=793 Euros). This again confirms 
the more vulnerable position of older women, the oldest elderly, elderly with a low 
occupational status and elderly with a low level of education.  
  
 
                                                             
94 Or, to put it differently, 86% of those without personal income sources are women. 
95 To illustrate, almost 90% of all older women without meaningful personal income sources live 
together with a partner. Similarly, 87% of all cohabitating elderly without personal income sources 
are women living with a partner. 
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Table 8.5. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal 
income package and EU-SILC adjusted at-risk-of-poverty rate, by sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
  Income  % below 
 
N Mean Median p poverty threshold 
Sex      
  Male 675 1393 1100 0.0184 20 
  Female 955 1225 1045  23 
Age          
  60-74 1011 1405 1100 <0.0001 20 
  75+ 619 1106 1022  23 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 525 1635 1313 <0.0001 14 
  Intermediate 383 1259 1004  28 
  Working class 465 1070 1000  19 
  None 190 978 937  36 
Education          
  High 337 1771 1428 <0.0001 12 
  Intermediate 744 1249 1061  22 
  Low 533 1057 967  27 
Living situation          
  Couple 1040 1379 1083 0.0059 22 
  Single 590 1156 1034  20 
Total 1631 1300 1067  21 
Note: The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is calculated as 60% of the EU-SILC adjusted median equivalent net monthly income 
from personal income sources. See chapter 7 for more details. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
2.3 A multinomial logit model explaining the income package composition 
We estimate a multinomial logit model to predict the income package composition 
(categorical variable) from the sociodemographic and socioeconomic stratification 
determinants. We investigate which background characteristics are significant in 
explaining the composition of the personal old age income package. We first explain the 
model construction, and second the results of the multinomial logit model. 
2.3.1 Construction of the model 
The dependent variable in the multinomial logit model is the personal income package 
composition, a categorical variable with seven categories (cf. supra). The reference 
category of the dependent variable in the model is “P1” (only a first pillar pension). Six 
independent variables are included in the model. These variables refer to the 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the respondents, and are all 
categorical variables (reference category between brackets): sex (female), age (75+), 
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occupational status (no occupation), level of education (low), living situation (single), and 
region of residence (Brussels Capital Region). 
Initially, we wanted to include two interaction effects: an interaction between education 
and occupational status, and one between sex and occupational status. However, the 
inclusion of these interaction effects led to a quasi-complete separation of data points (i.e. 
certain combinations of the variable categories resulted in very low frequencies or even 
zero observations), thus violating the logistic regression assumptions and leading to 
extremely high or low odds ratios, a surge in the standard errors and incorrect 
significance tests. Consequently, the interaction effects were not included in the model.  
Further, 85 observations with missing values on one of the variables were removed from 
the model, leaving a sample of 1598 observations.96 The assumptions of the logit model 
(i.e. linearity, multicollinearity and extreme values) were not violated. In SAS, PROC 
LOGISTIC with the GLOGIT link function (generalised logit) was used to estimate the 
model. 
The overall multinomial logit model is significant (p<0.0001). At the global level all the 
independent variables are statistically significant (Table 8.6). According to the Nagelkerke 
R² the logit model explains about 38% of the variance in the dependent variable (max-
rescaled R²=0.3857). The odds ratios (OR)97 and the p-values, indicating the significance of 
the effects, of the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 8.7. 
  
 
                                                             
96 In appendix 8 we compare the deleted observations with the observations that were kept into the 
model to investigate the potential influence of deleting observations with missing information. 
97 The OR is the ratio between two odds (A/B), indicating the probability that an event will occur 
versus the probability that the event will not occur. The OR is always interpreted in comparison 
with the reference category. For example, the ORmale,P2+P1 is the ratio of the odds that a man has 
P2+P1 versus P1 (man with P2+P1/man with P1) and the odds that a woman has P2+P1 (woman 
with P2+P1/women with P1). When OR is larger than 1, the probability of odds A is larger than the 
probability of odds B; when OR is smaller than 1, the probability of odds A is smaller than the 
probability of odds B; and when OR is 1, the probability of odds A is equal to that of odds B. 
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Table 8.6. Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the personal 
income package as dependent variable (weighted, 2007) 
  
Wald Chi² 
Significance  
p 
N  1598 
   
Global model significance  <0.0001 
   
Independent variables   
  Sex 99.7048 <0.0001 
  Age 124.9969 <0.0001 
  Occupational status 120.883 <0.0001 
  Level of education 35.2915 <0.0001 
  Living situation 99.3008 <.0001 
  Region of residence 26.013 0.0107 
   
Nagelkerke R²  0.3857 
2.3.2 Interpretation of the model results 
Based on the results of the multinomial logit model (Table 8.7), the following conclusions 
on the factors predicting the composition of the personal old age income package are 
drawn.  
First, sex, age, occupational status, and level of education significantly predict whether one 
combines a second and first pillar pension (P2+P1) or receives only a first pillar pension 
(reference category).  Overall, the odds of receiving a second and a first pillar pension 
(versus only a first pillar pension) are larger for men, respondents between 60 and 74 
years, elderly with a high occupational status (i.e. salariat) and elderly with an 
intermediate level of education (OR > 1). Women, elderly aged 75 years and over, elderly 
that never were in employment and elderly with a low level of education have lower odds 
on combining a second and first pillar pension (versus receiving only a first pillar 
pension). This confirms the more vulnerable situation of older women and the oldest 
elderly.  
Second, for the combination of a first and third pillar pension, age, occupational status, 
level of education and living situation are significant. The odds of combining a first and a 
third pillar pension (versus only a first pillar pension) are larger for elderly between 60 
and 74 years, elderly belonging to the salariat class, elderly with a high level of education, 
and elderly living with a partner (OR > 1). Sex, however, is not significant in predicting the 
combination of a first and a third pillar pension. 
Thirdly, the receipt of social security benefits (versus a first pillar pension) is significantly 
predicted by sex, age, and living situation. The odds on receiving social security benefits 
are larger for men and elderly between 60 and 74 years, compared to women and elderly 
of 75 years and over. For living situation, however, the odds of receiving social security 
benefits are smaller for those living with a partner than for singles (OR < 1).  
 Table 8.7. Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the personal income package as dependent variable (weighted, 
2007) 
 P2+P1 P1+P3 SS+other Wage+other Only P3 None 
 OR P OR p OR P OR p OR p OR p 
Sex (reference: female) 
  Male 3.3105 <0.0001 1.2278 0.1707 3.2062 <0.0001 2.8945 <0.0001 0.6099 0.0526 0.2946 <0.0001 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74 1.7071 0.0114 2.9949 <0.0001 8.5156 <0.0001 6.8387 <0.0001 5.0480 <0.0001 2.6677 <0.0001 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
 Salariat 2.7093 0.0506 2.4446 0.0036 1.8040 0.3488 1.6959 0.4306 0.2907 0.0031 0.1586 <0.0001 
 Intermediate 1.1951 0.7255 1.5790 0.1254 1.9709 0.2661 1.6590 0.4416 0.3953 0.0154 0.2325 <0.0001 
 Working    
   Class 
0.5899 0.3165 1.3897 0.2584 2.2651 0.1699 1.0819 0.9060 0.5243 0.0714 0.1479 <0.0001 
Level of education (reference: low) 
 High 1.8076 0.0896 2.1376 0.0013 1.3067 0.4630 4.2313 0.0006 3.5530 0.0024 0.9957 0.9909 
 Intermediate 1.7484 0.0397 1.2985 0.1211 1.0462 0.8554 2.3124 0.0133 2.5442 0.0011 0.7917 0.3106 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple 1.0983 0.6845 1.3653 0.0400 0.5954 0.0212 0.8713 0.6026 7.1086 <0.0001 8.6564 <0.0001 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders 0.8032 0.6407 2.1029 0.0884 1.2433 0.7251 4.2969 0.1735 2.4252 0.4216 0.5035 0.2044 
  Wallonia 0.3942 0.0563 2.1359 0.0829 1.1144 0.8628 2.3533 0.4284 2.2574 0.4620 0.4303 0.1256 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having only a first pillar pension (P1).  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
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Fourth, the receipt of a wage seems to be inhibited by sex, age, and level of education. As 
expected, the odds on receiving a wage (versus only a first pillar pension) are larger for 
men, respondents between 60 and 74 years, and elderly with an intermediate or a high 
level of education (OR > 1).  
Fifth, all background variables, expect region of residence, are significant in predicting the 
receipt of only a third pillar pension. The odds of receiving only a third pillar pension 
compared to receiving only a first pillar pension are larger for elderly between 60 and 74 
years, for elderly with an intermediate or high level of education, and for elderly living 
with a partner (OR > 1). Yet, the odds of receiving only a third pillar pension (versus a first 
pillar pension) are smaller for men than for women (OR < 1). Similarly, the odds of 
receiving a third pillar pension (versus a first pillar pension) are smaller for elderly with 
previous employment than for elderly without an employment history (OR < 1). 
Lastly, the odds of having no personal income sources compared to having a first pillar 
pension are smaller for men than for women (OR < 1). This confirms our hypothesis that 
women more often have no personal income sources than men. Also the odds of having no 
personal income sources are larger for elderly living with a partner (OR > 1), which again 
confirms our previous findings. Overall, this refers to married women that have never 
worked, and thus are not entitled to any personal income sources. Having worked is a 
negatively associated with having no personal income sources: respondents with an 
occupational history (irrespective of status) have smaller odds on having no personal 
income sources in comparison with respondents without previous employment (OR < 1). 
Finally, elderly between 60 and 74 years have higher odds on receiving no personal 
income sources.  
Note that this logistic regression model testing the composition of the personal old age 
income package confirms the vulnerable status of some older groups. The odds of having a 
more diverse income package (i.e. combining a second and/or third pillar pension with 
other income sources) versus having a single source income package (only first pillar 
pension) are overall lower for older women and the oldest elderly. On the other hand, the 
odds of having no meaningful income sources (i.e. only third pillar pension or no personal 
income sources) are larger for women than for men. Lastly, region of residence is not 
significant in explaining differences in the composition of the personal old age income 
package. This is explained by the fact that income matters (e.g. pensions, social security 
benefits) are regulated on the federal policy level, and thus account for the older 
population in all Belgian regions. 
2.4 A multivariate regression model explaining the generosity of the 
personal income package 
To explain the level of income the personal old age income package generates (numerical 
variable), a multivariate regression model was estimated. Sociodemographic and 
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socioeconomic background variables, as well as the composition of the old age income 
package, were included in the model as explanatory variables. We first explain the 
construction of the model, and afterwards discuss the model results. 
2.4.1 Construction of the model 
The equivalent individual monthly income for personal income sources is the dependent 
variable in the model. Seven categorical variables are included in the model as explanatory 
variables. These have been transposed to dummy variables via a reference coding (see 
Table 8.8). 
Table 8.8. Independent variables in the multivariate regression model and their 
reference category 
Variable name Reference category 
Personal income package composition Only first pillar pension (P1) 
Sex Female 
Occupational status No occupation 
Level of education Low 
Living situation Single 
Region of residence Brussels Capital Region 
Based on theoretical assumptions, we have included three interaction effects in the model: 
an interaction of the level of education and the occupational status, an interaction of sex 
and occupational status, and an interaction of sex and living situation. 
An exploratory linear regression showed a distorting influence of outliers and leverage 
points (so-called influential values) in the dependent variable and – to a limited extent – 
problems with the assumed normal distribution of the residuals of the independent 
variables.98 More specifically, the distribution of the residuals was right skewed (a heavy 
tail to the right), and their variance increased with values of the dependent and 
independent variables. To limit the influence of outliers and leverage points, it was 
decided to do a robust regression analysis using PROC ROBUSTREG in SAS. Different Box-
Cox transformations of the dependant (i.e. the square root and the log) were applied to 
overcome the violation of the normality assumption, yet none of them did actually 
 
                                                             
98 Besides normality and the presence of outliers and leverage points, the Gauss Markov 
assumptions of regression analysis include the assumption of homoscedasticity (i.e. constant 
variance in the residuals), linearity (i.e. a linear relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables), and multicollinearity (i.e. the existence of correlations between the 
independent variables in the model). It should be noted that the assumption of linearity does not 
hold for the categorical variables in the model. For more details on the Gauss Markov assumptions 
of linear regression analysis, consult Welkenhuysen-Gybels & Loosveldt (2002). 
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improve the model. 52 Respondents were deleted because of missing, leaving us with a 
sample of 1640 observations.99 
The regression analysis was executed in three stages. First, a model with only the 
dependent variable (level of the equivalent net monthly income from personal income 
sources) and the most important independent variable (i.e. composition of the income 
package) was tested. Second, the stratification determinants (i.e. sex, age, occupational 
status, level of education, living situation, and region) were introduced in the model. Third, 
the three interaction effects were introduced. For theoretical reasons, variables were not 
deleted from the model when they were not significant.  
Ideally, regression coefficients should be standardised before running the model. 
According to Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Loosveldt (2002), standardisation facilitates the 
comparison of parameter estimates between the categories in the model. Yet, when using 
the PROC ROBUSTREG in SAS, standardised regression coefficients cannot be calculated. 
This explains why unstandardised regression parameters  are presented in the next 
table. 
Overall, all three models are significant at an alpha-level of 0.001. The explained variance 
is quite low, ranging from 10% in the first model to 19% in the third model (see R² in 
Table 8.9). About one fifth of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by all 
variables in the complete model. The unstandardised parameter estimates and p-values, 
indicating the significance of the effects, are presented in Table 8.9.  
  
 
                                                             
99 In appendix 8 we compare the deleted observations with the observations that were kept into the 
model to investigate the potential influence of deleting observations with missing information. 
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Table 8.9. Results of the multivariate robust regression model with equivalent net 
monthly income from the personal income package (in Euro) as the dependent 
variable (weighted, 2007) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B p b p b p 
Intercept 1079 <0.0001 889 <0.0001 890 <0.0001 
Income source (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 152 0.0007 74 0.0998 83 0.0584 
  P1+P3 164 <0.0001 80 0.0088 75 0.0120 
  SS+other 21 0.6605 26 0.5722 2 0.9654 
  Wage+other 298 0.0002 246 0.0026 191 0.0091 
  Only P3 -311 <0.0001 -424 <0.0001 -461 <0.0001 
  None -421 <0.0001 -530 <0.0001 -597 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female) 
  Male     -144 <0.0001 620 0.0077 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74     5 0.8497 0 0.9929 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat   107 0.0243 -12 0.8947 
  Intermediate   -79 0.0731 -80 0.2586 
  Working class   -8 0.8558 -76 0.2043 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High   252 <0.0001 156 0.2297 
  Intermediate   74 0.0081 -14 0.8329 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple   203 <0.0001 342 <0.0001 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders   71 0.2952 60 0.3653 
  Wallonia   119 0.0841 110 0.1038 
Interaction effect of sex and occupational status 
  Male*Salariat     -583 0.0134 
  Male*Intermediate     -580 0.0142 
  Male*Working class     -519 0.0278 
Interaction effect of level of education and occupational status 
  High*Salariat     232 0.1178 
  High*Intermediate     -101 0.4984 
  High*Working class     -35 0.8516 
  Mid*Salariat     167 0.0929 
  Mid*Intermediate     76 0.3705 
  Mid*Working class     97 0.2189 
Interaction effect of sex and living situation 
  Male*Couple 
 
    -329 <0.0001 
R² 0.1011  0.1722   0.1933   
Change R²   0.0711   0.0211   
AIC 1993  2018   2049   
BIC 2031  2108   2193   
Note: The dependent variable is the equivalent net monthly income from personal income sources. The interaction effects 
should always be interpreted in relationship with the main effects of the variables in the interaction. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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2.4.2 Interpretation of the model results 
Most importantly, the multivariate regression model indicates that the composition of the 
income package is statistically significant in explaining the equivalent net monthly income 
from personal income sources. Overall, elderly with a more diverse income package have a 
higher equivalent net monthly income from this income package than elderly with a less 
diverse income package, even when controlling for background differences in sex, 
occupational status, level of education, living situation and region of residence (and 
interactions between these variables).  
The effect of the income package composition on the income level is significant for all 
categories of the income package, except for the combination of social security benefits 
with other income sources (SS+other). In the third model, which includes the 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables and the interaction effect, 
elderly combining a second or third pillar pension with a first pillar pension are predicted 
to have resp. 83 and 75 Euros more than elderly with only a first pillar pension. In the 
same model, elderly without personal income sources are predicted to have an income 
that is 597 Euros lower than that of elderly with only a first pillar pension. This confirms 
our hypothesis that a more diverse old age income package generates a higher level of 
protection against the financial dimension of old age dependency. 
In the third model, only living situation and the interaction effect of sex and living 
situation are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The equivalent net income from 
personal income sources is significantly higher for women living with partner and for men 
(irrespective of living situation) than for single women, when controlling for other 
background differences. Again note that no significant influence of the region of residence 
is found. 
Also note that the inclusion of the interaction effects in the third model does not improve 
the goodness-of-fit of the model. The R² increases with 0.0211 between the second and the 
third model, but the other goodness-of-fit indicators (AIC and BIC) increase, which implies 
a reduction in the explanatory power of the model.  
3. Additional protection from the asset package 
A next step in the analysis of the old age income package involves the inclusion of property 
and financial assets. Different strategies are at hand to include assets in the old age income 
package. We can assess the direct contribution from assets via the rental incomes from 
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secondary residence and the interests from financial assets; we can simulate the potential 
contribution from assets; and we can assess the prevalence of assets poverty.100  
In the first section, we describe the asset package in terms of ownership and contribution 
to the personal income package. In section 3.2, the financial contribution from financial 
assets and property ownership is investigated. We make a difference between the direct 
contribution from assets, the potential (simulated) contribution from assets, and the 
prevalence of asset poverty. In the third section, we examine whether a relationship exists 
between the personal old age income package and assets, both in terms of ownership and 
level of income protection. In section 3.4 we investigate which determinants are 
statistically significant in explaining asset ownership. We present the results from two 
binary logit models to explain financial asset ownership on the one hand, and property 
ownership on the other hand. In the last section we investigate the determinants that are 
decisive in explaining the contribution from asset. 
3.1 Description of the asset package 
The description of the asset package is threefold. First, we focus on asset ownership: to 
what extent has the research population access to financial and property assets. Second, 
the contribution from assets to the personal income package is investigated. A difference 
is made between the direct contribution via interest from financial assets and rental 
incomes from secondary residence, and the indirect contribution via a simulation of 
fictitious annuities and reverse mortgages. Third, we assess the quality of the asset 
package in terms of asset poverty. To what extent is the asset stock sufficient to buffer 
periods of financial deprivation? 
3.1.1 Financial asset and property ownership 
In this first section, we investigate asset ownership, which includes financial assets (bank 
accounts and other financial products) on the one hand, and property ownership (home 
ownership and secondary residence) on the other hand. Table 8.10 shows the weighted 
distribution of the research population by (combinations of) asset ownership. 
  
 
                                                             
100 Details on the simulation of the contribution from financial assets and property ownership, and 
on the calculation of asset poverty are provided in chapter 7. 
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Table 8.10. Distribution of the research population by asset ownership (weighted, 
2007) 
 
N % 
Asset ownership    
No assets 24 2 
Only financial assets 297 19 
Financial assets + property ownership 1249 78 
  + home  974 78 
  + home + 2nd residence 255 20 
  + 2nd residence 20 2 
Only property assets 26 2 
Total 1596 100 
N missing 35  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Asset ownership is common good among the Belgian elderly population. Only 2% of the 
research population does not have any asset sources at his/her disposal.101 The majority of 
the research population combines financial assets with property ownership (78%). 
Overall, these are elderly that have financial assets and own a house for living (98%). 
About 20% of the elderly combining financial assets and property ownership, have both a 
house for living and a secondary residence. 19% of the research population only has 
financial assets, while 2% has no access to assets at all. Another 2% of the research 
population only disposes of property ownership and has no financial assets. 
3.1.2 The contribution from financial assets and property 
We first investigate the direction contribution from financial assets and property 
ownership. To recall, this includes the interests from financial assets and the rental 
incomes from renting out secondary residence. Table 8.11 shows the mean and median 
equivalent monthly direct contribution from financial assets and property ownership.  
On average, financial assets and property ownership contributes 165 Euros per month to 
the old age income package. However, 50% of the research population receive 28 Euros or 
 
                                                             
101 When we compare this to the neighbouring countries of Belgium, we find that asset ownership – 
and particularly home ownership – is significantly more important in Belgium than in France, the 
Netherlands and Germany. For example, in Germany about 5% of the elderly population does not 
have any asset sources at his/her disposal (compared to about 2% in Belgium). In the Netherlands, 
45% of the elderly population only has financial assets, compared to 19% of the Belgian elderly 
population. Lastly, in France about 50% of the elderly population combines financial assets with 
home ownership, compared to 61% of the Belgian elderly population. More details on assets from a 
comparative point of view are provided in Verpoorten (2014). The relatively good position of 
Belgium concerning financial assets, in comparison with other European countries, also is 
confirmed in the study of Capeau and Pacolet (2009). 
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less per month from their asset sources. This discrepancy between the mean and the 
median direct contribution from assets stems from the contribution from secondary 
residence. The direct contribution from secondary residence is quite high, but only a few 
elderly have access to this type of revenues. To illustrate, the mean equivalent monthly 
direct contribution from assets for elderly that combine financial assets with home 
ownership and secondary property ownership is 449 Euros, compared to 116 Euros for 
elderly with financial assets and home ownership.  
Table 8.11. Mean and median equivalent monthly direct contribution from financial 
assets and property ownership by asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 
 N Mean Median 
Asset ownership     
No assets 24 0 0 
Only financial assets 297 63 10 
Financial assets + home  974 116 24 
Financial assets + home + 2nd residence 255 449 264 
Financial assets + 2nd residence 20 345 134 
Only property ownership 26 0 0 
Total 1596 165 28 
Note: The income differences between the asset package compositions are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi²=238.9326; DF=3: p<0.0001). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Table 8.11 also gives a first indication of the relationship between the asset contribution 
and asset ownership. The direction contribution from assets is higher for elderly that 
combine different asset sources, while the contribution is lower for elderly with a lower 
degree of diversity in their asset package. 
Secondly, we investigate the indirect, potential contribution from financial assets and 
property ownership to the old age income package. For this we draw on the simulation of 
the asset income, which includes a fictitious annuity from financial assets, a fictitious 
annuity from secondary residence, and a reverse mortgage from home ownership. Details 
on the simulation of the potential contribution from financial assets and property 
ownership are provided in chapter 7. The mean and median simulated equivalent monthly 
contribution from financial assets and property ownership are shown in Table 8.12.  
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Table 8.12. Mean and median simulated equivalent monthly contribution from 
financial assets and property ownership by asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 
 N Mean Median 
Asset ownership    
No assets 24 0 0 
Only financial assets 297 303 55 
Financial assets + home  974 1358 939 
Financial assets + home + 2nd residence 255 3064 2240 
Financial assets + 2nd residence 20 2223 1211 
Only property ownership 26 1077 726 
Total 1596 1442 926 
Note: The income differences between the asset package compositions are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis 
Chi²=679.9325; DF= 4; p<0.0001). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
On average, the indirect simulated equivalent monthly contribution from assets is about 
1400 Euros per month. However, for 50% of the research population the potential 
simulated equivalent monthly contribution from assets is lower than 916 Euros per 
month. The difference between the mean and the median simulated contribution from 
assets indicates a skewness in the distribution of these assets (cf. infra). 
As expected, the potential contribution from assets increases when different asset sources 
are combined. For example, the mean potential contribution from assets is 303 Euros per 
month for elderly that only have financial assets, compared to 1358 Euros for elderly 
combining financial assets and home ownership. Elderly that combine financial assets 
with home ownership and secondary residence ownership are the best off: the potential 
contribution from their asset package is about 3000 Euros per month. 
Table 8.12 also indicates that the potential contribution from property ownership is larger 
than that from financial assets. When we consider this more in detail, we find that the 
average potential contribution from property ownership is about 1200 Euros per month, 
while the average potential contribution from financial assets is about 450 Euros per 
month. This stems from the larger monetary value of property ownership in comparison 
with financial assets. For property owners, property assets on average account for 78% of 
the total simulated equivalent income from the asset package. 
3.1.3 Quality of the asset package 
In the last section, we investigate the quality of the asset package. This was 
operationalised in chapter 7 as the potential of the financial asset stock to overcome short 
periods of financial deprivation. The asset poverty threshold is set at three times the at-
risk-of-poverty threshold. Thus, the assets poverty threshold reflects the financial asset 
stock that is needed to stay above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a period of three 
months, or to put it differently, to overcome a three-month period of financial deprivation. 
Consequently, the equivalent asset poverty threshold is set at 2379 Euros. Note that only 
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the financial asset stock is taken into account, because while financial assets are available 
for direct consumption, this is not the case for property ownership. About 23% of the 
research population has an asset stock smaller than 2379 Euros, and thus cannot 
sufficiently protect themselves against short periods of income deprivation. 
3.2 The asset package along the lines of the personal income package 
More important than assessing the contribution from financial assets and property 
ownership, is investigating the contribution of assets along the lines of the personal 
income package. In the following paragraphs, we focus on the relationship between the 
personal old age income package and the asset package, both in terms of ownership (3.2.1) 
and level of protection (3.2.2 and 3.2.3). 
3.2.1 Asset ownership versus the personal income package 
First, we investigate whether differences in asset ownership are associated with 
differences in the personal income package. We expect that more diverse personal income 
packages are related to more diverse asset packages. Table 8.13 shows the distribution of 
the research population by the composition of their personal income package and their 
asset ownership. Little differences in the financial asset ownership are found between the 
personal income clusters. For all personal income packages, more than 90% of the 
research population has financial assets.  
Yet, important differences between the personal income packages appear when property 
ownership is included. A little more than a quarter of the elderly with only a first pillar 
pension, resp. elderly with social security benefits, do not have property ownership (resp. 
26% and 27%), whereas for the other personal income packages this is between 10% and 
15%. Property ownership ranges between 68% and 90% of the elderly population. When 
the combination of financial assets and property ownership is considered, we see that 
almost 70% of the elderly with only a first pillar pension, resp. with social security 
benefits, combines financial assets with some type of property ownership, compared to 
more than 80% of the research population with other personal income package 
configurations. In addition, it is striking that 24% of the elderly with a first and second 
pillar pension combines financial assets with home ownership and secondary residence 
ownership. And even more remarkable is that the same is found for elderly with only a 
third pillar pension, which we assume to be older women enjoying the profits of living 
together with an affluent partner.  
However, by and large, Table 8.13 confirms that more diverse personal income packages 
are related to more diverse asset packages. 
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Table 8.13. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income 
package and asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 
 
Personal income package (%) 
P1 P2+P1 P1+
P3 
SS+ 
other 
Wage+
other 
Only 
P3 
None 
Asset ownership        
No assets 2 0 0 5 4 0 2 
Only financial assets 26 13 15 27 15 10 13 
Financial assets + home  61 60 64 50 53 63 67 
Financial assets + home + 2nd  
    residence 
8 24 19 15 24 27 16 
Financial assets + 2nd    
    residence 
1 2 1 2 4 0 1 
Only property assets 3 1 1 2 0 1 1 
Total (N=100%) 510 145 450 128 87 107 169 
Note: The relationship between the personal income package composition and the asset package composition is 
statistically significant (Pearson Chi²= 124.9842; DF=30; p<0.0001). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Second, we assess the distribution of asset ownership along the income distribution based 
on the equivalent income from personal income sources. We expect that the diversity in 
asset ownership increases with the level of the personal income package. Table 8.14 
shows the asset ownership along the income distribution from personal income sources.  
Table 8.14. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income 
decile and asset ownership (weighted, 2007) 
 
Personal income decile (%) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 
Asset package           
No assets 4 1 2 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 
Only financial assets 18 15 21 23 21 23 22 17 14 10 
Financial assets + home  50 63 64 63 65 63 60 63 67 53 
Financial assets + home +   
    2nd residence 27 18 7 12 12 7 13 16 17 31 
Financial assets +  
    2nd residence 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 2 1 4 
Only property ownership 1 3 4 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 
Total (N) 162 156 159 215 115 145 160 161 173 149 
Note: In addition, we investigated the relationship between the generosity of the personal income package and the asset 
package composition. We found that the more diverse asset packages are significantly related to the more generous 
personal income packages (Kruskal-Wallis Chi²=16.7628; DF=5; p=0.0056). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Again, little differences are found between the income deciles regarding financial asset 
ownership. In all deciles, more than 94% of the research population has financial assets. 
The situation is different when property ownership is considered (see Figure 8.4). A 
higher income from personal income sources is associated with a higher degree of 
property ownership. In the lowest personal income decile 78% of the research population 
has property ownership, while in the upper personal income decile this holds for 89% of 
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the research population. The overall trend, illustrated with the black line in Figure 8.4, 
shows a small, yet steady increase in the proportion of property ownership when moving 
up the personal income distribution. 
Figure 8.4. Relative distribution of the research population by personal income 
decile and property ownership (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3.2.2 The contribution from assets versus the personal income package 
Third, the contribution from assets is assessed along the lines of the personal old age 
income package. We expect that more generous personal old age income packages go 
together with more generous asset packages, because elderly with a higher personal 
income have more savings potential, and are thus expected to have a larger asset stock. 
More generous asset packages are thus expected to be found at the upper end of the 
personal income distribution.  
Figure 8.5 shows the mean (dark grey bars) and median (pale grey lines) equivalent 
monthly direct contribution from assets along the personal income distribution. The 
general trend confirms our expectations: The direct contribution from assets increases 
when moving up the personal income distribution. Yet, there are important fluctuations 
between the income deciles, specifically when the mean direct contribution from assets is 
considered. The results are more stable when the median direct contribution from assets 
is investigated. This reveals that the differences between the first nine income deciles are 
relatively small, while the difference between D9 and D10 is quite large: the median direct 
monthly contribution from assets more than doubles from 43 Euros in D9 to 89 Euros in 
D10. 
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Figure 8.5. Mean and median equivalent monthly direct contribution from assets by 
personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
In addition, we calculated the correlation between the direct contribution from assets and 
the level of the personal income package.102 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 
significant (p=0.0469), but the correlation is very weak, almost absent (r=0.05). 
Further, Figure 8.6 shows the mean (dark grey bars) and median (pale grey lines) 
equivalent monthly simulated contribution from assets along the personal income 
distribution. This simulated contribution includes the fictitious annuities from financial 
assets and secondary residence, and the reverse mortgage on home ownership. The 
general trend for both the mean and the median is an increase in the simulated 
contribution from assets when moving up the personal income distribution. Yet, the 
fluctuations cannot be neglected. The mean and median simulated contribution from 
assets in the lowest income decile is only a little bit lower than the mean and median 
simulated asset contribution in the highest income decile. It is however unclear how this 
can be explained.103 
 
                                                             
102 The correlation is assumed to be linear. The Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated using 
PROC CORR in SAS. 
103 When we asses more in detail the asset ownership along the income distribution we find that an 
important part of the elderly population in the bottom income decile owns secondary residence and 
that the potential contribution from secondary residence is largest in the bottom income decile. We 
cannot explain this, although it might be explained by problems in the registration of asset 
information in surveys (cf. chapter 7).  
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Figure 8.6. Mean and median equivalent monthly simulated contribution from 
assets by personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Again, we calculated the correlation between the simulated contribution from assets and 
the level of the personal income package.104 The correlation is not significant (r=0.0092 
and p=0.7163), which reflects the unclear relationship between the personal income decile 
and the simulated contribution from assets shown in Figure 8.6. 
3.2.3 Quality of the asset package versus the personal income package 
Lastly, we investigate the relationship between the quality of the asset package and the 
personal income package. We expect that more diverse and more generous personal 
income packages go together with higher quality asset packages, because elderly with a 
better personal income package have a higher potential in building a sufficient asset stock. 
Figure 8.7 shows the proportion of the research population with an asset stock below the 
asset poverty threshold along the personal income distribution. The overall trend shows a 
decrease in asset poverty when moving up the income distribution: a more generous 
personal income package seem to be associated with higher quality asset packages. In the 
lowest personal income decile almost a quarter of the research population has an asset 
stock insufficient to cope with a three-month period of income deprivation, while in the 
upper income decile this is the case for only 12% of the research population. 
 
                                                             
104 The correlation between both variables is assumed to be linear. We computed the Pearson 
correlation coefficient using PROC CORR in SAS. 
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Yet, the overall trend hides again important differences between the income deciles. 
Between the first and the third personal income decile the asset poverty rate increases 
from 24% to 34%. From D3 to D5 the asset poverty rate decreases in line with the general 
trend (from 34% to 15%), yet it increases again from D5 to D7 (from 15% to 27%). 
Between the seventh and tenth income decile, the asset poverty rate decrease steadily 
from 27% to 12%. No explanations are found for these fluctuations in the asset poverty 
rate. 
Figure 8.7. Proportion of the research population with an asset stock below the 
asset poverty threshold by personal income decile (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3.3 The asset package: Tracing vulnerable groups  
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the asset package, in terms of 
composition and contribution, and the main stratification determinants, like sex, level of 
education and living situation to trace vulnerable groups of elderly. 
First, Table 8.15 shows the relative distribution of the research population by asset 
ownership and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living situation. This 
largely confirms the findings from section 2.2. Women, the oldest elderly, elderly with a 
low occupational status, resp. level of education, and single living elderly are in a more 
vulnerable position. They have a lower degree of diversity in their asset package and more 
often only have access to financial assets. Elderly that only have financial assets overall are 
single-living women with a relatively low socioeconomic status (resp. a low occupational 
status and/or a low level of education). Elderly that combine financial assets with home 
ownership and secondary residence ownership overall are younger elderly (between 60 
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and 74 years) with a high socioeconomic status, that live together with a partner. The 
profile of elderly that combine financial assets with home ownership is less pronounced, 
but we do find an overrepresentation of elderly living with a partner in this group.  
  
Table 8.15. Relative distribution of the research population by asset ownership and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education 
and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Asset ownership   
% 
No 
assets 
Financial 
assets 
Financial 
assets + home 
Financial assets + 
home + 2nd residence 
Financial assets 
+ 2nd residence 
Only property 
ownership 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Significance 
p 
Sex         
  Male 1 16 62 18 1 1 712 0.0443 
  Female 2 21 60 14 1 2 884  
Age          
  60-74 1 14 63 19 1 1 1034 <0.0001 
  75+ 2 27 57 10 1 3 562  
Occupational status        
  Salariat 0 17 58 23 2 0 538 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 2 16 62 17 2 1 368  
  Working class 2 25 60 8 1 3 451  
  None 1 14 71 13 0 1 176  
Education          
  High 1 15 57 24 3 0 346 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 1 17 62 17 1 1 729  
  Low 2 23 63 9 0 3 506  
Living situation        
  Couple 0 12 65 20 1 1 1028 <0.0001 
  Single 4 31 53 8 1 2 568  
Total 2 19 61 16 1 2 1596  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
1
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Second, Table 8.16 shows the mean and median direct and simulated equivalent monthly 
contribution from financial assets and property ownership by the main stratification 
determinants. Note that the findings based on the direct and the simulated contribution 
from asset are not always in the same direction, which can be attributed to the simulation 
method we used (cf. chapter 7). 
When we consider the direct contribution from assets, the more vulnerable position of 
older women, the oldest elderly, elderly with a low occupational status, resp. low level of 
education, and single living elderly is confirmed. This is explained largely by the lower 
asset accumulation potential of these groups. For example, during their active career men 
(or persons with a higher occupational status, resp. level of education) overall have higher 
wages than women (or persons with a lower occupational status, resp. level of education), 
and thus have a higher asset accumulation potential than women.  
Table 8.16. Mean and median direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution 
from asset sources by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living 
situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Direct contribution Simulated contribution 
 Mean Median p Mean Median p 
Sex       
  Male 191 37 0.0128 1448 927 0.2592 
  Female 144 24  1436 923  
Age           
  60-74 182 36 <0.0001 1206 876 <0.0001 
  75+ 132 20  1878 1098  
Occupational status         
  Salariat 259 69 <0.0001 1752 1145 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 163 33  1575 960  
  Working class 69 13  929 672  
  None 127 20  1482 1027  
Education           
  High 273 83 <0.0001 1865 1210 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 173 37  1459 973  
  Low 76 12  1117 702  
Living situation           
  Couple 178 38 <0.0001 1331 912 0.6675 
  Single 140 19  1649 958  
Total 165 28  1442 926  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
When we consider the potential simulated contribution from financial assets and property 
ownership, the more vulnerable situation of elderly with a low occupational status, resp. 
level of education is confirmed. Yet, this is not the case for older women, the oldest elderly 
and single living elderly. This is explained by the simulation method we used to compute 
the potential asset contribution (cf. chapter 7). The simulation takes account of the 
remaining life expectancy: a larger remaining life expectancy yields a smaller potential 
asset contribution. Individuals with a higher age have a shorter remaining life expectancy 
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and thus gain more from assets than younger individuals. This also is the case for women, 
that overall have a higher remaining life expectancy than men, and thus have a lower 
potential income from assets. The more favourable asset contribution for singles is 
explained by the fact that the asset stock is not shared with a partner, as is the case in 
couples, and thus the potential income from assets is larger. 
3.4 Two binary logit models explaining asset ownership 
In this section, we investigate which determinants are statistically significant in explaining 
asset ownership. Because financial asset ownership is quite widespread among the 
research population, and we do not want this to cloud the findings regarding property 
ownership, we estimate to separate models: one for financial asset ownership, and one for 
property ownership. Both are categorical binary variables (ownership or not), which 
explains the choice for a binary logistic regression model. In section 3.4.1 we explain the 
construction of the models, and in section 3.4.2 we focus on the results of the logit models. 
3.4.1 Construction of the models 
The dependent variable in the first model (referred to as LM1) is financial asset 
ownership, a categorical binary variable. The reference category is not having financial 
assets. The dependent variable in the second model (referred to as LM2) is property 
ownership, a categorical binary variable. The reference category is not having property.  
Both models include the same independent variables (see Table 8.17). A first group of 
independent variables refers to the personal old age income package: the composition of 
the personal old age income package, and the level of the personal old age income package 
(equivalent net monthly income from personal income sources). To simplify the 
interpretation of the results, we include the income level as a categorical variable with five 
categories based on the income quintiles. A second group of independent variables refers 
to the stratification determinants, that are included as controlling variables: sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education, living situation and region of residence. 
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Table 8.17. Independent variables in the logit models testing asset ownership and 
their reference category 
Variable name Reference category 
Personal income package composition Only first pillar pension (P1) 
Level of personal income Q1 (760 Euros) 
Sex Female 
Age 75+ 
Occupational status No occupation 
Level of education Low 
Living situation Single 
Region of residence Brussels Capital Region 
In both models, 162 observations with missing values on the explanatory or dependent 
variables were removed, leaving a sample of 1530 observations. An examination of the 
logistic regression assumptions indicated no violations on the multicollinearity and 
linearity of both models. A limited number of outliers were detected, however, it was 
decided not to delete them from the models. PROC LOGISTIC was used to estimate the 
models in SAS. 
The global model statistics of both logistic regression models are presented in table 8.18. 
LM1, explaining the financial asset ownership, is overall significant (p<0.0001). At the 
global level, only occupational status and living situation are statistically significant at the 
0.05-level. The explanatory power of LM1 is rather low, with a Nagelkerke R² of 0.1804: 
18% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the variables in the logit 
model.  
Table 8.18. Overview of the global model statistics of the logit regression models 
with financial asset ownership (LM1) and property ownership (LM2) as dependent 
variables (weighted, 2007) 
 LM1 (financial assets) LM2 (property assets) 
  
Wald Chi² 
Significance  
p 
 
Wald Chi² 
Significance  
p 
Global model significance  <0.0001  <0.0001 
     
Independent variables     
  Personal income package 10.3152 0.1124 16.9526 0.0095 
  Personal income level 2.0143 0.7332 6.0905 0.1956 
  Sex 0.1038 0.7476 1.0945 0.2957 
  Age 0.6791 0.4099 8.2335 0.0041 
  Occupational status 11.2258 0.0106 14.4462 0.0024 
  Level of education 1.2712 0.5297 1.6398 0.4405 
  Living situation 7.2353 0.0072 38.6565 <0.0001 
  Region of residence 3.7675 0.1520 8.2087 0.0165 
     
Nagelkerke R²  0.1804  0.1473 
LM2, explaining property ownership, also is overall significant (p<0.0001). Personal 
income package composition, age, occupational status, living situation and region are 
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significant at the 0.05-level. Again, the explanatory power of LM2 is rather low. According 
to the Nagelkerke R², the logit model explains only 15% of the variance in the dependent 
variable (max-rescaled R²=0.1473). The odds ratios (OR) and the p-values, indicating the 
significance of the individual effects, of LM1 and LM2 are presented in Table 8.19. 
Table 8.19. Results of the binary logit models with financial asset ownership (LM1) 
and property ownership (LM2) as dependent variables (weighted, 2007) 
 LM1 (financial assets) LM2 (property assets) 
 Odds ratio P Odds ratio p 
Personal income package (reference: 
P1) 
   
  P2+P1 3.9406 0.2143 1.7513 0.0696 
  P1+P3 3.4196 0.0184 1.4763 0.0411 
  SS+other 0.8690 0.7855 0.6051 0.0501 
  Wage+other 0.5851 0.4224 0.9320 0.8383 
  Only P3 4.2772 0.2035 1.5316 0.2446 
  None 1.4478 0.5912 0.9034 0.7211 
Personal income level (reference: <760 Euros)       
  760-999 1.3516 0.5085 0.8430 0.4336 
  1000-1189 1.0887 0.8536 0.8125 0.3890 
  1190-1571 1.8259 0.2581 0.9263 0.7482 
  ≥1572 1.7743 0.3842 1.4557 0.1758 
Sex (reference: female)        
  Male 1.1231 0.7476 1.1838 0.2957 
Age (reference: 75+)         
  60-74 1.3482 0.4099 1.5694 0.0041 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)       
  Salariat 1.1876 0.8436 0.4211 0.0046 
  Intermediate 0.4017 0.1909 0.5621 0.0447 
  Working class 0.2150 0.0215 0.3780 0.0004 
Level of education (reference: low)       
  High 1.7135 0.4778 1.3820 0.2049 
  Intermediate 0.8126 0.5545 1.0907 0.6111 
Living situation (reference: single)       
  Couple 2.6967 0.0072 2.6582 <0.0001 
Region (reference: Brussels)       
  Flanders 0.0000 0.9902 2.6618 0.0044 
  Wallonia 0.0000 0.9898 2.3449 0.0143 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable in LM1 is not having financial assets. In LM2 the reference 
category is not having property.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
3.4.2 Interpretation of the results in the logit models 
Based on the results of the logit models, presented in Table 8.19, the following conclusions 
are drawn on the variables explaining financial asset and property ownership. 
Regarding financial asset ownership (LM1), little statistically significant determinants are 
found. The generosity of the personal income package has no significant role in explaining 
whether one has financial assets or not. Further, only respondents having a first and third 
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pillar pension are significantly different for respondents with only a first pillar pension on 
financial asset ownership. The odds of having financial assets are larger for elderly with a 
first and third pillar pension than for elderly with only a first pillar pension (OR > 1). 
Among the stratification determinants, only having a low occupational status (working 
class) and living with a partner proof to be statistically significant. The odds of having 
financial assets are significantly smaller for elderly with a low occupational status than for 
elderly without an occupational status (OR < 1), which is explained by the fact that elderly 
without previous employment probably benefit from living together with a partner that 
has financial assets. Similarly, the odds of having financial assets are significantly larger 
for elderly living with a partner than for single living elderly (OR > 1).  
Regarding property ownership (LM2), we see that the odds of having property ownership 
are significantly larger for elderly combining first and third pillar pensions than for elderly 
with only a first pillar pension (OR > 1). Elderly receiving social security benefits, 
however, have smaller odds on having property ownership than elderly with a first pillar 
pension (OR < 1). Among the stratification determinants, elderly between 60 and 74 years, 
elderly living with a partner, and elderly living in Flanders or Wallonia have significantly 
higher odds on having property than elderly older than 75 years, single living elderly, and 
elderly living in Brussels (OR > 1). The odds ratio’s for occupational status (salariat and 
working class) are also statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but in the opposite 
direction that what would be expected. Elderly with a high, resp. low occupational status 
have lower odds on property ownership than elderly without previous employment. A 
clear explanation for this was not found. 
3.5 Multivariate regression models explaining the asset contribution 
To investigate whether the personal income package plays a significant role in explaining 
the differences in the contribution from financial assets and property ownership, we have 
estimated two multivariate regression models on the direct and the simulated asset 
contribution. In section 3.5.1 we explain the construction of the models, and in section 
3.5.2 we discuss the model results. 
3.5.1 Construction of the models 
The dependent variable in the first model (MM1) refers to the direct contribution from 
financial assets and property. This includes the interests from financial assets, and the 
rental incomes from secondary residence. The second model (MM2) focuses on the 
simulated contribution from financial assets and property ownership as the dependent 
variable. This includes the fictitious annuities from financial assets and secondary 
residence and the reverse mortgage from home ownership. Because both dependent 
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variables are continuous variables, we have estimated two multivariate regression 
models.   
We included eight independent variables in MM1 and MM2: two variables referring to the 
personal old age income package (composition and income level) and six 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables (sex, age, occupational status, 
level of education, living situation and region of residence). These categorical variables are 
transposed to dummy variables via a reference coding (cf. supra: Table 8.17).  
An exploratory linear regression model showed a limited distorting influence of outliers 
and leverage points, and limited problems with the assumed normal distribution of the 
residuals (i.e. skewed at the tails of the distribution). Because the distortion of normality 
was very limited, the distribution was considered to be normal. Further, no violations 
were found on the other Gauss-Markov assumptions of linear regression models (cf. 
supra). To limit the influence of outliers and leverage points, we decided to do a robust 
regression analysis using PROC ROBUSTREG in SAS, similar to the approach in section 0. 
MM1, testing the direct contribution from assets, includes 1456 respondents; 236 
respondents were deleted because of missings on the dependent or the independent 
variables.105 In MM2, testing the simulated contribution from assets, 184 respondents 
were deleted because of missing information on one of the variables in the model; MM2 
thus includes 1508 observations.106 
The regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the variables on the 
personal income package were included, and in the second stage, the background 
variables were included. Variables were not removed from the model when they were not 
significant. 
In the model testing the direct contribution from assets (MM1), the explanatory power of 
the independent variables is almost negligible. When only the personal income package 
variables are included, less than 1% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained 
in MM1 (R²=0.0086). After the inclusion of the background determinants, the explained 
variance in MM1 increases a little bit (R²=0.0294). This is also the case for the model 
testing the simulated asset contribution (MM2). In the model including only personal 
income package variables about 2% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained 
by the model (R²=0.0249); adding the background variables slightly increases the 
explanatory power of the model (R²=0.0684). The unstandardized regression parameters 
(b) and the p-values, indicating whether the effects are statistically significant, of both 
models are presented in Table 8.20.  
 
                                                             
105 In the model testing the direct contribution from assets, respondents without assets and without 
rental incomes from secondary property are not included. 
106 In Appendix 8, we give some insights in the observations that are deleted because of missing 
information on one of the variables in both models (MM1 and MM2). 
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Table 8.20. Results of the multivariate robust regression models with direct (MM1) 
and simulated (MM2) equivalent monthly contribution from assets (in Euros) as 
dependant variable (weighted, 2007) 
 MM1 (direct contribution) MM2 (simulated contribution) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b P b p b p b p 
Intercept 17 <0.0001 6 0.4515 946 <0.0001 746 <0.0001 
Personal income package (reference: P1)          
  P2+P1 13 0.0109 9 0.0868 386 <0.0001 297 0.0003 
  P1+P3 10 0.0007 9 0.0085 184 0.0018 175 0.0031 
  SS+other 5 0.3113 4 0.4336 -123 0.1599 -39 0.6524 
  Wage+other -1 0.8692 -8 0.2057 136 0.1888 75 0.4607 
  Only P3 8 0.1175 2 0.6657 137 0.1378 147 0.1135 
  None 13 0.0038 11 0.0183 106 0.1832 92 0.2733 
Personal income level (reference: < 760 Euros)         
  760-999 2 0.6085 4 0.2558 -169 0.0212 -125 0.0784 
  1000-1189 8 0.0599 9 0.0374 -134 0.0914 -134 0.0769 
  1190-1571 10 0.0158 10 0.0140 -133 0.0788 -130 0.0758 
  ≥1572 14 0.0006 8 0.0475 110 0.1412 60 0.4287 
Sex (reference: female)            
  Male   1 0.8126   2 0.9681 
Age (reference: 75+)            
  60-74   4 0.2261   -228 <0.0001 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)         
  Salariat   0 0.9554   -76 0.3520 
  Intermediate   4 0.4158   -94 0.2475 
  Working class   -3 0.4555   -257 0.0006 
Level of education (reference: low)         
  High   25 <0.0001   375 <0.0001 
  Intermediate   10 0.0012   198 0.0001 
Living situation (reference: 
single) 
          
  Couple   5 0.1399   -32 0.5272 
Region (reference: Brussels)           
  Flanders   7 0.2773   445 0.0001 
  Wallonia   -10 0.1388   181 0.1187 
Note: In MM1 the dependent variable is the direct contribution from assets; in MM2 the dependent variable is the 
simulated contribution from assets.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
3.5.2 Interpretation of the results in the multivariate regression models 
First, we focus on the multivariate regression model explaining the direct contribution 
from assets (MM1). Although the explanatory power of the model is relatively small (cf. 
supra), we do find some interesting - yet small - effects. Elderly combining a second or 
third pillar pension with a first pillar pension have significantly larger direct contributions 
from their assets than elderly that only have a first pillar pension. Remarkably this also 
holds for elderly without personal income sources, but we expect that this concerns 
elderly living with a more affluent partner that profit from the sharing of assets within the 
household. Further, we find that the direct contribution from assets is significantly larger 
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for elderly in the upper income quintiles, with an equivalent monthly income from 
personal sources above 1190 Euros per month, than for elderly in the bottom income 
quintile (with an equivalent monthly income from personal sources below 760 Euros per 
month). When controlling for differences in the sociodemographic and socioeconomic 
background of the research population, these effects persist, apart from the effect of 
combining a first and second pillar pension. Both findings confirm that a more diverse and 
a more generous personal income package goes together with a more generous 
contribution from the asset package, although we must admit that the differences are 
quite small.  
The effects of the stratification determinants overall are not significant in MM1. The more 
vulnerable situation of older women and the oldest elderly is not confirmed when we look 
at the direct contribution from financial assets and secondary residence. We expect that 
the more vulnerable situation of women partly is compensated by the fact that assets are 
shared within the household. For the oldest elderly, the ongoing assets accumulation 
during the retirement period could be an explanation why they do not differ significantly 
from their younger counterparts. 
Secondly, we look at the multivariate regression model including the simulated potential 
contribution from financial assets and property ownership as the dependent variable 
(MM2). Concerning the effect of the personal income package, we find that, when 
controlling for background differences, only elderly combining a second or third pillar 
pension with a first pillar pension have a significantly larger simulated contribution from 
assets than elderly with only a first pillar pension (a difference of resp. 297 and 175 Euros 
per month). 
Again, the more vulnerable situation of older women and the oldest elderly is not 
confirmed. No significant difference is found between men and women, and for age the 
simulated contribution from assets is significantly larger for the research population older 
than 75 years than for those between 60 and 74 years. This is explained by the account 
that is given to the remaining life expectancy in the simulation of the potential 
contribution from financial assets and property ownership (cf. supra). 
4. Combining personal income and asset sources in the extended 
income package 
The last section in this chapter focuses on the combination of personal income sources and 
asset sources into the extended income package, and an evaluation of the overall level of 
income protection derived from this. We make a difference between the extended old age 
income package that includes the direct income from asset sources (i.e. interest from 
financial assets and rental incomes from secondary residence), and the extended old age 
income package that includes the indirect, simulated income from asset sources (i.e. the 
reverse mortgage from home ownership, and the fictitious annuities from financial assets 
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and secondary residence). In doing so, account is given to the returns of scale that arise 
from living with a partner. 
In section 4.1 we discuss the generosity of the extended income package.107 We trace the 
existence of vulnerable groups in section 4.2, and assess whether including asset sources 
in the extended income package reduces their income vulnerability. In section 4.3 the 
quality of the extended income package is investigated. We focus on the income 
distribution to investigate whether the inclusion of assets in the extended old age income 
package changes the income distribution. Feedback information on the quality of the 
personal income package is provided to fully grasp the (possible) contribution from asset 
sources in the old age income package.  
4.1 The generosity of the extended income package 
Table 8.21 gives the mean and median total equivalent income from the extended old age 
income package. We distinguish the contribution from personal income sources and from 
asset sources (resp. financial assets, secondary residence and home ownership). Further, 
we make a difference between the available and the simulated income from the extended 
income package. This indicates the (potential) protection against the financial dimension 
of old age dependency the elderly Belgian population enjoys.  
Table 8.21. Mean and median available and simulated equivalent monthly income 
from the extended income package by income source (weighted, 2007) 
 Available income Simulated income 
Source Mean Median Mean Median 
Personal income sources 1298 1067 1298 1067 
Asset sources 160 101 1436 1055 
  Financial assets 120 85 438 268 
  Secondary residence 40 16 218 101 
  Home ownership - - 779 686 
Total 1458 1167 2734 2122 
Note: The available income includes the interest from financial assets and the rental incomes from secondary residence. 
Home ownership is not included in the available income (indicated with -). The simulated income includes the simulated 
reverse mortgage from home ownership, and the fictitious annuities from financial assets and secondary residence. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
When we look at the available income from the extended income package, we find that on 
average the Belgian elderly population disposes of 1458 Euros per month. An important 
part of the population however has a lower income: the median equivalent monthly 
income from the extended old age income package is 1167 Euros per month. Asset sources 
 
                                                             
107 In this section, the analyses are limited to the research population without missing information 
on one of the covariates (unweighted N=1574). 
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contribute on average 160 Euros per month to the extended income package (about 11%); 
the bulk of this are interests from financial assets (on average 120 Euros). Rental incomes 
from secondary residence account for only 40 Euros of the average income from the 
extended income package. An important point not to be overlooked is the fact that only a 
minority of the research population has access to rental incomes from secondary 
residence (cf. section 3.1.1). 
When we consider the simulated income from the extended old age income package, we 
find that the average simulated equivalent income from the extended income package is 
2734 Euros per month (median: 2122 Euros per month). Assets contribute importantly to 
the extended old age income package. The average contribution from assets is even larger 
than the average contribution from personal income sources (resp. 1436 Euros vs. 1298 
Euros). Personal income sources account for 47% of the overall extended income package. 
The bulk of the asset contribution stems from the simulated reverse mortgage on home 
ownership, that on average contributes almost 800 Euros per month. This is about 28% of 
the extended old age income package. This illustrates the important income potential that 
lies in home ownership for the Belgian elderly population. Also, the decumulation of 
financial assets could have an important contribution to the level of income protection 
enjoyed by the elderly population.  
In addition, we explore the differences in income protection provided by the extended 
income package. Figure 8.8 shows the mean available equivalent monthly income from the 
extended old age income package by income decile108. We distinguish the contribution 
from personal income sources (dark grey bars), financial asset interests (pale grey bars) 
and secondary residence rental incomes (white bars). The relative contribute from 
financial asset interest in each income decile is indicated with the dark grey dots. Because 
the relative contribution of rental incomes from secondary residence is very small, we do 
not include it in the figure. 
 
                                                             
108 The income decile distribution is based on the available income from the extended income 
package. 
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Figure 8.8. Mean available equivalent monthly income from the extended income 
package, by income source and income decile (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
The contribution from financial assets to the extended income package increases in 
absolute terms when moving up the income distribution (indicated with the dark grey 
dots). In the first income decile (D1), financial asset interests contribute on average 35 
Euros per month, while in D10 financial asset interests contribute more than 400 Euros 
per month. In relative terms, this increasing trend is, although less pronounced, also 
showing. In the lower deciles financial assets account for 4% to 6% of the total available 
income from the extended income package, while in the upper deciles financial assets 
account for 8% to 11% of the total available income. The income distribution shows to be 
right skewed, with a quite important difference in the mean income between D9 and D10. 
In  Figure 8.9, we consider the mean simulated income from the extended income package 
by the income decile distribution (based on the simulated extended income package). 
Again, we distinguish the contribution of personal income sources (dark grey bars), home 
ownership via reverse mortgage (mid grey bars), and the fictitious annuities from 
secondary residence (pale grey bars) and financial assets (white bars). In addition, Figure 
8.10 shows the relative contribution of the different sources in the total income from the 
extended income package in each income decile. 
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Figure 8.9. Mean simulated equivalent monthly income from the extended income 
package, by income source and income decile (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
The overall average simulated income distribution based on the extended income package 
shows to be right skewed. This indicates that the income distribution favours the higher 
income groups. This resembles the distribution shown in Figure 8.8. The income from 
personal income sources increases from about 550 Euros in D1 to almost 3000 Euros in 
D10. Further, home ownership contributes to the extended income package in all income 
deciles, but its contribution increases in absolute and relative terms when moving up the 
income distribution. In the bottom income decile, a reverse mortgage from home 
ownership could contribute about 100 Euros per month, while in the upper income decile 
this increases to more than 2000 Euros. In relative terms, the share of the reverse 
mortgage from home ownership increases from 15% in D1 to 25% in D10. Similar trends 
are found for the simulated contribution of financial assets and secondary residence. Both 
in absolute and in relative terms, the contribution of these income sources increases when 
moving up the income distribution. This confirms that elderly with a generous income 
from personal income sources, enjoy more from assets than elderly with a less generous 
personal income package. 
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Figure 8.10. Relative composition of  the simulated equivalent monthly income from 
the extended income package, by income source and income decile (weighted, 
2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
4.2 Tracing vulnerable groups 
When we look at the differences among the elderly population, our earlier findings on 
vulnerable groups are confirmed (see Table 8.22). The available income from the extended 
old age income package favours men, younger age groups, elderly with a higher 
occupational status or a higher level of education, and elderly living with a partner. 
Women, the oldest elderly, singles, and low-status elderly are found to be more 
vulnerable. 
However, this changes somewhat when we look at the simulated income from the 
extended old age income package. The more vulnerable income position of the oldest 
elderly and of singles disappears when the potential income from assets is added to their 
personal old age income package. This is the result of the simulation and how it takes 
account of age and living situation (see chapter 7). Regarding age, the simulation is based 
on the remaining life span. This is shorter for older persons than for younger persons. 
Thus, for older persons the asset stock is spent over a short time span, resulting in a 
higher simulated contribution. For living situation, the simulation assumes an equal 
distribution of the asset stock over both partners, favouring singles over couples. 
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Table 8.22. Mean and median direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution 
from the extended income package by sex, age, occupational status, level of 
education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Direct total income Simulated total income 
 Mean Median p Mean Median p 
Sex       
  Male 1580 1221 0.0031 2839 2165 0.0530 
  Female 1360 1125  2649 2087  
Age       
  60-74 1579 1220 <0.0001 2598 2078 0.0353 
  75+ 1227 1088  2993 2216  
Occupational status         
  Salariat 1872 1485 <0.0001 3383 2651 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 1435 1101  2827 2106  
  Working class 1135 1061  1992 1752  
  None 1105 1011  2472 2019  
Education       
  High 2029 1625 <0.0001 3626 2903 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 1415 1156  2697 2153  
  Low 1129 1006  2171 1722  
Living situation       
  Couple 1552 1220 <0.0001 2704 2124 0.1858 
  Single 1280 1096  2791 2117  
Total 1458 1167  2734 2122  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
4.3 Assessing the quality of the extended income package 
To assess the quality of the extended income package, the focus is twofold. On the one 
hand, the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the research population is calculated to investigate 
whether including assets in the income package contributes to reducing the old age at-
risk-of-poverty rate. On the other hand, the (in)equality of the income distribution is 
assessed. In both cases, we link this to the quality of the personal old age income package 
discussed in an earlier section of this chapter. In this way we aim to assess whether 
including assets in the extended old age income package induces the quality of the income 
protection enjoyed by the Belgian elderly population. 
4.3.1 Protection against old age poverty 
In this section, we investigate the protection the extended old age income package 
provides against old age poverty. We distinguish between the direct available income and 
the simulated potential income from the extended old age income package. Further, we 
use two different poverty thresholds. We use the EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold of 
793 Euros (60% of the EU-SILC adjusted median income from personal income sources). 
To recall, this poverty threshold reflects the income situation of the entire population (not 
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limited to the elderly population). The poverty threshold does not take account of the 
income from asset sources, and thus is not completely relative. However, according to 
Brandolini, Magri, and Smeeding (2010, p. 275), when we change the poverty thresholds, 
differences in the at-risk-of-poverty rate “would reflect both the use of the different 
indicator and the shift of the poverty line.”. Therefore, the poverty threshold is not 
recalculated.  
As a compensation, we also use age-specific, fully relative poverty thresholds, that reflect 
60% of the median equivalent monthly income from personal income sources (before the 
inclusion of assets), and 60% of the median equivalent monthly income from the extended 
old age income package (after the inclusion of assets) to assess the quality of the income 
protection provided by the extended old age income package. 
The at-risk-of-poverty rate based on the EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold 
Table 8.23 shows the at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after the inclusion of assets in the 
income package. In the extended income package, a difference is made between the at-
risk-of-poverty rate based on the available income, and on the simulated income. The 
difference between the at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after assets is shown in the Δ 
columns. 
Before the inclusion of assets in the old age income package, the overall at-risk-of-poverty 
rate is 21%. About one fifth of the elderly population has an income from personal income 
sources lower than 793 Euros per month. As expected, the poverty rate decreases when 
asset sources are included in the extended income package. This decrease is larger when 
the simulated income is considered than when the available income is considered, which is 
obvious because the contribution of the first is larger than that of the last (cf. supra). When 
the available income from assets is added to the extended old age income package, the 
overall at-risk-of-poverty rate decreases with about 5%, from 21% before assets to 16% 
after assets. When we add the simulated income from assets, the overall at-risk-of-poverty 
rate decreases with 16%, from 21% before assets to 5% after the inclusion of the 
simulated asset contribution. 
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Table 8.23. EU-SILC at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after assets by sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Poverty rate Poverty rate after assets (%) 
  before assets (%) Direct Δ Simulated Δ 
Sex         
  Male 19 14 -6 3 -16 
  Female 22 17 -5 6 -16 
Age           
  60-74 20 15 -5 5 -15 
  75+ 22 18 -4 5 -18 
Occupational status           
  Salariat 14 8 -5 3 -11 
  Intermediate 28 20 -8 5 -23 
  Working class 18 16 -2 6 -12 
  None 35 29 -6 7 -28 
Education           
  High 12 8 -4 4 -9 
  Intermediate 21 14 -7 4 -17 
  Low 27 23 -4  6   
Living situation           
  Couple 22 16 -6 3 -19 
  Single 19 16 -4 8 -11 
Total 21 16 -5 5 -16 
Note: The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is calculated as 60% of the EU-SILC adjusted median equivalent net monthly income 
from personal income sources. See chapter 7 for more details. Δ is the difference (%) between the poverty rate before and 
after the inclusion of assets in the income package.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, Table 8.23 allows us to investigate the effect of the inclusion of assets on the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate of the different vulnerable groups. When we compare the poverty 
rate before and after assets, based on the direct available income, we find that the 
inclusion of assets does not remove the differences between men and women, and 
between younger and older elderly. For living situation, including the direct available 
income from assets in the extended income package removes the higher poverty risk of 
elderly living with a partner. 
When we compare the poverty risk before and after assets based on the simulated income 
from assets, again we do not find that this removes the differences between men and 
women. The at-risk-of-poverty rate still is a little higher for women than for men (resp. 6% 
and 3%). For age, however, including the simulated income from assets manages to 
remove the difference between older and younger groups of elderly. Lastly, including the 
simulated income from assets inverts the difference between single living elderly and 
elderly living with a partner. Whereas before assets, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is higher 
for elderly living with a partner than for single living elderly (resp. 22% vs. 19%), this is 
no longer the case after the inclusion of the simulated income from assets. In that case, 
only 3% of the elderly living with a partner has an income below the EU-SILC adjusted 
poverty threshold, compared to 8% of the single living elderly. 
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The at-risk-of-poverty rate based on the age-specific poverty threshold 
To compensate for the fact that in the previous section no completely relative picture of 
the poverty risk is sketched, we also use the age-specific poverty thresholds to assess the 
quality of the old age income package. Table 8.24 shows the age-specific at-risk-of-poverty 
rate before and after assets. After assets, we distinguish the available and the simulated 
income from the extended income package. The difference between the poverty rates 
before and after assets is shown in the Δ columns. 
Before assets are included in the income package, about 11% of the research population 
has an income below the poverty threshold (i.e. based on the personal old age income 
package only). This does not really change when the available income from assets is 
included in the extended income package: again about 11% of the research population has 
an income below the poverty threshold (i.e. based on the available income from the 
extended income package). However, when the simulated income from assets is 
considered as part of the extended old age income package, the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
increases to 17%. To put it differently, when account is given to the potential income from 
home ownership, financial assets and secondary residence ownership, the at-risk-of-
poverty rate increases with about 6%. This indicates an unequal distribution of asset 
sources among the elderly population. 
Table 8.24. Age-specific at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after assets by sex, age, 
occupational status, level of education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Poverty rate Poverty rate after assets (%) 
  before assets (%) Direct Δ Simulated Δ 
Sex         
  Male 11 10 -1 15 4 
  Female 12 13 1 19 7 
Age           
  60-74 12 11 -1 17 5 
  75+ 10 12 2 18 7 
Occupational status           
  Salariat 9 7 -2 9 0 
  Intermediate 15 15 -1 17 1 
  Working class 7 10 3 25 17 
  None 19 21 2 20 1 
Education           
  High 10 8 -2 7 -3 
  Intermediate 11 10 -2 17 5 
  Low 12 16  4 24 12  
Living situation           
  Couple 11 11 0 13 2 
  Single 12 13 1 24 12 
Total 11 11 0 17 6 
Note: The age-specific at-risk-of-poverty threshold before assets is calculated at 60% of the median net equivalent income 
from personal income sources of the research population. The age-specific at-risk-of-poverty threshold after assets 
(available) is calculated at 60% of the available median net equivalent income from the extended income package of the 
research population. The age-specific at-risk-of-poverty threshold after assets (simulated) is calculated at 60% of the 
simulated median net equivalent income from the extended income package of the research population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
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Table 8.24 also shows the at-risk-of-poverty rate by a number of sociodemographic and 
socioeconomic background variables. This allows us to investigate the existence of 
vulnerable groups. When we compare the poverty rate before and after assets, based on 
the available income, we find that the poverty rate of the vulnerable groups (i.e. women, 
singles, the oldest elderly) increases slightly. For example, including the available income 
from assets increase the poverty rate of older women from 12% to 13%, while it reduces 
the poverty rate of older men from 11% to 10%. Similarly, the poverty rate of elderly aged 
75 years and over increases from 10% to 12%, while the poverty rate of the elderly 
between 60 and 74 years decreases from 12% to 11%. Including the available income 
from assets in the extended income package thus overall does not really influence the 
overall poverty risk of the elderly population, but it does (slightly) increase the differences 
between certain groups and stresses the more vulnerable situation of older women, the 
oldest elderly and singles. 
The conclusions are somewhat different when we compare the poverty risk before and 
after assets based on the simulated income from assets. Including the simulated income 
from assets in the extended income package emphases the more vulnerable income 
position of older women, singles and elderly with a low socioeconomic status (i.e. low 
occupational status and/or low level of education). After including the simulated income 
from assets, about one fifth of the female research population has an income below the 
poverty threshold compared to about 15% of their male counterparts. A quarter of the 
singles in the research population is considered as at-risk-of-poverty, versus 13% of the 
research population living together with a partner. This is at odds with our earlier findings 
on the generosity of the extended old age income package in which the differences 
between men and women, and between singles and elderly living with a partner were 
rather small. This is explained by the fact that asset sources are distributed unevenly 
among the elderly population, favouring those with a higher asset accumulating potential 
like men and elderly living with a partner. 
When we investigate the transition in and out of poverty with the inclusion of assets to the 
extended old age income package, we find the following. When based on the available 
income of assets, about 23% of those considered as poor before the inclusion of assets, are 
no longer considered as poor after the inclusion of assets. Similarly, about 23% of those at-
risk-of-poverty after the inclusion of assets were not considered as poor before the 
inclusion of assets in the extended old age income package.109 Adding the simulated 
income from assets, however, manages to lift about 52% of the elderly at-risk-of-poverty 
before assets above the age-specific poverty threshold. Yet, about 70% of the elderly 
below the poverty threshold after the inclusion of assets, were not considered as poor 
before the inclusion of assets. This again illustrates that including the simulated income 
 
                                                             
109 Or, to put it differently, 3% of the elderly above the age-specific poverty threshold before assets 
are considered as poor when the available income from assets is included. 
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from assets in the extended old age income package increases the differences among the 
elderly population. 
4.3.2 Enhancing old age income equality 
Based on the statistics presented in the previous section, it is expected that old age income 
inequality increases when the contribution from assets is added to the personal old age 
income package, specifically when the simulated asset contribution is considered. After all, 
asset ownership was found to be unequally spread among the elderly population, and the 
same was found to be true for the available and the simulated contribution from these 
sources to the income of the elderly population. To investigate this, we study two 
indicators: the income ratio and the Gini coefficient.  
The income ratio (income quintile share: S80/S20) gives the ratio of the highest income 
group to the lowest income group. The higher the ratio, the larger the difference between 
both, and the larger the degree of income inequality. In section 2.1 of this chapter, the 
income quintile share based on the personal income package was calculated. The income 
from personal income sources of the upper quintile was five times larger than that of the 
bottom income quintile (income quintile share of 5.0787). When the direct available 
income from assets is added to the income package, the ratio between S80 and S20 is 
5.0802 (see Table 8.25). The difference between the income ratio before and after assets, 
based on the available asset contribution, is thus negligible. However, this is different 
when the income quintile share is calculated for the extended old age income package 
including the simulated contribution from assets (i.e. including the reverse mortgage on 
home ownership and the fictitious annuities of financial assets and secondary residence). 
In that case, the income quintile share is 6.5867. The total simulated income from the 
extended old age income package of the upper income quintile is more than six times 
larger than that of the bottom income quintile. Further, before and after assets, based on 
the simulated asset contribution, the income quintile share increases with about a third. 
Adding the simulated income from assets thus increases the income inequality among the 
Belgian older population.  
Table 8.25. Income quintile share and Gini coefficient before and after adding assets 
to the old age income package (weighted, 2007) 
 
Income quintile share 
S80/S20 Gini coefficient 
Before assets 5.0787 0.3391 
After assets 
    Direct total income 5.0802 0.3402 
  Simulated total income 6.5867 0.3696 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
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In addition, Table 8.25 also shows the Gini-coefficient, another indicator of the (in)equality 
of the income distribution. The closer the Gini-coefficient is to one, the larger the degree of 
inequality in the income distribution. For the extended old age income package, based on 
the direct total income, the Gini-coefficient is 0.3402. This is slightly larger than the Gini-
coefficient based on the personal old age income package (before assets). Including the 
direct contribution from assets in the extended income package thus increases slightly the 
inequality of the income distribution. This conclusion becomes more robust when the Gini 
coefficient based on the extended income package with the simulated contribution from 
assets is considered. The Gini coefficient is 0.3696, and about 9% larger than the Gini 
coefficient based on the personal income package. Taking account of assets thus does not 
improve the income distribution among the Belgian elderly population. 
The Lorenz curve is the graphical display of the Gini-coefficient; it shows the cumulative 
income distribution and indicates the equality of the income distribution. Figure 8.11 
shows the Lorenz curve for the personal income package (black line) and for the extended 
income package. We distinguish the distribution of the direct available income (pale grey 
line) and the simulated income of the extended income package (dotted line). The curves 
are very close to each other, which indicates little differences in the income distribution. In 
the second half of the income distribution, the difference between the personal income 
curve and total direct income curve on the one hand, and the total simulated income on 
the other hand becomes larger. Adding a reverse mortgage from home ownership and 
spending assets via fictitious annuities increases income inequality when compared to the 
situation based on the income from personal income sources or when based on the 
available income from the extended income package. 
Figure 8.11. Lorenz curve of the equivalent monthly income from resp. the personal 
income package and the extended income package (direct and simulated total 
income) (weighted,  2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on the old age income package and the protection this income 
package provides against the financial dimension of age related dependency. We 
addressed the following research questions: What does the old age income package look 
like? How are the composition and the generosity of the old age income package related? 
What level of protection does the old age income package provide against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency (i.e. income dependency)? What groups are more 
vulnerable and enjoy lower levels of protection when the old age income package is 
considered. The answer provided was threefold.  
Concerning the personal old age income package 
First, the personal old age income package was investigated. Only income sources with 
personal ownership, like pensions and wages, were included. Account was given to the 
returns of scale from living together with a partner. Based on a hierarchical cluster 
analysis presented in chapter 7, seven income clusters were discerned, varying in the type 
and the number of income sources included. The income clusters, or packages, ranged 
from less to more diverse on the number and type of income sources included.  
The majority of the research population has a first pillar pension, either or not in 
combination with other income sources. About one third only has a first pillar pension, 
about 9% combines a first pillar pension and a second pillar pension, and 28% combines a 
first and third pillar pension. Almost one in five elderly does not have personal income 
sources. The net average equivalent income from these personal income sources is 1300 
Euros on a monthly basis. However, with a median income of 1067 Euros per month large 
differences in the income distribution exist. About 21% of the research population has an 
income below the EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold of 793 Euros per month. The 
income quintile share indicated that the personal income from the upper income quintile 
is about five times larger than that of the bottom income quintile.  
An ideal type description of the research population showed that elderly with only a first 
pillar pension at their disposal most often are older women (75 years and over) with a 
relatively low socioeconomic status, while elderly that combine a first pillar pension with 
a second and/or a third pillar pension overall are younger (60-74 years) men with a 
relatively high socioeconomic status. Further, elderly that only have a third pillar pension 
or have no personal income sources at their disposal overall are women between 60 and 
74 years living together with a partner, and with a low to intermediate socioeconomic 
status. 
A multinomial logit model investigating the determinants of the composition of the 
personal income package, indicated that the composition is significantly influenced by 
one’s former occupational status, level of education, living situation, sex and age. Women 
and the oldest elderly have lower odds on having a more diverse personal income 
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package. They less often have a second or third pillar pension, which indicates their more 
vulnerable income position. The generosity of the personal income package, on his turn, 
showed to be influenced by the income package composition: having a more diverse 
income package was related to having a higher income from the personal income package. 
Also classic inequalities were confirmed in that high-status elderly (i.e. with a high 
occupational status and/or a high level of education) showed to have a higher income 
from the old age income package than low-status elderly.  
Concerning the asset package 
Secondly, attention was paid to the asset package. This includes assets that are shared 
within the household: financial assets (e.g. savings in bank accounts, stocks and bonds), 
and property assets (home ownership and secondary residence ownership). The 
contribution from assets to the old age income package is approached in different ways:  
 via the direct asset income: interests from financial assets and rental incomes 
from secondary residence;  
 via the potential simulated asset income: fictitious annuities from financial assets 
and secondary residence, and a reverse mortgage on home ownership; and 
 via an assessment of the asset stock and its potential to provide income 
protection during a period of income deprivation (asset poverty). 
Asset ownership was found to be common good among the elderly population: 97% owns 
some kind of financial asset, and almost 80% of the research population combines 
financial and property assets. The contribution from assets is larger when more asset 
sources are included in the asset package. Overall, the mean direct monthly contribution 
from assets is 165 Euros per month, the mean simulated contribution, which includes a 
reverse mortgage on home ownership, is 1442 Euros per month. About 23% of the 
research population does not have an asset stock sufficient to cope with three months of 
absolute income deprivation.  
Important links between the personal old income package and the asset package were 
found. The inequalities in the personal old age income package were reproduced in the 
asset package. A higher degree of diversification in the personal old age income package 
goes hand in hand with a higher degree of asset ownership, particularly for property 
ownership. Also, a more generous personal old age income package is associated with 
higher rates of property ownership: property ownership increases along the personal 
income distribution. Similarly, the direct contribution from assets is larger for elderly with 
a more generous personal income package than for elderly with a less generous personal 
income package. The relationship between the simulated contribution from assets and the 
income from the personal income package was less straightforward, and not statistically 
significant. Further, asset poverty was lower among elderly with a more generous 
personal income package than among elderly with a less generous personal income 
package. For example, almost a quarter of the research population with a personal income 
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in the first income decile is considered as at-risk-of-asset-poverty compared to only 12% 
of the elderly with a personal income in the tenth income decile. Overall, we can speak of a 
kind of double Matthew effect: elderly with a larger income from personal  income sources 
do not only have more access to assets, also the direct and potential revenues from these 
assets, as well as the protection these assets provide against periods of income 
deprivation, are larger. 
In the asset package, the more vulnerable position of older women, the oldest elderly, 
singles and low-status elderly is confirmed. Property ownership is significantly smaller 
among the oldest elderly, elderly with a lower occupational status, and singles. No 
significant differences are however found when the direct contribution from assets is 
considered. Neither the direct available income from assets, nor the simulated income 
from assets is lower for women than for men. Also individuals older than 75 years, and 
between 60 and 74 years are not significantly different when the direct asset contribution 
is considered. When the simulated asset contribution is investigated, the oldest elderly 
even show to be significantly better off, although this is mainly the result of the inclusion 
of remaining life expectancy in the simulation of the potential asset contribution. 
Concerning the extended income package 
Third, personal income sources and asset sources were combined into the extended old 
age income package. Again, we distinguished the direct extended income package 
(including the direct income from assets via interests and rental incomes) and the 
simulated extended income package (including the simulated potential income from 
assets).  
On average, including the direct income from assets in the extended income package 
increases the income with about 160 Euros, to about 1458 Euros per month (net 
equivalent monthly income). Adding the simulated asset income to the income from 
personal income sources results in an average monthly income of 2734 Euros per month. 
When moving up the income distribution, the direct contribution from financial assets 
becomes relatively more important. Similarly, when we consider the income distribution 
based on the simulated income from the extended old age income package, the relative 
contribution of property ownership increases steadily when moving up the income 
distribution. 
Further, adding the direct available asset income to the extended income package does not 
succeed in removing the more vulnerable income position of women, the oldest elderly, 
singles and low-status elderly. However, this changes when the simulated income from 
assets is added. The more vulnerable income position of singles and the oldest elderly 
disappears in that case. However, this is not really the result of the success of the income 
package, but stems from the inclusion of the remaining life expectancy and living situation 
in the simulation of the potential asset income. Older individuals have a shorter time span 
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during which the asset stock is spent, and singles do not have to share their asset stock 
with a partner. This leads to a higher simulated income from assets. 
To assess the quality of the extended income package, different indicators were used. 
Firstly, we used both the EU-SILC adjusted poverty threshold and the age-specific poverty 
threshold to compute the poverty risk. Adding assets to the old age income package does 
not remove the more vulnerable income situation of certain older groups. The poverty risk 
of women, elderly above 75 years, low-status elderly (i.e. elderly with a low level of 
education  and/or a low occupational status) and singles remains higher, irrespective of 
the poverty threshold that was used. Another interesting fact was that in the completely 
relative approach (i.e. based on the age-specific poverty thresholds), the inclusion of 
assets increases the poverty risk of certain groups of elderly. For example, the age-specific 
poverty rate increases among elderly with a low occupational status, resp. low level of 
education when the direct asset income is added to the extended old age income package. 
Moreover, adding the simulated income from assets increases the poverty rate even more. 
Before assets about 11% of the research population has an income below the poverty 
threshold, whereas after including the simulated income from assets this increases to 
17%. Women, the oldest elderly, low-status elderly and singles were the main victims of 
this increase in the poverty rate. Adding the simulated income from assets to the old age 
income package thus does not contribute to providing more protection against poverty for 
the more vulnerable groups.  Secondly, we investigated whether adding assets contributes 
to a more equal distribution of resources among the elderly population. Including the 
direct income from assets did not give any result: little to no difference was found between 
the income quintile share and the Gini coefficient based on the income from personal 
income sources and the direct income from the extended income package. However, when 
we add the simulated income from assets, the inequalities in the income distribution 
increase. The income quintile share increases from 5.1 to 6.6; and the Gini coefficient 
increases from 0.34 to 0.37. Adding the simulated income from assets thus favours a small 
group of high-income elderly, with a large asset stock. 
Overall conclusion 
Our findings have important consequences for policy makers, who increasingly stress the 
potential contribution from asset sources to maintain a decent level of income protection 
during old age. Our analyses proof that adding assets to the old age income package to 
tackle the debates on old age poverty and income inequality is not just the goose that lays 
the golden eggs. It increases age-specific poverty rates, and adds to the already vulnerable 
situation of specific groups of elderly, like women and singles. Further, it increases income 
inequality, which is at odds with the main goals of the welfare state.  
Also, one should bear in mind that a part of the analyses are based on a reverse 
mortgaging hypothesis to include the wealth from home ownership in the old age income 
package. Yet, until now, no such thing is really possible in Belgium because of the lack of a 
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legal framework for reverse mortgaging as an insurance product. Policy makers willing to 
introduce such a mechanism should pay sufficient attention to its potential contribution to 
the old age income package. Also, it should be investigated how this changes the income 
situation of the elderly population in comparison with the rest of the population. Further, 
the introduction of reverse mortgaging, or related schemes, should include decent 
protection mechanisms for the older population: residence must be guaranteed until the 
elderly person deceases or decides to move out (for example to a residential care facility). 
Income from reverse mortgaging must be guaranteed, even when the potential property 
wealth is consumed entirely; and comprehensible information should be provided on the 
reduced possibility for bequests in case of reverse mortgaging.  
In addition, to completely assess the impact of adding an asset based annuity to the 
income from personal income sources on the financial dependency and the poverty risk of 
the elderly population, a strategy should be developed to compare the younger cohorts of 
elderly that have just left the labour market with the rest of the population. After all, only 
for this group the correct estimation of the potential asset based annuity can be made, 
taking account of their remaining life expectancy and their asset stock at the moment of 
retirement. In doing so, it will become possible to compare this group with the rest of the 
population to investigate whether or not including an asset based annuity in the extended 
old age income package actually contributes to additional and sufficient protection against 
the financial dimension of old age dependency. However, this requires an extensive 
amount of income and asset information of the entire population, which is not available in 
the SHARE, since this survey is limited to the population aged 50 and over. 
 
In the next chapter, we investigate the wide range of mechanisms that are available to the 
Belgian older population to provide protection against the functional dimension of old age 
dependency. We focus on the use of health and social care services of the elderly 
population confronted with an increased level of physical dependency in old age. Our main 
point of interest is the relationship between the care package and the (extended) income 
package: are the inequalities in the income package reproduced in the care package, what 
vulnerable groups can be discerned, etc.  
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CHAPTER 9. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE 
OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 
In the previous chapter the first research question, investigating the protection provided 
by the old age income package against the financial dimension of old age dependency, was 
tackled. This chapter takes a first step towards answering the second research question on 
the protection the Belgian elderly population enjoys against the functional dimension of 
old age dependency. This requires a move from the theoretical concept of care packaging 
to an operational, measurable concept. The operational concept includes different types of 
health and social care services, provided by both formal and informal caregivers. Because 
we use SHARE data, we are limited to the services that are questioned in the SHARE. We 
distinguish the use of the services on the one hand, and the intensity of utilisation on the 
other hand. Furthermore, we construct some indicators to assess the quality of the care 
package of the elderly population. 
In the first section we operationalise the composition of the old age care package. Account 
is given to the use of health care services on the one hand, and social care services on the 
other hand. Inspired by van Vliet, Broese van Groenou, and Deeg (2010) we investigate 
whether the use of care services is clustered into care packages. In the second section, we 
focus on the operationalisation of the intensity of the use of the different care services. In 
the last section, indicators to assess the quality of the care provided are developed and 
discussed. 
1. Composition of the old age care package 
The composition of the old age care package includes the use of health care services (e.g. 
doctor visits, specialist visits, hospital treatments) (section 1.1), and social care services 
(e.g. assistance with ADL and IADL) (1.2). These services are provided by formal and/or 
informal caregivers, from inside and/or outside the care receiver’s household. In section 
1.3 we investigate the possibility to distinguish care packages. 
1.1 The use of health care services 
The use of health care services focuses on whether the respondent has had contact with 
first-line or second-line health care providers in the last year. Information on this is 
included in the module on health care in the SHARE. The following questions contain 
information on the use of health care services: 
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hc002 Now we have some questions about your health care. Please think about your care during 
the last twelve months. During the last twelve months, about how many times in total have you 
seen or talked to a medical doctor about your health? Please exclude dentist visits and hospital 
stays, but include emergency room or outpatient clinic visits. 
[Numerical value] 
 
hc003 How many of these contacts were with a general practitioner or with a doctor at your 
health care centre? 
[Numerical value] 
 
hc004 Please look at card 15. During the last twelve months, have you consulted any of the 
specialists mentioned on card 15? (multiple answers possible) 
 
1. Specialist for heart disease, pulmonary, gastroenterology, diabetes or endocrine diseases 
2. Dermatologist  
3. Neurologist  
4. Ophthalmologist  
5. Ear, nose and throat specialist  
6. Rheumatologist or physiatrist  
7. Orthopaedist  
8. Surgeon  
9. Psychiatrist  
10. Gynaecologist  
11. Urologist  
12. Oncologist  
13. Geriatrician 
 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Elderly with at least one visit to a general practitioner are assigned (hc003) with first-line 
health care services ownership. Elderly answering affirmative on the question concerning 
specialist visits (hc004) are assigned with second-line health care services ownership. 
One should note that the respondents are asked to recall the health care contacts they 
have had during the last twelve months. Because of the extensive time span, it is unlikely 
that respondents will recall all health care contacts they had during the investigated time 
span. Such memory effects lead to bias in the respondent’s answers, and has consequences 
for the research results in that the number of health care contacts probably is 
underestimated (e.g. Gray, 1955; Sudman & Bradburn, 1973). In addition, it is likely that 
the more important health care contacts (for example, contact with a specialist for an 
important cardiac problem) are recalled, and that respondents will forget to report the 
less important health care contacts (for example, contact with a general practitioner when 
the respondent was hit by the flue). However, one advantage of investigating health care 
contacts over a longer time span is that is rules out seasonal differences in health care 
contacts. For example, during winter time individuals are more likely to become ill and 
have contact with a health care provider than during spring or summer time. By spreading 
the enquiry over a 12 month period, these seasonal differences are included in the 
registration. 
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Another disadvantage of the question on contact with a specialist (hc004) is in the 
phrasing of the question. The question is formulated as a check-all-that-apply question: 
respondents are asked to indicate all contacts they have had with a specialist from a quite 
long list of different specialists. Research (Billiet & Matsuo, 2012) has shown that 
respondents will try to estimate the number of “required” answers, and they will answer 
according to this. Consequently, check-all-that-apply questions will lead to an under 
reporting of the different types of specialists one had contact with. Moreover, it is likely 
that respondents will limit their answers to the social desirable answers in making their 
pragmatic selection, which again will lead to bias in the registered answers, and eventually 
in the research results based on these answers (Billiet, 2011).  
The receipt of hospital treatments, either as an inpatient or as an outpatient (i.e. hospital 
treatment without overnight stay), is based on two questions in the module on health care: 
hc012 During the last twelve months, have you been in a hospital overnight? Please consider 
stays in medical, surgical, psychiatric or in any other specialised wards. 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
hc023 During the last twelve months, have you had outpatient surgery? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Respondents answering affirmative on one of both questions (hc012 and/or hc023) are 
considered as having received hospital treatment. We have decided not to make a 
difference between inpatient and outpatient hospital care, because we are interested in 
the receipt of hospital care as such, irrespective of whether the respondent received this 
care as an inpatient or as an outpatient. One can argue that important differences exist in 
the type and the intensity of the hospital care received as an inpatient and as an 
outpatient. Yet, we chose not to include a high degree of detail in the type of hospital care 
received, and differences in the intensity of the care received are accounted when the 
overall intensity of health and social care services received is considered (cf. infra). 
Based on the information in the preceding questions, we have constructed a number of 
health care ownership variables. We distinguish between the receipt of first-line health 
care (general practitioner), second-line health care (specialist), and the receipt of hospital 
care (either out- or inpatient). Table 9.1 gives for each health care service the unweighted 
proportion of the research population that received this type of care in the last year. The 
majority has had contact with a general practitioner (95%), whereas 57% of the research 
population had contact with at least one specialist. About a quarter of the research 
population received any kind of hospital treatment.  
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Table 9.1. Use of health care services by the research population (unweighted, 
2007) 
  Use   
Health care service Based on ... Yes (%) No (%) Total (N) N missing 
First-line health care  hc002 / hc003 95 5 1692 6 
Second-line health 
care  
hc002 / hc004 
57 43 
1692 6 
Hospital treatment hc012 / hc023 25 75 1692 3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
1.2 The use of social care services 
The receipt of social care services is included in two modules of the SHARE. Formal social 
care services are questioned in the module on health care. Respondents can indicate if 
they have received formal nursing care, personal care and/or home help (hc032). Also the 
receipt of formal care in a residential setting is questioned (hc029): 
hc032 Please look at card 17. During the last twelve months, did you receive in your own home 
any of the kinds of care mentioned on this card? (Multiple answers possible) 
1. Professional or paid nursing or personal care  
2. Professional or paid home help, for domestic tasks that you could not perform yourself due to 
health problems  
3. Meals-on-wheels  
96. None of these 
 
hc029 During the last twelve months, have you been in a nursing home overnight? 
1. Yes, temporarily 
3. Yes, permanently 
5. No  
The receipt of informal care is questioned in the SHARE module on social support. First, it 
is questioned whether the respondent and/or his/her partner has received informal care 
(sp002). Second, it is questioned which type of care the respondent and/or his/her 
partner received (personal care, household help or administrative help) (sp004): 
sp002 Please look at card 38. Thinking about the last twelve months, has any family member 
from outside the household, any friend or neighbour given you or your partner any kind of help 
listed on this card?  
 
1. Personal care, e.g. dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, using the 
toilet 
2. Practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, 
household chores 
3. Help with paperwork, such as filling out forms, settling financial or legal matters 
 
1. Yes 
5. No 
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sp004 Please look at card 38. Which types of help has this person provided in the last twelve 
months? (Multiple answers possible) 
  
1. Personal care, e.g. dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, using the 
toilet  
2. Practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, 
household chores  
3. Help with paperwork, such as filling out forms, settling financial or legal matters 
An important disadvantage of the questions on the receipt of informal care is that these 
questions are registered as the household level. The questions thus point to the receipt of 
informal care by the respondent and/or his/her partner. The answers provided by the 
household respondent were transferred to all the other household members in the survey. 
Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether the care was received by the 
household respondent and/or by his/her partner. This is particularly important when the 
receipt of personal care is concerned, because personal care always is limited to the 
person receiving this type of care. In transferring the receipt of informal personal care to 
all household members it is possible that the receipt of personal care is ascribed to a 
household member who actually has not received personal care. This is expected to lead to 
an overestimation of the receipt of informal personal care. We expect this to be less 
important when the help with household chores is considered, because home help is more 
likely to be shared within the household and to contribute to the wellbeing of all 
household members. 
Respondents can report on social care received from maximum three different informal 
caregivers. Question sp007 in the module on social support makes it possible to determine 
whether the respondent has received informal care from more than one caregiver. When 
the respondent answers affirmative on this question, the type of care received is 
determined via question sp004 above. 
sp007 Is there any other family member from outside the household, friend or neighbour who 
has helped you or your partner with the tasks listed on card 38 in the last twelve months? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Further, also the receipt of informal care within the household is questioned in the module 
on social support. In contrast with the questions on informal care from outside the 
household, the receipt of within-household informal care is questioned at the individual 
level: 
sp018 And is there someone living in this household who has helped you regularly during the 
last twelve months with personal care, such as washing, getting out of bed, or dressing? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
Note that within-household informal care is limited to personal care like washing, 
dressing, etc. (ADL), whereas outside-household informal care also includes help with 
more operational household chores (IADL). Most obviously, within-household help with 
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household chores is not questioned because this is considered as part of the regular 
within-household distribution of household chores.  
Table 9.2 gives the unweighted proportion of the research population that receives social 
care. About 13% of the research population has received formal home help, and 11% has 
received formal personal care. The use of residential long-term care is negligible. 
Concerning informal care, we find that 27% of the research population has received 
informal home help from outside the household. Only a minority has received informal 
personal care: 2% of the research population has received informal personal care from 
outside the household, and 5% received within-household informal personal care. 
Table 9.2. Use of social care services by the research population (unweighted, 2007) 
  Use (%)   
Social care service Based on ... Yes No Total (N) N missing 
Formal care      
  Home help hc032 (items 2, 3) 13 87 1664 28 
  Personal care hc032 (item 1) 11 89 1664 28 
  Residential care hc029 0 100 1665 27 
Informal care      
  Inside household sp018 5 95 1692 0 
  Outside household      
    Home help sp002 (item 2, 3) 27 72 1691 1 
    Personal care sp002 (item 1) 2 98 1691 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
1.3 Defining care clusters via a hierarchical cluster analysis 
Based on the use of health care services on the one hand, and social care services on the 
other hand, we investigated the possibility to identify clusters of care services. This is 
inspired by an analysis of Van Vliet, Broese Van Groenou, and Deeg (2010) on the 
existence of extramural care packages among the Dutch population aged 70 and over with 
data from the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (LASA). Based on different 
configurations of appliances, health care services, and social care services, they 
distinguished eight extramural care packages: 
1. Minor care utilisation: elderly that rely not or only to a very limited extent on 
health and social care services; 
2. Primary (first-line) health care: the majority of this group of elderly has had 
contact with a general practitioner or a dentist, no other care services are dominant; 
3. Second-line health care: contact with a specialist is dominant within this care 
package, most often combined with contact(s) with primary health care providers; 
4. Particular home help: the majority of this group receives assistance with 
household chores provided by a particular care giver, though not with personal care 
tasks; 
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5. Informal care and hospital care: the receipt of hospital care is dominant among 
the elderly with this care package, as well as the receipt of informal help for either 
personal care and/or home help; 
6. Formal home help: almost all elderly with this care package rely on professionally 
provided home help; 
7. Mixed care package: different types of care (health care services, formal and 
informal care services for personal care and/or home help) are used by the elderly 
with this type of care package; 
8. Care network with transmural care: in this care package elderly with the most 
severe degree of care dependency, combining intensive extramural care services 
with transmural care services like day care centres and short stays in elderly homes, 
are found. 
According to Van Vliet et al. (2010), the composition of the care packages is hierarchical: 
they build on each other, in that the previous care package is (largely) incorporated in the 
following care package (see Fout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden.). For example, 
elderly receiving home help from a particular care giver (i.e. fourth care package) most 
often also receive primary and secondary health care (i.e. reflecting the second and the 
third care package). 
To distinguish the presence of care packages in the SHARE data, and inspired by the 
approach of Van Vliet et al. (2010), we executed a hierarchical cluster analysis. The 
following variables on the receipt of health and social care services were used as the input 
variables: contact with first-line health care (general practitioner), contact with second-
line health care (specialist), the receipt of hospital treatment, the receipt of formal home 
help, the receipt of formal personal care, the receipt of informal home help and the receipt 
of informal personal care. Similar to the strategy in chapter 7, we used the Ward’s 
technique to distinguish the care clusters. Four test statistics (i.e. the root-mean-square 
standard deviation (RMS STD), the semi partial R-squared (SPR), the R-squared (RS) and 
the inter-cluster distance (CD)) were calculated and plotted in SAS to decide on the most 
appropriate number of clusters (see Table 9.3). To recall, according to Sharma (1996) the 
RMS STD, that measures the homogeneity of the new cluster, as well as the RMS and the 
CD, indicating the homogeneity of the merged clusters, should be low. The RS, which 
measures the heterogeneity of the clusters, should be high (see chapter 7). 
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Table 9.3. Overview of the hierarchical cluster analysis statistics to decide on the 
number of care clusters 
Root-mean-square standard deviation 
(RMS STD) 
Semi-partial R-squared  
(SPR) 
  
R-squared (RS) Inter-cluster distance (CD) 
  
Based on the test statistics of the cluster analysis, it was decided that a seven cluster 
solution fits our data best. The RMS STD is quite low in comparison with other cluster 
solutions. Also the SPR and CD are relatively low when compared to the other cluster 
solutions. The R-squared (RS) is relatively high in the seven cluster solution and decreases 
with a more limited number of clusters. Each cluster can be associated with a certain type 
of health and social care service use. To determine the character of each cluster, the 
relative distribution of the research population by cluster and their use of health and 
social care services was studied (Table 9.4).  
  
222 
Table 9.4. Relative distribution of the research population by care cluster and 
health and social care services use (unweighted, 2007) 
  % health and social care services use 
 Total Health care Formal care Informal care 
Cluster N % 
1st 
line 
2nd 
line 
Hospital 
care 
Home 
help 
Personal 
care 
Home 
help 
Personal 
care 
  1 478 29 86 0 0 1 0 3 0 
  2 376 23 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 
  3 200 12 99 77 100 0 0 6 0 
  4 234 14 100 66 20 0 0 100 0 
  5 151 9 100 61 32 100 16 50 9 
  6 69 4 97 77 52 1 23 38 100 
  7 151 9 100 78 51 36 97 54 24 
Total 1659 100        
Note: 33 respondents were excluded from the cluster analysis because they had missings on at least one of the health and 
social care variables included in the analysis. Informal home help only includes home help provided by informal 
caregivers from outside the household. Informal personal care includes personal care from informal caregivers inside and 
outside the household. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
In the first cluster, the overall use of health and social care services is low, and the 
majority only had contact with a general practitioner (86%). This matches the “minor care 
utilisation” plus the “primary (first-line) health care” cluster differentiated by Van Vliet et 
al. (2010); 29% of the research population belongs to this care cluster. The second cluster 
includes 23% of the research population; these respondents combine first- and second-
line health care services. All respondents belonging to the third cluster (12% of the 
research population) have received a hospital treatment. This partially corresponds to the 
fifth cluster differentiated by Van Vliet et al. (2010). The fourth cluster includes about 14% 
of the research population. This cluster is characterised by the receipt of informal 
assistance with IADL (home help), while in the fifth cluster (9% of the research 
population) also formal home help is used. In the sixth care cluster, the focus is on the 
receipt of informal personal care services. To a more limited extend, the respondents in 
this cluster also receive informal home help (38%). This cluster is the smallest with only 
4% of the research population. The last cluster resembles the most intensive use of health 
and social care services. Respondents belonging to this cluster receive formal and informal 
care with ADL and IADL, and score relatively high on the receipt of health care services. 
For example, the majority has had contact with first- and second-line health care 
providers. About 9% of the research population belongs to this intensive care cluster. To 
summarise, the cluster analysis resulted in the following seven care clusters or care 
packages: 
1. Minor care use: elderly have a low use of health and social care services, and 
mainly rely on first-line health care services; 
2. Second-line health care: a combination of first-line and second-line health care 
services; 
3. Hospital care: the focus is on the receipt of hospital treatment, either as an in- or 
as an outpatient; 
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4. Informal home help: this group of older persons receives assistance with IADL in 
the form of informal home help services; 
5. Formal home help: the receipt of formal home help is dominant, yet an important 
part of this group combines this with informal home help; 
6. Informal personal care: informal assistance with ADL is central, though to a 
limited extent it is combined with formal personal care and informal home help; 
7. Mixed care package: different types of health and social care services are 
combined. 
2. Intensity of care use 
The intensity of the use of health and social care services refers to the number of times the 
elderly population received health and care during the last year. We distinguish the 
intensity of the use of health care services on the one hand (2.1), and the intensity of the 
use of social care services on the other hand (2.2). 
2.1 Intensity of health care services use 
To operationalise the intensity of the use of health care services, we constructed a 
categorical variable based on the number of times the older person had contact with a 
health care practitioner or a health care service during the last year.  
Information on the intensity of the use of health care services is included in the SHARE 
module on health care. Question hc003 includes the contacts with first-line health care 
providers (general practitioners). Contacts with second-line health care providers 
(specialists) are based on the questions hc002, hc003 and hc004. When a respondent 
answered affirmative on having had contact with a specialist (hc004), the intensity of the 
contact is the difference between the number of contacts questioned in hc003 (contact 
with GP) and hc002 (overall number of contacts with health care providers).  
hc002 Now we have some questions about your health care. Please think about your care during 
the last twelve months. During the last twelve months, about how many times in total have you 
seen or talked to a medical doctor about your health? Please exclude dentist visits and hospital 
stays, but include emergency room or outpatient clinic visits. 
[Numerical value] 
 
hc003 How many of these contacts were with a general practitioner or with a doctor at your 
health care center? 
[Numerical value] 
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hc004 Please look at card 15. During the last twelve months, have you consulted any of the 
specialists mentioned on card 15? (multiple answers possible) 
 
1. Specialist for heart disease, pulmonary, gastroenterology, diabetes or endocrine diseases 
2. Dermatologist  
3. Neurologist  
4. Ophthalmologist  
5. Ear, nose and throat specialist 
6. Rheumatologist or physiatrist 
7. Orthopaedist 
8. Surgeon 
9. Psychiatrist 
10. Gynaecologist 
11. Urologist 
12. Oncologist 
13. Geriatrician 
 
1. Yes 
5. No 
The intensity of the receipt of hospital care is questioned in hc013 (inpatient) and hc024 
(outpatient). Lastly, we also include the receipt of health care services in other 
institutions, like rehabilitation homes (hc065). Note that no account is given to the length 
of the stay in hospitals or other residential care facilities. 
hc013 How often have you been a patient in a hospital overnight during the last twelve months? 
[Numerical value] 
 
hc024 How often have you had outpatient surgery during the last twelve months?  
[Numerical value] 
 
hc065 How often have you been a patient overnight in any institution other than a hospital or a 
nursing home during the last twelve months? 
[Numerical value] 
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The intensity of the use of health care services is the sum of the contacts with the different 
health care providers. We do not take account of potential differences in the severity of the 
health care that is provided by certain health care professionals.110   
We calculate the mean number of contacts with a health care provider (mean intensity). In 
addition, we construct a categorical variable that distinguishes between a low, a moderate 
and a high intensity of the use of health care services. Respondents with less than six 
contacts with health care providers during the last year have a low intensity of use (on 
average less than one contact every two months); respondents with six to 12 contacts 
during the last year have a moderate intensity of use (on average less than one contact 
every month); and respondents with more than 12 contacts with health care providers 
have a high intensity of use (on average more than one health care contact a month).  
Table 9.5 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population by the intensity of 
the use of health care services. The majority of the research population has a low intensity 
of health care services use with one to six contacts with health care providers during the 
last year (51%). About 24% of the research population has a moderate intensity of health 
care services use, and 21% of the research population on average has had contact with a 
health care services more than once a month (high intensity). About 4% of the research 
population did not have any contact with a health care provider.  
Table 9.5. Distribution of the research population by the intensity of health care 
services use (unweighted, 2007) 
Intensity Number of contacts N % 
  No 0 72 4 
  Low 1-6 865 51 
  Moderate 7-12 402 24 
  High >12 353 21 
Total  1692 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
 
                                                             
110 For example, having had contact with a general practitioner is accounted in the same way as 
having had contact with a specialist, although it could be expected that the respondent who has had 
contact with a specialist is confronted with a more severe health problem than a respondent who 
only has had contact with a general practitioner. However, to take account of such differences we 
would have to ascribe weights to the different types of health care. In our opinion, it is not possible 
to calculate the correct weight of the different health care services because this would imply that 
we have exact information on why a respondent has had contact with a health care provider. 
Moreover, health care professionals provide different types of care, that differ in perceived 
intensity. For example, one can consult a dermatologist for an annual routine check-up (low degree 
of severity) or for a potential skin cancer (high degree of severity). Because taking account  of these 
differences would lead us to far from our initial research goals, we have opted not to make a 
difference in the intensity of the health care contacts. 
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2.2 Intensity of social care services use 
Secondly, we assess the intensity of the use of social care services. This is based on the 
number of hours the respondent has received social care during the last twelve months. 
Information on this is included in the SHARE modules on health care (hc) and social 
support (sp). 
The SHARE module on health care includes five questions on the intensity of the use of 
formal care services. We estimated the hours of formal care with ADL the respondent 
received taking account of the number of weeks he or she received this type of care 
(hc033) and the average hours of care per week he or she received (hc034). We did the 
same for the receipt of formal care with IADL (number of weeks: hc035; and average 
hours per week: hc036). Note that hours were always rounded up to full hours.111 We also 
took account of the receipt of meals-on-wheels: The assumption was made that the receipt 
of meals-on-wheels is equal to a time investment of half an hour per day, five days a week 
in the weeks receiving this service. 
hc033 During the last twelve months, how many weeks did you receive professional or paid 
nursing care in your own home? 
[Numerical value] 
 
hc034 On average, how many hours per week did you receive professional or paid nursing care 
at home?  
[Numerical value] 
 
hc035 During the last twelve months, how many weeks did you receive professional or paid help 
for domestic tasks at home because you could not perform them yourself due to health 
problems?  
[Numerical value] 
 
hc036 On average, how many hours per week did you receive such professional or paid help?  
[Numerical value] 
 
hc037 During the last twelve months, how many weeks did you receive meals-on-wheels, 
because you could not prepare meals due to health problems?  
[Numerical value] 
Concerning the intensity of the use of informal care, the SHARE module on social support 
includes two questions. We estimated the hours of informal care the respondent received 
from an informal care provider from outside the household during the last year taking 
account of the periodicity (daily, weekly, monthly) (sp005) and the average number of 
hours of care received in this period (sp006). Again, hours were rounded up to full hours. 
 
                                                             
111 This approach disguises periodical differences in the intensity of the receipt of social care 
services. It is not possible to distinguish periods with a high intensity of use versus periods with a 
low intensity of use. 
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sp005 During the last twelve months, how often altogether have you or your partner received 
such help from this person? Was this ...  
1. Almost daily 
2. Almost every week 
3. Almost every month 
4. Less often 
 
sp006 About how many hours did you or your partner receive such help altogether (on a typical 
day/in a typical week/in a typical month) from this person?  
[Numerical value] 
Note that no information is available on the intensity of the use of informal care provided 
by a household member. This type of care is always considered as high intensity care, 
being daily or almost daily for a period of at least three months in the last year. We have 
accounted this in the variable on the intensity of the use of social care as the receipt of one 
hour of care per day during the last twelve months. This is added up to the other (formal 
and/or informal) care the respondent received. 
Consequently, the intensity of the use of social care services refers to the estimated 
number of hours of formal and informal care received. It is the sum of the hours of formal 
care and the hours of informal care the respondent received during the last twelve 
months. Respondents that received less than one hour of care per week are considered as 
low intensity social care users. Respondents that received on average one to seven hours 
of care per week during the last twelve months are considered as moderate intensity care 
users. High intensity care users received on average more than seven hours of social care 
per week (at least one hour of care per day) during the last twelve months.  
Table 9.6 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population by the intensity of 
the use of social care services. The population is limited to the part of the population that 
has actually received social care. Within this group, about 27% has a low intensity of care 
use (less than one hour per week). Almost 40% of the older care receivers received one to 
seven hours of care per week (moderate intensity) and about a third has a high intensity 
of care use (more than seven hours per week). 
Table 9.6. Distribution of the research population, receiving social care services, by 
the intensity of care services use (unweighted, 2007) 
Intensity Weekly hours of care N % 
No 0 2 0 
Low <1 159 27 
Moderate 1-7 227 39 
High >7 193 33 
Total  581 100 
Note: 53 respondents were excluded because of missings on one of the intensity variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
An additional categorical variable was constructed to determine whether the respondent 
relies primarily on formal or on informal care. This is quite straightforward for elderly 
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relying exclusively on formal or on informal care. For elderly relying on both types of care, 
the intensity of formal and informal care is compared to assess whether they rely 
primarily on formal or on informal care services. When the intensity of the use of formal 
care services is larger than the use of informal care services, the respondent is assigned as 
relying primarily on formal care. Similarly, when the intensity of the use of informal care is 
larger than the use of formal care, the respondent is assigned as relying primarily on 
informal care. Table 9.7 shows the unweighted distribution of this variable. Almost 70% of 
the research population that receives social care relies exclusively on formal or informal 
care (resp. 20% and 48%). Among those receiving both types of social care, the majority 
relies primarily on informal care services (56%). 
Table 9.7. Distribution of the research population, receiving social care, by the most 
important source of care (formal and/or informal) (unweighted, 2007) 
Most important source of social care N % 
Exclusively formal care 129 20 
Both formal and informal care   
  Primarily formal care 88 14 
  Primarily informal care 110 17 
Exclusively informal care 306 48 
Total 633 100 
Note: 1 respondent was excluded because of missings on one of the intensity variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3. Assessing the quality of the old age care package 
We also wish to evaluate the quality of the old age care package. The quality of health and 
social care services proofs to be a complex, multidimensional and multifaceted object of 
research (Shekelle, MacLean, Morton, & Wenger, 2001; Sorenson & Mossialos, 2007; 
Wenger & Shekelle, 2001). Not only does it refer to the different levels at which care is 
provided, it also implies taking account of different care settings, diverse goals of care 
provision, a heterogeneous population with different values about care, several 
stakeholders, etc.  
At the macro level, assessing the quality of care overall implies an evaluation of the legal 
quality norms, the encompassing quality assurance and quality improvement mechanisms, 
etc. At the micro level, the focus is on the quality of care from the viewpoint of the care 
receiver, which mainly comes down to the satisfaction of the care receiver with the care 
he/she received and the success in which the care received manages to improve the health 
status and/or functional level of the care receiver. In between the macro and the micro 
level, at the meso level, the quality of care refers to an assessment of the care providers 
offering health and social care services (Sorenson & Mossialos, 2007).  
Moreover, the interpretation as well as the assessment of the quality of care is expected to 
differ between care settings: different quality standards and expectations exist for 
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example for the care provided in residential care settings versus the care provided at the 
house of the care receiver (Sorenson & Mossialos, 2007). Further, these quality of care 
examinations have to serve several goals. Not only can the results of these quality 
assessments be used to develop and evaluate standards on health and social care, they 
also have to enhance informed consumer choice and competition among care providers 
(Sorenson & Mossialos, 2007). In addition, we also wish to underline the potential role of 
these care quality assessments for the elderly population in that they have to contribute to 
safeguarding and guaranteeing the care receiver’s wellbeing and to monitoring their 
protection against the functional dimension of old age dependency. 
Several (sets of) indicators have been developed in attempts to grasp the complex nature 
of the quality of care. Researchers seem to agree that these indicators can be clustered in 
three broad groups: structural indicators, process indicators, and outcome indicators. The 
first group - structural indicators - focuses on the health care providers and facilities and 
their capacity to provide high quality care. This includes, among others, the facility’s staff, 
safety, available technologies, etc. The second group - the process indicators - point to the 
actual use of the care services (performance, overuse and underuse). The last group, the 
outcome indicators, investigate whether the care received manages to influence the care 
receiver’s health status in the intended direction. This includes, for example, the 
examination of one’s health status after the receipt of a specific medical treatment. For the 
quality of social care services, however, according to Sorenson and Mossialos (2007) it is 
much more difficult to correctly measure this type of outcome, since there is a less direct 
link between the quality of the care services and changes in the functional level of the care 
receiver.  
Given the aims of our research, we narrow our investigation to the quality of care at the 
level of the care receiver. This broadly comes down to two things: an objective assessment 
whether individuals with a specific need have received (appropriate) care, and a 
subjective evaluation of the care receiver’s satisfaction with the care he or she received.112 
This has to be done both for health and social care services. Obviously, the use of the 
SHARE data limits us to the information included in the dataset. 
 
                                                             
112 At the EU level, a set of indicators measuring health and long-term care has been developed as 
part of the European Strategy for Social Inclusion (European Commission Directorate Employment, 
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2009). The potentially interesting primary indicators are 
self-reported unmet need for medical care, and self-reported unmet need for dental care. In 
addition also the secondary indicators on self-perceived limitations with ADL and self-perceived 
general health status could be of interest. Yet, no such information is included in the second wave of 
the SHARE. 
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3.1 The quality of health care services 
In the second wave of the SHARE, no information was collected on the patient satisfaction 
with the health care services received.113 Consequently, in an attempt to assess the quality 
of the health care services we focus on the receipt of appropriate health care, more 
specifically whether respondents with specific health problems had contact with 
specialised health care providers for these health problems (3.1.1) and/or received 
appropriate medication for this condition (3.1.2).  
3.1.1 Appropriate health care contacts 
A first indicator assesses whether the respondent with a specific health problem has had 
contact with an appropriate specialist for this problem. For example, for a respondent who 
reports a chronic lung disease this implies having had contact with a pulmonary specialist. 
In this case, health care services are considered as successful, irrespective of the result of 
the health care received and irrespective of whether or not the respondent was satisfied 
with it.  
  
 
                                                             
113 In the first wave of data collection, however, respondents were questioned on whether or not 
they had to forgo health care services because of specific reasons like the financial burden, the 
unavailability of care services at the moment of need, etc. 
231 
Table 9.8. Matching health problems (based on item ph006) to contacts with 
specialists (based on item hc004) to assess health care quality114 
Specialist Type health problem 
Cardiologist Cardiological Hearth attack, including myocardial infarction, 
coronary thrombosis, congestive heart failure, etc. 
  Hypertension 
  High blood cholesterol 
  Stroke or cerebrovascular disease 
Long specialist Pulmonary Chronic lung disease 
  Asthma 
Gastroenterologist Gastro intestinal Stomach or peptic ulcer 
Endocrinologist Endocrinological Diabetes 
Neurologist Cerebrovascular Stroke or cerebrovascular disease 
 Neurological Parkinson 
  Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, organic brain 
syndrome, etc. 
Ophthalmologist Vision  Cataract 
Rheumatologist Musculoskeletal Arthritis, rheumatism 
  Osteoporosis 
Orthopaedist Musculoskeletal Hip fracture 
  Other fractures 
Oncologist Cancer Cancer or malignant tumour 
Geriatrician Neurological Parkinson 
  Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, organic brain 
syndrome, etc. 
 Musculoskeletal Osteoporosis 
Based on the matching of specific health problems with specialist contacts (Table 9.8), we 
were able to calculate the actual number of successful matches and compare this to the 
potential successful matches115, which indicates the ratio of success: 
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡
 
When the ratio of success equals one, this means that the older person has had contact 
with an appropriate specialist for every health problem included in the list in the previous 
table. A ratio of success close to zero implies that the older person hardly had any contact 
with a (suited) specialist for his/her health problems. The success ratio of health care 
contacts is transposed to a categorical variable with four categories: never successful 
(ratio equals zero), sometimes successful (ratio larger than zero, but smaller than 0.5), 
 
                                                             
114 One should note that benign tumour cannot be assigned to one specific specialist. Further, not all 
specialists in item hc004 are included here, because health problems related to their competence 
are not questioned. This holds for dermatologist, ear, nose and throat specialist, surgeon, 
psychiatrist, gynaecologist, and urologist. 
115 The number of potential successful matches refers to the maximum number of successful 
matches one could have had in case he/she would have had contact with an appropriate specialist 
for every health problem. 
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most of the times successful (ratio larger than 0.5, yet smaller than one), and always 
successful (ratio equals one).  
Table 9.9 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population by the ratio of 
successful health care contacts. We find that for about 32% of the respondents there 
always was a successful match between the health status and the services received (ratio = 
1). However, for 29% of the research population there never was a successful match 
between health status and health care services (ratio = 0). 
Table 9.9. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of success of health 
care contacts (unweighted, 2007) 
Successful health care contacts Ratio N % 
Never Ratio = 0 234 29 
Sometimes 0 < Ratio < 0.5 91 11 
Most of the times 0.5 ≤ Ratio < 1 219 27 
Always Ratio = 1 260 32 
Total  804 100 
Note: The successful match between health problems and health care contacts is only computed for respondents that had 
contact with a second-line health care provider. We were able to compute the success ratio for about 84% of this group of 
respondents. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3.1.2 Appropriate medication 
In addition, health care services are also considered as successful when respondents with 
a specific health care problem received appropriate medication for this problem. The 
following question (ph011) in the SHARE module on physical health investigated the use 
of medication for several medical conditions: 
ph011 Our next question is about the medication you may be taking. Please look at card 10. Do 
you currently take drugs at least once a week for problems mentioned on this card? (multiple 
answers possible) 
1. Drugs for high blood cholesterol 
2. Drugs for high blood pressure 
3. Drugs for coronary or cerebrovascular diseases 
4. Drugs for other hearth diseases 
5. Drugs for asthma 
6. Drugs for diabetes 
7. Drugs for joint pain or for joint inflammation 
8. Drugs for other pain (e.g. headache, back pain, etc.) 
9. Drugs for sleep problems 
10. Drugs for anxiety or depression 
11. Drugs for osteoporosis, hormonal 
12. Drugs for osteoporosis, other than hormonal 
13. Drugs for stomach burns 
14. Drugs for chronic bronchitis 
96. None 
97. Other drugs, not yet mentioned 
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We matched the respondent’s health problems with his/her medication use (see Table 
9.10). Note that only for a limited number of health problems we were able to identify 
specific medication. For several reasons, a number of health problems are not reflected 
univocally in the receipt of medication. For example, hip fracture is prone to an operation 
rather than to medication. In addition, certain types of medication cannot be univocally 
ascribed to a specific health problem (e.g. item 8 in ph011: drugs for other pain). Also, the 
focus on the current use of medication makes it impossible to determine whether the 
respondent has received medication for a specific health problem in the past, but was no 
longer taking it at the moment of interview. Lastly, it is possible that a respondent with 
multiple pathologies does not receive medication for each single health problem because 
the combination of different drugs can lead to adverse drug reactions. Consequently, the 
doctor can decide not to prescribe medication for each health problem when the risk for 
drug interaction is too large (French, 1996). 
Again, in the matching of the health problems and the receipt of medication no reference is 
made to whether the treatment was successful, and whether the respondent was satisfied 
with the treatment and its results. 
Table 9.10. Matching health problems (based on item ph006) to medication use 
(based on item ph011) to assess health care quality 
Health problem Medication 
Hearth attack, including myocardial infarction,  
  coronary thrombosis, congestive heart    
  failure, etc. 
Drugs for coronary or cerebrovascular 
diseases  
Drugs for other hearth diseases 
Hypertension Drugs for high blood pressure 
High blood cholesterol Drugs for high blood cholesterol 
Stroke Drugs for coronary or cerebrovascular 
diseases 
Diabetes Drugs for diabetes 
Chronic lung disease Drugs for chronic bronchitis 
Asthma Drugs for asthma 
Arthritis, rheumatism Drugs for joint pain or for joint inflammation 
Osteoporosis Drugs for osteoporosis 
Stomach or peptic ulcer Drugs for stomach burns 
Again, we compare the number of successful matches between the use of medication and a 
health problem with the potential number of successful matches to get the ratio of success 
on the receipt of medication: 
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
A ratio of success approaching one indicates that the respondent nearly always has 
received appropriate medication for a specific health problem, while a success ratio close 
to zero indicates that the respondent hardly ever receives appropriate medication. The 
success ratio is transposed to a categorical variable with four categories: never successful 
(ratio equals zero), sometimes successful (ratio larger than zero, but smaller than 0.5), 
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most of the times successful (ratio larger than 0.5, yet smaller than one), and always 
successful (ratio equals one).  
Table 9.11 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population by the ratio of 
success of the medication they received. About 54% of the research population always 
received appropriate medication for a given condition, and 28% most of the time received 
appropriate mediation. Only 14% never received appropriate medication for a health 
condition. 
Table 9.11. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of success of 
medication (unweighted, 2007) 
Successful medication Ratio N % 
Never Ratio = 0 183 14 
Sometimes 0 < Ratio < 0.5 47 4 
Most of the times 0.5 ≤ Ratio < 1 367 28 
Always Ratio = 1 700 54 
Total  1297 100 
Note: The successful match between health problems and medication is only computed for respondents that used 
medication in the last year. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3.1.3 Reflections on the health care quality indicators 
We are fully aware of the suboptimal character of the assessment of the quality of the 
health care services presented in the previous section. More importantly, the quality of 
health care is limited to the receipt of appropriate health care, because of the lack of 
sufficient information to assess the quality of the health care services received more in 
detail. In addition, the following limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
First, we cannot quantify a solid relationship between the respondent’s health status and 
the contact with a specialised health care provider. It is not possible to rule out that a 
respondent had contact with other health care providers, or that he/she had contact with 
a health care provider for another health problem. Secondly, we cannot assess the actual 
result of the health care services received. It is not possible to identify whether the 
treatment or the medication was successful or not. Thirdly, we cannot evaluate the 
respondent’s satisfaction with the services and medication he or she received. Fourth, we 
cannot identify whether the respondent has had contact with different specialists for one 
health problem. Fifth, only for a smaller part of the research population we were able to 
match the health care services use to a specific health condition. Also, the health care 
services included in the analysis are limited to contacts with specialists. It is not possible 
to estimate the success ratio of respondents with specific health problems that only had 
contacts with first-line health care providers. 
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All these limitations mainly are the result from limitations in the SHARE data. No 
information is collected on the patient satisfaction, on whether or not the older person had 
to forego certain types of health care, the lack of precise information to match health 
problems and health care services, etc. Working with more detailed health data could be a 
solution, yet, even than the quality of health care services remains a difficult concept to 
measure. 
3.2 The quality of social care services 
As discussed before, the quality of social care is a concept that is difficult to measure. We 
focus on three quality dimensions: the receipt of appropriate care, the patient satisfaction 
with the care received, and the patient satisfaction with the care provider. 
3.2.1 Receipt of personal care and home help 
A first indicator focused on whether elderly reporting limitations with ADL or IADL 
actually received resp. personal care or home help. A match between having limitations 
and receiving care is successful when elderly reporting at least one limitation with ADL 
(based on ph049 items 1 to 6) received personal care and when elderly with at least one 
IADL limitation (based on ph049 items 7 to 13) received home help.116 The 
operationalisation of the receipt of personal care and home help is included in section 1.3. 
Table 9.12 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population that receives 
social care by whether or not they receive appropriate care (i.e. care adapted to their 
limitations with ADL and/or IADL). Among the respondents with ADL limitations only 
37% received personal care. About 63% did not receive personal care. Among the 
research population with limitations in their IADL, the majority received appropriate 
home help (66%). 
  
 
                                                             
116 See appendix 7 for more information on the operationalisation of limitations with ADL and IADL. 
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Table 9.12. Distribution of the research population receiving social care by the 
match between the care received and limitations with ADL and IADL (unweighted, 
2007) 
 Successful Not successful 
 N % N % 
Personal care 107 37 179 63 
Home help 256 66 132 34 
Note: Only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL are included here. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3.2.2 Satisfaction with social care 
A second indicator focuses on the satisfaction of the care receiver with the social care 
services he or she received. This is based on a subjective assessment of whether or not the 
care received meets the needs of the care receiver. Information on this is questioned in the 
SHARE module on physical health: question ph050 focuses on the receipt of social care, 
and question ph051 on whether or not this care meets the needs of the respondent.  
ph050 Thinking about the activities that you have problems with, does anyone ever help you 
with these activities? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
ph051 Would you say that the help you receive meets your needs?  
1. All the time 
2. Usually 
3. Sometimes 
4. Hardly ever 
Table 9.13 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population that receives 
social care services by how satisfied they are with the services they received. We see that 
the majority of the care receivers is quite satisfied: 93% of the research population states 
that the care they received most of the time or always met their needs. Only 7% claims 
that the social care services they received only sometimes or hardly ever met their needs. 
Table 9.13. Distribution of the research population receiving social care by 
satisfaction with the care received (unweighted, 2007) 
Patient satisfaction N % 
Hardly ever 4 1 
Sometimes 25 6 
Most of the time 123 32 
Always 237 61 
Total 389 100 
Note: Only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL are included here. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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3.2.3 Preferences on the main care provider 
A third indicator focuses on the expectations of the care receiver and whether the care he 
or she received corresponds to these expectations. In the SHARE this is translated into the 
expectations on who has the main responsibility in the provision of social care: the family 
or the state. A difference is made between personal care and home help. This question is 
included in the drop-off questionnaire (q7): 
q7 In your opinion, who - the family or the State - should bear the responsibility for each of the 
following:  
B. Help with household chores for older persons who are in need such as cleaning, washing 
C. Personal care for older persons who are in need such as nursing or help with bathing or 
dressing 
 
1. Totally family 
2. Mainly family 
3. Both equally 
4. Mainly state 
5. Totally state 
We compare the most important caregiver (cf. 2.2: primary caregiver) with the 
respondent’s preference on who should provide this type of care. When both correspond 
to each other, there is a successful match between the respondent’s preference and the 
type of care he or she receives. For example, there is a successful match if a respondent 
who thinks the state should provide personal care, receives personal care from a formal 
caregiver. Elderly claiming an equal responsibility to the family and the state in care only 
have a positive match between the care they receive and their preference if they receive 
care from both formal and informal caregivers. 
Table 9.14 shows the unweighted distribution of the research population receiving social 
care services on the match between the care they receive and their preference on who 
should provide this care. As shown, both for personal care and for home help the majority 
of the research population received care according to their preferences (resp. 68% for 
personal care and 65% for home help). 
Table 9.14. Distribution of the research population receiving social care services by 
the match between the care they receive and their preference on who should 
provide this care (unweighted, 2007) 
 Successful Not successful 
 N % N % 
Personal care 114 68 54 32 
Home help 261 65 139 35 
Note: Only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL, that receive social care services, without missing 
information on one of the variables (i.e. type of care received, caregiver, and preference on who should provide care) are 
included here. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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3.2.4 Reflections on the social care quality indicators 
We are fully aware of the suboptimal character of the assessment of the quality of the 
social care services presented in the previous section. We limited our investigation to 
three dimension of care quality. In addition, the following limitations should be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results. 
First, as was the case with the indicators on the quality of health care, no account is given 
to the efficiency or the effectiveness of the care services received. We do not assess 
whether the care received improves the respondent’s functional level, because 
information to do so is not available in the SHARE. Moreover, according to Sorenson and 
Mossialos (2007) it is unclear whether the quality of care services should be assessed in 
this way, because improving the functional status is not always the main objective of social 
care provision. 
Second, the first indicator that matches the receipt of social care services with whether or 
not the respondent has limitations with ADL and/or IADL does not take account of the 
overall respondent’s preferences on the receipt of social care. We cannot assess if a 
mismatch (i.e. the respondent has ADL and/or IADL limitations but does not receive 
appropriate care) is the result of the unavailability of appropriate care or of the reluctance 
of the respondent on receiving this type of care. 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter the operationalisation of the care package was discussed. Both the use of 
health care services and the use of social care services is included. A cluster analysis, based 
on the different care services questioned in the SHARE, was used to determine the 
existence of care packages. Seven hierarchical care packages were discerned, ranging from 
a care package with minor care use to a diverse, complex care package including both 
health and (formal and informal) social care services. In addition, we operationalised the 
intensity of the use of health and social care services. This refers resp. to the number of 
contacts the respondent had with a health care provider during the last year, and the 
hours of social care received during the last year. Lastly, some indicators on the quality of 
the care package were developed. This includes for example the match between health 
conditions and medication, and the receipt of social care that is adapted to the preferences 
of the care receiver. 
 
In the next chapter, we present the research results on the old age care package. Our main 
focus is on the relationship between the old age income and care package, and on the 
protection the old age care package provides against the functional dimension of old age 
dependency. 
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CHAPTER 10  
THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 
UNRAFFLED117 
 
                                                             
117 A part of this chapter is based on: Verpoorten, R. (2014). The reproduction of income inequality in 
the use of health and long-term care services? An investigation into the (success) story of the national 
health insurance scheme for the Belgian elderly population. Paper presented on the 12th Annual 
ESPAnet Conference, 4-6 September, Oslo, Norway.  
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CHAPTER 10. THE OLD AGE CARE PACKAGE 
UNRAFFLED 
In chapter 8 we investigated the protection against the financial dimension of old age 
dependency. The focus was on the old age income package and the extent to which this 
provides protection against financial deprivation in old age. In this chapter, we focus on 
another important dimension of old age dependency: the functional dimension and the 
risk on long-term functional dependency. We investigate the health and social care 
services that could provide protection against this dimension of old age dependency. We 
explore the composition of the care package of the Belgian elderly population, with 
specific attention for the relationship between the old age income package and the old age 
care package. More specifically, we concentrate on the reproduction of inequalities in the 
old age income package into the care package. The following research questions are 
addressed:  
RQ 2a. How is the old age care package composed?  
RQ 2b. What is the intensity of the use of health and social care services? 
RQ 2c. What role does the old age income package play in explaining the composition of 
the care package and the intensity of the care services utilisation? 
RQ 3b. What role does the old age care package play in providing protection against the 
functional dimension of old age dependency?  
RQ 3c. What role does the old age income package play in providing protection against the 
functional dimension of old age dependency? 
In addition, we formulated four specific hypotheses: 
H1. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
have a more diverse care package than elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse 
old age income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H2. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
have more contact with specialists than elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse 
old age income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H3. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
rely more on formal care, while elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse old age 
income package are expected to draw more on informal care, when controlling for health 
status and functional level. 
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H4. Elderly with a more generous income package are expected to have a higher intensity 
of health and social care services use than elderly with a less generous income packages, 
when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H5. Elderly with a more diverse care package are expected to enjoy higher levels of 
protection against the functional dimension of old age dependency than elderly with a less 
diverse care package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H6. Elderly with a more generous income package are expected to enjoy higher levels of 
protection against the functional dimension of old age dependency than elderly with a less 
generous income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, the broad research strategy for the analysis of the health 
and social care package of the elderly population is discussed. In the second section we 
describe the composition of the care package and the intensity of the use of health and 
social care services. In section 3, we investigate the relationship between the income 
package and the care package. We explore whether differences in the care package 
composition and in the intensity of the use of care services are related to differences in the 
generosity and the composition of the old age income package. In section 4, we present a 
number of logistic regression models investigating the link between the care package and 
the income package when controlling for differences in the health status, functional level 
and the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the individuals. In section 
4.1, we test the overall care package composition, while in sections 4.2 and 4.3 we focus on 
the use of health care services and social care services. The same is done for the intensity 
of the use of care services in section 5. In the last section, we explore the quality of the 
health and social care services used by the Belgian elderly population. Based on different 
indicators (see chapter 9), we search for a link between the old age income package and 
the quality of the old age care package. Do elderly with more generous old age income 
packages dispose of higher quality health and social care services than elderly with less 
generous old age income packages? 
1. Overall research strategy 
To assess the protection provided by the care package, account is given to a number of 
background determinants, generally acknowledged as influencing the use of health and 
social care services. This is to control for their potential influence when investigating the 
relationship between the care package and the income package.  
To decide on which background variables should be included in the models, we draw on 
the seminal health care utilisation framework of Andersen and Newman (1973). This 
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framework explains the use of health care from three types of factors: predisposing, 
enabling and need factors.118 The predisposing factors included here are mainly 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic determinants: sex, age, level of education and 
former employment status. Among the enabling factors, the focus is on the old age income 
package, including not only personal income sources but also asset sources. Attention is 
given to the generosity and the composition of the income package. Further, also the living 
situation (either or not living together with a partner) is included as a factor inducing the 
access to care. Concerning the need factors, account is given to the health status and the 
functional level to control for need differences (i.e. differences in health status and 
functional level) among the elderly population (see Figure 10.1). Two dimensions of the 
health and social care package are assessed: the use of the care services and the intensity 
of this use. In addition, we also assess the quality of the care package. 
Figure 10.1. The care package: Conceptual scheme 
 
 
 
 
One should note that no account is given to the availability of care services. In chapter 4 of 
this dissertation the regional organisation of care services was sketched, but in the 
empirical analyses we will not include the potential influence of the supply side of health 
and social care on the use of these services, because we wish to focus on the role of the old 
age income package in explaining differences in the use of health and social care services. 
Including the supply of care services in, for example, a multilevel research design would 
shift our attention away from our main research questions. Yet, in reading and 
interpreting the research results one must keep in mind that differences in the availability 
and presence of care services can induce differences in the use of these services.119 
Descriptive and exploratory statistical techniques are applied to map the use of care 
services and the intensity of this use. The distributions of the categorical variables and 
their mutual relationships are displayed in cross tables. The appropriate test statistics are 
calculated to explore whether the observed relations are statistically significant. In 
addition, multivariate models are used to explain the composition of the care package and 
the intensity of the care use. To control for differences in the sociodemographic and 
socioeconomic background of the research population, we include the main background 
 
                                                             
118 The health care utilisation framework of Andersen and Newman (1973) is discussed more in 
detail in chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
119 See for example the research of Declercq et al. (2009) on this topic. 
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variables in the models (i.e. sex, age, level of education, occupational status, living 
situation, health status and functional level). Our central focus, however, is on the role of 
the old age income package. The choice of the appropriate techniques depends on the 
character of the dependent variables (i.e. categorical of metric). More details on this are 
provided in the relevant sections.  
2. The old age care package 
In this section, we explore the old age care package of the Belgian elderly population. First, 
we address the composition of the care package (2.1) and the intensity of the use of health 
and social care services (2.2). We also investigate whether there is a relationship between 
the intensity of use and the composition of the care package (2.3). Secondly, we pay 
attention to a number of sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables to 
give a first indication of potential vulnerable groups.  
Note that the potential influence of the income package on the care package is not 
addressed here, because this is discussed in detail in section 3. 
2.1 Composition of the old age care package 
In this first section, we focus on the composition of the care package. Table 10.1 shows the 
weighted distribution of the research population by the care package composition, based 
on the hierarchical care clusters (see chapter 9). About 29% of the research population 
has a minor care use, whereas 23% of the elderly combines first- and second-line health 
care services. 36% of the research population relies to an important extent on care 
services, provided by either formal or informal caregivers. For 23% of the research 
population home help services are dominant: about 14% relies primarily on informal 
home help, while 9% mainly receives home help from formal caregivers. A minority of the 
research population depends largely on informal personal care services (4%), while 9% 
combines several health and social care services (mixed care package).  
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Table 10.1. Distribution of the research population by care package composition 
(weighted, 2007) 
Care package N % 
Minor care use 486 29 
Second-line health care 374 23 
Hospital care 205 12 
Informal home help 231 14 
Formal home help 141 9 
Informal personal care 69 4 
Mixed care package 145 9 
Total 1651 100  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
2.2 Intensity of care use 
Secondly, we investigate the intensity of the care use. Table 10.2 gives the weighted 
distribution of the research population by the intensity of their health, resp. social care 
services use. A difference is made between a low (1 to 6 health care contacts per year / 
less than 1 hour of care per week), a moderate (7 to 12 health care contacts per year / 1 to 
7 hours of care per week) and a high intensity of utilisation (13 or more health care 
contacts per year / more than 7 hours of care per week). In addition, Table 10.2 also 
shows the mean and the median intensity of use, expressed in number of contacts with 
health care services and the number of hours of social care services received. 
Table 10.2. Relative distribution of the research population by the intensity of 
health and social care services use (weighted, 2007) 
 Health care services Social care services 
Mean  8 8 
Median  6 3 
   
Intensity of use (%)   
  No 4 65 
  Low 52 10 
  Moderate 23 14 
  High 20 11 
Total (N=100%) 1697 1604 
Note: The mean (resp. median) intensity of health care services refers to the average (resp. median) number of contacts 
the respondent had with a health care provider during the last year. The mean (resp. median) intensity of social care 
services refers to the average (resp. median) number of hours of social care services received during the last year, on a 
weekly basis. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
The majority of the research population has a low intensity of health care services use: 
52% had only one to six contacts with a health care provider during the last year. About 
20% had a quite intense use of health care services, with on average more than monthly 
visits to a health care provider. Only 4% of the research population did not have any 
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contact with a health care provider during the last year. On average, the research 
population had eight contacts with a health care provider during the last year.  
Concerning social care, the majority of the research population did not receive social care 
services during the last year (65%). About 35% of the research population reports the use 
of this type of care services. Within this group of social care receivers, about 28% gets less 
than one hour of care per week, and 39% receives one to seven hours of care per week. 
About 31% of the care receivers is considered as intense users of these services, and 
receives one average more than one hour of care per day. On average, the older care 
receivers receive about eight hours of care per week, which is quite high. However, 50% of 
the care receivers gets a maximum of three hours of social care services per week.  
2.3 Composition of the care package versus the intensity of use 
In addition, we also investigate whether a relationship exists between the intensity of care 
services use and the composition of the care package. According to Van Vliet et al. (2010), 
a higher degree of diversity in the care package indicates a higher degree of care 
dependency, that on its turn is related to a higher intensity of care services use. 
Consequently, more diverse care packages are expected to go hand in hand with a higher 
intensity in care services use. This is confirmed in the SHARE data. Table 10.3 shows the 
average intensity of health and social care services use by the composition of the care 
package. We see that the average intensity of use increases when the care package 
becomes more complex. For example, elderly with a minor care package on average had 4 
contacts with a health care provider and received no social care services, while a 
respondent with a mixed care package had 16 contacts with a health care provider and 
received 15 hours of social care services per week. 
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Table 10.3. Mean intensity of health and social care services use by the care package 
composition (weighted, 2007) 
 Mean intensity of use 
Care package 
Health care services 
(contacts) 
Social care services 
(hours/week) 
Minor care use 4 0 
Second-line health care 6 0 
Hospital treatment 9 0 
Informal home help 8 4 
Formal home help 12 7 
Informal personal care 17 14 
Mixed care package 16 15 
Total  8 8 
Note: The mean intensity of health care services refers to the average number of contacts the respondent had with a 
health care provider during the last year. The mean intensity of social care services refers to the average number of hours 
of care received during the last year, on a weekly basis. 
Note: Both for the intensity of health care services use and the intensity of social care services use the differences 
between the care packages are found to be statistically significant (p<0.0001) (according to the Kruskal-Wallis Chi² test 
statistics). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
2.4 Tracing vulnerable groups 
Lastly, we explore the existence of vulnerable groups regarding the care package and the 
intensity of the use of health and social care services. In doing so, we include the following 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables: sex, age, living with partner, 
occupational status and level of education. Because health status and functional level are 
essential in explaining the use of health and social care services (cf. Andersen & Newman, 
1973), we also address a number of health status and functional level variables. Note that 
income is not addressed here, because we will investigate this more in depth in the next 
section. 
Table 10.4 shows the weighted relative distribution of the research population by the care 
package composition and by a number of relevant socioeconomic and sociodemographic 
background variables. The following interesting findings pop out. First, women tend to 
have more complex care packages than men: 41% of the female research population relies 
to some extent on social care services, compared to only 29% of the male research 
population. Secondly, the positive relationship between age and the composition of the 
care package is proven in that the research population above 75 years overall has more 
diverse care packages than the research population between 60 and 74 years. This is 
explained by the fact that getting older is positively related to having a higher degree of 
physical dependency. Thirdly, high-status elderly are stronger represented in the second-
line health care package than lower-status elderly. For example, 30% of the elderly with a 
high occupational status (salariat) and 30% of the elderly with a high level of education 
belong to the second-line health care package, compared to only 16% of the elderly with a 
low occupational status and 18% of the low-educated elderly. Potentially, this is explained 
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by the fact that status is associated with income and that a higher income generates more 
possibilities to pay for the more expensive second-line health care providers. However, 
status can also be associated with knowledge: high-status elderly have more knowledge 
about the medical system and therefor have a lower burden in contacting a second-line 
health care provider. Lastly, singles are overrepresented in the more complex care 
packages and rely more on formal social care services than elderly living with a partner. 
For example, 15% of the single respondents belong to the “formal home help” package, 
compared to only 5% of the respondents with a partner. In addition, 5% of the 
respondents living with a partner have an “informal personal care” package, compared to 
only 2% of the single-living elderly. Possibly this is explained by the fact that single-living 
elderly cannot draw on the informal care provided by the partner, and thus more often 
rely on formally provided care. 
Table 10.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the care package 
composition and by sex, age, occupational status, level of education and living 
situation (weighted, 2007) 
 Care package (%) 
 
Minor 
Second-
line 
Hospital 
Informal 
home help 
Formal 
home help 
Informal 
personal 
care 
Mixed 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Sex         
  Male 32 23 15 13 6 5 6 741 
  Female 27 22 10 15 11 4 11 910 
Age                
  60-74 34 26 14 13 4 4 6 1074 
  75+ 21 16 9 16 18 5 14 577 
Occupational status               
  Salariat 29 30 14 11 5 4 8 550 
  Intermediate 29 22 11 15 12 4 7 386 
  Working class 32 16 12 17 8 5 10 467 
  None 29 18 11 13 11 5 12 184 
Education                 
  High 30 30 14 11 7 3 5 354 
  Intermediate 29 23 13 14 9 4 8 758 
  Low 30 18 10 16 8 5 12 524 
Living situation             
   Couple 34 26 14 10 5 5 6 1079 
  Single 21 17 9 22 15 2 14 571 
Total 29 23 12 14 9 4 9 1651 
Note: The relationship between the care package composition and all the background determinants is statistically 
significant (p <0.0001) (based on the Pearson Chi² test statistics). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Table 10.5 shows the mean intensity of care use by sex, age, occupational status, level of 
education and living situation. For health care services, this expresses the average number 
of contacts with a health care provider one had during the last year. For social care 
services, this expresses the average hours of social care services received per week in the 
last year. 
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Women, the oldest elderly, low-status elderly and singles on average have a higher 
intensity of health care services use than men, elderly between 60 and 74 years, high-
status elderly, and elderly living with a partner. The same is found for the intensity of the 
use of social care services. To a certain extent this is the result of the relationship between 
the complexity of the care package and the intensity of the use of care services (cf. supra).  
Table 10.5. Mean intensity of care use by sex, age, occupational status, level of 
education and living situation (weighted, 2007) 
  Mean intensity of use  
 Health care services Social care services 
 
Mean number of 
contacts 
 
p 
Mean hours/week  
p 
Sex     
  Male 8 0.0171 6 0.1475 
  Female 9  10  
Age       
  60-74 7 <0.0001 5 <0.0001 
  75+ 10  11  
Occupational status      
  Salariat 7 0.0022 6 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 8  6  
  Working class 9  9  
  None 10  16  
Education       
  High 7 <0.0001 5 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 8  6  
  Low 10  12  
Living situation       
  Couple 8 <0.0001 7 0.3299 
  Single 10  9  
Total 8  8  
Note: The mean intensity of health care services refers to the average number of contacts the respondent had with a 
health care provider during the last year. The mean intensity of social care services refers to the average number of hours 
of social care received during the last year, on a weekly basis. Only respondents actually using the services were included 
in the calculations. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
3. Investigating the relationship between the income package and 
the care package 
In this section, we investigate whether a relationship exists between the income package 
and the care package, a central question in this research. More specifically, links between 
the generosity and the composition of the income package on the one hand, and the 
composition and intensity of the care package on the other hand are investigated. It is 
expected that elderly with so-called ‘rich’ income packages differ from elderly with ‘poor’ 
income packages in their care use (both composition and intensity of use). Elderly with a 
more generous income package are assumed to have more access to health care, and have 
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a higher intensity of utilisation. Similarly, elderly with a more generous income package 
are supposed to have more and easier access to formal care services, while elderly with a 
less generous income package are compelled to the use of ‘cheap’ informal care.   
Note that we make a difference between the old age income package containing only 
personal income sources, and the extended old age income package, which includes also 
the available income from financial assets and property ownership.120 The main reason for 
this is the availability of the income for consumption: the income from personal income 
sources is considered to be more directly available for short-term expenses and regular 
consumption goals. Spending on health and social care services is part of this. However, 
the available income from the extended income package is expected not to be used 
entirely for regular consumption, since a part is derived from financial assets and property 
ownership.  
Further, one should also note that in this section we focus on the relationship between the 
care package and the income package without taking account of the potential influence of 
other background characteristics (like health and functional status, sex, age, etc.). In 
sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, we present a number of multivariate regression models 
including other background characteristics besides the old age income package to present 
a broader picture of the variables influencing the health and old age care package. 
In section 3.1, we focus on link between the income package and the composition of the 
care package. In section 3.2, we focus on the relationship between the income package and 
the intensity of the use of health and social care services. 
3.1 The care package composition along the lines of the old age income 
package  
The investigation of the relationship between the care package composition and the old 
age income package is twofold.  
On the one hand, we investigate whether the care package composition is related to the 
generosity of the old age income package (section 3.1.1). The hypothesis is that more 
generous income packages result in more diverse care packages, mainly because elderly 
with a more generous old age income package have more means to buy in care services. 
Further, we distinguish between the use of health care services and the use of social care 
services. Concerning the use of health care services, we expect that elderly with more 
generous income packages rely more on second-line health care providers than elderly 
with less generous income packages. Concerning the use of social care services, we expect 
that elderly with less generous income packages have to draw more on ‘cheap’ informal 
 
                                                             
120 More information on the composition of the old age income package, as well as the calculation of 
the level of income is included in chapter 7. 
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care, while elderly with more generous old age income packages have more opportunities 
to buy in care and thus rely more on formal care providers. 
On the other hand, a link between the composition of the old age income package and the 
care package is investigated (section 3.1.2). The main hypothesis is that more diverse old 
age income packages go hand in hand with more diverse care packages. 
3.1.1 The care package composition versus the generosity of the old age income 
package 
First, we investigate the overall relationship between the care package composition and 
the level of income protection from the income package. To recall, the personal income 
package includes only income sources with personal ownership, like pensions and social 
security benefits. The extended income package includes the income from personal 
income sources, and the available income from financial assets (via interests) and from 
secondary residence (rental income). All incomes are calculated on a monthly basis and 
are made equivalent to take account of the returns of scale from living together with a 
partner.  
Table 10.6 shows the mean and median income from the personal and the extended old 
age income package by the different configurations of the care package. Also a difference is 
made by the use of health care services (only first-line health care or a combination of 
first- and second-line health care services) and the use of social care services (formal vs. 
informal care services).  
First, we find that the generosity of the old age income package tends to decrease when 
the complexity of the care package increases. There seems to be a negative relationship 
between the generosity of the income package and the care package composition. In 
addition, elderly with a second-line health care package have the most generous old age 
income package, irrespective of the type of income sources included. The mean equivalent 
income from the personal income package of this group of elderly is 1596 Euros per 
month; when assets are included the mean income increases to 1771 Euros per month. 
Elderly with the highest degree of diversification in their care package proof to have the 
least generous old age income package. On average, elderly with a mixed care package 
receive 1026 Euros per month from the personal income package. When assets are 
included, the average income from the old age income package increases to 1121 Euros 
per month. Yet, one must note that we do not take account of any differences in the health 
status and the functional level of the elderly population, so it is possible that this 
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relationship changes when we investigate the generosity of the income package for elderly 
with a similar health status and functional level.121 This is addressed in section 4. 
Secondly, concerning the use of health care services, elderly that only had contact with 
first-line health care providers on average have 1215 Euros from the personal income 
package, while the average income from personal income sources of elderly that combine 
contacts with first- and second-line health care providers is about 150 Euros higher (1364 
Euros). Also when the income from the extended income package is considered, the 
expected income differences are confirmed. The average level of the extended income 
package of elderly with only first-line health care services is lower than that of elderly 
with first- and second-line health care services (resp. 1369 Euros per month vs. 1533 
Euros per month). 
Thirdly, little differences in the generosity of the old age income package of elderly that 
rely on formal care and elderly that rely only of informal care are found. Elderly combining 
formal and informal care have the least generous old age income packages.  
  
 
                                                             
121 However, an exploratory bivariate analysis of the relationship between the care package and the 
income package of elderly that are actually confronted with limitations in their health status and 
functional level (limitations in ADL or IADL) indicates that there is no significant relationship 
between the care package and the composition or the generosity of the income package. 
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Table 10.6. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal and 
the extended income package by care package composition, use of health and social 
care services (weighted, 2007) 
  Personal income package Extended income package 
 N Mean Median Mean Median 
Care package°      
  Minor care use 454 1212 1034 1353 1127 
  Second-line health care 359 1596 1154 1771 1322 
  Hospital treatment 190 1399 1098 1630 1218 
  Informal home help 216 1160 1068 1318 1146 
  Formal home help 137 1182 1041 1372 1125 
  Informal personal care 65 1221 1091 1320 1176 
  Mixed care package 135 1026 1000 1121 1054 
Health care services+      
  Only first-line  603 1215 1049 1369 1126 
  First- and second-line  888 1364 1087 1533 1213 
Social care services£      
  Only formal care 120 1195 1077 1350 1192 
  Formal + informal care 177 1042 976 1180 1020 
  Only informal care 284 1192 1070 1339 1145 
Note: The mean and median income from the extended income package refers to the income from personal income 
sources and the direct available income from assets (ie interest from financial assets and rental income from secondary 
residence). 
° The income differences between the care packages are statistically significant for both the personal income package 
(p=0.0052) and the extended income package (p=0.0001) (according to the Kruskal-Wallis Chi² test statistics). 
+ The income differences between the two groups of health care services are statistically significant for both the personal 
income package (p=0.0103) and the extended income package (p=0.0044) (according to the Kruskal-Wallis Chi² test 
statistics). 
£ The income differences between the groups of social care services use are statistically significant for both the personal 
income package (p=0.0013) and the extended income package (p=0.0062) (according to the Kruskal-Wallis Chi² test 
statistics). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, we investigate whether inequalities in the income distribution are reflected in 
the care package composition. How does the care package composition change along the 
income distribution? Because the differences between the personal and the extended old 
age income package are minor, we only present the personal income distribution (Figure 
10.2). Although the relationship between the income distribution and the care package 
composition is not straightforward, we do see that elderly with a second-line health care 
package (grey bars) are somewhat overrepresented in the upper income deciles, while 
elderly with a mixed care package (checked bars) are stronger represented in the lower 
income deciles:  28% of the elderly with a second-line health care package has an income 
in D9 or D10, compared to only 10% of the elderly with a mixed care package. Similarly, 
elderly with an informal home help package (grey dotted bars) are also less presented in 
the upper part of the income distribution: only 16% of this group of elderly has an income 
in D9 or D10.  
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Figure 10.2. Care package composition by personal income decile distribution 
(weighted, 2007)122 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Figure 10.3 shows the use of health care services (first-line vs. first- and second-line health 
care services) along the income distribution. No clear trend is found. On the one hand, the 
combination of first- and second-line health care services increases from the first to the 
fourth income decile, but drops in the fifth income decile. The proportion of elderly 
combining first- and second-line health care again increases from the sixth to the tenth 
income decile. On the other hand, the proportion of elderly that only uses first-line health 
care services tends to decrease from the first to the fifth income decile, and again increases 
slightly from the sixth to the tenth income decile. As could be expected from these 
observations, the relationship between the income decile distribution and the use of 
health care services is not statistically significant. 
 
                                                             
122 The differences between the income deciles are statistically significant (p=0.0003) (Based on the 
Pearson Chi² test statistic). 
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Figure 10.3. Health care services use by personal income decile distribution 
(weighted, 2007)123 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
When we assess the use of formal and informal social care services along the income 
distribution (Figure 10.4), we see that the tendency to use only formal care increases very 
little when moving up in the income distribution. The tendency to use only informal care is 
relatively stable. For example, 33% of the elderly that rely only on formal care services 
have an income in the upper three income deciles (D8, D9 and D10) compared to only 
26% of the elderly that rely only on informal care. The difference between both is not 
statistically significant. 
 
                                                             
123 The differences between the income deciles are not statistically significant at an alpha-level of 
0.05 (Pearson Chi²=12.6261; DF=9; p=0.1840). 
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Figure 10.4. Use of social care services by the personal income decile distribution 
(weighted, 2007)124 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
3.1.2 The care package composition versus the income package composition  
In this section, we investigate whether a relationship exists between the composition of 
the care package and the composition of the income package. We hypothesize that more 
diverse income packages go together with more diverse care packages. Note that this 
relationship can be intermediated by the generosity of the old age income package, which 
is also related to the income package composition (cf. chapter 8). 
Table 10.7 shows the relative distribution of the research population by the composition 
of the care package and the personal income package. We do not find a straightforward 
relationship between the degree of diversification in the care package and in the personal 
income package. On the contrary, a higher degree of diversification in the care package 
seems to be associated with a higher proportion of the research population that relies only 
on a first pillar pension. For example, 28% of the elderly with a minor care use rely on 
only a first pillar pension compared to 40% of the elderly with a mixed care package. 
Elderly combining two or more pensions are somewhat overrepresented in the second-
line health care package: 43% of the elderly with a second-line health care package 
 
                                                             
124 The differences between the income deciles are statistically significant (Pearson Chi²=39.8467; 
DF=18; p=0.0039). However, when respondents combining formal and informal long-term care 
services are excluded from the analysis, the differences between the income deciles are no longer 
statistically significant (Pearson Chi²=12.6883; DF=9; p=0.1973). 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Only formal Only informal Formal and informal
256 
combine a first pillar pension with a second or a third pillar pension in their personal 
income package (resp. 11% and 32%). 
Table 10.7. Relative distribution of the research population by care package 
composition and personal income package composition (weighted, 2007) 
 Personal income package (%) 
 
P1 P2+P1 P1+P3 
SS+ 
other 
Wage+ 
other Only P3 None 
Total  
(N=100%) 
Care package         
Minor care use 28 9 26 7 8 9 13 463 
Second-line health care 26 11 32 6 6 10 9 361 
Hospital treatment 24 10 30 10 6 4 15 197 
Informal home help 37 10 32 11 2 3 5 212 
Formal home help 46 5 28 6 3 5 7 130 
Informal personal care 42 5 22 7 2 7 15 65 
Mixed care package 40 8 23 10 3 4 12 131 
Total 31 9 29 8 5 7 11 1558 
Note: The relationship between the care package composition and the personal income package composition is statistically 
significant (Pearson Chi²=92.6627; DF=36; p<0.0001). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, Table 10.8 shows the relative distribution of the research population by the 
composition of the care package and the asset package. As could be expected from the 
results in chapter 8, little differences exist between the care package configurations along 
financial asset ownership. Only among the elderly with an informal personal care package 
the financial asset ownership is quite low: ‘only’ 89% has financial assets. More 
pronounced differences occur when home ownership and secondary residence are 
considered. Concerning home ownership, Table 10.10 shows that the proportion of elderly 
with home ownership decreases when the complexity of the care package increases. For 
example, 82% of the elderly with a minor care package owns a home for living, while this 
is the case for only 67% of the elderly with a mixed care package. Similarly, secondary 
residence ownership decreases when the complexity in the care package increases: 19% 
of the elderly with a minor care package owns a secondary residence, compared to only 
11% of the elderly with a mixed care package. 
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Table 10.8. Relative distribution of the research population by asset ownership and 
care package composition (weighted, 2007) 
 Asset ownership  
% Financial assets Home  2nd residence Total (N) 
Care package     
Minor care use 98 82 19 463 
Second-line health care 98 85 22 361 
Hospital treatment 97 84 20 197 
Informal home help 96 74 15 212 
Formal home help 98 79 15 130 
Informal personal care 89 74 9 65 
Mixed care package 96 67 11 131 
     
Significance (p) 0.0023 <0.0001 0.0262  
Note: Only the proportion of the research population that owns a specific asset source is included in this table. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
We can conclude that, despite our expectations, a higher degree of diversification in the 
income package is not significantly related to a higher degree of diversification in the care 
package. On the contrary, elderly with lower degrees of diversification in both their 
personal income package and their asset package tend to have more complex care 
packages. This could be the result from intermediating variables that are not measured 
here, like differences in the generosity of the income package or differences in the health 
status and functional level. Multivariate analyses, controlling for background differences, 
have to shed more light on the actual relationship between the composition of the care 
package and the old age income package (cf. section 4). 
3.2 The intensity of care use along the lines of the old age income package 
In this section we investigate whether the intensity of the care use is related to the 
generosity of the old age income package. We assume that more generous old age income 
packages generate more means to buy in care services, which results in a higher intensity 
of use of health and social care services. 
Table 10.9 gives the mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal 
and the extended income package by the intensity of the use of health and social care 
services. The mean and median income shows to be lower for elderly with a higher 
intensity of use than for elderly with a low intensity of care services use. For example, the 
level of the personal income package is about 1100 Euros per month for elderly with a 
high intensity of health care services use, while it is about 1400 Euros per month for 
elderly with a low intensity of use. For the use of social care services, the overall trend is 
the same, but the differences are smaller. Elderly with a high intensity of social care 
services use on average receive 1100 Euros per month from the personal income package, 
while elderly with a low intensity of use on average have almost 1200 Euros from their 
personal income package. 
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Table 10.9. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal and 
the extended income package by the intensity of health and social care use 
(weighted, 2007) 
  Personal income package Extended income package 
Intensity of use N Mean Median Mean Median 
Health care services      
  Low 807 1402 1082 1587 1212 
  Moderate 366 1231 1073 1378 1199 
  High 320 1122 1036 1246 1094 
Correlation      r=-0.0534  p=0.0393 r=-0.0654  p=0.0116 
 
Social care services           
  Low 198 1196 1084 1373 1237 
  Moderate 213 1123 1001 1258 1081 
  High 172 1118 991 1239 1042 
Correlation      r=-0.0544  p=0.2130 r=-0.0532  p=0.2267 
Note: Only respondents actually using health and social care services are included in the calculation. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, we calculated the correlation between the income from the personal and the 
extended income package and the intensity of use of health and social care services.125 The 
Spearman correlation coefficient between the generosity of the income package and the 
intensity of the use of health care services was not statistically significant (p=0.2130). The 
correlation, that was very weak, indicated a negative relationship between the intensity of 
use and the generosity of the income package. No significant correlation was found 
between the generosity of the income package and the intensity of use of social care 
services. 
When looking at the intensity of health and social services care use along the income 
distribution, presented in Figure 10.5126, we see that overall the mean intensity of both 
health and social care services is higher in the lower income deciles than in the upper 
income deciles. The mean intensity of health and social care services is largest in the third 
and fourth income decile: elderly in these income groups on average had more than 10 
contacts with a health care provider. Elderly using social care services in D3 and D4 on 
average received 12 to 13 hours of care per week. After D4 the mean intensity decreases. 
For example, in the highest income decile elderly on average had 7 health care contacts 
during the last year and elderly on average received 6 hours of care per week.  
 
                                                             
125 We computed the Spearman correlation coefficient using the PROC CORR procedure in SAS. 
126 Because little differences between the personal and the extended income package distribution 
were found, we only include the personal income distribution here. 
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Figure 10.5. Mean intensity of health and social care services use by the personal 
income decile distribution (weighted, 2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Lastly, we also assess the relationship between the generosity of the income package and 
whether the older care receiver relies primarily on formal or on informal care. Table 10.12 
shows the mean and the median monthly equivalent income from the personal and the 
extended old age income package by whether the respondent relies on: 
 only formal care;  
 only informal care;  
 formal and informal care, but mainly on formal care;  
 formal and informal care, but mainly on informal care. 
Table 10.10. Mean and median monthly equivalent net income from the personal 
and the extended income package by relying primarily on formal or informal care 
services (weighted, 2007) 
  Personal income package Extended income package 
 N Mean Median Mean Median 
Care provider      
Only formal care 120 1195 1077 1350 1192 
Primarily formal care 81 1061 1000 1222 1113 
Primarily informal care 95 1026 955 1146 977 
Only informal care 284 1192 1070 1339 1145 
      
Significance (p)  0.5787  0.2094  
Note: Only respondents using social care services are included in the calculation of the means and the medians. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
The income differences between the respondents relying on social care services are very 
small. The mean and median personal income of elderly relying only on formal care or 
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relying only on informal care are almost the same, about 1190 Euros per month. Among 
elderly combining formal and informal care services, the income from the income package 
is a little higher for elderly that rely primarily on formal care services than for elderly that 
rely primarily on informal care services (resp. 1061 Euros vs. 1026 Euros per month for 
the personal income package). 
We can conclude that whereas we expected that higher incomes would go together with a 
higher intensity of use of health and (formal) social care services, this is not univocally 
supported by the data. Elderly with high intensities of use of health and social care 
services overall have less generous income packages than elderly with low intensities of 
use. However, when we look at the income distribution, the mean intensity of use tends to 
peak in the lower half of the income distribution and decreases in the second half of the 
income distribution. We assume that unmeasured variables intervene in the relationship 
between the generosity of the income package and the intensity of health and social care 
services use. For example, age is related to the generosity of the old age income package 
and the use of health and social care services. Older respondents showed to have less 
generous income packages (cf. chapter 8), and are expected to have a more diverse and 
more intense use of care services. This is investigated further in the multivariate models in 
the next sections. 
4. Explaining the care package composition 
In this section, we investigate which determinants are statistically significant in explaining 
the composition of the care package, the use of health care services and the use of social 
care services. Three logistic regression models are estimated. Our main focus is on the 
effect of the old age income package (generosity and composition), but also other 
sociodemographic, socioeconomic and health status variables are included in the models.  
Given the categorical character of the three dependent variables, we calculate three 
logistic regression models. In section 4.1. we discuss the construction of the models; the 
model results are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
4.1 Construction of the logit models 
The dependent variable in the first logistic regression model is the care package 
composition, a categorical variable with seven categories: minor care use, second-line 
health care, hospital care, informal home help, formal home help, informal personal care 
and a mixture of these health and social care services (cf. supra). The reference category is 
the minor care package. The second model investigates whether the respondent has had 
contact with at least one second-line health care provider (specialist) during the last year 
(binomial categorical variable). The reference category is that the respondent did not have 
any contact with a second-line health care provider. In the third model, the use of social 
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care services is the dependent variable. This is a categorical variable with three categories: 
use of formal care, use of informal care, or a combination of both. 
Diverse independent variables are included in the three models (see Table 10.11). The 
focus is on the old age income package (generosity and composition). A difference is made 
between the models including the personal income package (A-models) and the models 
including the extended income package (B-models). To simplify the interpretation of the 
results, we include the generosity of the income package as a categorical variable with five 
categories corresponding to the income quintiles. Five health related independent 
variables are included: subjective health status, multimorbidity, multi health symptoms, 
multi ADL limitations and multi IADL limitations.127,128 Further, six sociodemographic and 
socioeconomic background variables are included: sex, age, occupational status, level of 
education, living situation, and region of residence. 
Table 10.11. Independent variables in the logit models testing the care package 
composition and their reference category 
  Dependent variable 
  Model 1: 
Care 
package 
Model 2: 
Second-line 
health care 
Model 3: 
Social care 
services 
Independent variable Reference category LM A LM B LM A LM B LM A LM B 
Income package 
  Personal income package Only P1 X X X X X X 
  Financial assets Ownership - X - X - X 
  Home ownership° Ownership - X - X - X 
  Secondary residence Ownership - X - X - X 
  Income level Q1 X X X X X X 
Health and functional level 
  Subjective health status Poor X X X X X X 
  Multimorbidity ≥2 health problems X X X X X X 
  Multisymptoms ≥2 health symptoms X X X X X X 
  Multi ADL limitations ≥2 ADL limitations X X - - X X 
  Multi IADL limitations ≥2 IADL limitations X X - - X X 
Sociodemographic and socioeconomic background 
  Sex Female X X X X X X 
  Age 75+ X X X X X X 
  Occupational status No occupation X X X X X X 
  Level of education Low X X X X X X 
  Living situation Single X X X X X X 
  Region of residence Brussels  X X X X X X 
Note: X = variable is included in the model   - = variable is not included in the model 
Note: In the B-models, home ownership is also included as an independent variable, although it does not generate an 
immediately available income like the interests from financial assets or the rental incomes from secondary residence. 
However, because home ownership can induce differences in the consumption behaviour of care services, we have included it 
here as an independent variable (cf. chapter 4). 
 
                                                             
127 For the operationalisation of the controlling variables, see Appendix 7.  
128 In the model testing the use of second-line health care, the functional status variables are not 
included. In the model testing the use of long-term care services, health status variables are not 
included. 
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In all models, observations with missings on one of the variables in the model were 
deleted.129 In addition, the population was limited to respondents that received the 
investigated type of care. In the models testing the contact with a second-line health care 
provider, the population in the model was limited to the respondents that had at least one 
contact with a health care provider (first- and second-line).130 The models with the use of 
social care services as the dependent variable, included only respondents that actually 
received social care services during the last year.131 Before estimating the models, the 
model assumptions were examined. No violations were found on the multicollinearity and 
linearity assumptions. To avoid problems with small n’s and empty cells, we did not 
include interaction effects in the models. A number of outliers were detected, however, we 
decided not to remove these observations from the models. Given the sample size, we 
expect that the (potential) distorting effect of these outliers is rather low. In SAS, we used 
PROC LOGISTIC to compute the logit models; the GLOGIT function (generalized logit) was 
used in the multinomial models. 
The logistic regression analyses were executed in two stages. In the first stage, we include 
only income package variables. In the second stage, we add the health and functional level 
variables, as well as the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables. In 
this way we can assess if the effect of the income package changes or disappears when 
other variables are taken into account. An overview of the global model statistics of the 
complete models (i.e. p-values, Nagelkerke R²) is shown in Table 10.12. The most 
remarkable observation is that the neither the personal old age income package nor the 
extended income package is statistically significant in any of the estimated models. 
  
 
                                                             
129 In Appendix 8 an analysis of the deleted observations on a number of background characteristics 
is provided. 
130 68 respondents that did not have contact with a health care provider are excluded from the 
model. 
131 945 respondents that did not receive long-term care during the last year are excluded from the 
model. 
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Table 10.12. Overview of the global model statistics of the logistic regression 
models on the use of care services (weighted, 2007) 
 
Model 1: 
Care package 
Model 2: 
Second-line health 
care 
Model 3: 
Social care 
services 
 LM 1A LM 1B LM 2A LM 2B LM 3A LM 3B 
N 1492 1492 1424 1424 547 547 
       
Global model significance <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
       
Income package       
  Personal income package 0.4455 0.4239 0.5188 0.5690 0.4920 0.3412 
  Financial assets - 0.0419 - 0.3269 - 0.6904 
  Home ownership - 0.4393 - 0.4114 - 0.4059 
  Secondary residence - 0.8850 - 0.8779 - 0.1844 
  Income level 0.3707 0.2612 0.3755 0.1270 0.1905 0.3707 
Health and functional level       
  Subjective health status 0.0001 0.0003 0.1081 0.0863 0.2889 0.1819 
  Multimorbidity <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.3178 0.3416 
  Multisymptoms <0.0001 <0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9721 0.9181 
  Multi ADL limitations <0.0001 <0.0001 - - 0.0003 0.0004 
  Multi IADL limitations <0.0001 <0.0001 - - 0.0141 0.0116 
Background variables       
  Sex 0.0279 0.0211 0.6107 0.6508 0.2022 0.2593 
  Age <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0456 0.0506 0.0087 0.0089 
  Occupational status 0.0738 0.0712 0.1545 0.1707 0.0901 0.1077 
  Level of education 0.3989 0.4840 0.7207 0.8521 0.5446 0.5477 
  Living situation <0.0001 <0.0001 0.5218 0.5416 0.2061 0.0798 
  Region of residence 0.2001 0.1167 0.0131 0.0187 0.1366 0.1472 
       
Nagelkerke R² 0.4187 0.4284 0.1119 0.1163 0.2693 0.2747 
Note: - = variable is not included in the model 
Because the models generate a quite extensive output, we have included the output in 
Appendix 10. The tables in the appendix include the odds ratios (OR) and the p-values. We 
distinguish between the model that includes only the income variables and the model that 
includes the income variables as well as the controlling variables.  
4.2 A multinomial logit model explaining the care package composition132 
In the first logit model (LM1A), that includes the personal old age income package as the 
main independent variable and the care package composition as the dependent variable, 
we see that before controlling for background differences the odds of receiving informal 
home help and the odds of receiving formal home help are lower for elderly with a wage 
 
                                                             
132 See Table A10.1, Table A10.2, Table A10.3 and Table A10.4 in Appendix 10 for odds ratios and p-
values. 
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or elderly without meaningful personal income sources (i.e. only P3 or none) than for 
elderly with a first pillar pension (OR < 1). Further, the odds on having a mixed care 
package are lower for elderly with a wage and for elderly with only a third pillar pension 
(OR < 1). Lastly, we also find that the odds on receiving second-line health care are 
significantly higher for elderly in the upper income quintile than for elderly in the bottom 
income quintile (OR > 1).  
When we add the controlling variables to the model, all but one significant effect of the 
income package on the care package composition disappear. Only the odds of receiving 
informal home help are significantly smaller for elderly without personal income sources 
than for elderly with a first pillar pension (OR < 1). Apart from that, no significant 
relations between the care package composition and the personal income package are 
found when we control for differences in the health status, functional level and the 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the respondents. 
In the second logit model (LM1B), that includes the extended old age income package as 
the main independent variable of interest, among the income variables, the following 
significant relationships are found. The odds on receiving informal home help are lower 
for elderly with a wage than for elderly with a first pillar pension (OR < 1), and the odds on 
receiving informal personal care are larger for elderly without financial assets than for 
elderly with financial assets (OR > 1). Further, the odds on having a second-line health 
care package are lower for high-income elderly than for low-income elderly (OR > 1). In 
addition, also the odds on receiving formal home help are higher for elderly in the highest 
income quintile than for elderly in the lowest income quintile (OR > 1). 
Although the old age income package does not have a significant effect on the care package 
composition when controlling for the health status, functional level, and a number of 
background variables, some conclusions can be drawn. We can say that the relationship 
between the care package composition and the old age income package is not as 
straightforward as initially expected. A higher income is not unison linked to having a 
more diverse care package, and the same holds for the relationship between having a 
more diverse income package and having a more diverse care package. Yet, we find some 
indications of such a relationship. For example, high-income elderly have higher odds on 
combining first- and second-line health care (versus having a minor care package) than 
low-income elderly. Also, the odds on receiving formal home help are larger for high-
income elderly than for low-income elderly. This hints into the direction of a more 
generous income package - more diverse care package relationship. 
The - overall - ruling out of the effect of income when controlling for health status, 
functional level and sociodemographic background differences, possibly is the result of the 
quasi-universal Belgian national health insurance. As discussed in chapter 4, the Belgian 
health insurance offers reimbursements for the use of a wide range of health and social 
care services. Low-income elderly (cf. chapter 4) can apply for partial or complete 
reimbursements for the use of health and social care services covered by the Belgian 
national health insurance. In addition, financial contributions for a specified number of 
health and social care services are provided by one’s health insurance fund. This could 
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explain why no major significant differences in the income package composition are found 
between high- and low-income elderly. The absence of a significant effect of asset 
ownership on the care package composition indicates that asset ownership does not 
induce an increased care consumption behaviour, as opposed to what was expected from 
the literature.133  
4.3 A binomial logit model explaining the use of health care services134 
The second group of models includes contact with a second-line health care provider as 
the dependent variable. In the first model (LM2A) no significant relationship exists 
between the personal income package and the use of second-line health care services. In 
contrast with our expectations, we do not find proof that having a higher income from 
personal income sources is significantly related to higher odds on contact with specialists. 
Health status and age are significant: the odds on contact with a second-line health care 
provider are significantly lower for elderly with less than two health related problems or 
symptoms (OR < 1). Further, the odds of contact with a second-line health care provider 
are significantly larger for elderly between 60 and 74 years than for elderly older than 75 
years.  
When we look at the second model (LM2B), that includes the extended income package as 
the main independent variable of interest, we do find some signs of a significant 
relationship between the use of second-line health care services and the old age income 
package. In the model that does not include the background variables, the odds of having 
contact with a second-line health care provider are significantly larger for high-income 
elderly (income quintiles Q4 and Q5) than for low-income elderly (OR > 1). Remarkably, 
the model also indicates that elderly without home ownership have higher odds on contact 
with a second-line health care provider than elderly with home ownership (OR > 1). This 
is striking, because we would expect to find an opposite relationship in which home 
ownership is positively associated with second-line health care use because home 
ownership can induce an altered - increased - care consumption pattern (cf. supra). The 
significant relationship between home ownership and second-line health care, however, 
disappears when health status and sociodemographic background variables are added to 
the model. In the complete model only the generosity of the extended income package 
remains significantly related to the use of second-line health care (OR > 1). This confirms 
that having a higher income increases the odds on contact with a specialist, even when we 
 
                                                             
133 According to Henretta and Campbell (1978), asset ownership is associated with altered 
consumption patterns, because assets provide a buffer for higher consumption levels. In addition, 
homeownership, on his turn, was expected to contribute importantly to the available income, since 
no rents nor mortgages have to be paid for housing. 
134 See Table A10.5 and Table A10.6 in Appendix 10 for odds ratios and p-values. 
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control for differences in the health status and the sociodemographic and socioeconomic 
background of the research population.   
The confirmation of our hypothesis indicates that, despite the reimbursements for the use 
of second-line health care services via the national health insurance, and the larger 
reimbursements for low-income elderly, the effect of income is not ruled out completely. 
Possibly this results from the fact that a larger group of specialist doctors has not 
subscribed to the general tariff agreements (cf. chapter 4), and thus are free to charge 
higher fees. This results in a larger non-refundable part and larger personal payments for 
the care receivers.135 Low-income elderly will experience more difficulties in paying these 
larger personal contributions than high-income elderly, and thus are confronted with a 
higher burden to contact second-line health care providers. 
4.4 A multinomial logit model explaining the use of social care services136 
A last group of models includes the use of social care services as the main dependent 
variable. In the complete models, neither the personal income package, nor the extended 
income package has a significant effect on whether the older person relies on formal care, 
informal care or on a combination of both. Only having functional limitations (i.e. two or 
more limitations in ADL and/or in IADL) and age are statistically significant in both 
models. 
Interestingly, although not statistically significant, we find that the odds of relying on 
informal care decrease when the generosity of the income package increases. This 
indicates that the probability that high-income elderly use informal care is lower than the 
probability that low-income elderly will do so, even when we control for differences in 
health status, functional level and other background variables (OR < 1). Similarly, the odds 
of combining informal and formal care services are lower for high-income elderly than for 
low-income elderly (OR < 1).  
5. Explaining the intensity of care use 
In this section, we investigate whether differences in the intensity of the use of health and 
social care services are explained by differences in the income package. We expect that 
 
                                                             
135 Based on figures from the NIHDI, a study directed in 2006 by the Belgian Health Care Knowledge 
Center on co-payments in the Belgian health care indicates that on average 20% of the specialists 
(with peaks to more than 30% in some Belgian regions) has refused to subscribe the general tariff 
agreements, compared to 15% of the general practitioners (De Graeve, Lecluyse, Schokkaert, Van 
Ourti, & Van de Voorde, 2006). 
136 See Table A10.7 and Table A10.8 in Appendix 10 for odds ratios and p-values. 
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more generous income packages generate more means to buy in health and social care 
services, resulting in a higher intensity of use. We construct two separate models: one 
model with the intensity of health care services use as the dependent variable, and one 
model with the intensity of social care services use as the dependent variable. In section 
5.1 we discuss the construction of both models; in sections 5.2 and 5.3 we go into the 
details of the model results. 
5.1 Construction of the models 
In the first model, the dependent variable refers to the intensity of the use of health care 
services, which is operationalized as the number of contacts the elderly person had with a 
health care provider during the last year. To make the interpretation of the results easier, 
we use the categorical variable with three categories: a low intensity of use (1 to 6 
contacts), a moderate intensity of use (7 to 12 contacts) and a high intensity of use (more 
than 12 contacts). The reference category is a low intensity of use. In the second model the 
intensity of the use of social care services (hours of social care services received) is the 
categorical dependent variable. We distinguish a low intensity of care use (less than one 
hour of care per week), a moderate intensity of use (one to seven hours of care per week), 
and a high intensity of care use (more than seven hours of care per week). The reference 
category is having a low intensity of care services use. 
The independent variables in the models on the intensity of health care use resemble the 
variables in the models testing the use of health care services. Functional level variables 
are not included in these models, because we do not expect functional status to be directly 
related to the use of health care services. For the models testing the intensity of formal 
social care services use, the independent variables are the same as those included in the 
models on the use of social care services (cf. supra). 
We enter the variables into the models in two stages: in a first stage we include only 
income variables, and in a second stage we add the controlling variables (health and 
functional status; sociodemographic and socioeconomic background variables). In this 
way we are able to see if the income package has a statistically significant effect on the 
intensity of use, and if this effect changes when account is given to the background 
differences between the respondents.  
Observations are deleted when they have missings on one of the variables in the model.137 
Further, we limited the analysis to respondents that had at least one contact with a health 
care provider138, resp. social care provider139 during the last year; respondents without 
 
                                                             
137 An analysis of the deleted observations is included in Appendix 8. 
138 68 respondents that did not have any contact with a health care provider have been excluded 
from the model. 
268 
this type of contacts were removed from the models. An examination of the logistic 
regression assumptions did not show any violations on the multicollinearity and linearity 
assumptions. A number of outliers were detected, however, we decided not to remove 
these observations from the models (cf. supra). In SAS, we used PROC LOGISTIC with the 
GLOGIT function (generalized logit) to calculate the logit models. 
The global model statistics of the complete models (including all variables of interest) are 
presented in Table 10.13 (p-values). The old age income package is not statistically 
significant in any of the models. The explanatory power of the different models is quite 
high: all models explain at least 30% of the variance in the dependent variable (based on 
the Nagelkerke R²).  
Table 10.13. Overview of the global model statistics (p-values) of the logistic 
regression models on the intensity of the use of care services (weighted, 2007) 
 Model 4: 
Health care services 
Model 5: 
Social care services 
 LM 4A LM 4B LM 5A LM 5B 
N 1145 1145 270 270 
     
Global model significance <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
     
Income package     
  Personal income package 0.2358 0.3204 0.3657 0.3589 
  Financial assets - 0.4000 - 0.4705 
  Home ownership - 0.5358 - 0.6336 
  Secondary residence - 0.5626 - 0.5422 
  Income level 0.2466 0.7640 0.5671 0.2887 
Health and functional level     
  Subjective health status <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1584 0.5602 
  Multimorbidity <0.0001 <0.0001 0.5709 0.8112 
  Multisymptoms <0.0001 <0.0001 0.7798 0.0483 
  Multi ADL limitations - - 0.0356 0.0004 
  Multi IADL limitations - - 0.0004 0.5602 
Background variables     
  Sex 0.0608 0.0607 0.6746 0.6266 
  Age 0.0001 0.0002 0.0014 0.0011 
  Occupational status 0.2052 0.1521 0.1267 0.1731 
  Level of education 0.0117 0.0138 0.1952 0.1646 
  Living situation 0.1556 0.1366 0.0097 0.0140 
  Region of residence 0.0308 0.0391 0.0078 0.0075 
     
Nagelkerke R² 0.3110 0.3099 0.4697 0.4890 
The detailed model results are included in appendix 10 (odds ratios and p-values). The 
results are discussed in the following sections. Section 5.2 focuses on the intensity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
139 1220 respondents that did not receive formal long-term care have been excluded from the 
models. 
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use of health care services, while section 5.3 focuses on the intensity of the use of social 
care services. 
5.2 A multinomial logit model explaining the intensity of health care services 
use140 
First, we consider the detailed model results of the model with the personal income 
package as the main independent variable (LM4A). When we control for differences in the 
respondent’s health status and sociodemographic and socioeconomic background, we see 
that elderly with a higher income have higher odds on having a moderate use of health 
care services (vs. a low intensity of use) than elderly with a low income (OR > 1). Further, 
the odds of having a high intensity of health care services use are significantly lower for 
elderly that combine first and third pillar pension, and elderly that receive a wage than for 
elderly that have only a first pillar pension (OR < 1). Yet, the explanatory power of the 
income variables is very limited. Mainly the respondent’s health status and his/her age are 
decisive in explaining the intensity of the use of health care services. The odds of having a 
moderate or a high intensity of health care services use are lower for elderly with a quite 
good health status than for elderly with a quite bad health status (i.e. for elderly with two 
or more health related problems or health related symptoms). Also elderly between 60 
and 74 years have significantly lower odds on having a moderate to high intensity of use 
than elderly that are 75 years and over (OR < 1).  
Secondly, we focus on the model including the extended income package as the main 
independent variable to investigate whether asset ownership induces a different (health 
care) consumption behaviour. Yet, in the complete model we do not find any evidence of 
this. None of the income variables are statistically significant. However, the direction of 
the relationship to some extent confirms our expectations. The odds of having a moderate 
intensity of health care services use (vs. a low intensity) are larger for elderly in the higher 
income quintiles than for elderly in the lower income quintiles (OR > 1). Again, health 
status variables and age are central in explaining differences in the intensity of the use of 
health care services. 
By and large, based on the logit models presented here we can conclude that in contrast 
with our expectations no statistically significant relationship is found between the 
intensity of health care services use and the old age income package. Again, we expect this 
to be one of the merits of the Belgian national health insurance scheme, which seems to 
eliminate successfully the income related inequalities in the use of health care services and 
in the intensity of the use of these services. 
 
                                                             
140 See Table A10.9 and Table A10.10 in Appendix 10 for odds ratios and p-values. 
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5.3 A multinomial logit model explaining the intensity of social care services 
use141 
When the effect of the personal old age income package is considered (LM5A), we do not 
find an overall statistically significant effect of the income variables on the intensity of the 
use of social care services. Neither the generosity, nor the composition of the income 
package is significant in explaining the intensity of the use of social care services by an 
older person. However, although not statistically significant, we see that the odds of 
having a moderate or a high intensity of use (versus a low intensity of use) tend to be 
higher among the higher income groups than among the lower income groups: the odds 
ratios are larger than one for income quintiles Q2, Q3 and Q4 (in comparison with Q1).  
A similar trend is found when the extended income package is considered. Again, neither 
the composition, nor the level of the available income from the income package have a 
statistically significant relationship with the intensity of the use of formal social care 
services. Nevertheless, we see that the odds of having a more intense use of formal care 
services tend to be higher for elderly in the upper income quintiles than for elderly in the 
bottom income quintile. For example, the odds of having a high intensity of formal care 
services use are about ten times higher for elderly in the upper income quintile than for 
elderly in the bottom income quintile (OR=10.80). 
In addition, in both models the intensity of use of social care services is significantly lower 
for elderly without limitations in their functional status (OR < 1). Further, the odds of 
having a moderate or high intensity of care services use (versus a low intensity of use) are 
smaller for men than for women (OR < 1), which indicates that women overall tend to be 
more intensive users of social care services. Similarly, the odds of having a higher intensity 
of care services use are significantly smaller for elderly living with a partner than for 
singles (OR < 1), which indicates that single-living elderly are more intensive social care 
users. 
To conclude we can say that the old age income package does not have a significant effect 
on the intensity of the use of social care services when we control for differences in the 
health status, functional level, and sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of 
the research population. This resembles the results of the multinomial logit model on the 
intensity of health care services use. Again this could be an indication of the success of the 
quasi universal national health insurance scheme, which provides reimbursements for the 
use of certain social care services, and more generous repayments for low-income groups, 
thus intervening in the expected relationship between the old age income package and the 
intensity of the use of social care services. An alternative explanation could be that the 
importance of (‘cheap’) informal care rules out income related differences in the intensity 
 
                                                             
141 See Table A10.11 and Table A10.12 in Appendix 10 for odds ratios and p-values. 
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of the use of care services. However, also when we limit the logit models to the intensity of 
the use of formal care services, no significant effect of the old age income package is found. 
6. Assessing the quality of the old age care package 
In this section, we evaluate the quality of the health and social care services of the Belgian 
elderly population. In doing so, the analyse are limited to the respondents that received 
the investigated type of care. Our investigation includes an objective assessment of the 
receipt of appropriate care for specific needs, and a subjective assessment of the care 
receiver’s satisfaction with the care received. This is done both for health and social care 
services. We use six indicators to measure the quality of the old age care package (cf. 
section 2.3): 
 the ratio of success of specialist contacts;  
 the ratio of success of the receipt of adequate medication142; 
 the receipt of personal care by elderly with ADL limitations; 
 the receipt of home help by elderly with IADL limitations; 
 the satisfaction of the care receiver with the care received; and 
 whether the social care received corresponds to the care receiver’s opinion on 
who should provide care. 
Our investigation is restricted by several - overall data related - limitations (cf. supra).143 
This leads to an important amount of missing values in the constructed quality indicators. 
Consequently, the statistics presented here wish to explore the quality of the health and 
social care services used rather than to really evaluate the quality of these services. In 
addition, because of the important amounts of missing values, the reliability of the test 
statistics is expected to be low. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
research results. 
In the analyses, there is a strong focus on the link between the receipt of appropriate care 
and the income package to investigate whether income differences are translated into care 
differences in that more generous income packages generate more appropriate care 
packages. We separately analyse the appropriateness of the health care services received 
(section 6.1) and of the social care services received (section 6.2).  
 
                                                             
142 Please note that medication is used here as an indicator of the quality of health care, although 
medication as such is not included in the care package concept. However, because medication often 
is prescribed by a health care provider, the use of medication is closely related to contact with a 
general practitioner or a specialist. 
143 To recall, very limited information on the quality of care is included in the SHARE (see chapter 
9).  
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6.1 The quality of the health care package 
We first focus on the quality of the health care package. This is limited to the receipt of 
appropriate health care and medication for specific health problems. In the previous 
chapter, the receipt of appropriate health care was operationalised as the ratio of success 
of matching specific health problems to contacts with an appropriate specialist. The actual 
successful matches are compared with the potentially successful matches to get the 
success ratio. Similarly, the ratio of success of the receipt of appropriate medication for 
specific health problems is calculated.  
Table 10.14 shows the distribution of the research population by the ratio of successful 
specialist contacts and successful medication.144 Overall, the success ratio of having 
received appropriate medication is higher than that of appropriate specialist contacts. The 
average ratio of success for medication is about 0.72, while for specialist contacts it is only 
0.52. Almost 30% of the research population with a specific health problem never had 
contact with an appropriate specialist during the last year, while only 14% did never 
receive appropriate medication. More than half of the research population always received 
appropriate medication, while only 33% of the respondents with a specific health problem 
always had contact with an appropriate specialist.  
Table 10.14. Distribution of the research population by the ratio of successful health 
care contacts and medication (weighted, 2007) 
  
Specialist contacts Medication 
  
N % N % 
Success ratio Ratio     
Never 0 235 30 183 14 
Sometimes 0.1-0.5 85 11 46 4 
Most of the time 0.5-0.9 209 27 360 28 
Always 1 257 33 692 54 
      
Mean   0.51   0.72   
Total (N)   785   1280   
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Additionally, we investigated the relationship between the health care quality indicators 
and the generosity of the income package. Table 10.15 shows the success ratio of specialist 
contacts and medication along the personal income quintile distribution. Although we 
expected that elderly in the higher income quintiles would have higher success ratios, this 
 
                                                             
144 More details on the relationship between the quality of the health care package and some 
background characteristics of the research population are provided in the annex. The success ratio 
of specialist contacts is lower for women than for men, which confirms their more vulnerable 
position. 
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is not confirmed in the data. For example, about 35% of the elderly in the upper income 
quintile with a specific health problem never had contact with an appropriate specialist, 
compared to 29% of the elderly in the bottom income quintile. Little differences are found 
between the income quintiles on the success ratio of the medication use. In all income 
quintiles, more than 70% of the research population received appropriate medication for 
a specific health condition. 
Table 10.15. Relative distribution of the research population by the individual 
income quintile distribution and the ratio of successful health care contacts and 
medication (weighted, 2007)145 
% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Specialist contacts      
Never 29 32 28 26 35 
Sometimes 8 14 13 14 6 
Most of the time 31 27 24 25 24 
Always 32 27 35 36 35 
Total (N=100%) 137 180 134 154 161 
      
Mean ratio  0.52 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.50 
Correlation r=-0.0063 p=0.0806   
      
Medication      
Never 12 15 16 14 14 
Sometimes 3 4 4 4 2 
Most of the time 27 29 33 29 25 
Always 58 52 47 53 59 
Total (N=100%) 250 299 216 252 230 
      
Mean ratio  0.75 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.74 
Correlation r=0.0186 p=0.5116   
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In addition, we calculated the linear correlation between the generosity of the personal 
income package and the success ratio of specialist contacts and medication.146 Neither for 
the success ratio of specialist contacts, nor for the success ratio of medication a significant 
correlation with the generosity of the personal income package was found. 
Based on the statistics presented here, we can conclude that the majority of the elderly 
population with specific health problems received health care services adapted to their 
health conditions, either via contacts with appropriate specialists or via the receipt of 
appropriate medication. In contrast with our expectations, no straightforward relationship 
 
                                                             
145 The relative distribution based on the extended available income package resembles this 
distribution based on the individual old age income package. Therefore, we only include the 
individual income quintile distribution. 
146 We computed the Spearman correlation coefficient using the PROC CORR procedure in SAS. 
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between the generosity of the old age income package and the quality of the health care 
services is found. Elderly with a more generous income package do not have a higher ratio 
of success, neither for the contacts with specialists, nor for the receipt of appropriate 
medication. This could be attributed to the ‘mediating potential’ of the Belgian national 
health insurance scheme. As mentioned before, reimbursements for the use of a wide 
range of health care services (including medication) are provided via the Belgian national 
health insurance scheme. In that scheme low-income households are eligible for more 
favourable reimbursement rates than high-income households. It seems that this 
intervention rules out the expected income-related differences in the receipt of 
appropriate health care between low- and high-income elderly. Obviously, one must take 
into the suboptimal character of the health care quality indicators because of the lack of 
relevant information in the SHARE. 
6.2 The quality of the social care package 
In this section, we address the quality of the social care services received by the elderly 
population. We focus on three quality aspects, namely whether an older person with 
limitations in ADL and/or IADL receives appropriate care (resp. personal care and/or 
home help); whether the care receiver considers the care as meeting his or her needs; and 
whether the received care matches with the care receiver’s expectations on who should 
provide care (the family versus the state). Again, we investigate the relationship between 
the generosity of the old age income package and the receipt of appropriate care. We 
expect that more generous income packages generate more appropriate care packages.147  
Table 10.16 shows the distribution of the research population by the receipt of care 
adapted to their ADL and IADL limitations, and whether the care provider meets the care 
receivers’ preferences on who should provide this type of care. In addition, Table 10.17 
includes information on whether the care provided meets the needs of the care receiver. 
Note that only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL, and respondents 
actually using social care services are included in these statistics. 
  
 
                                                             
147 More details on the relationship between the quality of the long-term care package and some 
background characteristics of the research population are provided in appendix 9. 
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Table 10.16. Distribution of the research population by the receipt of appropriate 
social care and the preferential care provider (weighted, 2007) 
 Success No success Total 
 N % N % (N=100%) 
Receipt of appropriate care      
  Personal care 103 37 175 63 278 
  Home help 243 65 130 35 373 
Preferential care provider      
  Personal care 91 66 46 34 137 
  Home help 248 65 134 35 382 
Note: The receipt of appropriate care includes only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL. The patient 
satisfaction with the care provider (‘preferential care provider’) is limited to elderly that received personal care and/or 
home help. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Table 10.17. Distribution of the research population by the patient satisfaction with 
the social care services received (weighted, 2007) 
Patient satisfaction with care N % 
Never 4 1 
Sometimes 25 7 
Most of the time 119 32 
Always 225 60 
Total 373 100 
Note: The patient satisfaction with the care services received includes only respondents with limitations in their ADL 
and/or IADL. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
More than 60% of the research population with limitations in their ADL did not receive 
personal care, while about 35% of the research population with limitations in their IADL 
did not receive home help (“receipt of appropriate care”). This indicates a higher burden 
to search for and to find appropriate care for elderly with ADL limitations. In addition, 
Table 10.16 shows that - overall - the care is provided by a care provider that meets the 
preferences of the care receiver (“preferential care provider”). Both for personal care and 
for home help, more than 60% of the older care receivers indicate that the care is provided 
by the caregiver of their preference. Also the satisfaction with the care received is quite 
high: more than 90% of the research population with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL 
that receives care states that the care received most of the time to always meets their care 
needs. 
Furthermore, we investigated the relationship between the generosity of the old age 
income package and the appropriateness of the old age care package to assess whether 
income-related differences are reproduced in the quality of the care package. We expect 
that elderly in the upper income quintiles enjoy higher quality care than elderly in the 
lower income quintiles. However, this is not confirmed entirely in the data presented in 
Table 10.18. Elderly in the upper income quintiles do not receive more often social care 
services adapted to their care needs than elderly in the lower income quintiles (“patient 
satisfaction”). Similarly, elderly in the upper income quintiles are not more satisfied with 
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the care they received than elderly in the lower income quintiles. On the contrary, low-
income elderly are stronger represented among the research population that states to be 
always satisfied (25% versus 19% high-income individuals).  Only the indicator on the 
preferential care provider points somewhat in the expected direction. Among those that 
received personal care from their preferential care provider, elderly with an income in the 
upper income quintile are stronger represented than elderly with an income in the bottom 
income quintile (resp. 20% versus 14%).  
Table 10.18. Relative distribution of the research population by the individual 
income quintile distribution and the social care quality indicators (weighted, 
2007)148 
% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Receipt of appropriate personal care       
  Success 19 27 19 16 19 98 
  No success 16 32 18 22 11 173 
Receipt of appropriate home help            
  Success 19 29 18 15 19 236 
  No success 21 31 17 19 12 128 
Preferential personal care provider       
  Success 14 32 19 14 20 90 
  No success 24 32 16 19 10 42 
Preferential home help provider            
  Success 18 27 11 23 20 231 
  No success 20 29 19 16 16 130 
Patient satisfaction with care       
  Never 0 27 0 46 27 4 
  Sometimes 24 17 29 16 15 25 
  Most of the time 16 39 17 18 10 116 
  Always 25 22 15 19 19 218 
Note: The receipt of appropriate social care includes only respondents with limitations in their ADL and/or IADL. The 
patient satisfaction with the care provider (‘preferential care provider’) is limited to elderly that received personal care 
and/or home help. The patient satisfaction with the care received includes only respondents with limitations in their ADL 
and/or IADL. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
It becomes clear that our expectations on the relationship between the generosity of the 
income package and the appropriateness of the old age care package are not confirmed. 
Elderly with more generous income packages do not receive more appropriate social care 
than elderly with less generous old age income packages. This can have several reasons. 
The restrictions in the old age care package quality indicators leave important dimensions 
of care quality unmeasured. In addition, the group of elderly relying on social care services 
is rather small and no complete information from the three indicators was available, 
 
                                                             
148 The relative distribution based on the extended available income package resembles this 
distribution based on the individual old age income package. Therefore, we only include the 
individual income quintile distribution. 
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which could bias the research results. Furthermore, the relationship between the old age 
income package and the receipt of appropriate social care services possibly is distorted by 
intervening variables not included here. For example, when the receipt of appropriate care 
is related to sex or living situation, two factors also related to the generosity of the income 
package, these variables could intervene in the relationship between the old age income 
package and the quality of the old age care package. In addition, the role of the Belgian 
national health insurance scheme, that also includes a wide range of social care services, 
and the provision of social care services via the Public Social Service Departments may not 
be neglected. Different mechanisms, favouring low-income households, are developed to 
limit the reproduction of income inequalities in the use of social care services: increased 
reimbursement rates, an extended third party payer’s scheme, reduced user fees for social 
care services provided by the Public Social Service Departments, etc.149 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on the protection of the older population against the functional 
dimensions of old age dependency. Several questions were posed. How does the care 
package of the Belgian elderly population look like, and what role does the old age income 
package play in the composition and level of protection enjoyed from this care package? 
More specifically, are differences in the income package reproduced in the care package, 
and do elderly with a more generous old age income package have a more diverse, a more 
intense and a higher quality health and social care package? Five hypotheses were 
formulated and tested: 
H1. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
have a more diverse care package than elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse 
old age income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H2. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
have more contact with specialists than elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse 
old age income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H3. Elderly with a more generous and/or a more diverse income package are expected to 
rely more on formal care, while elderly with a less generous and/or a less diverse old age 
income package are expected to draw more on informal care, when controlling for health 
status and functional level. 
H4. Elderly with a more generous income package are expected to have a higher intensity 
of health and social care services use than elderly with a less generous income packages, 
when controlling for health status and functional level. 
 
                                                             
149 A more detailed overview of the different services is provided in chapter 4. 
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H5. Elderly with a more diverse care package are expected to enjoy higher levels of 
protection against the functional dimension of old age dependency than elderly with a less 
diverse care package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
H6. Elderly with a more generous income package are expected to enjoy higher levels of 
protection against the functional dimension of old age dependency than elderly with a less 
generous income package, when controlling for health status and functional level. 
Concerning the care package 
First, we investigated the composition of the care package. Different health and social care 
services, as well as the intensity of the use of these care services, were included in the 
analysis. A hierarchical cluster analysis, discussed in chapter 8, showed the existence of 
seven care packages (care clusters), ranging from a low to a high degree of care diversity.  
A large part of the older research population in Belgium has a quite low degree of diversity 
in their care use. About half of the research population has a minor care package or a 
second-line health care package, and thus relies solely on medical care services. About a 
third of the research population combines health and social care services in different 
configurations. The most diverse care package, i.e. the mixed care package that includes 
first- and second-line health care services, formal and informal personal care and home 
help, is found among 9% of the elderly population.  
In addition, we assessed the intensity of the use of these care services. We made a 
difference between the intensity of the use of health care services (i.e. the number of 
contacts with a health care provider during a one year period) and the use of social care 
services (i.e. the hours of formal and informal care received during the same one year 
period). Concerning the intensity of the use of health care services, we found that about 
half of the research population has a low intensity of use (less than 6 health care contacts 
per year), and about 20% has a high intensity of use (on average more than monthly 
health care contacts). Among the elderly that received social care services, 40% received 
one to seven hours of care per week in 2007. A third of the care users is considered as 
high-intensity-users, receiving at least one hour of care per day (on average). 
Furthermore, the intensity of the use of health and social care services showed to be 
related to the composition of the care package. Elderly with a more diverse care package 
have a higher intensity of care services utilisation than elderly with a less diverse care 
package.  
Lastly, we also explored the presence of vulnerable groups in the use of health and social 
care services, based on the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the 
research population. We found that women tend to be overrepresented among the elderly 
with more diverse care package than men. Similarly, the research population aged 75 
years and over have more diverse care packages than elderly between 60 and 65 years. To 
some extent, status also was related to the use of second-line health care services. Elderly 
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with a high occupational status or a high level of education were overrepresented in the 
second-line health care package in comparison with elderly with a lower occupational 
status or a lower level of education. However, for the intensity of use, the opposite was 
found to be true. The average number of health care contacts and the hours of social care 
services received were higher among low-status elderly than among high-status elderly. 
Concerning the relationship between the income package and the care package 
Secondly, we focused on the relationship between the income package and the care 
package. This is the core of our dissertation. We investigated whether differences in the 
income package are related to differences in the composition of the care package and in 
the intensity of the use of health and social care services. We expected to find a kind of 
reproduction of inequalities: elderly with a generous and diverse old age income package 
were expected to have more diverse care packages and a higher intensity of care services 
utilisation than elderly with less generous old age income packages, when controlled for 
differences in their health and functional status. We did not limit our analyses to the 
personal old age income package (including personal income sources like pensions and 
social security benefits), but we included also the available income from assets (i.e. 
interests from financial assets and income from secondary residence). After all, asset 
income could provide the additional income needed to pay for certain care services. 
Account was also given to the potential influence of home ownership. 
From the bivariate statistics we learned that elderly with a more diverse care package 
tend to have less generous and less diverse income packages. Elderly with a mixed care 
package have the lowest average income from the old age income package, while elderly 
with a second-line health care package have the highest average income from the old age 
income package. However, when we investigated the care package composition along the 
income distribution, we did not find a straightforward relationship between the income 
level and the care package composition. Elderly with a second-line health care package 
were somewhat over represented in the upper income deciles, while elderly with a mixed 
care package were somewhat over represented in the lower income quintiles. In addition, 
a higher degree of diversification in the care package was found to be associated with a 
lower degree of diversification in the personal income package. For example, while only a 
third of the elderly with a mixed care package combines a first pillar pension with a 
second and/or a third pillar pension, this holds for more than 40% of the elderly with a 
second-line health care package. Also property ownership proved to be lower among 
elderly with more diverse care packages than among elderly with less diverse care 
packages. In line with the bivariate statistics on the care package composition and the 
income package, we found that the generosity of the income package is lower for elderly 
with a high intensity of care services use than for elderly with a low intensity of care 
utilisation.  
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To control for differences in the health and functional status of the research population, 
and differences in the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background, we estimated 
different logit models with the care package composition and the intensity of the care 
services use as the dependent variables. Our focus was on the generosity and the 
composition of the income package to explain differences in the care package. In none of 
the estimated logit models, the income package composition and the generosity of the 
income package had a significant influence on the composition of the care package and on 
the intensity of the use of health and social care services. Overall, differences in the 
composition and the intensity of the care package were explained by differences in the 
health and functional status of the research population. None of our hypotheses on the 
relationship between the old age income package and the old age care package could be 
confirmed. 
Concerning the quality of the care package 
Thirdly, we explored the quality of the health and social care package of the elderly 
population. This is associated with our third research question on the extent to which the 
old age income package and the old age care package succeed in meeting the needs of the 
elderly population. In this chapter, the needs concept refers to the protection against the 
functional dimension of old age dependency. This was operationalised taking account of 
the health and functional status of the older population (e.g. health conditions, limitations 
in ADL and IADL, etc.). We matched the health and functional status of the elderly 
population to their health and social care use to assess to quality of the care package.  
The appropriateness of the health care services proved to be quite high. More than half of 
the research population with a specific health condition most of the time had contact with 
an appropriate second-line health care provider. The success ratio of the receipt of 
appropriate medication was even higher: more than 80% of the research population 
stated that most of the time they received appropriate medication for a certain health 
problem. For social care services, we found that only 40% of the elderly with ADL 
limitations received personal care, and more than 60% of the elderly with IADL limitations 
received home help. The success ratio based on the preferential care provider and the 
patient satisfaction, however, was higher. For more than 60% of older population 
receiving care, this care is provided by the care provider of their preference. Moreover, 
more than 90% of the elderly with ADL or IADL limitations that receive social care 
services state that the care they receive most of the time meets their needs.  
The quality of the care package was linked to the generosity of the old age income package 
to investigate whether income differences explain care quality differences. However, no 
statistically significant relationship was found between the generosity of the income 
package and the receipt of appropriate social care. We thus can conclude that the receipt 
of appropriate care does not depend on the generosity of the old age income package, and 
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that inequalities in the old age income package are not reproduced into differences in the 
receipt of appropriate health and social care services. 
However, with regard to our exploration of the quality of the care package, one must take 
into account the limitations we experienced in the operationalisation of the care quality 
concept, and resulting from this the preliminary character of the analyses presented here.  
Overall conclusion 
The research results in this chapter show that no statistically significant relationship 
exists between the old age income package and the old age care package. No reproduction 
of income inequalities into the use of health and social care services takes place among the 
Belgian elderly population. 
This indicates the ‘mediating potential’ of the encompassing Belgian national health 
insurance scheme, which provides protection for a wide range of health and social care 
services. In this health insurance scheme, different mechanisms are included that aim to 
limit the reproduction of income inequalities in the use of health and social care services. 
Low-income households can apply for more favourable reimbursements rates, an 
extension of the third party payer’s scheme for certain health care services, cheaper 
services, etc. This facilitates the access of low-income households to certain health and 
social care services and mediates the influence of income. This is confirmed in our 
analyses: when we control for health status, elderly with less generous income package 
are not significantly different from elderly with more generous income packages regarding 
the use of health and social care services.  
However, not finding significant effects of the old age income package on the use of health 
and social care services could also point to the fact that our initial hypothesis 
overestimated the possibility to ‘shop’ for health and social care services in Belgium. The 
access to – and thus the use of – a wide range of social care services is based on 
dependency tests, that take account of one’s functional status (and not of one’s income). 
Further, the use of social care services is expected to be supply-driven: it depends on the 
availability of these services in the near surroundings of the older person in need of care. 
With regard to formal care services, this could include for example the presence of a local 
service centre that provides the social care services that are needed by the needy 
individual. With regard to informal care, this involves the presence of a (potential) 
informal care giver (a child, a child-in-law, a neighbour, etc.), able and willing to give care 
to the older individual. This has been investigated more in detail by Declercq et al. (2009). 
They found for example that the use of formal care is significantly related to the supply of 
formal family care services (offered by public or private care services). The availability of 
more hours of formal family care services is positively related to hours of formal care used 
by the elderly population. 
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Nevertheless, one should take into account the limitations in the operationalisation of the 
quality of the health and social care services. Consequently, more detailed data are 
necessary to evaluate the role of the old age income package in the quality of the health 
and social care package. Also, we should bear in mind that our analyses do not allow us to 
compare the current situation with a situation without a national health insurance 
scheme. It thus is not possible to exclude the potential influence of other societal 
processes or other unmeasured background characteristics.  
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CHAPTER 11. FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PACKAGING PUZZLE 
This dissertation started from the observation that the demographic process of ageing has 
increased the importance of the elderly in the overall population. Consequently, age-related 
issues are high on the agenda of researchers and policy makers. These issues often are based 
on the increased dependency that is associated with old age. Elderly are faced with different 
dimensions of increased dependency. In this dissertation we focused on the two most 
important dimensions of old age dependency, namely financial dependency and functional 
dependency. Our research concentrated on the mechanisms available to the elderly 
population to protect them against the negative consequences of these dimensions of old age 
dependency.  
In this dissertation’s final chapter, we will take a step back to get an overview of the work 
that was done. We do not aim to give a summary of the research findings, since each chapter 
in the dissertation was concluded with a critical reflection on the main findings. Yet, in this 
final chapter we wish to tackle a number of outstanding W’s that are to be found in all PhD 
projects. Where did we started from? What does our research contribute? What could have 
been better? Where do we go from here? What do these findings imply for the future? In the 
next sections, we systematically address these W’s and pinpoint the main findings of our 
research, things to be kept in mind, food for thought, etc. 
1. Where did we start? 
Our research was initiated by the observation that the population is ageing. The 
contemporary society is confronted with increasing groups of elders in the population. Not 
only the group of individuals aged 60 years and over has grown in importance, also the group 
of individuals aged 80 years and over has increased, and is expected to increase even further 
in the future. Given the growing weight of the older population in the overall population, old 
age related problems become more important for both researchers and policy makers. These 
old age related problems can be traced back to the concept of old age dependency and its 
negative consequences.  
Our research focused on the two main dimensions of old age dependency: financial 
dependency and functional dependency. Because the older population has withdrawn from 
the labour market, they no longer can stand in for their own financial wellbeing. They are 
dependent on other sources and actors to protect their living standard and prevent them 
from falling into poverty. This was referred to as financial dependency. Further, given the 
strong link between age, health status and functional level, ageing confronts individuals 
increasingly with health problems and functional limitations. Consequently, they become 
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more and more dependent on specific services and actors providing health and social care 
services. This has been referred to as functional (or long-term care) dependency.  
Our research was not limited to the observation of increasing financial and functional  
dependency among the elderly population. Instead, we focused on the wide range of 
mechanisms that are available for the elderly population to protect them against the negative 
consequences of old age financial and functional dependency. Theoretically, we approached 
this from the packaging perspective of Rainwater, Rein and Schwartz (1986). Rainwater et al. 
(1986) investigated the combination of income sources by households in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. They based their concept of the income package on the 
different claims that are made by households in different institutional spheres (the family 
sphere, the economic sphere and the political sphere). These claims have to contribute to the 
safety, security, welfare and wellbeing of the households. To a certain extent, this includes the 
mechanisms that have been developed in the field of social policy in the contemporary 
welfare state. However, also other mechanisms, not situated in the field of social policy, are 
considered as potential elements of the income package (e.g. personal savings, property 
ownership).  
We have used the packaging concept to investigate the mechanisms that are used by the older 
population to protect themselves against the financial and functional dimension of old age 
dependency. Our puzzle focused on the composition of these income and care packages, on 
the level of protection that is provided against the two dimensions of old age dependency, 
and on the linkages between the income and the care packages. In addition, by including the 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the research population, we also wished 
to shed light on differences and potential inequalities among the elderly concerning the 
protection they enjoy against old age dependency. To solve the packaging puzzle, we 
investigated thoroughly the wide range of income sources and health and social care services 
that are available to the Belgian elderly population. Empirical analyses, based on a subsample 
of the second wave of the SHARE, were used to verify the clustering of income and care 
sources into packages, as well as to investigate differences within the elderly population 
concerning the composition and the level of protection that is provided by these packages.   
2. What does our research contribute? 
Our research contributes in different ways to the debate on the protection of the elderly 
population against the two most important dimensions of old age dependency. Overall, the 
main contribution of the research is that is investigates a societal and political hot topic: the 
demographic process of population ageing has placed several ageing related topics high on 
the agenda of policy makers. Investigating the protection of the elderly population against the 
main dimensions of old age dependency thus proofs to be very important for policy makers 
challenged by the consequences of population ageing on the one hand, and urged to maintain 
loyal to the basic characteristics of the contemporary welfare state on the other hand. Our 
research touched upon several interesting issues within this context: the combination of a 
wide range of income and care sources into so-called income and care packages; the 
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inequalities within the elderly population in these income and care package; the potential of 
including asset ownership as a part of the old age income package; the relationship between 
the income and the care package, etc. In this way, our research provides food for thought for 
(social) policy makers.  
In addition, we have extended the theoretical packaging approach of Rainwater, Rein and 
Schwartz (1986) in two ways. First, while the original concept of Rainwater et al. (1986) was 
limited to the active population, we used it to investigate the elderly population. In the 
second chapter of this dissertation, we extensively discussed how the notions of claims, 
rewards and institutional spheres – that are central in the theoretical framework of 
Rainwater et al. (1986) – can be adopted to study the use of a wide range of protective 
mechanisms of the elderly population. Secondly, while Rainwater et al. (1986) limited the 
sources in their packaging concept to monetary income sources, we included both monetary 
and non-monetary sources contributing to the welfare and wellbeing of the elderly 
population. Again, the notions of claims, rewards and institutional spheres proved to be 
useful to investigate non-monetary sources of protection, more specifically those sources that 
provide protection in case of functional dependency. We added an empirical test to 
investigate whether the theoretical reflections on the clustering of sources into packages is 
confirmed in reality. In the empirical analyses, cluster analysis was used as the statistical 
technique to investigate the existence of clusters of income sources and care sources. This 
confirmed the existence of a clustering of income and care sources into resp. income and care 
packages. Moreover, the results of the cluster analyses allowed us to demarcate empirical, 
data-driven package solutions rather than imposing our own (theory-driven) potential 
cluster compositions to the data.  
Thirdly, our empirical analyses provide detailed information on the income package of the 
elderly population. Our research does not only include a wide range of income sources with 
personal ownership, like first, second and third pillar pensions, but also pays extensive 
attention to the potential contribution of asset sources, like savings and property ownership. 
By taking a holistic perspective on the combination of different, both public (social policy 
related) and private, income sources into income packages providing protection against the 
financial dimension of old age, our research adds importantly to the empirical research on the 
income protection of the Belgian elderly population. Little detailed information was found to 
be available on the combination of first, second and third pillar pensions by Belgian 
pensioners, as well as on the potential of such combinations to contribute to protecting the 
former living standard of the older population during their retirement. Moreover, the 
potential contribution from financial assets and property assets to the old age income 
package was not yet investigated in its complete extent. The holistic perspective, that we 
adopted, allowed us to investigate thoroughly the potential contribution assets could have to 
the old age income package. Investigating assets as such is not new in the research field, 
however, including combinations of assets and ‘regular’ personal income sources does shed 
some new light on the protection the elderly population enjoys against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency. We found that, although asset ownership is widespread 
among the Belgian elderly population, inequalities in the personal income package are 
transferred to the asset stock. This provides food for thought for the policy debates on the 
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potential role assets could play in safeguarding the living standard of the elderly population. 
Similarly, we found that in Belgium, asset ownership, and particularly home ownership, is 
widespread, but that important inequalities prevail. For example, individuals with low 
incomes from personal income sources, older women and the oldest elderly tend to be 
disadvantaged. Inequalities in the personal old age income package are transposed to the 
asset package, which illustrates a Mathew effect in the old age income protection. Elderly 
with low personal income sources have less access to asset sources, and the (potential) 
revenues from these sources tend to be lower. To a certain extent, we also found a strong link 
between the old age income package and the previous labour market status, in that a higher 
occupational status is related to more generous old age income packages. Policy makers, keen 
to include assets in the calculation of pensions, should be aware of the consequences of this. 
Income inequality among the elderly population is expected to increase, and income 
differences between the elderly will become more pronounced when assets are structurally 
included in the old age income package (cf. infra). In addition, this could have consequences 
for the protection the elderly population enjoys in other societal fields that are closely related 
to income protection (e.g. the potential to participate in a social and cultural events).  
Fourth, and closely related to the previous paragraph, our research paid extensive attention 
to the relationship between the old age income package and the old age care package. We 
focused on whether inequalities in the old age income package are transposed to the old age 
care package. The literature review indicated a strong focus on the role of personal income 
sources in explaining care use. Little attention is paid to the possible contribution of asset 
sources in explaining differences in the use of health and social care services. Our expectation 
was that asset sources, irrespective of their direct contribution to the available income, can 
induce a certain consumption behaviour that is related to an increased use of health and 
social care services. To investigate this empirically, we have estimated different models with 
the use of care services as the dependent variable and the different income sources as 
independent variables. However, in contrast with our expectations, overall we did not find a 
significant relationship between the old age income package and the old age care package. 
Asset ownership did not induce differences in the care use of the elderly population. The 
main explanation for the absence of a statistically significant relationship between the income 
and the care package was found in the extensive health insurance scheme that has been 
developed in Belgium and that provides broad financial compensations for the use of a wide 
range of health and social care services. This points to a so-called ‘decommodification’ of the 
use of health and social care services by the national health insurance scheme in Belgium. 
While the sources in the old age income package show a strong link with the previous labour 
market situation, and evidence of ‘commodification’ is found in the composition and 
generosity of the asset package, this is not the case for the health and social care package. Our 
empirical analyses indicate that inequalities in the use of care services are not directly related 
to inequalities in the old age income package. However, although our analyses do not show a 
significant relationship between the old age income package and the old age care package, we 
may not forget that for a small group of the elderly population, those with a very low income, 
access to health and social care services is problematic. This group remains under the radar 
in our analyses, probably because this group represents only a very small part of our research 
population. 
288 
3. What could have been better? 
The third “W” addresses the main weaknesses of our research. Every critical and conscious 
social scientist must be aware of the downsides of his or her research, and of the 
consequences of this for the research results. The weaknesses often stem from the choices 
that are made at the onset and during the research process. Indicating these weaknesses on 
its turn is necessary for a complete understanding of the research results, and, it can expose 
opportunities for future research (cf. infra).  
Certain limitations of the research are inextricably bound up with the choice for a certain 
research design. In our research, the choice for a quantitative research design was initiated 
by the research questions. Given the strong focus on describing the income and care packages 
of the elderly population, as well as the aim to explain differences in these packages, a 
quantitative research design was the most obvious choice. In addition, the availability of an 
interesting and rich dataset as that from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe explains our choice not to collect our own data, but to rely on a secondary data 
analysis. However, the secondary, quantitative research design that was set up, did not only 
hold the opportunity for an interesting view into the income and care packages of the elderly 
population, it also had some downsides that could have consequences for the validity of our 
research results. 
First, our research shows how the empirical research design challenges the initial theoretical 
aspirations of the research. In the empirical part of this study we were confronted with the 
boundaries of what could be measured via survey questionnaires. The wide range of potential 
sources that were distinguished in the theoretical exploration of the old age income and care 
package proved to be too complex to be captured in a survey format. Income and care 
services are not questioned with the high degree of detail that would be necessary to get a 
complete picture of the old age income and care package. Consequently, simplifications and 
limitations in the sources to be included in the income and care packages were inevitable. 
Moreover, it is imaginable that individuals are not always capable or willing to correctly 
name the income and care services they receive. In addition, the registration of certain 
income sources, like second and third pillar pensions that were received as lump sum 
payments in the years preceding the survey, is not watertight. In chapter 7 of this 
dissertation, we showed that the registration of second and third pillar pensions in the 
SHARE is limited to the pensions received in the year preceding the survey. An alternative 
route was followed to trace the receipt of second and third pillar pensions in the past by 
using information from the retrospective SHARELIFE survey. However, we are fully aware of 
the suboptimal character of this strategy and the fact that certain elderly that have received 
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second and third pillar pensions, remain under the radar and are not registered as having 
received these types of pensions in our data.150  
Using administrative data records instead of survey data could partially overcome this 
problem, because all income and care services that are granted via the official circuits could 
be included here. Moreover, when working with administrative data records, researchers can 
be sure that the amounts registered are correct, and that neither memory effects nor 
reluctance of the respondents has an influence on the research results. Yet, this requires a 
complete registration of all income and care services that are received by the elderly 
population. However, in Belgium until now no global administrative data record exists 
including all sources of interest in this dissertation. Personal income data, for example, are 
partially available in the Datawarehouse Labour Market and Social Protection (i.e. all 
information on wages, public pensions, occupational pensions, social security benefits, other 
old age benefits). Yet, information on third pillar pensions, property ownership or financial 
asset ownership is not available in this datawarehouse. Similarly, the use of health and social 
care services is not captured as such in administrative data records. Data bases like the IMA 
databank151 include information on the receipt of health care services, but this is not linked to 
information on the health status of the care receiver. In addition, information on the receipt 
of informal care is not registered in administrative data records, and thus cannot be captured 
in research that is limited to administrative data.  
Third, the problems that are related to the use of secondary data in our research design are 
not limited to the degree of detail in the data or the quality of the registered answers, but also 
include the demarcation of the research population. Again, we are confronted with the 
boundaries of survey research in that the target population of the Belgian SHARE does not 
include elderly that permanently live in residential care facilities. In chapter 6 of this 
dissertation, we estimated that this leads to an exclusion of about 6% of the Belgian elderly 
population. Such an exclusion would not be worrisome when the institutionalized population 
is not very different from the rest of the older population. However, from the research of 
Peeters, Debels and Verpoorten (2013) we know that this is not the case. Excluding 
 
                                                             
150 When we compare our main findings with similar findings based on data from administrative data 
records, we find that the overall trends are the same. Both in our research and in the research based on 
administrative data records (based on the analyses presented in the Belgian Pension Atlas (Berghman 
et al., 2010)), the oldest elderly and women are found to have the lowest pension protection. Also the 
trend that second pillar pension ownership is higher among individuals with more generous first pillar 
pensions to a certain extent is confirmed in both our research and the research based on 
administrative data records (Berghman et al., 2010). A complete comparison of our survey-based 
findings and the findings based on administrative data in the Belgian Pension Atlas is not possible 
because of the different calculation of the income levels. For example, in our research the level of the 
personal old age income package includes not only pension incomes but also incomes from labour and 
from social security benefits. In the Belgian Pension Atlas (Berghman et al., 2010), the amounts are 
limited to first and second pillar pension incomes, and do not include wages, social security benefits or 
private payments. 
151 The IMA databank is based on the registrations of health care services by the InterMutualistisch 
Agentschap (overall National Health Insurance Agency). For more information, see http://www.nic-
ima.be. 
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institutionalised elderly leads to an underrepresentation of female pensioners and the oldest 
elderly (85 years and over) and an overrepresentation of male pensioners and younger 
elderly (60-74 years). Given the statistically significant relationship between sex, age and the 
generosity of the old age income package, excluding institutionalised elderly can have 
consequences for our research results.152 For example, the exclusion of institutionalised 
elderly could result in an overestimation of the generosity of the old age income package, 
because overall the old age income package of institutionalised elderly is less generous than 
that of non-institutionalised elderly. According to the analyses of Peeters, Debels and 
Verpoorten (2013), based on Belgian register data, the average equivalent pension income of 
institutionalised elderly is significantly lower than that of the non-institutionalised elderly (a 
difference of 148 Euros on average). Moreover, the proportion of elderly receiving an Income 
Guarantee benefit is importantly larger in the institutionalised population than in the non-
institutionalised older population (resp. 15.7% versus 5.3% receive an Income Guarantee 
benefit. In addition, institutionalised elderly have a very specific profile concerning their care 
use. They combine different types of health and social care services, they are known by a high 
intensity of care use and they rely to an important extent on social care services provided by 
formal care providers, while also the contribution of informal care providers may not be 
neglected153. In the Belgian national health insurance scheme increased reimbursements are 
included for institutionalised elderly, providing coverage for the health and social care 
services received. Residence costs and additional costs (for example for laundry, hair dresser, 
recreation, etc.) have to be covered by the elderly themselves. The restrictions in the SHARE 
research population makes it not possible to investigate this potentially very interesting 
group of institutionalized elderly.154  
However, not all limitations of the research are prompted by the empirical research design. 
Also theoretical and conceptual choices that are made in the beginning and during the 
research have certain consequences for the overall picture. Some of these choices and their 
consequences have been discussed in the preceding chapters, however, here we wish to 
stress one additional matter. At the onset of the research we have decided to limit the concept 
 
                                                             
152 However, because the group of institutionalised elderly is a relatively small group in the overall 
research population, it is possible that the exclusion does not have an influence on the statistical 
significance of the different models that were calculated during the research process. This is confirmed 
by Peeters, Debels and Verpoorten (2013). The differences between the average pension incomes 
based on the total population and the non-institutionalised population are negligible: The difference 
ranges between 0.2 and 0.8%. Yet, when the receipt of the Income Guarantee benefit is considered, the 
exclusion of institutionalised elderly underestimates the important of the Income Guarantee scheme 
with about 10% (Peeters et al., 2013). Consequently, the exclusion of institutionalised elderly in survey 
research is expected to lead to an underestimation of the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the older 
population. Or, to put it differently, excluding institutionalised elderly leads to an overestimation of the 
quality of the old age income package. 
153 For example, a child that (occasionally) helps his/her parent with getting dressed or eating, while 
the parent permanently resides in a nursing home. 
154 We investigated the possibility to use the Belgian Health Interview Survey (HIS) to study the 
income and care packages of the institutionalised population. However, the income information 
included in the HIS does not have the degree of detail that is needed to sketch the old age income 
package (see chapter 6). 
291 
of old age dependency to its two main dimensions: financial and functional dependency. In 
doing so, we have decided not to discuss the other dimensions of old age dependency like 
mental dependency and social dependency. This does not mean that we do not acknowledge 
the potential contribution of the other dimensions of dependency to the overall wellbeing of 
the elderly population. However, our choice to limit our research to the two main dimensions 
of dependency was prompted by our aim to study not old age dependency as such, but to 
study the protective measures that are available to limit the negative consequences of old age 
dependency. In addition, limiting the dimensions of old age dependency to financial and 
functional dependency allowed us to study in depth the mechanisms available to the elderly 
population, rather than to study in width all dimensions of dependency. Yet and again, we 
wish to stress that this does not imply a denial of the importance of the other dimensions of 
old age dependency.  
4. What’s in it for the future? 
In the last section of the final, reflective, chapter of this dissertation we wish to reflect on the 
last “W” to be answered: What’s next? This includes challenges and recommendations for 
Belgian policy makers involved in the broad field of old age protection, as well as includes 
turning the weaknesses, discussed in the previous section, into opportunities for future 
research (4.1) and for policy changes (4.2). 
4.1 Opportunities for researchers 
This dissertation creates different opportunities for future research. More specifically, it 
would be very interesting and useful to investigate the income and care packages of the 
elderly population using register data. As discussed before, the use of register data is 
expected to increase the reliability of the research results. However, this implies that a wide 
range of data on incomes and the use of health and social care services is registered, which 
nowadays still not always is the case. In addition, it must be possible to link the different data 
sources to investigate the interplay between the income package and the care package. As 
discussed in a previous section of this chapter, the detailed registration of the use of health 
and social care services that is needed for such an investigation however is not yet available.  
In addition, another important lack in our research is that the research population is limited 
to the elderly living at home. Elderly that permanently live in a residential care facility are 
excluded from the research population, because they are not included in the sample frame of 
the SHARE. However, it would be very interesting to investigate how this group of the elderly 
population “manages” their income and care packages. How does this group use its financial 
assets to pay for the – often high – costs of residential long-term care? Are institutionalised 
elderly obliged to sell their home to finance their stay in a nursing home? What differences 
can be found within the group of institutionalised elderly regarding their income packages? 
These are just some of the research questions that could be posed. Furthermore, an 
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investigation of the income package linked to differences in the care setting could be an 
interesting opportunity for future research. This could imply a comparison of the income 
package of elderly living at home, elderly in residential care settings and elderly in semi-
residential care settings (i.e. service flats and other types of assisted living facilities). 
Attention could be paid to income inequalities between groups of elderly, as well as to the 
way they use assets to pay for health and (long-term) care. It would also be interesting to 
investigate how the older population handles the assets that were build up during the active 
life phase when they are confronted with issues of increasing care dependency. To what 
extent do elderly actually use their financial assets to pay for the use of health and social care 
services? Are elderly willing to use the financial potential of their property to pay for 
additional costs related to health and social care services? This and other related research 
questions ask for a detailed investigated of the way the older population handles his/her 
financial and property assets as a part of their income package. 
Lastly, an extension of our research, that focused on the financial and functional dimension of 
old age dependency, with an investigation of the protection the older population enjoys 
against the other dimensions of old age dependency could shed an even broader picture on 
the overall wellbeing of the elderly population. This could include the “protection” against 
social isolation, and how this is related for example to the income and care package. It is not 
unthinkable that elderly with a broad social network have more access to informal social care 
than elderly without such a social network. Similarly, elderly with a more generous income 
package could have more financial means to participate in social associations and events, 
which on his turn has an influence on the social dimension of old age dependency. 
Investigating the links between the different dimensions of old age protection certainly holds 
many opportunities for future research. 
4.2 Opportunities for policy makers  
The detailed study of the income and care packages of the Belgian older population also holds 
opportunities and points of interest for policy makers involved in different policy fields like 
pension policy, health care, social care, housing, etc. We first reflect on the future challenges 
and opportunities for policy makers concerning the protection against the financial 
dimension of old age dependency (i.e. the protection provided by the old age income 
package). Secondly, we reflect on how policy makers should take account of protecting the 
elderly population against the functional dimension of old age dependency (i.e. the protection 
provided by the old age care package). 
In this research the different components of the old age income package have been studied 
with a great degree of detail. First, second and third pillar pensions proved to be very 
important among the personal income sources; and financial assets and home ownership 
among the income sources that are shared within the household. Although asset ownership 
proved to be very important among the Belgian elderly population, the accumulation of 
income inequalities in the personal and the extended income package cannot be neglected. In 
chapter 8 of this dissertation, the empirical analyses showed that elderly with a more 
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generous personal income package tend to have a more generous extended income package, 
while elderly with a less generous personal income package tend to have a less generous 
extended income package. In addition, also inequalities in the personal income package were 
found. For example, elderly who combine different pension sources (first and second and/or 
third pillar pensions) often have a more generous personal old age income package than 
elderly with a less diverse old age income package. In the conclusions of chapter 8, we 
recommended policy makers to take account of these inequalities when they want to rethink 
the role of the government in the provision of old age income protection. For example, there 
is a growing body of opinion that increasing the role of (semi-)private income sources, like 
second and third pillar pensions, financial assets, etc., could reduce the financial challenges 
faced by the public pension schemes due to the process of population ageing. However, 
account must be given to the potential consequences of this for the income equality within 
the older population. 
In October 2014 the coalition agreements was presented by the new federal government, in 
which several proposals were put forward that could potentially influence the old age income 
package (Michel, 2014). Most importantly, the agreement emphasizes an increase in the 
generosity of the minimum income protection schemes, so that they are lifted above the EU-
SILC at-risk-of-poverty threshold. For pensioners, this implies an increase in the Income 
Guarantee scheme for the elderly. In addition, the federal coalition agreement states that the 
minimum retirement pension of pensioners with a complete career must be 10% above the 
EU-SILC at-risk-of-poverty threshold. However, it must be mentioned that the federal 
coalition agreement remains quite vague about the actual efforts to realise this.  
In addition, the federal coalition agreement foresees that pensioners without restrictions can 
combine a public retirement pension and a wage from labour (Michel, 2014). This is expected 
to increase the importance of wages in the old age income package, and can contribute to the 
potential of the old age income package to safeguard the standard of living after retirement. 
However, the consequences of this for the income differences among the elderly population 
must be studied thoroughly. It is thinkable that individuals that have worked in so-called 
“heavy” labour market segments are not able to continue working after their pensionable age, 
and thus will face an income disadvantage when compared to individuals in less “heavy” 
labour market segments who are less burdened by physical factors and have more 
opportunities to keep on working after their pensionable age.  
Further, concerning second pillar pensions, the coalition agreement states that efforts will be 
done to encourage regular annuity payments in the second pension pillar instead of lump 
sum payments (Michel, 2014). Thus, second pillar pensions will have a regular, direct 
contribution to the old age income package, and are expected to be less hoarded up in savings 
accounts or spent on large (luxury) expenses, as is the case with lump sum payments. The 
contribution of the second pillar to the protection against the financial dimension of old age 
dependency thus is expected to become larger. However, in our opinion, too little attention is 
paid to removing existing inequalities in the access to and the financial importance of second 
pillar pensions. To make the second pillar pension a valuable part of the old age income 
package, ownership among the older population must be distributed more evenly, and the 
financial importance of (already existing) second pillar pension schemes must be increased.  
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In addition, in the last state reform the responsibility on the housing bonus is transposed 
from the federal policy level to the regional policy level (Belgische Federale 
Overheidsdiensten, 2014). This creates opportunities for the regions to reform the housing 
bonus. For example, in Flanders the remodelling of the housing bonus leads to a reduction in 
the fiscal deducible amount and detaches the level of the tax exemption from the level of the 
household income (Turtelboom, 2014).155 Overall, this is expected to reduce the government 
support households will receive when buying a house. The consequences for the distribution 
of home ownership among the population (and the future elderly population) are unknown. 
Overall, we expect that reducing the importance of the housing bonus without a valuable 
alternative is expected to disfavour the capabilities of households to obtain home ownership, 
although the fixed tax rate for the calculation of the housing bonus is expected to be more 
favourable for low-income households than for high-income households (see, among others, 
Heylen, 2014).156,157 Given the great importance of home ownership for the protection of the 
elderly population against the financial dimension of old age dependency, this is expected to 
have important consequences for future generations of elderly. While nowadays home 
ownership can be considered as a buffer against financial destitution, particularly for low-
income households, reforms in the housing bonus can reduce this buffer function of property 
ownership, thus disfavouring future elderly households. In particular households with 
incomes below the average household income, yet not in the lowest income quintile, are 
expected to face more problems in obtaining home ownership. In addition, minister Homans 
(2014), responsible for housing policy, has decided to terminate the subsidies for social 
private property in Flanders. This probably will make home ownership more difficult for low-
income households, with the same potential risks for the protection of future generations of 
(low-income) pensioners against the financial dimension of old age dependency. 
Concerning the use of health and social care services, our study did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between the income and the care package of the elderly population. 
The use of health and social care seems to be decommodified by the widespread and quite 
generous national health insurance scheme. This national health insurance scheme provides 
financial compensations for a wide range of health and social care services for almost the 
entire Belgian population. However, two considerations are in place here. First, the fact that 
we do not find a statistically significant relationship between the generosity of the old age 
 
                                                             
155 Whereas before 2015 the level of the housing bonus depended on the marginal tax rate, since 2015 
a fixed tax rate is used for the calculation of the housing bonus.  
156 Research of Heylen (2013) on the distributional impact of housing subsidies in Flanders indicates 
that the mortgage tax relief overall disfavours low-income households because of several reasons: The 
fiscal advantage of the housing bonus increases with the income level (although this partly will be 
ruled out by the change to a fixed tax rate), high-income households are overrepresented among 
mortgage owners, and high-income households have a higher mortgage capability than low-income 
households. This also is confirmed in the research of Goeyvaerts et al. (2014). 
157 Also remarkable is that these changes in the housing bonus are not discussed as a part of the 
Flemish housing policy (in the policy notes of minister Homans on housing), but as a part of the 
Flemish fiscal policy. We wonder whether this implies that the housing bonus is not considered as a 
tool to encourage home ownership among the population, but merely is conceived as a fiscal 
instrument. This discussion is also part of the PhD research of Heylen (2014). 
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income package and the overall care use of the elderly population does not mean that there 
are no groups in the older population that are faced with important problems regarding the 
access and the use of health and social care services. As discussed in the conclusion of chapter 
10, a small group of elderly with a very low income is expected to have less access to health 
and social care services because of their income situation and other related factors (like low 
levels of education). Yet, this group probably is underrepresented in the sample that was 
investigated in this dissertation, and thus remains ‘under the radar’. Secondly, the lack of a 
significant relationship between income and care within the elderly population at no point 
may be used to justify cutbacks in the national health insurance scheme. Luckily, at the first 
sight, the coalition agreements presented in October 2014 do not point into that direction 
(Michel, 2014). Little concrete actions are included in the coalition agreements, yet, it is 
stated that a “qualitative, affordable and accessible health care must be guaranteed”. 
Consequently, existing barriers in the access to the health care system must be reduced, for 
example by an automatic attribution of the third party payer’s scheme for persons entitled to 
increased repayments in the national health insurance scheme. The current third party 
payer’s scheme will be reformed, and priority will be given to increasing the access of the 
most destitute groups to a general practitioner (Michel, 2014). However, at no point concrete 
information is given on neither the pace nor the reach of this extension of the third party 
payer’s scheme.  
Further, with the sixth state reform, the responsibilities of the regions in the organisation and 
financing of social care services are increased (Belgische Federale Overheidsdiensten, 2014). 
In Flanders, the already existing care insurance is made part of a ‘new’ Flemish Social 
Protection system (Vandeurzen, 2014). No major changes in the care insurance scheme are 
foreseen: the insurance contributions, as well as the benefits, remain flat-rate. Neither an 
income correction, nor a link with the degree of care dependency is foreseen to be 
implemented in the Flemish care insurance scheme. In addition, in Wallonia the organisation 
of a care insurance scheme like in Flanders is not planned for the near future, despite the 
increase of regional competences in the field of social protection (Gouvernement Wallon, 
2014). This implies that the differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding the 
protection against the functional dimension of old age (i.e. long-term care dependency) are 
expect to increase.  
With this final words said, it is now up to future researchers to fill in the gaps in what we 
currently know about the income and care packages of the elderly population. Policy makers 
on their turn must stay attentive for the inequalities among the elderly regarding their 
protection against the financial and functional dimensions of old age dependency. 
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APPENDIX 1. SHARE DATA STRUCTURE 
1. Computer Assisted Personal Interview 
1.1 Coverscreen module 
General household information (e.g. household composition) 
Identification of different respondents (financial respondent and household respondent) 
Information collected before the start of the interview, provided by one household member 
1.2 Individual modules 
Information on 18 topics, collected at household and individual level: 
   1. Demographics  
   2. Physical health 
   3. Behavioral risks 
   4. Cognitive function 
   5. Mental health 
   6. Health care  
   7. Employment and pensions 
   8. Grip strength 
   9. Walking speed 
   10. Children 
   11. Social support 
   12. Financial transfers 
   13. Housing 
   14. Household income 
   15. Consumption 
   16. Assets 
   17. Activities 
   18. Expectations 
 
In the second wave, three additional modules were added: 
   1. Chair stand test 
   2. Peak flow test 
   3. End of life 
1.3 Interviewer module 
Interviewer observations on the interview, based on interviewer questionnaire after the 
interview 
2. Paper and pencil questionnaires 
2.1 Drop-off questionnaires 
2.2 Vignette questionnaires 
3. Generated variables 
3.1 Generated variables 
Thematically generated variables based on the individual modules: 
   1. Education – ISCED 
   2. Health 
   3. Housing and region 
   4. Occupation – ISCO and NACE 
   5. Support and household composition 
   6. Alive or deceased 
3.2 Imputations 
Imputed values for variables with item non-response 
3.3 Weights 
Different weights to correct for unit non-response  
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APPENDIX 2. THE CALCULATION OF THE WEIGHTS 
We use weights to take account of differences between the sample population and the 
overall population that could influence our research results. Two types of weights are 
combined: design weights and poststratification weights. Design weights have to 
compensate for differences in the sampling probabilities stemming from the sample 
design and the sample framework. Poststratification weights have to compensate for unit 
non-response and the underrepresentation of certain population groups in the sample 
population. For the calculation of the combined weights, we follow the method of Pickery 
(2010).  
In a first step, the design weights are applied. These weights are provided by the SHARE 
research team, and are calculated as “the inverse of the probability of being included in the 
[...] sample.” (De Luca & Rossetti, 2010, p. 23). Table A2.1 shows the unweighted 
distribution of the sample by age and sex. Table A2.2 shows the distribution of the sample 
by age and sex after the application of the design weights. 
Table A2.1. Distribution of the unweighted sample by age and sex 
 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Sex           
Men 139 8 142 8 156 9 121 7 141 8 
Women 220 13 202 12 183 11 179 11 209 12 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
Table A2.2. Distribution of the sample by age and sex, after the design weight 
 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Sex           
Men 50765 8 51432 8 57249 9 43960 7 51994 8 
Women 80190 13 74320 12 66881 11 65460 11 76613 12 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
In the second step, we calculate the poststratification weights taking account of the 
population distribution by age and sex. Table A2.3 shows the population distribution by 
age and sex.  
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Table A2.3. Population distribution by age and sex 
 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Sex           
Men 285594 12 214874 9 200239 9 164521 7 154184 7 
Women 296296 13 237845 10 238913 10 224829 10 273509 12 
Source: Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie (2009) 
Following Bethlehem (2002), the post-stratification weights (weightPS) are calculated per 
stratum of age and sex as: 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑃𝑆 =
𝑁ℎ
𝑛ℎ
𝑥
𝑛
𝑁
 
in which Nh refers to the size of the stratum in the population, nh refers to the size of the 
stratum in the sample, N to the total population size and n to the total sample size. In the 
calculation of the poststratification weights we already take account of the design weights. 
The poststratification weights are shown in Table A2.4. 
Table A2.4. Poststratification weights by age and sex 
 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
Sex      
Men 5.6258 4.1778 3.4977 3.7425 2.9654 
Women 3.6949 3.2003 3.5722 3.4346 3.5700 
The final weights equal the product of the poststratification weights and the design 
weights. In a third step the final weights are rescaled so the mean of the weights equals 1. 
This has to ease the interpretation of the research results. The final weighted sample 
distribution by age and sex is show in Table A2.5. After application of the combined 
weights, the relative sample distribution by age and sex equals the relative population 
distribution in Table A2.3. 
Table A2.5. Distribution of the sample by age and sex, after the application of the 
combined and rescaled weights 
 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Sex           
Men 210 12 158 9 147 9 121 7 113 7 
Women 218 13 175 10 175 10 165 10 201 12 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE wave 2 
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APPENDIX 3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE METHODOLOGICAL 
CHOICES: A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In our research design we made several methodological choices. Although we seriously 
reflected on these choices, we cannot neglect the potential influences of these 
methodological interventions on the research results. Sensitivity analysis is a widely used 
approach to evaluate the consequences of the methodological choices made during the 
research, and, to put it differently, to investigate “these potential changes and errors and 
their impacts on conclusions to be drawn from the model.” (Pannell, 1997, p. 139). If the 
model results are insensitive to changes in the parameters, this increases the reliability of 
our research results. If not, we can use the results of the sensitivity analysis to evaluate the 
extent to which our methodological choices influence our research results.  
In the next three sections, we focus on the influence of the weighting parameters to 
compensate for unit non-response (section 1), the inclusion of imputed values to 
compensate for item non-response (section 2), and the use of equivalence scales to take 
account of returns of scale within households (section 3). In all sections, we evaluate the 
main descriptive statistics as well as the results of a number of multivariate models. 
1. Weights 
An exploration of the SHARE data showed that the survey is prone to a quite extensive 
degree of unit non-response. We estimated that only 36% of the initial sample of 
individuals was actually interviewed in the first wave (see chapter 6). Because the non-
responding part of the target population can be different from the responding part of the 
target population, non-response bias is likely to occur. However, because we do not have 
information on the non-responding part of the target population, we were not able to 
completely compare the responding and the non-responding part of the target population. 
The only option available was to compare the realized sample with the target population 
on a number of basic characteristics (i.e. age and sex). This showed an undercoverage of 
men and individuals between 60 and 64 years in the sample. To compensate for the 
differences between the realized sample and the target population, we included 
poststratification weights that were calculated taking account of the population 
distribution by age and sex. In chapter 6, we mentioned that the use of weights can 
increase the standard error and the variance in the variables, which can affect the 
reliability of the research results. In this section, we will evaluate the influence of the 
weights on the main model results. In doing so, we compare the main model results 
including and excluding the weights, no other changes to the models are made.  
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1.1 Comparison of the weighted and unweighted univariate distribution 
Table A3.1 shows the weighted and unweighted univariate distribution of the main 
categorical variables in our research: the personal income package composition, the 
composition of the asset package and the health and social care package composition. The 
last column (Δ) indicates the difference in terms of percentage between the weighted and 
the unweighted distribution.  
Table A3.1. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted distribution of the 
research population by personal income package composition, asset package 
composition, and care package composition (2007) 
 
Including weights Excluding weights Δ 
 
N % N % % 
Personal income package      
  P1 542 32 569 34 -4.9 
  P2+P1 148 9 149 9 -0.5 
  P1+P3 473 28 477 28 -0.9 
  SS+other 133 8 116 7 13.1 
  Wage+other 94 6 85 5 10.0 
  Only P3 109 7 107 6 2.0 
  None 176 11 183 11 -3.8 
Asset package      
  No assets 24 2 24 1 0.3 
  Financial assets 297 19 306 19 -2.9 
  Financial assets+property ownership 1.249 78 1.249 78 0.0 
  Only property ownership 26 2 27 2 -5.6 
Care package      
  Minor care use 486 29 466 29 4.1 
  Second-line health care 374 23 370 23 1.0 
  Hospital care 205 12 197 12 3.8 
  Informal home help 231 14 223 14 3.5 
  Formal home help 141 9 145 9 -2.8 
  Informal personal care 69 4 65 4 5.4 
  Mixed care package 145 9 144 9 0.9 
Note: “Δ” indicates the difference in terms of percentage between the weighted and the unweighted distribution.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
The differences between the weighted and the unweighted distribution tend to be 
relatively small. The most outstanding difference is found in the personal income package 
composition: including weights leads to an overrepresentation of elderly with social 
security benefits (difference of 13%) and elderly with a wage (difference of 10%). Elderly 
that only have a first pillar pension, as well as elderly without personal income sources are 
somewhat underrepresented in the weighted analyses (a difference of resp. 5% and 4%). 
Regarding the asset package composition, elderly with financial assets and elderly with 
only property ownership tend to be underrepresented in the weighted analyses. But, 
because the share of these groups in the overall population is relatively small, this does 
not affect the overall distribution. The same is found for the care package composition: 
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including weights tends to overrepresent certain groups, but without influencing the 
overall distribution. 
In addition, we also compare the most important means and medians (i.e. generosity of the 
personal income package, the direct and simulated asset contribution, and the direct and 
simulated total income) with and without weights in the calculations (see Table A3.2).  
Again, we do not find major differences between the weighted and the unweighted 
statistics. The difference is never larger than 2%. The personal income package is a little 
more generous when weights are included in the analysis. On average, the weighted 
average level of the personal income package is about 26 Euros higher than the 
unweighted average level (1300 Euros vs. 1274 Euros). However, no difference between 
the weighted and the unweighted median of the personal income package is found. This 
indicates that the inclusion of weights tends to ascribe a higher weight to elderly with a 
higher income than to elderly with a lower income. The same is found to be true for the 
direct asset contribution. 
Table A3.2. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted mean and median 
contribution from the personal income package and the asset package (2007) 
 Including Excluding Δ 
 weights weights N % 
Personal income package     
  Mean 1300 1274 25.76 2.0 
  Median 1067 1064 3.03 0.3 
Direct asset contribution         
  Mean 165 162 2.60 1.6 
  Median 28 28 -0.20 -0.7 
Simulated asset contribution         
  Mean 1442 1469 -27.94 -1.9 
  Median 926 930 -4.79 -0.5 
Direct total income         
  Mean 1458 1428 30.66 2.1 
  Median 1167 1157 10.34 0.9 
Simulated total income         
  Mean 2734 2735 -1.14 0.0 
  Median 2122 2123 -0.92 0.0 
Note: “Δ” indicates the difference in terms of percentage between the weighted and the unweighted means and medians. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
1.2 Comparison of the weighted and unweighted model results 
In this section we focus on the potential influence of the weights on the results of the main 
models. First, we investigate the logistic regression model that was estimated with the 
personal income package composition as the dependent variable (Table A3.3). The 
differences between the weighted and the unweighted model are minor: the variables that 
are significant in the weighted model, also are significant in the unweighted model.   
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Table A3.3. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted global parameter statistics 
of the multinomial logit model with composition of the personal income package as 
dependent variable (2007) 
 
Including weights Excluding weights 
  Wald Chi² P Wald Chi² p 
Sex 99.70 <0.0001 94.79 <0.0001 
Age 125.00 <0.0001 122.88 <0.0001 
Occupational status 120.88 <0.0001 119.12 <0.0001 
Education 35.29 <0.0001 34.77 0.00 
Living situation 99.30 <0.0001 106.63 <0.0001 
Region 26.01 0.01 24.69 0.02 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Secondly, we compare the multivariate regression model with the level of the personal old 
age income package as the dependent variable, with and without weights (Table A3.4). 
Again, no differences are found in the significant variables. We do however find some 
differences in the parameters. For example, the weighted parameter for sex is somewhat 
smaller than the unweighted parameter (resp. 47.50 versus 63.43). This stems from the 
different weights that are attached to sex in the weighted model.  
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Table A3.4. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted detailed parameter 
statistics of the multivariate robust regression model with equivalent net income 
from the personal income package (in Euro) as the dependent variable (2007) 
  Including weights Excluding weights 
  b p b p 
Intercept 862.11 <0.0001 866.86 <0.0001 
Income source (reference: P1)   
  
  P2+P1 95.69 0.03 90.21 0.03 
  P1+P3 77.42 0.01 79.26 0.01 
  SS+other 0.28 0.99 10.45 0.82 
  Wage+other 208.82 0.01 233.46 0.00 
  Only P3 -467.48 <0.0001 -444.54 <0.0001 
  None -551.91 <0.0001 -528.87 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)   
  
  Male 47.50 0.65 63.43 0.54 
Age (reference: 75+)   
  
  60-74 10.22 0.68 8.96 0.71 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)   
  
  Salariat 50.52 0.54 46.68 0.56 
  Intermediate -54.46 0.41 -52.91 0.41 
  Working class -55.29 0.31 -40.31 0.44 
Level of education (reference: low)   
  
  High 195.26 0.06 192.87 0.06 
  Intermediate 22.77 0.70 24.39 0.66 
Living situation (reference: single)   
  
  Couple 321.01 <0.0001 312.58 <0.0001 
Region (reference: Brussels)   
  
  Flanders 67.15 0.27 53.33 0.35 
  Wallonia 117.29 0.06 97.97 0.09 
Interaction effect of sex and occupation   
  
  Male*Salariat -2.33 0.98 -13.87 0.90 
  Male*Intermediate 4.55 0.97 -5.66 0.96 
  Male*Working class 60.68 0.58 42.50 0.69 
Interaction effect of education and occupation   
  
  High*Walariat 147.14 0.24 113.35 0.20 
  High*Intermediate -148.81 0.24 42.87 0.57 
  High*Working class -73.25 0.66 46.88 0.49 
  Mid*Salariat 88.89 0.32 156.51 0.20 
  Mid*Intermediate 31.12 0.69 -134.86 0.28 
  Mid*Working class 61.54 0.39 -94.55 0.58 
Interaction effect of sex and living situation   
  
  Male*Couple -335.73 <0.0001 -337.24 <0.0001 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Thirdly, we compared the global model statistics of the weighted and the unweighted 
binomial logit models with resp. financial asset ownership and property ownership as the 
main dependent variables (Table A3.5). Again, we do not find differences in the variables 
that are significant in the weighted and the unweighted models. 
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Table A3.5. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted global parameter statistics 
of the binomial logit models with financial asset ownership and property ownership 
as dependent variables (2007) 
 
Financial asset ownership Property ownership 
  Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted 
 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Personal income package  
  composition 10.32 0.11 10.16 0.12 16.95 0.01 15.41 0.02 
Level of personal income 2.01 0.73 1.86 0.76 6.09 0.20 6.23 0.19 
Sex 0.10 0.75 0.13 0.72 1.09 0.30 0.70 0.40 
Age 0.68 0.41 0.76 0.38 8.23 0.00 7.61 0.01 
Occupational status 11.23 0.01 9.24 0.03 14.45 0.00 14.36 0.00 
Education 1.27 0.53 1.45 0.48 1.64 0.44 1.66 0.44 
Living situation 7.24 0.01 7.84 0.01 38.66 <0.0001 39.29 <0.0001 
Region 3.77 0.15 3.79 0.15 8.21 0.02 9.63 0.01 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Fourthly, Table A3.6 shows the detailed model parameters and their p-values for the 
multivariate regression models testing the direct and simulated contribution from asset 
sources. Concerning the direct asset contribution, we overall do not find differences in the 
variables that are significant in the weighted and the unweighted model. However, for the 
level of the personal income package, we see that in the weighted model the third income 
quintile (1000-1189 Euros) differs significantly from the reference category at the alpha-
level of 0.05, while this is not the case in the unweighted model (resp. p=0.04 and p=0.08). 
Similarly, the p-value of the upper income quintile is just above the 0.05 level in the 
weighted model, while it is below the 0.05 level in the unweighted model. The differences 
in the parameters, however, are only minor. 
 Table A3.6. Comparison of the weighted and unweighted detailed parameter statistics of the multivariate robust regression model 
with direct and simulated equivalent monthly contribution from assets (in Euro) as dependent variable (2007) 
 Direct asset contribution Simulated asset contribution 
 Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted 
 B p b p b p b p 
Intercept 5.96 0.45 7.19 0.36 746.29 <0.0001 702.04 <0.0001 
Personal income package (reference: P1)                 
  P2+P1 8.57 0.09 8.24 0.09 296.59 0.00 263.75 0.00 
  P1+P3 8.60 0.01 8.15 0.01 175.47 0.00 160.61 0.01 
  SS+other 4.23 0.43 3.95 0.50 -39.48 0.65 -42.27 0.65 
  Wage+other -7.70 0.21 -5.83 0.35 75.43 0.46 86.28 0.41 
  Only P3 2.33 0.67 3.29 0.54 147.47 0.11 151.89 0.10 
  None 11.42 0.02 12.19 0.01 91.93 0.27 115.55 0.16 
Personal income level (reference: <760 Euros)                 
  760-999 4.32 0.26 3.81 0.30 -124.50 0.08 -93.23 0.16 
  1000-1189 9.23 0.04 7.64 0.08 -133.74 0.08 -81.06 0.27 
  1190-1571 10.37 0.01 10.71 0.01 -129.73 0.08 -133.91 0.06 
  ≥1572 8.48 0.05 9.67 0.02 60.12 0.43 63.98 0.37 
Sex (reference: female)                 
  Male 0.69 0.81 0.68 0.81 1.98 0.97 1.46 0.98 
Age (reference: 75+)                 
  60-74 3.54 0.23 3.78 0.21 -228.14 <0.0001 -235.06 <0.0001 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)                 
  Salariat 0.27 0.96 -0.76 0.88 -76.29 0.35 -61.30 0.45 
  Intermediate 3.79 0.42 4.23 0.36 -94.16 0.25 -50.27 0.54 
  Working class -3.30 0.46 -3.80 0.39 -256.94 0.00 -242.29 0.00 
Level of education (reference: low)                 
  High 25.32 <0.0001 24.05 <0.0001 374.91 <0.0001 394.76 <0.0001 
  Intermediate 9.86 0.00 10.06 0.00 198.09 0.00 198.80 <0.0001 
Living situation (reference: single)                 
  Couple 4.74 0.14 4.13 0.19 -32.38 0.53 -31.70 0.53 
Region (reference: Brussels)                 
  Flanders 7.34 0.28 7.74 0.23 444.60 0.00 457.82 <0.0001 
  Wallonia -9.97 0.14 -10.19 0.13 181.01 0.12 187.31 0.09 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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In the multivariate regression model with the simulated asset contribution as the 
dependent variable, again no differences in the significant independent variables are 
found. The differences between the parameters, however, are larger. For example, in the 
weighted model the parameter of P2+P1 is 297, while in the unweighted model it is about 
264, a difference of 34. Similarly, in the weighted model the parameters of the personal 
income level variable are lower than in the unweighted model. 
Lastly, we also compare the global model statistics of the weighted and the unweighted 
multinomial logit models with the care package composition as the dependent variable 
(Table A3.7). In line with the previous findings, there are no differences in the variables 
that are significant in the weighted and the unweighted models. 
Table A3.7. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the weighted and 
unweighted multinomial logit model with the care package composition as 
dependent variable (2007) 
 
Including weights Excluding weights 
  Wald Chi² P Wald Chi² P 
Personal income package 25.72 0.37 27.45 0.28 
Personal income level 36.51 0.45 33.43 0.59 
Subjective health status 27.71 0.00 30.09 <0.0001 
Multimorbidity 33.51 <0.0001 35.42 <0.0001 
Multi health symptoms 42.04 <0.0001 41.90 <0.0001 
Multi ADL limitations 38.64 <0.0001 44.51 <0.0001 
Multi IADL limitations 29.51 <0.0001 31.65 <0.0001 
Sex 14.16 0.03 12.10 0.06 
Age 50.86 <0.0001 55.64 <0.0001 
Occupational status 27.29 0.07 25.52 0.11 
Education 12.60 0.40 16.68 0.16 
Living situation 63.89 <0.0001 59.65 <0.0001 
Region 15.81 0.20 15.74 0.20 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
1.3 Conclusion 
Based on the comparisons of the weighted and the unweighted univariate distribution of 
the main variables of interest, as well as the comparison of the weighted and the 
unweighted models, we can conclude that little differences are found between the 
distributions, the model statistics, and the parameters of the weighted and the unweighted 
models. Consequently, it could be an option to leave out the weights in the analyses. 
However, because the weights compensate for small differences between the target 
population and the realised sample we have kept them in the analyses. The absence of 
important differences between the weighted and the unweighted distributions and models 
contributes to the reliability of our research results, in that the inclusion of weights in the 
analyses does not bring about major changes in the research results. 
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2. Imputed values 
Given our focus on the old age income package, income level variables have a central 
position in our research. Overall, income questions in surveys are prone to quite high 
degrees of item non-response. For several reasons, survey respondents are reluctant to 
give (detailled) information on their income (e.g. because they don’t know the exact 
amount, because they consider this as personal information, etc.). In the SHARE, an 
unfolding brackets procedure was used to limit item non-response on the income 
questions. However, even when the answers of the unfolding brackets procedure were 
included, item non-response still remained considerable. An estimation based on relevant 
amount questions in the modules on employment and pensions, and assets and housing 
showed that, after the unfolding brackets procedure, 5% to 39% of the answers was 
missing (cf. chapter 6). To limit the negative effects of this item non-response, we decided 
to include imputed values. These imputations were provided by the central SHARE 
research team, and were the result of a multiple imputation procedure.  
In this section, we recompute the main statistics and models to investigate the influence of 
the imputations on the research results. Again, we will not change other aspects of the 
models. Respondents with missing information (because we do not use imputed values) 
are not included in the analyses. Further, the analyses presented in the next sections are 
limited to the statistics and the models that could change when imputed values are left out 
of the analyses. Consequently, the univariate distribution of the composition of the 
packages as well as the multinomial logit model with the personal income package 
composition as the dependent variable are not included here.  
2.1 Comparison of the univariate distributions including and excluding 
imputations  
In Table A3.8 we calculated the mean and the median contribution from the personal 
income package, the asset package and the overall extended old age income package with 
and without imputations. A first important finding is that the exclusion of imputations 
leads to a strong reduction in the size of the population, specifically when assets are added 
to the old age income package. This is caused by the high degree of item non-response on 
asset questions, as discussed more in detail in chapter 6. Secondly, we find that the means 
are always higher when imputed values are included than when imputed values are left 
out of the analyses. For example, the mean personal income including imputations is 
almost 10% higher than the mean personal income without imputations (a difference of 
127 Euros). This difference is even larger when the contribution from assets is concerned: 
the average direct asset contribution including imputations is about 22% higher than the 
average direct asset contribution without imputations.  
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Table A3.8. Comparison of the mean and median contribution from the personal 
income package and the asset package, with and without imputations (weighted, 
2007) 
 With Without Δ 
 imputations imputations N % 
Personal income package     
  N 1630 1400   
  Mean 1300 1173 127 9.7 
  Median 1067 1051 15 1.4 
Direct asset contribution     
  N 1596 581   
  Mean 165 129 36 22.0 
  Median 28 19 9 30.6 
Simulated asset contribution     
  N 1596 613   
  Mean 1442 1108 334 23.2 
  Median 926 804 122 13.2 
Direct total income     
  N 1566 611   
  Mean 1458 1325 133 9.1 
  Median 1167 1122 45 3.9 
Simulated total income     
  N 1566 611   
  Mean 2734 2291 443 16.2 
  Median 2122 1933 189 8.9 
Note: “Δ” indicates the difference in terms of percentage between the means and medians with and without imputations. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Based on the results presented in the previous table, we can conclude that including 
respondents with missing information on the amount questions via imputations leads to 
an overrepresentation of respondents with (estimated) higher income levels. This leads to 
higher means and medians in the statistics that include imputed values than in the 
statistics that leave out respondents with missing information.  
2.2 Comparison of the model results including and excluding imputations 
In addition to the univariate statistics presented in the previous section, in this section we 
recomputed the main models to investigate whether leaving out imputations changes the 
conclusions based on these models. 
Table A3.9 compares the parameters statistics of the multivariate robust regression model 
with the equivalent net monthly income from the personal income package as the 
dependent variable, in the dataset with imputations and the dataset without imputations. 
Overall, we do not find major changes in the significance of the variables. Only P2+P1 is no 
longer significantly different from the reference category when we leave out the 
respondents with imputed values. As expected, the parameter values (b) change when we 
exclude observations with imputations. For example, leaving out imputations reduces the 
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parameter values of the categories P2+P1 and P1+P3. Since incomes tend to be higher for 
elderly combining a first pillar pension with a second and/or a third pillar pensions, this 
confirms our earlier finding that including imputations in the analyses overrepresents the 
higher income levels. 
Table A3.9. Comparison of the detailed parameter statistics of the multivariate 
robust regression model with equivalent net income from the personal income 
package (in Euro) as the dependent variable, with and without imputations 
(weighted, 2007) 
  With imputations Without imputations 
  b p b p 
Intercept 862.11 <0.0001 876.79 <0.0001 
Income source (reference: P1)       
  P2+P1 95.69 0.03 82.88 0.06 
  P1+P3 77.42 0.01 69.30 0.02 
  SS+other 0.28 0.99 -20.13 0.65 
  Wage+other 208.82 0.01 219.61 0.00 
  Only P3 -467.48 <0.0001 -461.43 <0.0001 
  None -551.91 <0.0001 -551.54 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)       
  Male 47.50 0.65 66.72 0.52 
Age (reference: 75+)       
  60-74 10.22 0.68 7.51 0.76 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)       
  Salariat 50.52 0.54 38.33 0.66 
  Intermediate -54.46 0.41 -70.34 0.29 
  Working class -55.29 0.31 -102.54 0.06 
Level of education (reference: low)     
  High 195.26 0.06 134.10 0.18 
  Intermediate 22.77 0.70 0.96 0.99 
Living situation (reference: single)     
  Couple 321.01 <0.0001 329.86 <0.0001 
Region (reference: Brussels)       
  Flanders 67.15 0.27 76.46 0.20 
  Wallonia 117.29 0.06 122.81 0.04 
Interaction effect of sex and occupation       
  Male*Salariat -2.33 0.98 -13.68 0.90 
  Male*Intermediate 4.55 0.97 3.16 0.98 
  Male*Working class 60.68 0.58 57.79 0.59 
Interaction effect of education and occupation       
  High*Walariat 147.14 0.24 92.82 0.32 
  High*Intermediate -148.81 0.24 5.43 0.94 
  High*Working class -73.25 0.66 75.01 0.30 
  Mid*Salariat 88.89 0.32 174.36 0.16 
  Mid*Intermediate 31.12 0.69 -65.12 0.61 
  Mid*Working class 61.54 0.39 -13.77 0.93 
Interaction effect of sex and living situation       
  Male*Couple -335.73 <0.0001 -333.71 <0.0001 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Secondly, we assess the impact of imputations on the binomial logit models on financial 
asset ownership and property ownership. At the level of the global model statistics, 
presented in Table A3.10, we do not find major changes when we leave out the 
respondents with imputed values. When we do not include the respondents with imputed 
values on the personal income package, occupational status no longer is significant in 
explaining financial asset ownership. Similarly, for property ownership the significant 
effect of region (at the alpha-level of 0.05) disappears when imputed values are excluded. 
Table A3.10. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the binomial logit 
models with financial asset ownership and property ownership as dependent 
variables, with and without imputations (weighted, 2007) 
 
Financial asset ownership Property ownership 
  
With 
imputations 
Without 
imputations 
With 
imputations 
Without 
imputations 
 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Wald 
Chi² p 
Personal income package  
  composition 10.32 0.11 9.42 0.15 16.95 0.01 15.93 0.01 
Level of personal income 2.01 0.73 2.77 0.60 6.09 0.20 2.95 0.57 
Sex 0.10 0.75 0.11 0.74 1.09 0.30 0.83 0.36 
Age 0.68 0.41 1.25 0.26 8.23 0.00 8.37 0.00 
Occupational status 11.23 0.01 6.28 0.10 14.45 0.00 12.86 0.00 
Education 1.27 0.53 0.96 0.62 1.64 0.44 1.09 0.58 
Living situation 7.24 0.01 8.34 0.00 38.66 <0.0001 34.75 <0.0001 
Region 3.77 0.15 2.96 0.23 8.21 0.02 5.79 0.06 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
Thirdly, Table A3.11 shows the results of the multivariate regression models on the direct 
and the simulated asset contribution, including and excluding imputed values. In the 
model with the direct asset contribution as the dependent, leaving out the imputed values 
removes the significant effect of having an income between 1000 and 1189 Euros (Q3). 
The changes in the parameters due to the exclusion of observations with imputed values 
seem to confirm that the inclusion of imputations tends to overrepresent elderly with a 
more diverse (thus a more generous) income package. For example, for the direct asset 
contribution the parameters of P2+P1 and P1+P3 are lower in the model without 
imputations than in the model with imputations.  
The overall conclusions based on the model without imputations, however, are not very 
different from the main conclusions from the model with imputations. When we control 
for sociodemographic and socioeconomic background differences, in the model with 
imputations we still find that the direct asset contribution is significantly larger for elderly 
with a first and a third pillar pension than for elderly with only a first pillar pension. 
Similarly, the model shows that elderly with a more generous personal income package 
overall have a higher direct contribution from their assets than elderly with a less 
generous personal old age income package.  
 Table A3.11. Comparison of the detailed parameter statistics of the multivariate robust regression model with direct and simulated 
equivalent monthly contribution from assets (in Euro) as dependent variable, with and without imputations (unweighted, 2007) 
 Direct asset contribution Simulated asset contribution 
 With imputations Without imputations With imputations Without imputations 
 b p b p b p b p 
Intercept 5.96 0.45 8.18 0.15 746.29 <0.0001 306.83 0.08 
Personal income package (reference: P1)                 
  P2+P1 8.57 0.09 -4.39 0.23 296.59 0.00 344.28 0.00 
  P1+P3 8.60 0.01 4.96 0.04 175.47 0.00 168.91 0.02 
  SS+other 4.23 0.43 3.05 0.40 -39.48 0.65 122.11 0.27 
  Wage+other -7.70 0.21 -1.93 0.71 75.43 0.46 -0.21 0.99 
  Only P3 2.33 0.67 2.41 0.53 147.47 0.11 270.04 0.02 
  None 11.42 0.02 8.88 0.02 91.93 0.27 258.75 0.02 
Personal income level (reference: <760 Euros)                 
  760-999 4.32 0.26 0.40 0.90 -124.50 0.08 19.90 0.83 
  1000-1189 9.23 0.04 6.46 0.05 -133.74 0.08 0.40 0.99 
  1190-1571 10.37 0.01 10.65 0.00 -129.73 0.08 66.29 0.51 
  ≥1572 8.48 0.05 9.72 0.01 60.12 0.43 185.89 0.09 
Sex (reference: female)                 
  Male 0.69 0.81 -3.03 0.15 1.98 0.97 -71.61 0.27 
Age (reference: 75+)                 
  60-74 3.54 0.23 -0.99 0.65 -228.14 <0.0001 -291.97 <0.0001 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation)                 
  Salariat 0.27 0.96 4.92 0.15 -76.29 0.35 190.77 0.07 
  Intermediate 3.79 0.42 3.91 0.25 -94.16 0.25 131.57 0.21 
  Working class -3.30 0.46 3.47 0.29 -256.94 0.00 -16.51 0.87 
Level of education (reference: low)                 
  High 25.32 <0.0001 6.40 0.04 374.91 <0.0001 372.12 0.00 
  Intermediate 9.86 0.00 5.78 0.01 198.09 0.00 116.72 0.11 
Living situation (reference: single)                 
  Couple 4.74 0.14 1.46 0.50 -32.38 0.53 10.65 0.87 
Region (reference: Brussels)                 
  Flanders 7.34 0.28 -3.06 0.49 444.60 0.00 453.03 0.00 
  Wallonia -9.97 0.14 -8.61 0.06 181.01 0.12 197.88 0.15 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Lastly, we evaluate the differences stemming from working with imputed values in the 
multinomial logit model with the care package composition as the main dependent 
variable. Table A3.12 shows the global parameter statistics of the multinomial logit 
models with and without imputations.  
Table A3.12. Comparison of the global parameter statistics of the multinomial logit 
model with the care package composition as dependent variable, with and without 
imputations (weighted, 2007) 
 
With imputations Without imputations 
  Wald Chi² p Wald Chi² p 
Personal income package 25.72 0.37 20.89 0.65 
Personal income level 36.51 0.45 42.84 0.20 
Subjective health status 27.71 0.00 19.95 0.00 
Multimorbidity 33.51 <0.0001 29.39 <0.0001 
Multi health symptoms 42.04 <0.0001 50.90 <0.0001 
Multi ADL limitations 38.64 <0.0001 36.58 <0.0001 
Multi IADL limitations 29.51 <0.0001 28.05 <0.0001 
Sex 14.16 0.03 13.83 0.03 
Age 50.86 <0.0001 42.15 <0.0001 
Occupational status 27.29 0.07 28.38 0.06 
Education 12.60 0.40 13.81 0.31 
Living situation 63.89 <0.0001 56.69 <0.0001 
Region 15.81 0.20 13.82 0.31 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
No important differences are found in the global model statistics when we exclude 
respondents with imputed values from the dataset. Possibly this results from the fact that 
this model does not include variables related to the asset package. As shown before, 
excluding respondents with imputations lead to important changes when asset variables 
are included in the model. However, when only personal income package variables are 
included the differences between the dataset with imputations and without imputations 
are smaller. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Based on the comparisons of the univariate statistics of the main variables of interest, as 
well as the main models of interests, including and excluding respondents with missing 
information on the amount questions, we find that leaving out respondents with imputed 
values on the amount questions leads to important changes in the descriptive statistics as 
well as in the modelled parameters. Particularly when the contribution of assets is 
considered, leaving out respondents with imputed values has important consequences. 
This stems from the high degrees of item non-response in the amount questions in the 
module on assets (cf. chapter 6). Leaving out respondents with imputed values thus 
reduces importantly the research population. Moreover, leaving out respondents with 
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imputations on the amount questions tends to reduce the proportion of the higher 
incomes in the dataset. This leads to lower means, and to a reduced influence of certain 
variables in the model (for example, the personal income package composition). The 
overall conclusions from the different models, however, do not tend to change importantly 
when we exclude the respondents with imputed values on the amount questions.  
3. Equivalence scales 
To take account of the returns of scale that arise from living together with a partner, we 
used the OECD-modified equivalence scale. This scale was developed by Hagenaars et al. 
(1994), and nowadays is a very commonly used equivalence scale in social research (e.g. in 
the EU-SILC). The scale assigns a weight of 1 to the first adult household member; a weight 
of 0.5 to each additional adult household member; and a weight of 0.3 to each child in the 
household. Since we limited our research population to single living elderly and elderly 
living with a partner, we only used two equivalence factors: 1 for singles, and 1.5 for 
elderly living with a partner. However, we must be aware that the research results can 
change when we use a different equivalence scale. According to Förster (1994, p. 13) “As 
for the composition of the low-income population, almost by definition, the larger the 
elasticity [i.e. the larger the weight of each additional household member], the greater the 
share of large families (thus children) among the low-income population and the smaller 
the share of single persons (thus elderly) and older married couples.” Using an 
equivalence scale that gives a lower weight to the additional adult household member, 
increases the equivalent income of couples and thus is expected to increase the share of 
couples in the high-income population. Consequently, singles are expected to be stronger 
represented in the low-income population, and the share of singles below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold will be larger. 
To investigate how our choice for the modified OECD equivalence scale influenced our 
research results, we have recomputed the mean and median contribution from the 
personal old age income package. We also recalculated the age-specific poverty rates 
taking account of three different equivalence factors (see Table A3.13).158 
  
 
                                                             
158 We include the age-specific poverty rate in the analysis presented here, because we were not 
able to recompute the EU-SILC correction factor with different equivalence scales. More details on 
the EU-SILC correction factor are provided in chapter 7. This correction factor is based on the EU-
SILC net median equivalent income of the entire population. The modified OECD equivalence scale 
is used to take account of returns of scale within households. 
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Table A3.13. Overview of three commonly used equivalence scales 
 Household income is divided by ... Factor for 
couples 
Oxford equivalence scale ... a factor that assigns a value of 1 to the 
first adult in the household; 0.7 to the 
following adults and 0.5 to every child in 
the household  
1.7 
OECD modified equivalence scale ... a factor that assigns a value of 1 to the 
first adult in the household; 0.5 to the 
following adults and 0.3 to every child in 
the household 
1.5 
Square root equivalence scale ... the square root of the number of 
household members 
1.4 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009) 
Table A3.14 compares the mean and the median income from the personal old age income 
package, and the related age specific at-risk-of-poverty rate based on the Oxford 
equivalence scale, the OECD modified equivalence scale and the square root equivalence 
scale. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is highest when the Oxford equivalence scale is used 
(14%), and lowest when the square root equivalence scale is used, though the difference 
between the poverty rate based on the modified OECD equivalence scale and poverty rate 
based on the square root scale is negligible (a difference of 0.07 percentage points).  
As expected, when the Oxford equivalence scale is used, a higher proportion of elderly 
living with a partner is found below the poverty threshold. 16% of the elderly with a 
partner has an equivalent income below the poverty threshold, compared to 11% of the 
single-living elderly. When a lower weight is assigned to the second adult in the couple (i.e. 
when the square root equivalence scale is used), elderly without a partner become more 
apparent below the poverty threshold. In that case, 13% of the single-living elderly has an 
income below the poverty threshold, compared to 10% of the elderly living together with 
a partner. This confirms our expectations.  
For our research it is important to keep in mind that using a different equivalence scale 
can change the poverty rate of certain groups in our research population. However, 
because in our research population the differences in the household composition are 
limited (i.e. one- or two-person-households) the influence of the equivalence scale on our 
conclusions is expected to be rather small. However, in more diverse population, including 
several household compositions, the influence of the equivalence scale used is expected to 
be more important. 
 
 
 Table A3.14. Comparison of the mean and median net monthly equivalent income from the personal old age income package and the 
age-specific at-risk-of-poverty rate, by the Oxford equivalence scale, the OECD modified equivalence scale and the square root 
equivalence scale (weighted, 2007) 
  Oxford equivalence scale OECD modified equivalence scale Square root equivalence scale 
  Mean Median 
% below poverty 
threshold  Mean Median 
% below poverty 
threshold  Mean Median 
% below poverty 
threshold  
Sex                   
  Male 1265 1000 14 1393 1100 11 1459 1135 10 
  Female 1139 1000 14 1225 1045 12 1269 1078 12 
Age                   
  60-74 1280 1000 14 1405 1100 12 1470 1136 12 
  75+ 1040 970 14 1106 1022 10 1140 1061 10 
Occupational status                  
  Salariat 1490 1207 10 1635 1313 9 1709 1376 9 
  Intermediate 1163 945 19 1259 1004 16 1309 1056 16 
  Working class 991 942 11 1070 1000 8 1111 1040 7 
  None 909 879 23 978 937 19 1013 950 19 
Education                   
  High 1621 1319 10 1771 1428 10 1847 1461 10 
  Intermediate 1142 987 14 1249 1061 12 1304 1099 12 
  Low 984 900 17 1057 967 12 1094 993 11 
Living situation                   
  Couple 1217 955 16 1379 1083 11 1463 1148 10 
  Single 1156 1034 11 1156 1034 11 1156 1034 13 
Total 1195 1000 14 1300 1067 11 1354 1100 11 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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APPENDIX 4. COMPARING OBSERVATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT 
IMPUTATIONS 
In this appendix, we reflect on the potential differences between the respondents for 
whom we have included imputed values on the personal income package and the 
respondents for whom no imputed values are included in the calculation of the level of the 
personal income package. We assess the differences between both groups of respondents 
on a number of background and income variables. Table A4.1 presents some 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background characteristics, and Table A4.2 
presents the composition of the personal old age income package. In each table the 
difference in percentage points between the distribution without and with imputations is 
show. Further, we have included the p-value of the Pearson Chi² test statistic to assess 
whether the differences between the groups are statistically significant. 
Regarding the sociodemographic and socioeconomic background of the respondents 
without and with imputed values on the personal income level (Table A4.1), we find that 
among the respondents with imputed values the respondents aged 75 years and over are 
overrepresented with about 6 percentage points. Possibly this indicates that the oldest old 
have more difficulties in recalling exact income amounts, and thus have missing 
information on this type of variables. Further, among the respondents with imputations 
we find a small overrepresentation of individuals with an intermediate occupational status 
and individuals with a low level of education. However, according to the p-values, these 
differences are not statistically significant. Only for living situation we find an important 
difference between the respondents without and with imputations on the personal income 
level. Among the respondents with imputed values, single-living individuals are 
overrepresentated (a difference of 11 percentage points) (p=0.0015).  
Concerning the personal income package composition, presented in table A4.2, we find 
that among the respondents with imputed values on the personal income level there is an 
overrepresentation of elderly with only a first pillar pension (a difference of 8 percentage 
points) and of elderly with a wage (a difference of 9 percentage points). Further, elderly 
with only a third pillar pension or without personal income sources are underrepresented 
among the elderly with imputed values (a difference of resp. 7 and 12 percentage points). 
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Table A4.1 Distribution of the research population without and with imputations on 
the personal income level by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living 
situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
 Without imputations With imputations   
 N % N % ∆ p 
Sex       
  Male 632 45 103 44 0 0.9251 
  Female 783 55 130 56 0  
Age        
  60-74 926 65 139 59 -6 0.0767 
  75+ 489 35 95 41 6  
Occupational status          
  Salariat 474 35 80 35 0 0.8267 
  Intermediate 320 24 61 26 3  
  Working class 401 30 64 28 -2  
  None 157 12 25 11 -1  
Education         
  High 311 22 44 19 -3 0.4758 
  Intermediate 647 46 105 46 0  
  Low 445 32 81 35 3  
Living situation         
  Couple 939 66 130 56 -11 0.0015 
  Single 477 34 104 44 11  
Region of residence        
  Flanders 854 60 152 65 5 0.3853 
  Wallonia 510 36 74 32 -4  
  Brussels 51 4 7 3 0  
Total 1415 100 233 100   
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the observations without imputations and with 
imputations. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
Table A4.2 Distribution of the research population without and with imputations on 
the personal income level by personal income package composition (weighted, 
2007) 
 Without imputations With imputations   
 N % N % ∆ p 
Personal income package       
Only P1 436 31 92 39 8 <0.0001 
P2+P1 122 9 24 10 2  
P1+P3 395 28 71 30 3  
SS+other 119 8 12 5 -3  
Wage+other 59 4 32 14 9  
Only P3 108 8 1 0 -7  
None 175 12 1 0 -12  
Total 1415 100  233 100     
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the observations without imputations and with 
imputations. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
344 
APPENDIX 5. PRINCIPAL LIMIT FACTORS 
Table A5.1 shows the principal limit factors that are used to simulate the reverse 
mortgages, based on home ownership. These factors are based on the age of the individual 
and on the 2007 long-term interest rate of 4.33%. For couples, the PLF is based on the age 
of the partner with the longest remaining life expectancy. 
Table A5.1 Principal limit factors used for the simulation of reverse mortgages, by 
age, at an interest rate of 4.33% 
Age PLF Age PLF 
60 0.602 83 0.735 
61 0.610 84 0.741 
62 0.619 85 0.747 
63 0.625 86 0.754 
64 0.629 87 0.760 
65 0.637 88 0.765 
66 0.642 89 0.769 
67 0.648 90 0.776 
68 0.652 91 0.776 
69 0.659 92 0.776 
70 0.663 93 0.776 
71 0.671 94 0.776 
72 0.677 95 0.776 
73 0.681 96 0.776 
74 0.689 97 0.776 
75 0.693 98 0.776 
76 0.698 99 0.776 
77 0.702 100 0.776 
78 0.706 101 0.776 
79 0.714 102 0.776 
80 0.718 103 0.776 
81 0.724 104 0.776 
82 0.730 105 0.776 
Source: US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2013) 
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APPENDIX 6. SIMULATING THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION FROM 
ASSETS 
We simulate the potential contribution from assets to include them in the extended old 
age income package. The simulation is performed separately for three asset sources: 
financial assets, home ownership and secondary residence ownership. Financial assets are 
transposed to monthly fictitious annuities (Anm,eq), assuming a complete spending of the 
asset stock. Any secondary residences are assumed to be sold and the proceeds are 
transposed to monthly fictitious annuities. Account is given to the total amount in assets 
and/or the secondary residences’ value (NWt); the 2007 long-term interest rate (r) for 
government bond yields with a maturity of 10 years for the united EURO-area (4.33 %) 
(based on the interest rate of an OLO reference loan with a duration of 10 years at the 
secondary market, provided by the National Bank of Belgium in its annual macro-
economic statistics); and the remaining life expectancy (Ex) based on sex and age 
(Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie, 2013). For couples, the 
remaining life expectancy of the longest living partner is used, assuming the payment of a 
joint and full survivor annuity (a fixed annuity before and after the decease of one of both 
partners) (Brown, 2002; Brown & Poterba, 2000). The fictitious annuities are made 
equivalent using the modified OECD equivalence scale (1 for singles, 1.5 for couples) 
(Hagenaars et al., 1994; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009). 
All components are included in the following formula (cf. Weisbrod & Hansen, 1968): 
𝐴𝑛𝑚,𝑒𝑞 =
NWt ∗ r ∗
1
1−(1 + r)−Ex
12 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
 
For home ownership, we simulate monthly reverse mortgages (RMm,eq), based on a 
percentage of the estimated property’s value and the remaining mortgage (HV-M). This 
percentage, the principal limit factor (PLF), is drawn from the reverse mortgaging scheme 
of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2013) and is based on the long-
term interest rate and age (for couples: age of the youngest partner) (cf. Lefebure et al., 
2006; Verbist & Lefebure, 2008). The principal limit factors are included in appendix 5. 
The reverse mortgage is transposed to a fictitious annuity taking account of the 2007 long-
term interest rate (r) (4.33%); the remaining life expectancy (Ex); and the equivalence 
factor (cf. Weisbrod & Hansen, 1968): 
𝑅𝑀𝑚,𝑒𝑞 =
𝑃𝐿𝐹 ∗ (𝐻𝑉 − 𝑀) ∗ 𝑟 ∗
1
1 − (1 − 𝑟)−𝐸𝑥
12 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
 
To illustrate, we calculate the simulated contribution from a total financial asset stock of 
10000 Euros; a house with an estimated value of 200000 Euros without a mortgage, and a 
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secondary residence worth 150000 Euros. The examples differ in living situation, sex, and 
age (see Table A6.1). As shown, the simulated contribution is always larger for singles 
than for couples (no sharing of sources), for men than for women (differences in 
remaining life expectancy), and for older than for younger (shorter remaining expected 
life span). 
Table A6.1. Simulating the potential contribution from assets 
 
Partner 1 
Partner 
2 
Financial assets Home Secondary 
residence 
(1) M 60 - - 61 733 712 
(2) M 75 - - 100 1372 1296 
(3) W 60 - - 55 665 634 
(4) W 75 - - 85 1201 1078 
(5) M 60 W 60 37 443 422 
(6) M 60 W 75 41 489 475 
(7) M 75 W 60 37 443 422 
(8) M 75 W 75 57 801 719 
Notes: Rows 1 to 4 represent singles, rows 5 to 8 represent couples. Rows 1 and 2 represent single men of resp. 60 (1) and 
75 years (2); rows 3 and 4 represent single women of resp. 60 (3) and 75 years (4). Rows 5 and 8 represent couples, 
where both partners are resp. 60 (5) and 75 years of age (8). Rows 6 and 7 represent couples where resp. the man (6) or 
the woman (7) is the youngest partner. 
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APPENDIX 7. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE BACKGROUND 
VARIABLES 
1. Sex, age and living situation 
Information on sex, age and living situation is derived from the SHARE coverscreen 
interview on individual level. Sex (man/woman) is noted by the interviewer, and asked for 
confirmation in case of doubt (cv005). Age is based on the year of birth (cv007) and the 
interview year; it thus refers to the actual age of the respondent at the moment of 
interview. Age is remodelled to a categorical variable with two categories: 60 to 75 years, 
and 75 years or older. 
cv007 In what year were you born? 
Numerical value (1900-2007) 
Living situation differentiates between living single or living with a partner or spouse. For 
singles, no account is given to whether they are divorced, widowed or have never been 
married. For elderly living with a partner, no difference is made between marriage or 
(registered) cohabitation. Living situation is based on the following SHARE question 
(cv009): 
cv009 Are you ... 
1. Living with a spouse 
2. Living with a partner 
3. Living as a single 
Table A7.1 gives the weighted distribution of the research population by sex, age and 
living situation. 
Table A7.1. Distribution of the research population by sex, age and living situation 
(weighted, 2007) 
 N % 
Sex   
  Male 748 45 
  Female 934 55 
Age   
  60-74 1082 64 
  75+ 600 36 
Living situation   
  Couple 1086 65 
  Single 596 35 
Total 1682 100 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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2. Labour market history: Occupational status 
To include information on the labour market history of the respondent, one summary 
variable is included: occupational status. This is based on the European Socio-economic 
Classification (ESeC) of occupations, that uses occupation to explain social stratification 
(Harrison & Rose, 2006). The ESeC takes account of: 
 the individuals’ former employment position (whether one was an employee, an 
employer, self-employed, or not involved in the labour market); 
 for employers: the number of people employed; 
 for employees: the type of contract (labour contract versus service relationship). 
The ESeC is divided in ten categories (see Table A7.2). For those not in paid employment, 
like retirees, reference is made to the last main paid job for their classification in the ESeC. 
Table A7.2. The European Socio-economic classification of occupations 
 European Socio-economic classification of occupations - Classes 
1. Large employers, higher grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations 
2. Lower grade professional, administrative and managerial occupations and higher grade 
technician and supervisory occupations 
3. Intermediate occupations 
4. Small employer and self-employed occupations (excluding agriculture etc.)  
5. Self-employed occupations (agriculture etc.) 
6. Lower supervisory and lower technician occupations 
7. Lower services, sales and clerical occupations 
8. Lower technical occupations 
9. Routine occupations 
10. Never worked and long-term unemployed 
Source: Harrison & Rose (2006) 
For the construction of occupational status, information is needed on one’s (former) 
occupation, (former) employment status and (former) organisation size: 
 occupations are coded to the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-1988) (ILO Bureau of Statistics, 2004); 
 employment status distinguishes employees, employers, the self-employed, 
managers, and supervisors; and 
 the size of the organisation is used to distinguish large and small employers, and 
higher and lower managers. 
Since the majority of the research population is no longer in employment, occupational 
status refers to the last job. For the small group still in active employment, information on 
the current job was used, based on the assumption that they are working in a similar 
occupation as during their active labour market career. Respondents that are permanently 
disabled or sick, and homemakers are considered as a separated category (i.e. never 
worked or long-term unemployed).  
Before assessing the occupational status, the current job situation is determined. We 
distinguish retired elderly (with a labour market history), elderly still in employment and 
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elderly who have never worked. This is based on the following questions in the SHARE 
module on employment and pensions: 
ep005 Please look at card 20. In general, which of the following best describes your current 
employment situation? (one answer) 
1. Retired 
2. Employed or self-employed (including working for family business) 
3. Unemployed and looking for work 
4. Permanently sick or disabled 
5. Homemaker 
97. Other (Rentier, living off own property, student, doing voluntary work) 
 
ep002 Did you do any paid work during the last four weeks, either as an employee or self-
employed, even when this was only for a few hours? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
ep006 Did you ever do any paid work? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
The actual construction of occupation status is based on the instructions from the ESeC 
user guide and has three steps (Harrison & Rose, 2006). In the first step, employment 
status and organization size is determined from the following questions in the SHARE 
module on employment and pensions: 
ep051 We are now going to talk about the last job you had. In this job, were you an employee or 
self-employed? 
1. Employee 
2. Civil servant 
3. Self-employed 
 
ep057 In this job, did you have any responsibility for supervising the work of other employees? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
 
ep058 About how many people were you responsible for? 
1. 1 to 5 
2. 6 to 15 
3. 16 to 24 
4. 25 to 199 
5. 200 to 499 
6. 500 or more 
Employment status thus differentiates: 
 employers in large organisations (more than 15 employees); 
 employers in small organisations (less than 15 employees); 
 the self-employed without employees; 
 supervisors (employees or civil servants); and 
 other employees or civil servants. 
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Afterwards, employment status is combined with information on the job description, as 
asked in the following question: 
ep052 What describes best this job? 
1. Legislator, senior official or manager 
2. Professional 
3. Technician or associate professional 
4. Clerk 
5. Service worker and shop and market sales worker 
6. Skilled agricultural or fishery worker 
7. Craft and related trades worker 
8. Plant and machine operator or assembler 
9. Elementary occupation 
10. Armed forces 
The result is a categorical variable with ten categories, similar to the categories in Table 
A7.2. We remodelled the variable to a four-category-variable to ease the analyses (see 
Table A7.3). Table A7.4 gives the weighted distribution of the research population by 
occupational status. For 66 respondents (4%) of the weighted sample occupational status 
is missing. 
Table A7.3. Occupational status 
 ESeC Class Occupational status  
1. Large employers, higher grade professional, 
administrative and managerial occupations 
 1. Salariat 
2. Lower grade professional, administrative 
and managerial occupations and higher 
grade technician and supervisory 
occupations 
3. Intermediate occupations 
 2. Intermediate occupations 
4. Small employer and self-employed 
occupations (excluding agriculture etc.)  
5. Self-employed occupations (agriculture etc.) 
6. Lower supervisory and lower technician 
occupations 
7. Lower services, sales and clerical 
occupations 
 3. Working class 
8. Lower technical occupations 
9. Routine occupations 
10. Never worked and long-term unemployed  4. Never worked and long-term 
unemployed 
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Table A7.4. Distribution of the research population by occupational status (2007, 
weighted) 
Occupational status N % 
Salariat 562 35 
Intermediate occupations 391 24 
Working class 475 29 
No occupation 186 12 
Total 1616 100 
N missing 66  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
3. Socioeconomic status: Level of education 
We include the level of education as an indicator of socioeconomic status. Higher levels of 
education are associated more strongly with a higher socioeconomic status, while lower 
levels of education correlate with a lower socioeconomic status. Level of education is 
based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), an 
internationally approved classification of education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
1997): 
 pre-primary education; 
 primary education; 
 lower secondary education; 
 upper secondary education; 
 post-secondary, non-tertiary education;  
 first stage of tertiary education; and 
 second stage of tertiary education. 
The following questions in the module on demographics were used to construct this 
variable: 
dn010 What is the highest school leaving certificate or school degree that you have obtained, not 
taken account of any higher education?  
1. Elementary school 
2. Lower secondary school – General  
3. Lower secondary school – Arts 
4. Lower secondary school – Technical education 
5. Lower secondary school – Professional education 
6. Higher secondary school – General 
7. Higher secondary school – Arts 
8. Higher secondary school – Technical education 
9. Higher secondary school – Professional education 
95. No degree yet/still in school 
96. None 
97. Other type (also abroad) 
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dn012 Which degrees of higher education do you have? 
1. Higher college education, short type 
2. Higher college education, long type 
3. University 
4. Still in higher education or vocational training 
96. None 
97. Other (also abroad) 
 
dn041 How many years have you been in full time education? 
(numerical value) 
This ISCED variable was further simplified into a three-category-variable: low (no or 
primary education), intermediate (lower secondary and upper secondary education), and 
high level of education (tertiary education). Table A7.5 gives the weighted distribution of 
the research population by their highest level of education according to the ISCED. The 
level of education is missing for 15 respondents in the weighted sample (1%). 
Table A7.5. Distribution of the research population by level of education (weighted, 
2007) 
Level of education N % 
High level  359 22 
Intermediate level 770 46 
Low level 537 22 
Total 1667 100 
N missing 15  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
4. Health status and functional level 
Different strategies, varying in complexity and detail, exist to assess health status (e.g. 
Atella, Brunetti, & Maestas, 2012; Berkman & Gurland, 1998; Larsson, Thorslund, & 
Kareholt, 2006; Rogers & Saint Onge, 2007; Sprangers et al., 2000). Account can be given 
to both the existence and the intensity of health and functional problems, and to the 
objective and subjective health status. Subjective health status refers to the individual’s 
evaluation of his/her health status, while objective health status refers to health related 
conditions, symptoms and diseases as diagnosed by a physician, though reported by the 
individual. In the SHARE, four measures of health and functional status are included 
(Mackenbach, Avendano, Andersen-Ranberg, & Aro, 2005): 
 summary measures; 
 measures of diseases and health symptoms; 
 measures of limitations in functioning; and 
 measures of limitations in activities of daily living. 
First, the summary measures give insights in the more general health status, with 
questions like “Do you have any long-term health problems, illness, disability or 
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infirmity?” and “To what extent have you been limited in your activities due to health 
related problems?”. Secondly, the questions on diseases and health symptoms refer to 
different health related problems like high blood pressure, cancer, and diabetes. Attention 
is also paid to other conditions like back pains, fatigue, dizziness, etc. Thirdly, measures of 
limitations in functioning include having difficulties with everyday activities like walking, 
climbing stairs and carrying weights. Lastly, the SHARE also registers problems with 
activities of daily living (ADL and IADL) due to health, memory or mental problems. This 
includes for example problems with getting dressed, washing, eating, cooking, doing 
administration, etc. 
A first indicator of health status that we use refers to the subjective evaluation of the 
health status. This is based on the following question in the module on physical health: 
ph003 Would you say your health is...  
1. Excellent 
2. Very good 
3. Good 
4. Fair 
5. Poor 
To ease the analyses, the subjective health status variable is dichotomised in that “0” 
indicates a fair to excellent health status, while “1” refers to a poor self-perceived health.  
The second and third indicator refer to health conditions and health problems: having two 
or more health related problems (multimorbidity), and having multiple health related 
symptoms (two or more). Ideally, account should be given to the differential impact of 
different conditions on the health status and the quality of life, because not all conditions 
are associated with similar degrees of severity and disability. However, no such 
information is included in the SHARE.159 The following questions from the module on 
physical health are used: 
  
 
                                                             
159 For more information on this alternative strategy, see Sprangers et al. (2000). 
354 
ph006 Has a doctor ever told you that you had any of the conditions on this card? Please tell me 
the number or numbers of the conditions. (multiple answers possible) 
1. A heart attack including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis or any other heart 
problem including congestive heart failure 
2. High blood pressure or hypotension 
3. High blood cholesterol 
4. A stroke or cerebral vascular disease 
5. Diabetes or high blood sugar 
6. Chronic lung disease such as a chronic bronchitis or emphysema 
7. Asthma 
8. Arthritis, including osteoarthritis, or rheumatism 
9. Osteoporosis 
10. Cancer or malignant tumour, including leukaemia or lymphoma, but excluding minor skin 
cancers 
11. Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer 
12. Parkinson disease 
13. Cataract 
14. Hip fracture or fomoral fracture 
15. Other fractures 
16. Alzheimer’s’ disease, dementia, organic brain syndrome, senility or any other serious 
memory impairment 
17. Benign tumour 
18. None 
97. Other conditions 
 
ph010 Please look at card 9. For the past six months at least, have you been bothered by any of 
the health conditions on this card? Please tell me the number or numbers. (multiple answers 
possible) 
1. Pain in your back, knees, hips or any other joint  
2. Heart trouble or angina, chest pain during exercise 
3. Breathlessness, difficulty breathing  
4. Persistent cough  
5. Swollen legs 
6. Sleeping problems  
7. Falling down  
8. Fear of falling down  
9. Dizziness, faints or blackouts  
10. Stomach or intestine problems, including constipation, air, diarrhoea  
11. Incontinence or involuntary loss of urine  
12. Fatigue  
96. None  
97. Other symptoms, not yet mentioned 
The fourth and fifth indicator refer to the having two or more limitations in resp. the ADL 
and IADL. The following two questions in the SHARE module on physical health are used 
for this, where the first six items refer to problems with ADL (from dressing to using the 
toilet), while the following items refer to problems with IADL (from using a map to 
managing money): 
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ph049 Please look at card 12. Here are a few more everyday activities. Please tell me if you have 
any difficulty with these because of a physical, mental, emotional or memory problem. Again 
exclude any difficulties you expect to last less than three months. (multiple answers possible) 
1. Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks  
2. Walking across a room  
3. Bathing or showering  
4. Eating, such as cutting up your food  
5. Getting in or out of bed  
6. Using the toilet, including getting up or down  
7. Using a map to figure out how to get around in a strange place  
8. Preparing a hot meal  
9. Shopping for groceries  
10. Making telephone calls  
11. Taking medications  
12. Doing work around the house or garden  
13. Managing money, such as paying bills and keeping track of expenses  
Table A7.6 gives the weighted distribution of the research population by the different 
indicators of health status and functional level. Information on ADL and IADL is missing 
for one respondent. 
Table A7.6. Distribution of the research population by health status and functional 
level (weighted, 2007) 
 N % 
Subjective health status   
  Fair to excellent 1539 91 
  Poor 143 9 
Multimorbidity   
  Less than two health problems 836 50 
  Two or more health problems 846 50 
Multi health symptoms   
  Less than two health symptoms 854 51 
  Two or more health symptoms 828 49 
Multi ADL limitations   
  Less than two ADL limitations 1545 92 
  Two or more ADL limitations 136 8 
  N missing 1  
Multi IADL limitations   
  Less than two IADL limitations 1474 88 
  Two or more IADL limitations 207 12 
  N missing 1  
Total 1682  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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APPENDIX 8. ANALYSIS OF DELETED OBSERVATIONS WITH 
MISSING INFORMATION 
Observations are deleted from the models when there is incomplete information on the 
independent and the dependent variables in the models. To assess the potential bias 
resulting from deleting respondents with missing observations from the different models, 
in this appendix we compare the observations that are deleted from the model and the 
observations that are kept into the model. Further, we reflect on the deviation between the 
observations that are kept into the models and the total population.  
1. Analysis of deleted observations in the models on the old age 
income package 
In chapter 8, six regression models, testing different aspects of the old age income 
package, are presented: 
 Type of model Dependent variable 
Model 1 Multinomial logit model Personal income package composition 
Model 2 Robust multivariate regression model Level of personal income package 
Model 3 Binomial logit model Financial asset ownership 
Model 4 Binomial logit model Property ownership 
Model 5 Robust multivariate regression model Level of direct asset contribution  
Model 6 Robust multivariate regression model Level of simulated asset contribution 
In all models, sociodemographic and socioeconomic background determinants are 
included as controlling (independent) variables. Respondents with missing information on 
one of the background variables are deleted. Further, in models 2 to 6 also income package 
variables are included as independent variables. Consequently, respondents with missing 
information on the income package variables are deleted from the models. 
In the following tables, we compare the deleted observations, the observations that are 
kept into the models, and the total sample. The difference in percentage points between 
the observations in the model and the complete population is shown in the last column 
(∆).  
The differences between the respondents in the models and the overall sample are 
relatively small. However, we do see that women are overrepresented in the group of 
respondents with missing information. This is explained by the fact that women are 
overrepresented among the respondents with missing information on their occupational 
status. The same holds for the respondents aged 75 years and over. This group is also 
overrepresented among the deleted observations, because they are overrepresented 
among the respondents with missing information on their occupational status. Lastly, we 
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also see a slightly stronger prevalence of respondents with only a third pillar pension or 
without personal income sources in the group of deleted respondents. Again, this is 
related to the overrepresentation of women in the group of deleted respondents: women 
significantly have more access to this type of personal income packages (only P3 or no 
personal income) (cf. supra). 
Table A8.1 Deleted observations in model 1 with the personal income package 
composition as the dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 23 27 676 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 62 73 931 58 993 59 1 
Age        
  60-74 36 42 1006 63 1042 62 -1 
  75+ 49 58 601 37 650 38 1 
Occupational status        
  Salariat 6 7 537 33 543 32 -1 
  Intermediate 5 6 392 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 3 4 479 30 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 1 1 199 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 82 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education        
  High 8 9 338 21 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 41 48 735 46 776 46 0 
  Low 20 24 534 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 19 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation        
  Couple 44 52 1036 64 1080 64 -1 
  Single 41 48 571 36 612 36 1 
Region of residence        
  Flanders 28 33 1040 65 1068 63 -2 
  Wallonia 44 52 514 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 13 15 53 3 66 4 1 
Personal income package        
  P1 27 32 542 34 569 34 0 
  P2+P1 7 8 142 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 17 20 460 29 477 28 0 
  SS+other 5 6 111 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 1 1 84 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 3 4 104 6 107 6 0 
  None 19 22 164 10 183 11 1 
  Missing 6 7 0 0 6 0 0 
Total 85 100  1607 100  1692 100    
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A8.2 Deleted observations in model 2 with the level of the personal income 
package as the dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 43 33 656 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 87 67 906 58 993 59 1 
Age           
  60-74 59 45 983 63 1042 62 -1 
  75+ 71 55 579 37 650 38 1 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 21 16 522 33 543 32 -1 
  Intermediate 15 12 382 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 17 13 465 30 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 7 5 193 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 54 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education          
  High 16 12 330 21 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 60 46 716 46 776 46 0 
  Low 38 29 516 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 12 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation          
  Couple 76 58 1004 64 1080 64 0 
  Single 54 42 558 36 612 36 0 
Region of residence         
  Flanders 65 50 1003 64 1068 63 -1 
  Wallonia 52 40 506 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 13 10 53 3 66 4 1 
Personal income package          
  P1 48 37 521 33 569 34 0 
  P2+P1 9 7 140 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 30 23 447 29 477 28 0 
  SS+other 8 6 108 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 5 4 80 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 3 2 104 7 107 6 0 
  None 21 16 162 10 183 11 0 
  Missing 6 5 0 0 6 0 0 
Level of personal income          
  Not missing 52 40  1562 100  1640 97   3 
  Missing 78 60 0  0  78  3 -3  
Total 130 100 1562 100 1692 100  
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A8.3 Deleted observations in model 3 with financial asset ownership as the 
dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 56 35 643 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 106 65 887 58 993 59 1 
Age          
  60-74 76 47 966 63 1042 62 -2 
  75+ 86 53 564 37 650 38 2 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 29 18 514 34 543 32 -2 
  Intermediate 25 15 372 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 27 17 455 30 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 11 7 189 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 43 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education          
  High 20 12 326 21 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 75 46 701 46 776 46 0 
  Low 51 31 503 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 10 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation          
  Couple 98 60 982 64 1080 64 0 
  Single 64 40 548 36 612 36 0 
Region of residence          
  Flanders 87 54 981 64 1068 63 -1 
  Wallonia 62 38 496 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 13 8 53 3 66 4 0 
Personal income package          
  P1 60 37 509 33 569 34 0 
  P2+P1 10 6 139 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 38 23 439 29 477 28 -1 
  SS+other 10 6 106 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 7 4 78 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 5 3 102 7 107 6 0 
  None 26 16 157 10 183 11 1 
  Missing 6 4 0 0 6 0 0 
Level of personal income          
  Not missing 110  68 1530 100   1640 97   3 
  Missing 52  32 0  0  52  3 -3  
Financial asset ownership        
  No 5 3 46 3 51 3 0 
  Yes 119 73 1484 97 1603 95 -2 
  Missing 38 23 0 0 38 2 2 
Total 162 100  1530 100  1692 100  
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A8.4 Deleted observations in model 4 with property asset ownership as the 
dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 56 35 643 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 106 65 887 58 993 59 1 
Age          
  60-74 76 47 966 63 1042 62 -2 
  75+ 86 53 564 37 650 38 2 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 29 18 514 34 543 32 -2 
  Intermediate 25 15 372 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 27 17 455 30 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 11 7 189 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 43 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education          
  High 20 12 326 21 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 75 46 701 46 776 46 0 
  Low 51 31 503 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 10 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation          
  Couple 98 60 982 64 1080 64 0 
  Single 64 40 548 36 612 36 0 
Region of residence          
  Flanders 87 54 981 64 1068 63 -1 
  Wallonia 62 38 496 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 13 8 53 3 66 4 0 
Personal income package          
  P1 60 37 509 33 569 34 0 
  P2+P1 10 6 139 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 38 23 439 29 477 28 -1 
  SS+other 10 6 106 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 7 4 78 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 5 3 102 7 107 6 0 
  None 26 16 157 10 183 11 1 
  Missing 6 4 0 0 6 0 0 
Level of personal income          
  Not missing 110  68 1530 100   1640 97   3 
  Missing 52  32 0  0  52  3 -3  
Property asset ownership        
  No 29 18 284 19 313 18 0 
  Yes 95 59 1246 81 1341 79 -2 
  Missing 38 23 0 0 38 2 2 
Total 162 100  1530 100  1692 100  
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A8.5 Deleted observations in model 5 with level of the direct asset 
contribution as the dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 82 35 617 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 154 65 839 58 993 59 1 
Age          
  60-74 102 43 940 65 1042 62 -3 
  75+ 134 57 516 35 650 38 3 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 46 19 497 34 543 32 -2 
  Intermediate 40 17 357 25 397 23 -1 
  Working class 62 26 420 29 482 28 0 
  No occupation 18 8 182 13 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 30 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education          
  High 29 12 317 22 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 106 45 670 46 776 46 0 
  Low 85 36 469 32 554 33 1 
  Missing 16 7 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation          
  Couple 116 49 964 66 1080 64 -2 
  Single 120 51 492 34 612 36 2 
Region of residence          
  Flanders 126 53 942 65 1068 63 -2 
  Wallonia 94 40 464 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 16 7 50 3 66 4 0 
Personal income package          
  P1 105 44 464 32 569 34 2 
  P2+P1 13 6 136 9 149 9 -1 
  P1+P3 46 19 431 30 477 28 -1 
  SS+other 19 8 97 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 12 5 73 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 6 3 101 7 107 6 -1 
  None 29 12 154 11 183 11 0 
  Missing 6 3 0 0 6 0 0 
Level of personal income          
  Not missing 184 78 1456 100 1640 97 -3 
  Missing 52 22 0 0 52 3 3 
Level of direct contribution                
  Not missing 116 49 1456 100 1572 93 -7 
  Missing (no ownership)* 87 37 0 0 87 5 5 
  Missing (with ownership) 33 14 0 0 33 2 2 
Total 236 100 1456 100 1692 100  
* Respondents without financial asset ownership and without secondary residence ownership do not have direct 
revenues from assets. Consequently, they have a missing value from this variable. 
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A8.6 Deleted observations in model 6 with level of the simulated asset 
contribution as the dependent variable 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 63 34 636 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 121 66 872 58 993 59 1 
Age          
  60-74 89 48 953 63 1042 62 -2 
  75+ 95 52 555 37 650 38 2 
Occupational status          
  Salariat 31 17 512 34 543 32 -2 
  Intermediate 33 18 364 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 38 21 444 29 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 12 7 188 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 38 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education          
  High 21 11 325 22 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 86 47 690 46 776 46 0 
  Low 61 33 493 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 9 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation          
  Couple 102 55 978 65 1080 64 -1 
  Single 82 45 530 35 612 36 1 
Region of residence          
  Flanders 101 55 967 64 1068 63 -1 
  Wallonia 70 38 488 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 13 7 53 4 66 4 0 
Personal income package          
  P1 69 38 500 33 569 34 0 
  P2+P1 10 5 139 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 39 21 438 29 477 28 -1 
  SS+other 16 9 100 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 10 5 75 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 5 3 102 7 107 6 0 
  None 29 16 154 10 183 11 1 
  Missing 6 3 0 0 6 0 0 
Level of personal income          
  Not missing 132 72 1508 100 1640 97   
  Missing 52 28 0 0 52 3   
Level of simulated contribution               
  Not missing 122 66 1508 100 1630 96   
  Missing  62 34 0 0 62 4  
Total 184 100 1508 100 1692 100  
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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2. Analysis of deleted observations in the models on the old age 
health and social care package 
In chapter 10, different models testing diverse aspects of the old age health and social care 
package are presented: 
 Type of model Dependent variable 
Model 7-8 Multinomial logit model Care package 
Model 9-10 Binomial logit model Second-line health care 
Model 11-12 Multinomial logit model Type of social care 
Model 13-14 Multinomial logit model Intensity health care contacts 
Model 15-16 Robust multivariate regression model Intensity formal social care 
In all models, sociodemographic and socioeconomic background determinants are 
included as controlling (independent) variables. Respondents with missing information on 
one of the background variables are deleted. In addition, respondents with missing 
information on one of the income variables are deleted. Lastly, respondents are also 
deleted when we do not have information on the use of health and social care services. 
In the following table, we compare the deleted observations, the observations that are 
kept into the models, and the total sample. The difference in percentage points (∆) 
between the observations in the model and the complete sample is shown in the last 
column. 
Again we see an overrepresentation of women and the oldest old among the deleted 
respondents (cf. supra), which stems from the overrepresentation of both groups among 
the observations without information on their occupational status. In addition, elderly 
with more complex care packages show to be slightly overrepresented among the deleted 
observations. For example, 12% of the deleted respondents has a mixed care package, 
compared to 9% of the observations in the model.   
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Table A8.7 Deleted observations in the models with health and social care services 
as the dependent variables 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Sex        
  Male 70 35 629 42 699 41 -1 
  Female 130 65 863 58 993 59 1 
Age        
  60-74 86 43 956 64 1042 62 -2 
  75+ 114 57 536 36 650 38 2 
Occupational status        
  Salariat 46 23 497 33 543 32 -1 
  Intermediate 32 16 365 24 397 23 -1 
  Working class 38 19 444 30 482 28 -1 
  No occupation 14 7 186 12 200 12 -1 
  Missing 70 35 0 0 70 4 4 
Level of education        
  High 28 14 318 21 346 20 -1 
  Intermediate 91 46 685 46 776 46 0 
  Low 65 33 489 33 554 33 0 
  Missing 16 8 0 0 16 1 1 
Living situation        
  Couple 105 53 975 65 1080 64 -2 
  Single 95 48 517 35 612 36 2 
Region of residence        
  Flanders 109 55 959 64 1068 63 -1 
  Wallonia 75 38 483 32 558 33 1 
  Brussels 16 8 50 3 66 4 1 
Personal income package        
  P1 82 41 487 33 569 34 1 
  P2+P1 12 6 137 9 149 9 0 
  P1+P3 43 22 434 29 477 28 -1 
  SS+other 16 8 100 7 116 7 0 
  Wage+other 9 5 76 5 85 5 0 
  Only P3 6 3 101 7 107 6 0 
  None 26 13 157 11 183 11 0 
  Missing 6 3 0 0 6 0 0 
Financial asset ownership        
  No financial assets 10 5 41 3 51 3 0 
  Financial assets 152 76 1451 97 1603 95 -3 
  Missing 38 19 0 0 38 2 2 
Home ownership        
  No home ownership 36 18 298 20 334 20 0 
  Home ownershipt 126 63 1194 80 1320 78 -2 
  Missing 38 19 0 0 38 2 2 
Secondary residence        
  No secondary residence 136 68 1237 83 1373 81 -2 
  Secondary residence 26 13 255 17 281 17 0 
  Missing 38 19 0 0 38 2 2 
Level of personal income        
  Not missing 52 26 0 0 52 3 3 
  Missing 148 74 1492 100 1640 97 -3 
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Table A8.7 Deleted observations in the models with health and social care services 
as the dependent variables (continued) 
  
Deleted 
observations 
Observations in 
the model Total sample 
  N % N % N % ∆ 
Level of extended income        
  Not missing 118 59 0 0 118 7 7 
  Missing  82 41 1492 100 1574 93 -7 
Subjective health        
  Bad 175 88 1373 92 1548 91 -1 
  Fair to good 25 13 119 8 144 9 1 
Multimorbidity        
  Less than 2  89 45 737 49 826 49 -1 
  More than 2 111 56 755 51 866 51 1 
Multisymptoms        
  Less than 2  83 42 765 51 848 50 -1 
  More than 2 117 59 727 49 844 50 1 
Multi ADL limitations        
  Less than 2 166 83 1385 93 1551 92 -1 
  More than 2 33 17 107 7 140 8 1 
  Missing 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Multi IADL limitations        
  Less than 2 150 75 1322 89 1472 87 -2 
  More than 2 49 25 170 11 219 13 2 
  Missing 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Care package        
  Minor care package 38 19 440 29 478 28 -1 
  Second-line health care 30 15 346 23 376 22 -1 
  Hospital care 17 9 183 12 200 12 0 
  Informal home help 29 15 205 14 234 14 0 
  Formal home help 25 13 126 8 151 9 0 
  Informal personal care 5 3 64 4 69 4 0 
  Mixed care package 23 12 128 9 151 9 0 
  Missing 33 17 0 0 33 2 2 
Note: “∆” indicates the difference in percentage points between the population in the model and the overall population. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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APPENDIX 9. THE QUALITY OF THE CARE PACKAGE BY A NUMBER 
OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS 
In this appendix, we illustrate the quality of the care package by the main 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic background characteristics included in our research 
(i.e. sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation and region of 
residence). Tables A9.1 and A9.2 focus on the quality of the health care services, while 
Tables A9.3, A9.4 and A9.5 focus on the quality of the social care services received.  
Table A9.1. Relative distribution of the research population by the ratio of 
successful specialist contacts by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, 
living situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
% Never Sometimes 
Most of 
the time Always Mean 
Total 
(100%) 
Sex             
  Male 30 5 21 43 0.56 331 
  Female 30 15 31 25 0.47 454 
Age             
  60-74 36 8 23 32 0.48 489 
  75+ 20 15 32 33 0.56 296 
Occupational status             
  Salariat 32 8 21 39 0.53 284 
  Intermediate 32 10 25 33 0.51 181 
  Working class 28 14 30 28 0.49 199 
  None 28 12 34 27 0.49 89 
Level of education             
  High 28 9 24 39 0.55 182 
  Intermediate 34 9 26 30 0.48 366 
  Low 25 14 30 31 0.53 227 
Living situation             
  Couple 33 7 23 37 0.52 492 
  Single 25 17 32 26 0.49 293 
Region of residence       
  Flanders 34 10 22 34 0.50 442 
  Wallonia 25 11 34 30 0.53 306 
  Brussels 25 15 27 34 0.54 37 
Total 30 11 27 33 0.51 786 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A9.2. Relative distribution of the research population by the ratio of 
successful medication by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living 
situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
% Never Sometimes 
Most of 
the time Always Mean 
Total 
(100%) 
Sex             
  Male 15 3 25 57 0.73 467 
  Female 14 4 30 52 0.71 632 
Age             
  60-74 15 4 25 56 0.72 673 
  75+ 13 3 32 51 0.72 425 
Occupational status             
  Salariat 16 3 27 54 0.71 352 
  Intermediate 11 2 29 58 0.75 263 
  Working class 16 5 28 52 0.70 312 
  None 14 4 28 54 0.71 123 
Level of education             
  High 15 5 26 54 0.71 225 
  Intermediate 15 3 27 55 0.72 503 
  Low 13 4 31 52 0.71 360 
Living situation             
  Couple 14 3 26 58 0.73 697 
  Single 15 5 32 48 0.69 402 
Region of residence       
  Flanders 16 2 25 57 0.72 617 
  Wallonia 12 5 34 49 0.71 441 
  Brussels 19 5 21 55 0.69 39 
Total 14 4 28 54 0.72 1099 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A9.3. Relative distribution of the research population by the receipt of 
appropriate social care by type of care and by sex, age, occupational status, level of 
education, living situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
 
Personal care Home help 
%  Success 
No 
success 
Total 
(N=100%) Success 
No 
success 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Sex             
  Male 36 64 96 52 48 128 
  Female 37 63 182 72 28 245 
Age             
  60-74 26 74 121 52 48 153 
  75+ 45 55 157 74 26 221 
Occupational status             
  Salariat 37 63 68 48 52 98 
  Intermediate 30 70 64 74 26 74 
  Working class 39 61 88 70 30 124 
  None 39 61 42 66 34 57 
Level of education             
  High 45 55 39 48 52 62 
  Intermediate 33 67 112 62 38 142 
  Low 37 63 120 74 26 163 
Living situation             
  Couple 36 64 143 47 53 177 
  Single 38 62 135 82 18 196 
Region of residence             
  Flanders 42 58 135 68 32 186 
  Wallonia 32 68 135 62 38 176 
  Brussels 39 61 8 77 23 11 
Total 37 63 278 65 35 373 
Note: Only elderly with limitations in ADL, resp. IADL are included here. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A9.4. Relative distribution of the research population by the preferential care 
provider by sex, age, occupational status, level of education, living situation and 
region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
 
Personal care Home help 
%  Success 
No 
success 
Total 
(N=100%) Success 
No 
success 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Sex           
   Male 59 41 50 62 38 49 
  Female 71 29 87 66 34 85 
Age             
  60-74 66 34 62 63 37 63 
  75+ 66 34 75 67 33 71 
Occupational status             
  Salariat 67 33 44 68 32 31 
  Intermediate 68 32 32 62 38 39 
  Working class 61 39 34 57 43 46 
  None 69 31 22 75 25 14 
Level of education             
  High 63 37 26 62 38 25 
  Intermediate 61 39 59 67 33 56 
  Low 74 26 51 63 37 53 
Living situation             
  Couple 58 42 76 60 40 63 
  Single 76 24 61 68 32 71 
Region of residence       
  Flanders 68 32 77 68 32 80 
  Wallonia 64 36 58 58 42 52 
  Brussels 68 32 3 80 20 3 
Total 66 34 137 65 35 134 
Note: Only elderly with limitations in ADL, resp. IADL, that received the indicated type of care are included here. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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Table A9.5. Relative distribution of the research population by the patient 
satisfaction with the social care services received by sex, age, occupational status, 
level of education, living situation and region of residence (weighted, 2007) 
% Never Sometimes 
Most of the 
time Always 
Total 
(N=100%) 
Sex           
  Male 1 9 32 58 125 
  Female 1 5 32 62 249 
Age           
  60-74 0 9 32 59 142 
  75+ 2 6 32 61 231 
Occupational status           
  Salariat 1 6 25 69 93 
  Intermediate 1 11 30 58 83 
  Working class 2 5 40 54 117 
  None 0 7 23 71 59 
Level of education           
  High 2 7 24 66 54 
  Intermediate 1 7 33 59 148 
  Low 1 6 33 59 164 
Living situation           
  Couple 1 9 25 66 181 
  Single 2 5 38 55 192 
Region of residence      
  Flanders 0 6 22 71 192 
  Wallonia 2 8 41 49 172 
  Brussels 0 0 63 37 9 
Total 1 7 32 60 373 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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APPENDIX 10. DETAILED LOGIT MODELS EXPLAINING THE USE OF 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE SERVICES 
This appendix includes the detailed results of the logit models explaining different aspects 
of the use of health and social care services. The results of these models are discussed in 
chapter 10: 
 
Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
variables 
 
Table 
LM1A Care package  Personal income package Table A10.1 
  Personal income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.2 
LM1B Care package Extended income package Table A10.3 
  Extended income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.4 
LM2A Second-line health care Personal income package Table A10.5 
  Personal income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.5 
LM2B Second-line health care Extended income package Table A10.6 
  Extended income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.6 
LM3A Formal social care Personal income package Table A10.7 
  Personal income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.7 
LM3B Formal social care Extended income package Table A10.8 
  Extended income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.8 
LM4A Intensity health care use Personal income package Table A10.9 
  Personal income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.9 
LM4B Intensity health care use Extended income package Table A10.10 
  Extended income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.10 
LM5A Intensity social care use Personal income package Table A10.11 
  Personal income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.11 
LM5B Intensity social care use Extended income package Table A10.12 
  Extended income package + controlling 
variables 
Table A10.12 
 
 Table A10.1 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the personal 
income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM1A 
(only income) 
Second-line health 
care 
Hospital care Informal home 
help 
Formal home 
help 
Informal personal 
care 
Mixed care 
package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.2651 0.3756 1.2300 0.5309 0.8412 0.5830 0.3010 0.0155 0.4080 0.1438 0.6033 0.2130 
  P1+P3 1.1252 0.5444 1.2603 0.3335 0.9650 0.8675 0.6758 0.1291 0.5441 0.0914 0.6151 0.0733 
  SS+other 0.8570 0.6263 1.6231 0.1518 1.0482 0.8835 0.6057 0.2375 0.6870 0.4900 0.9617 0.9170 
  Wage+other 0.7157 0.2803 0.8674 0.7090 0.2029 0.0029 0.2417 0.0143 0.1767 0.0646 0.2848 0.0355 
  Only P3 1.1824 0.5539 0.5539 0.1773 0.2901 0.0046 0.3752 0.0329 0.6728 0.4650 0.3304 0.0236 
  None 0.9124 0.7396 1.4650 0.2148 0.2202 0.0003 0.3468 0.0126 1.0845 0.8514 0.5906 0.1433 
Personal income level (reference: <760) 
  760-999 0.8988 0.6480 0.8118 0.4666 0.7873 0.3802 0.9908 0.8981 2.0620 0.0948 1.0933 0.7541 
  1000-1189 1.0966 0.7199 1.2959 0.3820 0.8095 0.4785 1.1710 0.6523 1.2153 0.7188 1.0877 0.7937 
  1190-1571 1.3445 0.2278 1.1907 0.5604 0.9742 0.7845 0.7149 0.3671 2.4466 0.0582 1.0326 0.8284 
  >1572 1.8090 0.0133 1.2434 0.4588 0.6654 0.1725 1.0827 0.8139 1.7733 0.2662 0.4766 0.0833 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a minor care package. The global effect of the personal income package composition and the income level is statistically 
significant at an alpha-level of 0.05 (for income package composition: Wald Chi²=40.3694; p=0.0219; for income level: Wald Chi²=74.4486; p=0.0002). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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 Table A10.2 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the personal 
income package and the background variables as the independent variables (weighted, 2007) 
LM1A 
(complete) 
Second-line 
health care 
Hospital care Informal home 
help 
Formal home help Informal personal 
care 
Mixed care package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR P OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.2386 0.4500 1.2358 0.5531 1.4077 0.3281 0.6141 0.3767 0.6560 0.5280 1.2238 0.6601 
  P1+P3 1.0876 0.6856 1.3487 0.2463 1.4278 0.1381 1.3970 0.2706 0.8672 0.7259 1.0528 0.8715 
  SS+other 0.9112 0.7900 1.4902 0.2788 1.5177 0.2483 1.8187 0.2300 0.7652 0.6677 1.6194 0.2894 
  Wage+other 0.7803 0.4445 0.9322 0.8634 0.3459 0.0594 0.7577 0.6751 0.3733 0.3153 0.7822 0.7063 
  Only P3 1.2449 0.4726 0.6122 0.2954 0.6341 0.3343 1.4750 0.4628 1.0393 0.9516 1.0698 0.9041 
  None 0.8584 0.6155 1.7236 0.1273 0.3996 0.0467 1.1094 0.8371 1.4562 0.4973 1.4535 0.4079 
Personal income level (reference: <760) 
  760-999 0.8731 0.5750 0.5924 0.0858 0.5851 0.0724 0.8698 0.7032 1.2320 0.6635 0.8562 0.6647 
  1000-1189 0.9593 0.8760 0.9686 0.9087 0.6365 0.1633 1.0541 0.8785 0.8259 0.7458 0.8536 0.6921 
  1190-1571 1.2201 0.4359 0.9985 0.8482 0.9940 0.8191 0.9247 0.8498 1.9686 0.1864 1.1990 0.6483 
  >1572 1.5400 0.0923 1.1553 0.6510 1.0166 0.8975 2.1483 0.0683 2.0077 0.2198 0.7534 0.5554 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good 0.9269 0.8835 0.1880 0.0003 0.4720 0.1305 0.3784 0.0677 0.1440 0.0002 0.3143 0.0213 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two 0.7090 0.0349 0.4210 <0.0001 0.5159 0.0010 0.3248 <0.0001 0.5449 0.0619 0.4477 0.0023 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two 0.5525 0.0005 0.4260 <0.0001 0.3864 <0.0001 0.4822 0.0071 0.2178 <0.0001 0.3433 0.0001 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations) 
  Less than two 0.6612 0.5339 1.8528 0.4880 0.5355 0.3306 0.2412 0.0262 0.1774 0.0115 0.0933 <0.0001 
Multi IADL (reference: two or more IADL limitations) 
  Less than two 0.8015 0.6702 0.6283 0.3880 0.2871 0.0071 0.1549 0.0001 0.1535 0.0007 0.2179 0.0016 
Sex (reference: female) 
  Male 0.7802 0.1473 1.5059 0.0574 0.9383 0.7637 0.6642 0.1490 1.6084 0.1718 0.8773 0.6359 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74 1.1522 0.4463 1.0049 0.9816 0.6649 0.0535 0.1945 <0.0001 0.6054 0.1335 0.4701 0.0037 
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 Table A10.2 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the personal 
income package and the background variables as the independent variables (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM1A 
(complete) 
Second-line 
health care 
Hospital care Informal home 
help 
Formal home help Informal personal 
care 
Mixed care package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR P OR p 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
 Salariat 1.6186 0.1257 0.9955 0.9888 0.8764 0.7310 1.0620 0.8957 1.0633 0.9216 1.9533 0.1330 
 Intermediate 1.3810 0.2818 0.8601 0.6877 1.0883 0.8120 2.0652 0.0719 1.3547 0.5975 1.0816 0.8542 
- Working class 0.8479 0.5785 0.9864 0.9699 1.1174 0.7452 1.0567 0.8934 0.9794 0.9701 0.8761 0.7440 
Level of education (reference: low) 
 High 0.9803 0.9385 1.3497 0.3521 0.8212 0.5535 1.5743 0.2844 0.8173 0.7080 0.5453 0.1397 
 Intermediate 1.0443 0.8216 1.3621 0.1860 1.1102 0.6391 1.9663 0.0190 0.8943 0.7516 0.8324 0.5101 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple 0.9687 0.8649 0.8146 0.3638 0.3101 <0.0001 0.3230 <0.0001 2.3665 0.0437 0.3935 0.0006 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders 0.3177 0.0108 0.4923 0.1922 0.7800 0.6709 2.6047 0.3020 50926 0.9685 0.8673 0.8443 
  Wallonia 0.3688 0.0289 0.3599 0.0666 0.7196 0.5790 2.1229 0.4204 42533 0.9690 0.8483 0.8224 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a minor care package. The global effect of the personal income package composition and the income level is not significant at the 
0.05-level (for income package composition: Wald Chi²=25.7231; p=0.3707; for income level: Wald Chi²=36.5080; p=0.4455). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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 Table A10.3 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the extended 
income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM1B  
(only income) 
Second-line health 
care 
Hospital care Informal home help Formal home 
help 
Informal 
personal care 
Mixed care 
package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.1993 0.4997 1.2225 0.5487 0.8655 0.6515 0.3133 0.0203 0.4809 0.2378 0.6897 0.3671 
  P1+P3 1.1068 0.6057 1.2466 0.3624 0.9941 0.9744 0.6745 0.1304 0.6393 0.2218 0.6427 0.1075 
  SS+other 0.8418 0.5892 1.6114 0.1610 1.0236 0.9426 0.6083 0.2436 0.7582 0.6149 0.9672 0.9296 
  Wage+other 0.7100 0.2725 0.7989 0.5601 0.1986 0.0027 0.2389 0.0140 0.1716 0.0631 0.3024 0.0466 
  Only P3 1.1725 0.5758 0.5807 0.2148 0.3264 0.0103 0.4266 0.0641 0.8031 0.6881 0.3982 0.0609 
  None 0.9420 0.8282 1.6275 0.1131 0.2483 0.0010 0.4080 0.0347 1.2251 0.6409 0.6903 0.3074 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.3372 0.6011 2.2117 0.1614 1.9884 0.1954 0.8198 0.8089 6.4376 0.0011 1.3282 0.6640 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 0.9127 0.6508 0.9738 0.9108 1.4210 0.1000 1.1277 0.6514 1.4328 0.2687 1.8986 0.0072 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 0.9957 0.9801 1.0487 0.8360 1.0302 0.9013 1.3436 0.3383 1.7693 0.2117 1.3497 0.3525 
Total direct income level (reference: <837) 
  837-1066 1.0319 0.8250 1.1096 0.7261 0.9296 0.7910 1.2915 0.4525 1.7202 0.2053 1.4653 0.2608 
  1067-1092 1.2436 0.3791 1.4662 0.1861 1.0485 0.8250 1.3372 0.4055 1.8125 0.1773 1.0005 0.7591 
  1093-1759 2.0943 0.0025 1.2998 0.3974 0.9711 0.8806 1.1531 0.7004 1.9170 0.1696 1.3613 0.3664 
  >1760 2.0056 0.0050 1.9391 0.0282 1.0069 0.8728 1.5902 0.2020 1.9194 0.1979 0.7078 0.4165 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a minor care package. The global effect of the personal income package composition. financial asset ownership and the income 
level from the extended income package is significant at the 0.05-level (for income package composition: Wald Chi²=66.4817; p=0.0015; for financial asset ownership: Wald Chi²=13.5570; 
p=0.0350; for income level: Wald Chi²=38.3135; p=0.0345). The global effect of home ownership and secondary residence ownership is not significant at the 0.05-level (for home ownership: 
Wald Chi²=12.2203; p=0.0573; for secondary residence ownership: Wald Chi²=3.1679; p=0.7872). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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 Table A10.4 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the extended 
income package and the background variables as the main independent variables (weighted, 2007) 
LM1B 
(complete) 
Second-line health 
care 
Hospital care Informal home 
help 
Formal home help Informal personal 
care 
Mixed care 
package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.1870 0.5475 1.1958 0.6188 1.2772 0.4881 0.5473 0.2795 0.6854 0.5719 1.1622 0.7454 
  P1+P3 1.0786 0.7177 1.3417 0.2578 1.3970 0.1674 1.3748 0.2973 0.9020 0.8013 1.0103 0.9621 
  SS+other 0.9337 0.8382 1.4990 0.2752 1.4778 0.2813 1.8024 0.2403 0.7422 0.6449 1.6142 0.2941 
  Wage+other 0.8215 0.5465 0.9010 0.8016 0.3323 0.0523 0.7743 0.7025 0.3724 0.3189 0.8228 0.7654 
  Only P3 1.2877 0.4056 0.6462 0.3483 0.6551 0.3665 1.5024 0.4430 1.2709 0.7025 1.1017 0.8617 
  None 0.9185 0.7790 1.9570 0.0584 0.4428 0.0751 1.2780 0.6270 1.7630 0.3076 1.5700 0.3184 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.4120 0.5452 1.8863 0.3001 1.2244 0.7223 0.4230 0.3328 5.9993 0.0068 0.8340 0.8055 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 0.7055 0.1091 0.7361 0.2365 0.8333 0.4435 0.6225 0.1161 1.0992 0.7977 1.0005 0.9847 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 1.0567 0.7763 0.9073 0.6868 0.7563 0.2748 0.8875 0.7249 1.1940 0.7176 0.8000 0.5253 
Total direct income level (reference: <837) 
  837-1066 1.0012 0.8309 0.9864 0.8903 0.7412 0.3112 1.1897 0.6562 1.6600 0.2880 1.2362 0.5753 
  1067-1092 1.1350 0.6205 1.2940 0.3970 0.9959 0.7842 1.5815 0.2522 1.7660 0.2514 1.0512 0.7712 
  1093-1759 1.8800 0.0135 1.1995 0.5788 1.1513 0.6549 1.6979 0.2113 2.4036 0.0916 1.8350 0.1255 
  >1760 1.6900 0.0494 1.8026 0.0772 1.4617 0.2731 2.8857 0.0135 2.4505 0.1216 1.0607 0.8371 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good 0.9836 0.9744 0.2132 0.0007 0.5198 0.1855 0.3851 0.0708 0.1604 0.0005 0.3260 0.0253 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two 0.7145 0.0398 0.4162 <0.0001 0.5221 0.0012 0.3304 <0.0001 0.5545 0.0724 0.4509 0.0022 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two 0.5523 0.0005 0.4269 <0.0001 0.3838 <0.0001 0.4884 0.0086 0.2139 <0.0001 0.3431 00.0001 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations) 
  Less than two 0.6372 0.4961 1.8336 0.4949 0.5489 0.3461 0.2405 0.0253 0.1771 0.0111 0.0981 00.0001 
Multi IADL (reference: two or more IADL limitations) 
  Less than two 0.7846 0.6429 0.6095 0.3609 0.2737 0.0055 0.1428 <0.0001 0.1588 0.0010 0.2078 0.0012 
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 Table A10.4 Results of the multinomial logit model with composition of the care package as dependent variable and the extended 
income package and the background variables as the main independent variables (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM1B 
(complete) 
Second-line health 
care 
Hospital care Informal home 
help 
Formal home help Informal personal 
care 
Mixed care 
package 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p OR P OR p 
Sex (reference: female) 
  Male 0.7797 0.1469 1.5356 0.0467 0.9594 0.8451 0.6602 0.1425 1.6488 0.1568 0.8837 0.6561 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74 1.1154 0.5592 0.9653 0.8745 0.6470 0.0404 0.1877 <0.0001 0.6274 0.1693 0.4473 0.0021 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
 Salariat 1.7066 0.0911 1.0205 0.9585 0.9000 0.7847 1.0908 0.8502 1.1618 0.8112 1.9845 0.1262 
 Intermediate 1.4435 0.2240 0.9039 0.7876 1.1387 0.7164 2.1968 0.0528 1.4350 0.5362 1.1133 0.8031 
 Working class 0.8797 0.6686 0.9882 0.9738 1.1634 0.6601 1.1778 0.6938 0.9801 0.9713 0.9057 0.8088 
Level of education (reference: low) 
 High 0.9220 0.7561 1.2434 0.5055 0.7475 0.3883 1.3883 0.4469 0.8240 0.7259 0.5110 0.1083 
 Intermediate 0.9988 0.9879 1.3073 0.2544 1.0729 0.7536 1.8038 0.0428 0.8278 0.5973 0.8171 0.4713 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple 0.9256 0.6867 0.7715 0.2625 0.2895 <0.0001 0.2889 <0.0001 2.8733 0.0185 0.3794 0.0005 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders 
0.2720 0.0046 0.4278 0.1244 0.7575 0.6407 2.4866 0.3339 
48769.480
7 0.9680 0.8470 0.8218 
  Wallonia 
0.3232 0.0153 0.3144 0.0407 0.7150 0.5782 2.0546 0.4482 
40636.420
5 0.9685 0.8319 0.8047 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a minor care package. The global effect of financial asset ownership is significant at the 0.05-level (Wald Chi²=13.0729; 
p=0.0419). The global effect of the personal income package composition. home ownership. secondary residence ownership and the income level is not significant at the 0.05-level (for personal 
income package composition: Wald Chi²=36.9870; p=0.4239; for home ownership: Wald Chi²=5.8581; p=0.4393; for secondary residence: Wald Chi²=2.3467; p=0.8850; for income level: Wald 
Chi²=28.1515; p=0.2612). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.5 Results of the binomial logit model with the use of second-line health 
care as dependent variable and the personal income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM2A Second-line health care 
 Only income variables Complete model 
 OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.1193 0.5780 1.1949 0.4203 
  P1+P3 1.2696 0.0908 1.2880 0.1016 
  SS+other 1.2527 0.2986 1.2231 0.3943 
  Wage+other 0.7700 0.3088 0.8048 0.4309 
  Only P3 1.1534 0.5356 1.2722 0.3416 
  None 1.1486 0.4973 1.1289 0.6071 
Personal income level (reference: <760) 
  760-999 1.0434 0.8033 0.9213 0.6498 
  1000-1189 1.1557 0.4366 0.9870 0.9340 
  1190-1571 1.1696 0.3894 1.0489 0.8057 
  >1572 1.4178 0.0583 1.3423 0.1512 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good   0.6896 0.1081 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two   0.6192 0.0001 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two   0.4394 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male   0.9349 0.6107 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74   1.3058 0.0456 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat   1.1660 0.5101 
  Intermediate   1.1992 0.4080 
  Working class   0.8486 0.4385 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High   1.1451 0.4992 
  Intermediate   1.1105 0.4564 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple   0.9167 0.5218 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders   0.4033 0.0180 
  Wallonia   0.3362 0.0051 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having used second-line health care services during the last 
year. The global effect of the personal income package composition and the income level is not significant at the 0.05 
level. neither before nor after the inclusion of the background variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.6 Results of the binomial logit model with the use of second-line health 
care as dependent variable and the extended income package as the main 
independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM2B Second-line health care 
 Only income variables Complete model 
 OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1) 
  P2+P1 1.1154 0.5961 1.1810 0.4540 
  P1+P3 1.2636 0.1025 1.2796 0.1135 
  SS+other 1.2130 0.3771 1.1858 0.4734 
  Wage+other 0.7520 0.2709 0.8163 0.4614 
  Only P3 1.1984 0.4345 1.2940 0.3065 
  None 1.2063 0.3592 1.1686 0.5064 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 0.7396 0.3764 0.7023 0.3269 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.3770 0.0258 1.1346 0.4114 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 1.0317 0.8347 0.9761 0.8779 
Total direct income level (reference: <837) 
  837-1.066 1.1586 0.4109 1.0728 0.6992 
  1.067-1.092 1.1880 0.3335 1.0585 0.7630 
  1.093-1.759 1.5589 0.0141 1.4598 0.0498 
  >1.760 1.6597 0.0073 1.5037 0.0539 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good   0.6708 0.0863 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two   0.6242 0.0001 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two   0.4473 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male   0.9419 0.6508 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74   1.2990 0.0506 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat   1.1435 0.5668 
  Intermediate   1.1955 0.4174 
  Working class   0.8466 0.4346 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High   1.0871 0.6822 
  Intermediate   1.0805 0.5852 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple   0.9192 0.5416 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders   0.4061 0.0206 
  Wallonia   0.3447 0.0068 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having used second-line health care services during the last 
year. The global effect of the personal income package composition and the income level is not significant at the 0.05 
level. neither before nor after the inclusion of the background variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
  
Table A10.7 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as dependent variable and the personal 
income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM3A Only income variables Complete model 
 Only informal care Formal and informal care Only informal care Formal and informal care 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 1.7875 0.2541 1.1404 0.8201 2.0802 0.1810 1.7097 0.3952 
  P1+P3 1.0249 0.9317 0.6291 0.1555 1.1585 0.6342 0.8907 0.7492 
  SS+other 0.9517 0.9113 0.9084 0.8423 0.6392 0.3750 0.9397 0.9145 
  Wage+other 0.4810 0.2586 0.3953 0.2277 0.3591 0.1464 0.5251 0.4481 
  Only P3 0.5411 0.2657 0.3900 0.1171 0.4830 0.2315 0.7621 0.6913 
  None 0.5105 0.1644 0.5983 0.2999 0.4501 0.1362 0.8310 0.7506 
Personal income level (reference: <760)     
  760-999 1.1163 0.7810 1.2224 0.6214 0.8783 0.7549 1.2007 0.6825 
  1000-1189 0.5411 0.1450 0.4438 0.0702 0.5240 0.1478 0.4469 0.1050 
  1190-1571 0.6995 0.3819 0.3236 0.0174 0.7788 0.5676 0.4472 0.1216 
  >1572 0.7138 0.4459 0.4655 0.1184 0.9686 0.8451 0.8067 0.6993 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.5661 0.2195 0.4695 0.1162 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    1.4856 0.1570 1.1640 0.6448 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    0.9619 0.8924 0.9233 0.8166 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations) 
  Less than two    1.2250 0.3840 0.6223 0.0375 
Multi IADL limitations (reference: two or more IADL limitations) 
  Less than two    0.8602 0.4359 0.6016 0.0113 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    1.1335 0.6607 0.6858 0.2703 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    2.0514 0.0076 1.1584 0.6362 
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 Table A10.7 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as dependent variable and the personal 
income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM3A Only income variables Complete model 
 Only informal care Formal and informal care Only informal care Formal and informal care 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    0.4232 0.0697 0.9104 0.8581 
  Intermediate    0.5282 0.1474 0.7708 0.5914 
  Working class    1.1408 0.7698 1.0111 0.9782 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.6523 0.3264 0.6087 0.3143 
  Intermediate    0.6096 0.1091 0.5763 0.1137 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.7657 0.3343 0.5630 0.0768 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    1.0905 0.9087 5.5338 0.0962 
  Wallonia    0.7284 0.6796 3.0720 0.2796 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having received only formal care during the last year. In the model that includes only income variables. the global effect of the income 
level is significant at the 0.05 level (Wald Chi²=17.1516; p= 0.0309). but the global effect of the personal income package composition is not significant at this alpha-level (Wald Chi²=10.9091; 
p=0.5372). In the complete model. neither the global effect of the personal income package composition. nor the global effect of the generosity of the income package is significant at the 0.05-
level (for the income package composition: Wald Chi²=11.4419; p=0.1905 / for the income level: Wald Chi²=11.4108; p=0.1905). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.8 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as dependent variable and the extended 
income as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM3B Only income variables Complete model 
 Only informal care Formal and informal care Only informal care Formal and informal care 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 1.8390 0.2343 1.1572 0.8011 2.0854 0.1809 1.5536 0.4896 
  P1+P3 1.0527 0.8574 0.6127 0.1314 1.1907 0.5733 0.8555 0.6679 
  SS+other 0.9409 0.8918 0.8551 0.7469 0.5841 0.2890 0.8070 0.7085 
  Wage+other 0.4853 0.2696 0.4040 0.2425 0.3428 0.1304 0.4288 0.3207 
  Only P3 0.5238 0.2361 0.4087 0.1357 0.4301 0.1551 0.6822 0.5720 
  None 0.4750 0.1259 0.5634 0.2492 0.4272 0.1149 0.8419 0.7689 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.7740 0.4667 1.5221 0.6139 1.2221 0.8090 0.7307 0.7319 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 0.8321 0.4929 0.8315 0.5330 0.9333 0.8101 0.6757 0.2360 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 0.7723 0.4741 0.7873 0.5586 0.6257 0.2155 0.4479 0.0666 
Total direct income level (reference: <837)     
  837-1066 0.7328 0.4665 0.8615 0.7310 0.6220 0.2898 0.8236 0.6809 
  1067-1092 0.5344 0.1517 0.3264 0.0154 0.6038 0.2905 0.4135 0.0863 
  1093-1759 0.4120 0.0432 0.2986 0.0102 0.4624 0.0975 0.3998 0.0741 
  >1760 0.4993 0.1345 0.3221 0.0228 0.6674 0.4146 0.5255 0.2521 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.5679 0.2268 0.4126 0.0666 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    1.4542 0.1817 1.1268 0.7179 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    0.9586 0.8836 0.8730 0.6948 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations) 
  Less than two    1.5381 0.3576 0.4036 0.0479 
Multi IADL limitations (reference: two or more IADL limitations) 
  Less than two    0.7648 0.4942 0.3606 0.0117 
3
8
2
 
 Table A10.8 Results of the multinomial logit model with the use of social care services as dependent variable and the extended 
income as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM3B Only income variables Complete model 
 Only informal care Formal and informal care Only informal care Formal and informal care 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    1.1316 0.6647 0.7157 0.3252 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    2.0645 0.0071 1.1767 0.6000 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    0.4568 0.1014 1.0028 0.9563 
  Intermediate    0.5354 0.1608 0.7742 0.6014 
  Working class    1.1943 0.6946 1.1324 0.8027 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.6330 0.3030 0.5485 0.2367 
  Intermediate    0.6184 0.1230 0.5790 0.1199 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.7369 0.2770 0.4830 0.0266 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    1.1950 0.8129 4.9145 0.1200 
  Wallonia    0.7874 0.7542 2.5957 0.3551 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having received only formal care during the last year. The model that includes only income variables is not significant at the 0.05 level. In 
the complete model. none of the income variables is significant at the alpha-level of 0.05.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.9 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care services use as dependent variable and the 
personal income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM4A Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 0.6717 0.1025 0.3989 0.0008 0.9980 0.9885 0.7307 0.3189 
  P1+P3 0.7164 0.0487 0.4634 <0.0001 0.8729 0.4694 0.6532 0.0437 
  SS+other 0.7738 0.3220 0.5868 0.0468 0.9875 0.9653 0.6493 0.1923 
  Wage+other 0.5641 0.0740 0.1506 0.0002 0.8394 0.6117 0.2429 0.0095 
  Only P3 0.5722 0.0590 0.4175 0.0034 0.8167 0.5351 0.7830 0.4938 
  None 0.9963 0.9818 0.4720 0.0051 1.4608 0.1791 0.6627 0.2195 
Personal income level (reference: <760)     
  760-999 1.8524 0.0039 1.3813 0.1382 1.5602 0.0530 0.9978 0.8513 
  1000-1189 1.6879 0.0267 1.3941 0.1554 1.5269 0.0929 1.2523 0.3988 
  1190-1571 1.8683 0.0048 0.9035 0.6769 1.8736 0.0088 0.9804 0.8662 
  >1572 1.1496 0.5528 0.7094 0.1778 1.4307 0.1686 1.0525 0.7418 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.2114 <0.0001 0.0825 <0.0001 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    0.4364 <0.0001 0.3414 <0.0001 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    0.5701 0.0002 0.2960 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    0.8702 0.3884 1.3885 0.0831 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    0.5745 0.0005 0.5299 0.0003 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    1.6094 0.1027 0.6281 0.1386 
  Intermediate    1.4747 0.1595 0.7691 0.3634 
  Working class    1.4627 0.1562 0.7225 0.2452 
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 Table A10.9 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care services use as dependent variable and the 
personal income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM4A Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.5073 0.0072 0.5727 0.0541 
  Intermediate    1.0393 0.8232 0.8726 0.4776 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.8117 0.2036 0.7095 0.0679 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    1.5382 0.3096 4.3900 0.0289 
  Wallonia    2.1303 0.0770 4.7165 0.0227 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a low intensity of health care services use during the last year. In the model that includes only income variables. the income level 
and the income package composition are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (for the income package composition: Wald Chi²=40.7695; p<0.0001 / for the income level: Wald Chi²=25.4888; 
p=0.0015). In the complete model. neither the global effect of the personal income package composition. nor the global effect of the generosity of the income package is significant at the 0.05-
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.10 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care services use as dependent variable and the 
extended income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM4B Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 0.7223 0.1868 0.4691 0.0064 0.9957 0.9841 0.7578 0.3812 
  P1+P3 0.7514 0.0942 0.5033 0.0001 0.8793 0.4953 0.6739 0.0625 
  SS+other 0.8358 0.4907 0.6407 0.1001 1.0301 0.9188 0.6980 0.2794 
  Wage+other 0.5365 0.0531 0.1534 0.0003 0.7958 0.5101 0.2520 0.0118 
  Only P3 0.5913 0.0754 0.4952 0.0190 0.7834 0.4506 0.8257 0.5909 
  None 0.9888 0.9626 0.5203 0.0152 1.3885 0.2397 0.6775 0.2427 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 2.4039 0.0377 2.2089 0.0651 1.8131 0.1812 1.5650 0.3568 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.0559 0.7488 1.2258 0.2412 0.8107 0.2642 0.9028 0.6200 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 1.4455 0.0437 1.8659 0.0050 1.1820 0.3916 1.2351 0.3906 
Total direct income level (reference: <837)     
  837-1066 1.3951 0.1302 1.1617 0.5036 1.1983 0.4472 0.9392 0.7355 
  1067-1092 1.5896 0.0341 1.1750 0.4882 1.5010 0.0848 1.2205 0.4598 
  1093-1759 1.2765 0.2763 0.9341 0.7712 1.3817 0.1858 1.1724 0.5561 
  >1760 1.1413 0.5673 0.7453 0.2702 1.3250 0.2793 0.9791 0.6714 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.2116 <0.0001 0.0837 <0.0001 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    0.4346 <0.0001 0.3381 <0.0001 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    0.5560 0.0001 0.3002 <0.0001 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    0.8631 0.3610 1.3766 0.0909 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    0.5793 0.0006 0.5296 0.0004 
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 Table A10.10 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of health care services use as dependent variable and the 
extended income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM4B Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    1.6581 0.0835 0.6292 0.1405 
  Intermediate    1.4844 0.1534 0.7683 0.3624 
  Working class    1.5233 0.1189 0.6984 0.2019 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.5106 0.0087 0.5809 0.0636 
  Intermediate    1.0408 0.8177 0.8592 0.4320 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.8056 0.1946 0.6973 0.0567 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    1.4230 0.4103 4.1426 0.0384 
  Wallonia    1.9761 0.1145 4.3699 0.0323 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a low intensity of health care services use during the last year. In the model that is limited to the income variables. only the 
composition of the personal income package and secondary residence ownership are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the complete model. no income variables are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.11 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of formal care services use as dependent variable and the 
personal income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007)  
LM5A Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 0.8572 0.7820 0.0000 0.9905 1.6757 0.2426 4.3359 0.0370 
  P1+P3 0.7867 0.4965 0.8755 0.7874 1.1669 0.8165 0.6942 0.7328 
  SS+other 0.6300 0.3575 0.6172 0.5250 1.4470 0.7264 1.5054 0.8051 
  Wage+other 0.5850 0.5271 0.6577 0.7252 3.5722 0.0925 0.0000 0.9940 
  Only P3 1.0747 0.9067 0.0000 0.9911 5.8133 0.0109 5.0815 0.1502 
  None 1.2263 0.6990 0.7649 0.7321 0.4090 0.0815 0.8332 0.8086 
Personal income level (reference: <760)     
  760-999 0.9313 0.8658 1.1525 0.6674 1.3542 0.5930 1.5374 0.6539 
  1000-1189 0.9852 0.8440 0.6391 0.5598 1.4691 0.5161 1.2375 0.7364 
  1190-1571 0.6605 0.3997 0.3101 0.1515 2.9701 0.0937 8.2339 0.0742 
  >1572 0.9110 0.8447 0.9037 0.6899 0.5554 0.3995 0.0000 0.9923 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.7327 0.4130 0.5365 0.3492 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    1.1621 0.7066 0.6922 0.6609 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    1.2098 0.7106 0.2555 0.0443 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations)     
  Less than two    0.2341 0.0014 0.0805 0.0004 
Multi IADL limitations (reference: two or more IADL limitations)     
  Less than two    0.7593 0.4875 1.1280 0.8533 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    0.2968 0.0008 0.2100 0.0154 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    0.2968 0.0008 0.2100 0.0154 
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 Table A10.11 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of formal care services use as dependent variable and the 
personal income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM5A Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    1.5853 0.4589 0.2370 0.2097 
  Intermediate    3.2937 0.0396 2.9163 0.2071 
  Working class    1.6035 0.3995 1.0330 0.9669 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.5108 0.2481 1.8034 0.5222 
  Intermediate    1.0606 0.8803 0.5265 0.3270 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.3399 0.0050 0.2339 0.0260 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    1.1596 0.8936 11840779 0.9949 
  Wallonia    0.2975 0.2820 3628464 0.9952 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a low intensity of social care services use during the last year. None of the income variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2  
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Table A10.12 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of social care services use as dependent variable and the 
extended income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) 
LM5B Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR p OR p 
Personal income package (reference: P1)     
  P2+P1 0.8791 0.8189 0.0000 0.9902 0.5016 0.3368 0.0000 0.9921 
  P1+P3 0.7647 0.4416 0.8781 0.7939 1.6811 0.2419 5.8656 0.0168 
  SS+other 0.6678 0.4254 0.7011 0.6484 1.1809 0.8044 0.6263 0.6753 
  Wage+other 0.6531 0.6176 0.9254 0.8863 1.5367 0.6830 1.3467 0.8661 
  Only P3 1.1266 0.8463 0.0000 0.9907 2.3575 0.2462 0.0000 0.9936 
  None 1.1455 0.7984 0.6905 0.6478 4.8995 0.0225 4.6916 0.1972 
Financial asset ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 0.5491 0.4472 0.8734 0.8919 0.3337 0.2545 0.2750 0.3434 
Home ownership (reference: ownership) 
  None 1.0503 0.8768 1.0273 0.9377 0.8064 0.5882 0.5485 0.3458 
Secondary residence ownership (reference: ownership)  
  None 1.4212 0.4024 5.6724 0.1063 1.2444 0.6616 4.5985 0.2860 
Total direct income level (reference: <837)     
  837-1066 0.9086 0.7525 0.8382 0.6525 1.0624 0.7477 1.3266 0.5569 
  1067-1092 0.6696 0.4087 0.3322 0.2172 0.9304 0.7993 1.1666 0.5296 
  1093-1759 0.6884 0.4554 0.2178 0.0807 1.3069 0.6313 0.6560 0.7063 
  >1760 0.8968 0.8032 1.0574 0.7074 2.3881 0.1855 10.7999 0.0848 
Subjective health (reference: poor) 
  Fair to good    0.4306 0.1020 0.7498 0.7021 
Multimorbidity (reference: two or more health related problems) 
  Less than two    0.7176 0.3885 0.5283 0.3509 
Multisymptoms (reference: two or more health related symptoms) 
  Less than two    1.0665 0.8728 0.6333 0.5958 
Multi ADL limitations (reference: two or more ADL limitations)     
  Less than two    1.1920 0.7364 0.2631 0.0549 
Multi IADL limitations (reference: two or more IADL limitations)     
  Less than two    0.2164 0.0012 0.0656 0.0005 
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 Table A10.12 Results of the multinomial logit model with the intensity of social care services use as dependent variable and the 
extended income package as the main independent variable (weighted, 2007) (continued) 
LM5B Only income variables Complete model 
 Moderate High Moderate High 
 OR p OR p OR P OR p 
Sex (reference: female)  
  Male    0.7345 0.4403 1.1336 0.8524 
Age (reference: 75+) 
  60-74    0.2845 0.0006 0.1971 0.0170 
Occupational status (reference: no occupation) 
  Salariat    1.7572 0.3752 0.2132 0.2024 
  Intermediate    3.2598 0.0469 2.7121 0.2595 
  Working class    1.6055 0.3996 1.0580 0.8984 
Level of education (reference: low) 
  High    0.4750 0.2279 1.8974 0.5413 
  Intermediate    1.0818 0.8446 0.4950 0.3142 
Living situation (reference: single) 
  Couple    0.3732 0.0102 0.1947 0.0250 
Region (reference: Brussels) 
  Flanders    0.9975 0.9620 8885044 0.9947 
  Wallonia    0.2521 0.2327 2703614 0.9951 
Note: The reference category of the dependent variable is having a low intensity of social care services use during the last year. None of the income variables is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SHARE data wave 2 
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SUMMARY 
From the observation that population ageing goes together with an increasing importance 
of age specific social risks, like financial and (long-term) care dependency, this 
dissertation investigates how elderly protection themselves against the financial and 
physical dimensions of old age dependency. This PhD investigates the sources used by the 
Belgian elderly population to protect themselves against the financial and physical 
dimensions of old age dependency. Based on the packaging perspective, developed by 
Rainwater et al. (1986), the clustering of income and care sources into resp. income and 
care packages is investigated. Particular attention is paid to differences (inequalities) 
among the elderly population, and to the reproduction of inequalities from one package to 
another. To put it differently, we investigate whether inequalities in the old age income 
package are reflected in inequalities in the old age care package.  
To do so, data from the second wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE) are used. The research population is limited to individuals aged 60 and 
over living in private households in Belgium. A quantitative research design is set up to 
investigate the research questions that arose from the literature review including among 
other the main results from earlier research on the social protection of the elderly 
population. 
The research shows that there is a certain degree of commodification in the protection 
against the financial dimension of old age dependency. Elderly that combine different 
personal income sources more often have a more generous old age income package, and, 
in addition, elderly with a more generous personal income package overall also have a 
more generous asset package. Similar results were found for the direct contribution of the 
asset package, including the direct revenues from financial assets and secondary 
residence, and for the simulated contribution of the asset package, that includes simulated 
annuities based on the wealth accumulated in financial assets and secondary residence as 
well as a reverse mortgage on home ownership.  
However, when we consider the protection against the functional dimension of old age 
dependency (i.e. the health and social care package), we do not find evidence of such a 
commodification. On the contrary, the inequalities in the old age income package are not 
transposed to the old age care package. This decommodification of the old age care 
package is expected to stem from the broad and quite generous national health insurance 
scheme that has been installed in Belgium and that covers a wide range of health and 
social care services protecting the older population against the negative consequences of 
functional dependency in old age. 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Vertrekkende van de vaststelling dat de vergrijzing van de bevolking gepaard gaat met een 
toenemend belang van leeftijdsspecifieke sociale risico’s, zoals financiële en langdurige 
zorgafhankelijkheid, onderzoekt deze doctoraatsthesis hoe de oudere bevolking zichzelf 
beschermd tegen de gevolgen van deze leeftijdsafhankelijkheid. De verschillende bronnen 
die hiervoor gebruikt worden door de Belgische oudere bevolking, alsook de samenhang 
tussen deze bronnen, worden grondig onderzocht. De theoretische basis hiervoor ligt in de 
packaging benadering, die in de jaren 1980 ontwikkeld werd door Rainwater en zijn 
collega’s (1986). Bijzondere aandacht gaat uit naar de verschillen die bestaan tussen 
ouderen onderling, en hoe deze verschillen uitmonden in structurele ongelijkheden wat 
betreft de bescherming die men geniet tegen de financiële en fysieke dimensies van 
leeftijdsafhankelijkheid. De nadruk wordt hier gelegd op de accumulatie van 
ongelijkheden over de verschillende pakketten heen, of, met andere woorden, hoe 
ongelijkheden in het inkomenspakket worden gereflecteerd in ongelijkheden in het 
zorgpakket van de oudere in kwestie. 
Om de verschillende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden kozen we voor een 
kwantitatieve analyse van secundaire data. Gegevens van de tweede onderzoeksgolf van 
de Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) worden gebruikt. De 
onderzoekspopulatie heeft betrekking of personen van 60 jaar of ouder die deel uitmaken 
van private huishoudens in België.  
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat er een zekere vorm van commodificatie van de bescherming 
die de oudere bevolking geniet tegen de financiële dimensie van leeftijdsgerelateerde 
afhankelijkheid optreedt. Ouderen die verschillende inkomensbronnen combineren 
hebben doorgaans een meer genereus inkomenspakket, en bovendien hebben deze 
ouderen doorgaans ook een betere toegang tot vermogens (nl. financiële vermogen, 
huiseigenaarschap en eigenaarschap van huureigendommen). Dit geldt zowel voor de 
resultaten op basis van de directe opbrengst van vermogens (nl. interesten van financiële 
vermogens en huuropbrengsten van huureigendommen) als voor de resultaten op basis 
van de gesimuleerde opbrengst van vermogens (nl. gesimuleerde rente op basis van het 
financiële vermogen en de waarde van de huureigendommen, alsook een omgekeerde 
hypotheek op basis van de eigen woning). Echter, wanneer we de bescherming tegen de 
fysieke dimensie van leeftijdsgerelateerde afhankelijkheid onderzoeken, vinden we geen 
direct bewijs van een soortgelijke commodificatie. Integendeel, ongelijkheden in het 
inkomenspakket worden niet perse vertaald in ongelijkheden in het zorgpakket. Deze 
decommodificatie van het zorgpakket is waarschijnlijk het gevolg van de omvattende en 
genereuze gezondheidszorgverzekering die ontwikkeld is in België. Dit quasi-universeel 
systeem compenseert het gebruik van de meerderheid van de gezondheidszorg en de 
langdurige zorgvoorzieningen, en beschermt de oudere bevolking tegen de negatieve 
gevolgen van leeftijdsgerelateerde fysieke afhankelijkheid. 
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RESUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS 
La vieillissement du population augmente l’importance des risques relate au grand âge, 
comme la dépendance financier et physique. Le doctorat examine la protection de la 
population âgées contre les conséquences relate aux cette dépendance financier et 
physique. Fondé théorétique à l’approche packaging, formulé par Rainwater, Rein et 
Schwartz en 1986, la combinaison de sources différentes est considérée comme la solution 
pour combattre les conséquences négatives relatées au grand âge. Nous recherchons la 
combinaison des sources en “paquets” de revenues et de soins (income and care 
packages). L’objectif de notre étude consiste à analyser les différences entre les personnes 
âgées concernant les paquets de revenues et de soins. Aussi, nous souhaitons démontrer 
comment les différences dans les paquets de revenues et de soins influencent la protection 
contre la dépendance financier et physique de la population âgée. Nous recherchons si les 
inégalités dans les paquets de revenus sont transférées dans les paquets de soins. 
Les analyses quantitative sont basées sur les données de la Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), menée en 2006-2007. Les données concernent les 
revenues financières (par exemple les pensions de retraite et les pensions 
complémentaires), les économies, le logement, les soins de santé, et les soins de santé 
social. La population de recherché est limité aux personnes Belges de 60 ans et plus, qui 
habitent chez-soi.  
Notre étude révèle une commodification de la protection contre la dépendance financier de 
la population âgée. Les personnes âgées, qui combinent différentes revenues, ont un 
paquet des revenues plus généreuse, et, en plus, ce groupe a plus accès à des sources 
fortunes (comme la logement et les économies). Notre étude des paquets de soins, par 
contre, ne démontre pas une transmission des inégalités des paquets de revenues aux 
paquets de soins. Les différences entre les personnes âgées par rapport à leur protection 
par la dépendance physique ne sont pas relatées aux différences des paquets de revenus. 
Cette decommodification est le success de l’assurance maladie qui a été développé en 
Belgique pendant les derniers décennies. 
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